[Cite as State v. Thayer, 2012-Ohio-3301.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF MEDINA )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 11CA0045-M
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE JEFFREY G. THAYER MEDINA MUNICIPAL COURT COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO Appellant CASE No. 10 TRC 07725
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: July 23, 2012
MOORE, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Jeffrey G. Thayer (“Thayer”), appeals from the February 8,
2011 judgment entry of the Medina Municipal Court denying his motion to suppress. For the
following reasons, we affirm.
I.
{¶2} On November 19, 2010, while heading westbound on West Smith Road, Ohio
State Highway Patrol Trooper Daniel Jones (“Trooper Jones”) observed Thayer drive on the
double yellow line in the middle of the road. The tires of Thayer’s car did not extend beyond the
double yellow line, nor did the car cross over the double yellow line into any other lanes of
traffic. Trooper Jones followed him for approximately two miles while recording Thayer’s
driving with a video recording device in his patrol car. 2
{¶3} After some time, Thayer activated his right turn signal, decelerated, and turned
right onto Erhart Road. As he did so, Trooper Jones again observed him drive on the double
yellow line. At that time, Trooper Jones activated his lights and initiated a traffic stop.
{¶4} Upon approaching Thayer’s car, Trooper Jones noticed that he had “red and
glassy eyes,” and also “smelled a strong odor1 of alcoholic beverage coming from inside the
vehicle.” Trooper Jones asked him to step out of the car and determined that the odor was
coming from Thayer’s mouth. At that time, Trooper Jones asked Thayer to walk with him back
to the rear of the patrol car and inquired as to whether he had consumed any alcohol. Thayer
answered that he had four drinks the whole night.
{¶5} Subsequently, off camera, Trooper Jones administered the horizontal gaze
nystagmus (“HGN”) test, a standardized field sobriety test. During the HGN, Trooper Jones
observed six out of six clues, possibly indicating the percentage that Thayer could test over the
legal limit of alcohol in his blood. Trooper Jones then attempted to have Thayer perform the
walk and turn test and the one-legged stand test. However, due to Thayer’s spinal cord injury,
Trooper Jones did not administer these additional tests.
{¶6} At approximately 9:46 p.m., Trooper Jones placed Thayer under arrest and issued
him a citation for operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (“OVI”), in violation
of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), operating a vehicle with a prohibited breath alcohol content, in
violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(d), and driving left of center, in violation R.C. 4511.25.
1 We note, however, that in his police report, Trooper Jones indicated only a “mild” odor, while his testimony indicated a “strong” odor. 3
{¶7} The citation was filed in Medina Municipal Court on November 22, 2010. That
same day, Thayer entered a plea of not guilty to all charges. Further, Thayer, through counsel,
requested a trial by jury.
{¶8} Thayer filed a motion to suppress wherein he challenged the constitutionality of
the traffic stop. In his motion, he argued that (1) Trooper Jones did not have probable cause or a
reasonable, articulable suspicion to perform the traffic stop, (2) pursuant to R.C.
4511.19(D)(4)(b) and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) training
manual, Trooper Jones’ administration of the field sobriety test failed to substantially comply
with standardized testing procedures, and (3) Trooper Jones lacked probable cause to arrest him
for OVI.
{¶9} The trial court held a hearing on Thayer’s motion to suppress. At the hearing,
Trooper Jones testified on behalf of the State. Thayer did not call any witnesses to testify on his
behalf.
{¶10} On February 8, 2011, the trial court journalized a judgment entry denying
Thayer’s motion to suppress. In its judgment entry, the trial court found that “traveling on the
double yellow line establishes the potential traffic offense of failing to drive ‘upon the right half
of the roadway’ as required by R.C. 4511.25(A).” As a result, the trial court determined there
was reasonable and articulable suspicion to justify the initial detention of Thayer’s car. In
addition, the trial court found that Trooper Jones had conducted the HGN test in substantial
compliance with NHTSA standards, and under the totality of the circumstances, Trooper Jones
had probable cause to arrest Thayer for OVI.
{¶11} Thayer changed his plea to no contest as to OVI in violation of R.C.
4511.19(A)(1)(a), and the State dismissed the other charges. 4
{¶12} The trial court sentenced him to a fine, license suspension, limited driving
privileges with restrictive plates, and 180 days in jail, with 170 days suspended, and 10 days
mandatory jail time.
