State v. Taylor

508 So. 2d 987, 1987 La. App. LEXIS 9700
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedJune 10, 1987
DocketNo. 18455-KA
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 508 So. 2d 987 (State v. Taylor) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Taylor, 508 So. 2d 987, 1987 La. App. LEXIS 9700 (La. Ct. App. 1987).

Opinion

HALL, Chief Judge.

The defendant, Carlton Taylor, Jr., was convicted by a jury of aggravated burglary in violation of LSA-R.S. 14:60 and aggravated rape in violation of LSA-R.S. 14:42. On the burglary charge, defendant was sentenced to thirty years at hard labor and on the rape charge, defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment, with the sentences to run concurrently.

On appeal, defendant raises the following issues:

1. Whether the trial court erred in allowing Deputy Charlie Frazier of the DeSoto Parish Sheriff’s Department to qualify as an expert in the field of fingerprint identification;
2. Whether the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for a mistrial based on the victim’s reference to other crimes evidence; and
3. Whether the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the crimes with which he was charged.

Finding no merit to defendant’s assignments of error, we affirm his convictions and sentences.

ISSUE NUMBER ONE

Lt. Charlie Frazier of the DeSoto Parish Sheriff’s Department was qualified as an expert in the field of fingerprint identification and testified concerning fingerprints found at the scene of the crimes. Defendant argues that the trial court should not have allowed Lt. Frazier to qualify as an expert in light of testimony from Lt. Judson Rives of the DeSoto Parish Sheriff’s Department that “our people have been trained but we go to the experts,” referring to Major Taylor at the Crime Lab.

Lt. Rives, who testified concerning Lt. Frazier's qualifications, explained that Lt. Frazier was trained in fingerprint identification but did not have the years of experience that Major Taylor had. Before Lt. Frazier was allowed to testify as an expert, both defense counsel and the prosecution questioned him concerning his qualifications. Officer Frazier attended fingerprint identification school at the Northwest Loui[989]*989siana Crime Lab in 1976. In 1984 he studied forty hours of basic fingerprinting technique and forty hours of advanced fingerprinting taught by the FBI at the LSU Law Enforcement Institute. According to Lt. Frazier, he has checked fingerprints in the field “numerous times.”

A witness who seeks to testify as an expert must establish that he has special knowledge of the subject about which he is called upon to testify. LSA-R.S. 15:466. The competence of an expert witness is a question of fact which is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Rulings on the qualification of expert witnesses will not be disturbed unless they are manifestly erroneous. State v. Drew, 360 So.2d 500 (La.1978), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1059, 99 S.Ct. 820, 59 L.Ed.2d 25 (1979); State v. Mims, 501 So.2d 962 (La.App. 2d Cir.1987); State v. White, 430 So.2d 171 (La.App. 2d Cir.1983), writ denied, 433 So.2d 1055 (La.1983).

Based on Lt. Frazier’s training in excess of eighty hours and his field experience, the trial court was not manifestly erroneous in accepting him as an expert in the field of fingerprint identification.

ISSUE NUMBER TWO

Defendant claims that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for a mistrial after the victim testified that some months prior to the date of the burglary and rape, defendant had been at her house and “couldn’t keep his hands off of me.” Defendant asserts that this was an improper reference to other crimes evidence, the introduction of which the state had failed to advise him as required by State v. Prieur, 277 So.2d 126 (La.1973) and LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 720.

Evidence of other crimes is generally not admissible except under certain circumstances. LSA-R.S. 15:445-48. In State v. Barham, 467 So.2d 880 (La.App. 3d Cir.1985), writ denied, 475 So.2d 355 (La.1985), the Third Circuit held that testimony by a rape victim that the defendant required her and her brother to remove their swimsuits and engage in assorted games on the day of the rape was not a reference to criminal conduct because such games did not violate any criminal statutes. Therefore, the testimony was admissible in the defendant’s prosecution for forcible rape despite the lack of Prieur notice and was relevant to show his prurient interest in the victim.

In the present case, the victim’s unsolicited testimony that defendant could not keep his hands off of her does not advert to any conduct which is violative of a criminal statute; therefore, there was no requirement that the state give Prieur notice. Such testimony tended to show defendant’s prurient interest in the victim.

ISSUE NUMBER THREE

Defendant argues that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the crimes with which he was charged because there was no positive identification of him as the assailant.

In order to satisfy due process standards, the record evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, must be sufficient for a rational juror to conclude that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 821; LSA-R.S. 15:438.

At trial, the victim testified that on the night of August 8, 1985, she was at her home in Mansfield, Louisiana lying on the sofa bed in the living room with her two children when she fell asleep watching television around 11:00 p.m. She awoke when the television went off and as she started to get up, she was grabbed around the neck by a man saying “don’t scream, I have a knife.” The victim could not see her assailant’s face because she shut her eyes, but not before she saw “a shining blade up in the air.” The assailant, still holding her throat, backed her up into the adjacent bedroom and partially laid her on the bed while continually telling her not to scream. According to the victim, she did not attempt to resist when her assailant engaged in sexual intercourse with her because he had a weapon and she feared not only for her own life, but also for the lives of her children.

[990]*990After completing the act of intercourse, the assailant placed a pillow over the victim’s face, told her he had a gun, and then left. The victim lay on the bed for a few minutes, then got up and looked in the kitchen where she saw a screen had been pulled off the window and the telephone cord had been cut. She took the two children across the street to J.T. Henderson’s home at approximately 12:40 a.m. and telephoned her mother. She arrived at her mother’s home at approximately 1:05 a.m. and called the police. After the police arrived, the victim was taken to the hospital where a rape kit was performed.

Mr. Henderson’s son, William, was awake watching television when the victim arrived. He testified that he had seen a Trans-Am or Z-28 parked in front of the victim’s home with its parking lights on .and then later he saw the car drive off. After viewing pictures of defendant’s car which is a metallic orange Trans-Am, Henderson testified that it looked like the car he saw at the victim’s house, but he could not be sure it was the same car because he had not been able to see the color of the car.

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Related

State v. Taylor
512 So. 2d 1182 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1987)

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Bluebook (online)
508 So. 2d 987, 1987 La. App. LEXIS 9700, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-taylor-lactapp-1987.