State v. Taylor

• Court: Superior Court of Delaware
• Decided: February 28, 2025
• Docket: 1509010730
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE : : v. : : ID No. 1509010730 DUSTIN TAYLOR, : : Defendant. : : Submitted: February 6, 2025 Decided: February 28, 2025

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO CORRECT AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE

Upon consideration of defendant Dustin Taylor’s motion to correct an illegal

sentence and his supplement thereto, it appears to the court that:

1. Taylor filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence raising two

arguments: (1) that he was illegally sentenced as a habitual offender because he was

still serving a Level V sentence when he incurred the charges in this case, which did

not allow for a period of rehabilitation, and (2) that he received ineffective assistance

of counsel because his attorney did not file an appeal or move to correct the illegal

sentence.

2. In his motion, Taylor did not specify which convictions he believed

overlapped. This court asked Taylor by letter dated January 13, 2025, to identify the

overlapping convictions. Taylor filed a response explaining that he was still serving a Level V sentence imposed on May 7, 2014 for the charges of burglary third degree

and possession of a firearm by person prohibited (“PFBPP”) in Case No.

1312002706A1 when he pleaded guilty on January 4, 2016 to the offense of assault

in a detention facility. He argues that the 8-year sentence he received for assault in a

detention facility is illegal because he had no chance for rehabilitation while he was

still serving a sentence for his previous felony convictions. He cites to Dickens v.

State,2 where the Delaware Supreme Court remanded a case because the predicate

offenses for Dickens’ habitual offender status overlapped.

3. Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a) allows this court to correct an

illegal sentence at any time. A sentence is illegal if it violates double jeopardy, is

ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served, is

internally contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by statute, is uncertain

as to the substance of the sentence, or is a sentence that the judgment of conviction

did not authorize.3

4. Taylor’s motion fails because his sentences for burglary third degree

and PFBPP were imposed before he committed the offense of assault in a detention

facility. Therefore, he had an opportunity for rehabilitation before he committed the

1 Taylor was declared a habitual offender on the burglary third conviction and was sentenced to time served, 103 days. For the PFBPP charge, he was not declared a habitual offender but received the 5-year minimum sentence for that charge. 2 2012 WL 3104942 (Del. July 31, 2012). 3 Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998). 2 offense of assault in a detention facility, even though he was still incarcerated for the

burglary and PFBPP convictions.

5. Delaware courts have considered and rejected similar arguments to

Taylor’s. In Payne v. State, the defendant argued that “because he was never released

from prison after committing his first felony, he had no opportunity for rehabilitation

between sentences.”4 The Delaware Supreme Court found that the Superior Court

correctly denied Payne’s postconviction motion when it found that “‘some chance

for rehabilitation’ does not mean time away from the criminal justice system but

simply that the defendant be afforded sufficient opportunities to reform, even in the

prison system.”5 The Court noted that to accept Payne’s argument would preclude

the application of the habitual offender statute to prisoners who commit felonies

while incarcerated.

6. Likewise, this court rejected a similar argument and clarified any

confusion arising from the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Buckingham v.

State6 as follows: “‘Some chance for rehabilitation after each sentencing’ means only

that there must be crime-conviction-sentence, crime-conviction-sentence

sequencing, with no overlap, for each given felony that is included in the habitual

offender status calculation. And there need be no more than the passing of a moment

4 1994 WL 91244, at *1 (Del. 1994). 5 Id. 6 482 A.2d 327 (Del. 1984). 3 between the fall of the gavel recessing a prior’s sentencing hearing and the person’s

commission of his next felony to insure there is no overlap.”7

7. In Dickens, the case upon which Taylor relies, the offenses and

convictions overlapped. In Taylor’s case, however, his offenses did not overlap.

Taylor was serving a 5-year Level V sentence for PFBPP that was imposed on May

7, 2014 in Case No. 1312002706A. He committed the offense of assault in a

detention facility on September 14, 2015. Therefore, he had over a year for

rehabilitation before he committed the offense of assault in a detention facility. His

sentence is not illegal.

8. Taylor’s second argument alleging ineffective assistance of counsel is

time-barred under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. But it also fails on its merits

because, as explained above, his attorney had no basis to challenge the State’s

habitual offender motion or Taylor’s sentence.

For these reasons, Taylor’s motion to correct an illegal sentence must be

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Robert H. Robinson, Jr.

Robert H. Robinson, Jr., Judge

7 State v. Peters, 283 A.3d 668, 694 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 2022) (emphasis omitted); see also, e.g., State v. Grzybowski, 2024 WL 3466952 (Del. Super. Ct. July 17, 2024). 4