{¶13} Thayer filed a timely notice of appeal, setting forth three assignments of error for
our consideration. His sentence was stayed pending this appeal.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
WHEN THE STATE TROOPER DOES NOT CLAIM [THAYER’S] VEHICLE WENT LEFT OF CENTER BUT INSTEAD ONLY TRAVELED ONTO THE DOUBLE YELLOW LINE, AND THE TRIAL COURT FINDS THAT OPERATION “ESTABLISHES THE POTENTIAL TRAFFIC OFFENSE OF FAILING TO DRIVE ‘UPON THE RIGHT HALF OF THE ROADWAY’ AS REQUIRED BY [R.C. 4511.25(A)], DOES THE RESULTING TRAFFIC STOP VIOLATE [THAYER’S] CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST ILLEGAL SEIZURES?
{¶14} “An appellate court’s review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress
presents a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Campbell, 9th Dist. No. 05CA0032-M,
2005-Ohio-4361, ¶ 6. “The trial court acts as the trier of fact during a suppression hearing, and
is therefore best equipped to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and resolve questions of fact.”
Id. This Court will accept the factual findings of the trial court if they are supported by some
competent, credible evidence. See State v. Balog, 9th Dist. No. 08CA0001-M, 2008-Ohio-4292,
¶ 7, citing State v. Searls, 118 Ohio App.3d 739, 741 (5th Dist.1997). “However, the application
of the law to those facts will be reviewed de novo.” Id.
{¶15} In his first assignment of error, Thayer argues that the traffic stop amounted to an
unconstitutional seizure because (1) the evidence demonstrates that he drove lawfully on the
right half of the roadway, and (2) the trial court’s legal conclusion that a potential traffic
violation amounted to reasonable and articulable suspicion is contrary to law. In support of this 5
argument, Thayer contends that based upon Trooper Jones’ testimony, and pursuant to R.C.
4511.25, he did not commit a violation of the law because, although his tires touched the double
yellow line, the car never crossed the double yellow line. He further contends that he did not
commit a traffic violation, and, as such, Trooper Jones did not have reasonable and articulable
suspicion or probable cause to justify a traffic stop. Finally, Thayer contends that the facts in
this case distinguish it from our decision in Campbell.
{¶16} In response, the State argues that based upon the testimony of Trooper Jones,
there was reasonable and articulable suspicion to justify the stop because Trooper Jones observed
a marked lanes violation, pursuant to R.C. 4511.33(A), or a lanes of travel violation, pursuant to
R.C. 4511.25(A). In support of this argument, the State cites a Twelfth District Court of
Appeal’s decision, State v. Burton, 12th Dist. No. CA2005-12-528, 2006-Ohio-4048. In Burton,
the Twelfth District held that, pursuant to R.C. 4511.33(A), a police officer had probable cause
to stop the appellant due to a marked lanes violation, where the appellant, for two to three
seconds, drove directly on the center double yellow line with his left tires prior to going back
into his lane of travel.
{¶17} It is well-settled that “[a] traffic stop constitutes a seizure within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment.” Campbell at ¶ 10, citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-810
(1996). “However, an investigative stop of a motorist does not violate the Fourth Amendment if
the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the individual is engaged in criminal activity.”
Campbell at ¶ 10, citing Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 299 (1999). “To justify a
particular intrusion, the officer must demonstrate ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’” Weisner at
299, quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). “In evaluating the facts and inferences 6
supporting the stop, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances as ‘viewed through
the eyes of a reasonable and cautious police officer on the scene, guided by his experience and
training.’” State v. Sweatt, 9th Dist. No. 25147, 2010-Ohio-2989, ¶ 7, citing State v. Bobo, 37
Ohio St.3d 177, 179 (1988), quoting United States v. Hall, 525 F.2d 857, 859 (C.A.D.C.1976).
“Thus, ‘if the specific and articulable facts available to an officer indicate that a driver may be
committing a criminal act, which includes the violation of a traffic law, the officer is justified in
making an investigative stop.’” State v. Hoder, 9th Dist. No. 03CA0042, 2004-Ohio-3083, ¶ 8,
quoting State v. Shook, 9th Dist. No. 93CA005716, 1994 WL 263194, *5 (June 15, 1994).
{¶18} In the present matter, Trooper Jones twice observed Thayer drive on the double
yellow line in the middle of the road: once while traveling westbound on West Smith Road, and
again when appellant made a wide right turn onto Erhart Road. Also, the State introduced the
officer’s dashboard camera video showing Thayer’s back tires fully covering the double yellow
line as he makes a wide right turn onto Erhart Road.
