State v. Tavel

District Court of Appeal of Florida

State v. Tavel

407 So. 2d 953, 1981 Fla. App. LEXIS 21857

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedDecember 8, 1981

DocketNo. 81-428

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 407 So. 2d 953 (State v. Tavel) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. Tavel, 407 So. 2d 953, 1981 Fla. App. LEXIS 21857 (Fla. Ct. App. 1981).

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Opinion

SCHWARTZ, Judge.

The defendant was given a pre-Villery¹ sentence of three years in the state prison to be followed by two years probation. He was released after serving only two years and two months of the three year term. In the order now under review, the trial court rejected the state’s position that the defendant was “on parole” for the remaining ten months and began the probationary term only at the conclusion of the full three years. Instead, it held that the two years of probation commenced upon Tavel’s release and accordingly dismissed as untimely an application to revoke his probation which was commenced more than two years later, although within five years of the original sentence. See Carpenter v. State, 355 So.2d 492 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). We agree with that conclusion and affirm. See Section 947.24, Florida Statutes (1977); Villery v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 396 So.2d 1107, 1111 (Fla.1981); but cf. Lewis v. State, 402 So.2d 482 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).

Affirmed.

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SCHWARTZ, Judge.

The defendant was given a pre-Villery¹ sentence of three years in the state prison to be followed by two years probation. He was released after serving only two years and two months of the three year term. In the order now under review, the trial court rejected the state’s position that the defendant was “on parole” for the remaining ten months and began the probationary term only at the conclusion of the full three years. Instead, it held that the two years of probation commenced upon Tavel’s release and accordingly dismissed as untimely an application to revoke his probation which was commenced more than two years later, although within five years of the original sentence. See Carpenter v. State, 355 So.2d 492 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). We agree with that conclusion and affirm. See Section 947.24, Florida Statutes (1977); Villery v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 396 So.2d 1107, 1111 (Fla.1981); but cf. Lewis v. State, 402 So.2d 482 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).

Affirmed.

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407 So. 2d 953, 1981 Fla. App. LEXIS 21857, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-tavel-fladistctapp-1981.

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