State v. Tavarez

2025 Ohio 5672
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedDecember 19, 2025
DocketWD-24-077
StatusPublished

This text of 2025 Ohio 5672 (State v. Tavarez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Tavarez, 2025 Ohio 5672 (Ohio Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Tavarez, 2025-Ohio-5672.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT WOOD COUNTY

State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. WD-24-077

Appellee Trial Court No. 24 CR 162

v.

Gregorio Tavarez DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellant Decided: December 19, 2025

*****

Paul A. Dobson, Wood County Prosecuting Attorney, and David T. Harold, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Jeffrey Nunnari, for appellant.

***** SULEK, P.J.

{¶ 1} Appellant Gregorio Tavarez appeals the judgment of the Wood County

Court of Common Pleas, which convicted him, following a guilty plea, of three counts of

endangering children, one count of pandering obscenity involving a minor, and one count

of disseminating matter harmful to juveniles. He asserts that his guilty plea was not

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. For the reasons that follow, the trial

court’s judgment is affirmed. I. Factual Background and Procedural History

{¶ 2} On April 18, 2024, the Wood County Grand Jury returned a ten-count

indictment charging Tavarez with five counts of endangering children in violation of R.C.

2919.22(B)(5) and (E)(4), felonies of the second degree; three counts of pandering

obscenity involving a minor or impaired person in violation of R.C. 2907.321(A)(5) and

(C), felonies of the fourth degree; one count of disseminating matter harmful to juveniles

in violation of R.C. 2907.31(A)(1) and (F), a felony of the fifth degree; and one count of

possessing criminal tools in violation of R.C. 2923.24(A) and (C), a felony of the fifth

degree.

{¶ 3} The trial court arraigned Tavarez on April 29, 2024, at which he entered

pleas of not guilty to the charges.

{¶ 4} On September 16, 2024, Tavarez withdrew his initial pleas of not guilty and

entered pleas of guilty to three of the counts of endangering children, one count of

pandering obscenity involving a minor or impaired person, and one count of

disseminating matter harmful to juveniles. The trial court conducted a detailed Crim.R.

11 colloquy, following which it found him guilty of the offenses.

{¶ 5} The matter was then continued for sentencing and the preparation of a

presentence investigation report. At sentencing, the trial court ordered Tavarez to serve a

total indefinite prison term of six to nine years.

II. Assignment of Error

{¶ 6} Tavarez timely appeals his judgment of conviction, asserting one assignment

of error for review:

2. 1. Appellant’s guilty pleas were not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered.

III. Analysis

{¶ 7} “A defendant entering a plea in a criminal case must do so knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily, and the failure of any one element renders enforcement of

that plea unconstitutional.” State v. Hart, 2024-Ohio-5622, ¶ 10 (6th Dist.), quoting State

v. Mull, 2024-Ohio-370, ¶ 12 (6th Dist.). “Ohio’s Crim.R. 11 outlines the procedures that

trial courts are to follow when accepting pleas.” State v. Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 11.

The rule “‘ensures an adequate record on review by requiring the trial court to personally

inform the defendant of his rights and the consequences of his plea and determine if the

plea is understandingly and voluntarily made.’” Id., quoting State v. Stone, 43 Ohio St.2d

163, 168 (1975).

{¶ 8} In this case, Tavarez argues that the trial court failed to comply with Crim.R.

11(C)(2)(b), which states that the trial court “shall not accept a plea of guilty” without

first “[i]nforming the defendant of and determining that the defendant understands the

effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea,

may proceed with judgment and sentence.” He contends that the trial court failed to

comply with the rule because it did not explain that his guilty plea may be used against

him at a later trial. The State concedes that no such explanation was given but argues that

one was not required.

{¶ 9} Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b) requires that the trial court inform the defendant of two

things: “the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest” and “that the court, upon

3. acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence.” “To satisfy the

requirement of informing a defendant of the effect of a plea, a trial court must inform the

defendant of the appropriate language under Crim.R. 11(B),” and it may do so either

“orally or in writing.” State v. Jones, 2007-Ohio-6093, paragraph two of the syllabus, ¶

51. It thus must inform the defendant that “[t]he plea of guilty is a complete admission of

the defendant’s guilt,” and “[w]hen a plea of guilty . . . is accepted pursuant to this rule,

the court . . . shall proceed with sentencing under Crim.R. 32.” Crim.R. 11(B)(1) and (3).

Informing defendant that his guilty plea may be used against him at a later trial is not

provided for in Crim.R. 11(B).

{¶ 10} Tavarez nonetheless contends that the trial court was required to inform

him that his guilty pleas may be used against him at a later trial pursuant to R.C. 2937.09,

which states, “If the charge is a felony, the court or magistrate shall, before receiving a

plea of guilty, advise the accused that such plea constitutes an admission which may be

used against him at a later trial.” R.C. 2937.09, however, applies to a preliminary

examination upon arraignment, not to a subsequent change of plea to an indictment.

{¶ 11} Accordingly, because the trial court was not required to inform Tavarez

that his guilty pleas may be used against him in a later trial, and because it otherwise

properly informed him on the constitutional and nonconstitutional matters, Tavarez’s

guilty pleas were knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. His assignment of error

is not well-taken.

4. IV. Conclusion

{¶ 12} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Wood County Court of

Common Pleas is affirmed. Tavarez is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to

App.R. 24.

Judgment affirmed.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Thomas J. Osowik, J. JUDGE

Myron C. Duhart, J. JUDGE

Charles E. Sulek, P.J. CONCUR. JUDGE

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

5.

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