{¶19} On direct examination, Trooper Jones testified that he initially observed appellant
go “left of center” while traveling westbound on West Smith Road. The following line of
questioning ensued:
Q. Was your initial observation on video?
A. Not the first initial observation, no.
Q. Were the lanes marked?
A. Yes.
Q. You say left of center, did he travel on the center lane beyond the center line? Please describe for the Court what you observed.
A. What I saw of the first initial was that the tires were on the double yellow line.
Q. And the double yellow line is in the middle of the road, correct? 7
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And did the vehicle extend beyond the double yellow into, or beyond, the center at that point?
A. Not into the other lanes, no, sir.
Q. Okay. You said beyond the center?
A. Of his lane, yes.
***
Q. Okay. Again, back to the traffic infraction. You testified that you observed the defendant travel left of center prior to the video coming on?
Q. Did you observe it at any other time?
A. Once he made the turn onto Erhart.
(Emphasis added.)
Further, on cross-examination, Trooper Jones provided more detailed testimony regarding his
observations, as well as observations from the video recording taken from the dash-board camera
in his patrol car:
Q. You would agree with me that the video recording that we just saw here in the Court where you are following [Thayer’s] vehicle fails to show any left of center violation, correct?
A. Well, the first initial is when the video wasn’t on.
Q. So your answer to my question, Trooper Jones, would [be] yes, Mr. Sheldon, that’s correct, the video does not show [Thayer’s] vehicle going left of center, is that your answer?
A. At the turn on Erhart.
Q. At the turn on Erhart, what, Trooper Jones?
A. [Thayer] drives on the double yellow line again.
Q. He did not cross over the opposing lane, correct? 8
A. Correct.
Q. So the very edge of [Thayer’s] tires touch the yellow line, is that correct?
A. No. The tires were covering the double yellow line.
Q. Now, for the approximately two miles you followed [Thayer], that’s on the video, it doesn’t show a traffic violation, correct?
A. Not the first initial one I saw. The second one it does.
Q. Okay. And you claim that’s on there?
A. Second one, yes.
Q. And what was that traffic violation?
A. When [Thayer] went, turned right onto Erhart his tires again drove over the— drove on the double yellow line.
Q. Okay. And what is that traffic violation, Trooper Jones?
A. I labeled it as left of center, sir.
{¶20} R.C. 4511.25 states, in relevant part, that “[u]pon all roadways of sufficient width,
a vehicle or trackless trolley shall be driven upon the right half of the roadway * * *.” While the
record provides no evidence of Thayer driving left of center and violating R.C. 4511.25, the
record does show that Trooper Jones observed Thayer violate a different traffic law. R.C.
4511.36(A) states, in relevant part, that “[t]he driver of a vehicle intending to turn at an
intersection shall be governed by the following rules: (1) [a]pproach for a right turn and a right
turn shall be made as close as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway.”
{¶21} Here, although Trooper Jones did not cite Thayer for violating R.C.
4511.36(A)(1), Trooper Jones’ testimony clearly establishes that he witnessed him violate that 9
traffic provision when Thayer made a wide right turn onto Erhart Road and, in doing so, drove
on the double yellow line in the middle of the road. Additionally, the video evidence clearly
demonstrates that, as Thayer turned right onto Erhart road, there were no obstacles, such as a
parked vehicle, preventing him from staying as close as practicable to the right-hand curb or
edge of the roadway. As stated above, “[a] police officer’s observation of a person violating a
traffic law is sufficient to give rise to the officer’s reasonable conclusion that the person is
engaged in criminal activity.” Campbell at ¶ 11.
{¶22} Therefore, based upon the record before us, the traffic stop was reasonable as a
matter of law, and the trial court properly denied Thayer’s motion to suppress.
{¶23} Thayer’s first assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
WHERE THE ORIGINAL REASON FOR THE TRAFFIC STOP IS EXTENDED BEYOND THAT REASON (TRAVELING ON RIGHT HALF OF ROADWAY VIOLATION) AND THE TROOPER REQUESTS [THAYER] TO EXIT HIS VEHICLE AND OBSERVES THAT [THAYER’S] EYES ARE RED AND GLASSY, DOES THE TROOPER’S CONTINUED DETENTION OF [THAYER] TO PERFORM FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS AMOUNT TO AN UNREASONABLE SEIZURE IN VIOLATION OF [THAYER’S] FOURTH AMENDMENT AND OHIO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS?
