State v. Teel
This text of State v. Teel (State v. Teel) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE ) ) v. ) ID No. 2004004125 ) ERIC S. TEEL, ) ) Defendant. )
Submitted: September 26, 2023 Decided: December 7, 2023
ORDER
This 7th day of December, 2023, the Court enters the following Order:
Eric Teel is quite unhappy about his conviction and sentence, which might
seem ironic since he pled guilty and received exactly the sentence he bargained for.
This, his second Rule 61 petition, will be denied, as was his first petition.
1. Mr. Teel is serving a 10-year minimum mandatory sentence for
Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited (“PFBPP”) as mandated by 11 Del.
C. §1448(e)(1)(C). He will serve a probationary term upon completion of his
prison sentence pursuant to his concurrent plea of guilty to terroristic threatening.
2. Mr. Teel filed a Rule 61 claim in May, 2022. In that motion, he took
issue with the 10-year mandatory sentence, arguing that the paperwork was 1 defective in listing the 2 prior violent felonies that predicated the mandatory
sentence. The Court obtained briefing by the parties and considered his argument
carefully.
3. In September, 2022, the Court ruled that the defect in the paperwork
was a scrivener’s error and did not require resentencing because he had, in fact, been
convicted of 2 prior violent felonies, thus meeting the statutory criterion for
enhanced sentencing.
4. Mr. Teel appealed the Rule 61 Order to the Delaware Supreme Court.
After filing his notice of appeal, Teel also filed a new Rule 61 motion in Superior
Court. In light of the Defendant’s appeal of the prior Rule 61, the Court stayed any
action on this second motion while the matter was pending in the Supreme Court.
5. In September, 2023, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the denial
of Rule 61 relief, thus sending the matter back to this Court, thereby allowing
jurisdiction to again reside in Superior Court. The affirmance also had the effect of
allowing this Court to now consider Teel’s second Rule 61 motion.
6. Second or subsequent Rule 61 motions are subject to Rule 61(d)(2)
which provides that second or subsequent motion for relief “shall be summarily
dismissed unless the movant was convicted after a trial and…”
2 7. Mr. Teel was not convicted after trial, he was convicted after a plea of
guilty. His motion is therefore subject to summary dismissal. While this would
ordinarily end the matter, the Court nonetheless considered the merits of Teel’s
second Rule 61 motion. The Court finds nothing in his subsequent motion that
would warrant relief under the extremely limited circumstances permitted even if he
had proceeded to trial.
In light of the above, Defendant’s subsequent Rule 61 Motion is
SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Charles E. Butler Charles E. Butler, Resident Judge
cc: Prothonotary Nichole T. Whetham Warner, Deputy Attorney General Eric S. Teel, (SBI # 00394778)
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