{¶24} In his second assignment of error, Thayer argues that, after the initial traffic stop,
Trooper Jones’ continued detention of him amounted to an unreasonable seizure in violation of
the Fourth Amendment to the United States and Ohio constitutions. Specifically, he argues that
the extension of the initial traffic stop was not based upon any reasonable articulable suspicion
that he was under the influence of alcohol. Further, Thayer contends that (1) having red and
glassy eyes, and (2) smelling a strong odor of alcohol coming from the vehicle, do not rise to the
level of reasonable articulable suspicion to further detain him. 10
{¶25} In response, the State argues that (1) Thayer’s red and glassy eyes, (2) the odor of
alcohol in the vehicle, and (3) his admission to consuming alcohol clearly provided Trooper
Jones with additional specific and articulable facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion beyond
that which prompted the initial traffic stop. In support of this argument, the State cites our
decision in State v. Tomko, 9th Dist. No. 19253, 1999 WL 1037762 (Nov. 3, 1999).
{¶26} As addressed in Tomko, “[w]hen an appellate court reviews the propriety of an
investigatory stop, it must consider the totality of the circumstances.” Tomko at *2, citing Bobo
at paragraph one of the syllabus. “Probable cause is not necessary to conduct a field sobriety
test.” Tomko at *2. “Rather, reasonable suspicion of criminal activity will support further
investigation.” Id. “Essentially, reasonable suspicion exists if an officer can point to specific
and articulable facts indicating that a driver may be committing a criminal act.” Id.
Additionally, during an investigative traffic stop, “if an officer encounters ‘additional specific
and articulable facts’ giving rise to a reasonable suspicion beyond that which prompted the stop,
the officer may continue to detain the individual to investigate those new concerns.” Id. quoting
Shook at *3.
{¶27} In Tomko at *2, the driver was travelling 75 miles per hour in a 65 mile per hour
zone and was stopped for speeding. During the initial traffic stop, the trooper observed factors,
beyond those which prompted the stop, giving him reason to further detain the appellant in order
to conduct field sobriety tests. Id. at *3. The trooper testified that the driver “smelled of
alcohol” and “had blood-shot eyes.” Id. Tomko argued that his prolonged detention was
unlawful because “the smell of alcohol alone does not constitute reasonable suspicion of alcohol
impairment [.]” Id. at *2. In affirming the judgment of the trial court, we stated that:
The combination of [Tomko’s] bloodshot eyes, a smell of alcohol, and his admission that he had consumed two beers was sufficient to provide [the trooper] 11
with reasonable suspicion to detain [Tomko] to investigate a possible violation of Ohio’s laws prohibiting the operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.
Id. at *3.
{¶28} Here, similar to Tomko, the initial traffic stop was proper because Trooper Jones
observed a violation of R.C. 4511.36(A)(1). Further, upon approaching Thayer’s vehicle,
Trooper Jones testified that Thayer “had glassy eyes, and [that he] smelled a strong odor of
alcoholic beverage coming from inside the vehicle.” Because Thayer’s wife was a passenger in
the car, Trooper Jones asked him to step out of the car in order to determine the source of the
odor. Trooper Jones explained that, when Thayer stepped out of his vehicle, he determined that
the smell of alcoholic beverage was coming from his mouth. Trooper Jones further testified:
Q. What did you do next?
A. Once * * * he got out of the vehicle, I asked him to take a walk back to the patrol car, to the rear of the patrol car.
Q. Did you ask him whether he had been consuming alcohol?
A. Prior to the patrol car, I don’t believe. * * *
Q. Prior to arresting did you?
Q. Did he tell you whether he had been consuming any alcohol?
Q. Did he say how much?
A. He said he had four.
Q. Okay.
A. The whole night.
Subsequently, Trooper Jones administered the HGN test, and observed six out of six clues. At
that time, Trooper Jones arrested appellant for OVI. 12
{¶29} Based upon the record before us, and under the totality of the circumstances, we
cannot say that Trooper Jones improperly detained Thayer after the initial traffic stop. The
combination of Thayer’s red and glassy eyes, the odor of alcohol coming from his mouth, and his
admission that he had consumed four alcoholic beverages over the course of the evening was
sufficient to provide Trooper Jones with reasonable suspicion to detain Thayer in order to
investigate whether he had been operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.
{¶30} Thayer’s second assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
UNDER THE TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES, DID THE TROOPER HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST [THAYER] WHEN THE TROOPER FAILED TO PERFORM THE HGN TEST IN SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE NHTSA MANUAL AND HE BASED PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST FOR OVI ON AN ADMISSION TO CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOL, A MILD ODOR OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE, RED AND GLASSY EYES, AND SUCH IMPROPERLY PERFORMED HGN TEST THAT DID NOT SHOW IMPAIRMENT?
{¶31} In his third assignment of error, Thayer argues that Trooper Jones lacked probable
cause to arrest him for OVI based upon (1) an admission to consuming some alcohol, (2) a mild
odor of alcoholic beverage, (3) red and glassy eyes, and (4) an improperly performed HGN test.
{¶32} In response, the State argues that, under the totality of the circumstances, the trial
court correctly determined that probable cause existed to arrest appellant for OVI. The State
supports its argument with our decision in City of Tallmadge v. Barker, 9th Dist. No. 24414,
2009-Ohio-1334. In Barker at ¶ 19, we concluded that probable cause existed to arrest Barker for
OVI where the officer had knowledge of four clues on the HGN test, had knowledge of bad
driving, and Barker admitted that she had been drinking alcoholic beverages.
{¶33} “‘In determining whether the police had probable cause to arrest an individual for
[OVI], we consider whether, at the moment of arrest, the police had sufficient information, 13
derived from a reasonably trustworthy source of facts and circumstances, sufficient to cause a
prudent person to believe that the suspect was driving under the influence.’” Barker at ¶ 12,
quoting State v. Homan, 89 Ohio St.3d 421, 427 (2000), superceded by R.C. 4511.19(D)(4)(b) on
other grounds as recognized by State v. Schmitt, 101 Ohio St.3d 79, 2004-Ohio-37. Additionally,
“[e]ven without positive results on field sobriety testing, the totality of the facts and
circumstances may support probable cause to arrest for a violation of Section 4511.19(A) of the
Ohio Revised Code.” State v. Walters, 9th Dist. No. 11CA0039-M, 2012-Ohio-2429, ¶ 10. “The
amount of evidence necessary for probable cause to suspect a crime is being committed is less
evidence than would be necessary to support a conviction of that crime at trial.” Id., quoting
State v. McGinty, 9th Dist. No. 08CA0039-M, 2009-Ohio-994, ¶ 11. Further. “[i]t is necessary
to show merely that a probability of criminal activity exists, not proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, or even proof by a preponderance of evidence that a crime is occurring.” Walters at ¶ 10.
{¶34} Here, in determining that Trooper Jones had probable cause to arrest appellant for
OVI, the trial court stated:
The Court finds that this observation concerning operation, combined with [Thayer’s] admission as to the consumption of alcohol, the odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from the vehicle and later from [Thayer’s] mouth when he was outside the vehicle, regardless of how its strength is characterized, combined with red and glassy eyes and a score of [six] out of six on the HGN is adequate under a totality of the circumstances test, to establish probable cause to arrest [Thayer] for operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol.
Based upon the record, we conclude that the above-stated facts are supported by competent,
credible evidence. We note, however, that in its judgment entry, the trial court misstated the
sequence in which Trooper Jones learned that Thayer consumed four alcoholic beverages. In the
trial court’s recitation of facts, Trooper Jones asked Thayer whether he had consumed any
alcohol prior to his stepping out of the car. However, through Trooper Jones’ testimony, the 14
record establishes that Trooper Jones learned Thayer had consumed alcohol after he stepped out
of the car. Because the trial court does not base its conclusion regarding probable cause on the
sequence in which these events occurred, and because the facts as testified to by the trooper
provide competent and credible evidence, we find that Thayer was not prejudiced by this error.
{¶35} Thayer also challenges Trooper Jones’ administration of the HGN test, arguing
that Trooper Jones failed to substantially comply with NHTSA standards in administering the
test. Specifically, he contends that Trooper Jones erred in three respects: (1) Trooper Jones
never indicated whether Thayer had distinct and sustained nystagmus at maximum deviation, (2)
Trooper Jones did not substantially comply with the third part of the HGN test which determines
the onset of nystagmus prior to forty-five degrees, and (3) Trooper Jones had no idea as to the
significance of the HGN results.
{¶36} The record reveals that Trooper Jones provided detailed testimony regarding the
training and techniques used to administer the HGN test. First, Trooper Jones explained that he
was trained pursuant to the standardized principals set forth in the NHTSA manual, and that
those same principals were in effect at the time of the traffic stop. Second, he explained that in
administering the HGN test, he looked for six clues, or three on each eye. However, prior to
starting the HGN test, Trooper Jones (1) looked for equal pupil size in each eye, and (2) checked
to see if Thayer’s eyes were tracking equally.
{¶37} After verifying that Thayer’s pupils were equal in size and tracking equally,
Trooper Jones administered the first part of the HGN test known as the test of lack of smooth
pursuit. As per the NHTSA manual, he administered this test twice on each eye, in order to look
for nystagmus, or involuntary jerking. In doing so, he testified that he observed involuntary
jerking in both of Thayer’s eyes. 15
{¶38} Then Trooper Jones administered the second part of the HGN test known as
maximum deviation. Again, he administered this part of the HGN test twice and observed jerking
in both of Thayer’s eyes.
{¶39} Finally, Trooper Jones administered the third part of the HGN test known as onset
45 degrees. According to his testimony, he administered this part of the HGN test twice and
observed jerking in both of Thayer’s eyes.
{¶40} Additionally, Trooper Jones testified that he observed six out of six clues, and that
six clues are “the total number of clues on the HGN,” indicating “a percentage that the driver is
going to test over a point one.”
{¶41} In its judgment entry, the trial court found as follows:
The Court finds based upon the trooper’s testimony and the timeframe involved that the State has established by clear and convincing evidence that the [HGN] test was conducted in substantial compliance with the NHTSA standards then in effect. The results of the [HGN] test are admissible both for probable cause and at trial on the merits.
As stated above, “[t]he trial court acts as the trier of fact during a suppression hearing, and is
therefore best equipped to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and resolve questions of fact.”
Campbell, 2005-Ohio-4361, at ¶ 6. Therefore, we decline to substitute our own judgment for
that of the trial court regarding the weight given Trooper Jones’ testimony.
{¶42} In State v. Slates, 9th Dist. No. 25019, 2011-Ohio-295, ¶ 28-30, this Court
addressed the issue of field sobriety testing and probable cause. Slates involved a traffic stop
where the officer first observed the driver traveling without headlights and straddling the lane
divider between interstates 76 East and 77 South. Slates then stopped on the entrance ramp to 77
South and turned on his hazard lights. The officer testified that he smelled alcohol emanating
from Slates’ car and that Slates admitted to “having a ‘few’ drinks that evening.” Id. at ¶ 25. 16
Prior to arresting Slates for OVI, the officer administered the HGN test. We concluded that,
based upon the officer’s testimony regarding his administration of the HGN test, the State
established that the officer “conducted the HGN test in substantial compliance with the
prescribed instructions.” Id. at ¶ 28. However, we also concluded that even “assuming the State
failed to establish substantial compliance, the officer still had probable cause to arrest Slates.” Id.
{¶43} In support of our conclusion in Slates, we explained “[t]his Court has stated that
the totality of the facts and circumstances can support probable cause for arrest even in the
absence of the administration of field sobriety tests,” and “‘even when the results of the field
sobriety tests must be excluded for lack of compliance to standardized procedures.’” Id. at ¶ 29,
quoting State v. Sunday, 9th Dist. No. 22917, 2006-Ohio-2984, ¶ 32.
{¶44} Here, Trooper Jones testified that: (1) he twice observed Thayer drive on the
double yellow line in the middle of the road, (2) Thayer’s eyes were red and glassy, (3) an odor
of alcoholic beverage emanated from Thayer’s mouth, and (4) Thayer admitted to consuming
four alcoholic beverages.
{¶45} Based upon our ruling in Slates, even if we were to agree that Trooper Jones did
not substantially comply with the standards for administering the HGN test, we would yet
conclude that under the totality of the circumstances and the record before us, Trooper Jones had
probable cause to arrest Thayer for OVI.
{¶46} Thayer’s third assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶47} Accordingly, the judgment entry of the Medina Municipal Court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed. 17
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Medina Municipal
Court, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
CARLA MOORE FOR THE COURT
WHITMORE, P. J. DICKINSON, J. CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
DAVID C. SHELDON, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
WILLIAM A. LEFAIVER, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
GREG HUBER, Prosecuting Attorney, and ARTHUR E. FOTH, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.