State v. Tavano, No. Cr99-0067778 (Aug. 9, 2000)

2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 9608
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedAugust 9, 2000
DocketNo. CR99-0067778
StatusUnpublished

This text of 2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 9608 (State v. Tavano, No. Cr99-0067778 (Aug. 9, 2000)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Tavano, No. Cr99-0067778 (Aug. 9, 2000), 2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 9608 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Pursuant to General Statutes § 54-33f, the defendant, John F. Tavano, has filed a Motion to Suppress evidence obtained as a result of a search and seizure warrant authorized on February 6, 1999, by Superior Court Judge Lawrence C. Klaczak. The defendant argues that the warrant is fatally defective and that the resulting search and seizure was, in effect, conducted without a warrant. Specifically, the defendant argues that the failure to mark either of the two boxes next to the "place" and CT Page 9609 "person" descriptions on the order page resulted in neither the place nor the person being the authorized subject of a search.1

For the following reasons, the Court disagrees with the defendant's arguments. The Motion to Suppress is, therefore, denied.

The issuance of search warrants is governed by General Statutes §§54-33a, in particular sections (b) and (c),2 as well as ArticleFirst, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution.3 The Connecticut Supreme Court has refused to recognize a "good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule under the state constitution. State v. Diaz,226 Conn. 514, 545, 628 A.2d 567 (1993). The Court in Diaz noted that its ruling creates "an important incentive for issuing judges to scrutinize warrant applications closely because the significant cost of an error will be exclusion of the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant." Id. See also State v. Marsala, 216 Conn. 150, 168-169, 579 A.2d 58 (1990). Ultimately, the goal is "to ensure that the issuing judge's ex parte probable cause determination, based upon reasonably drawn inferences, will be sufficiently reliable so as to be entitled to the normal deference a reviewing court ordinarily gives to judicial factual findings." State v.Diaz, supra, 226 Conn. 545.

A reviewing court, as a general rule, is limited to the four corners of the affidavit when ruling on a motion to suppress. State v. Rosario,238 Conn. 380, 386, 680 A.2d 237 (1996). This limitation exists because "reviewing court[s] may consider only the information that was actually before the issuing judge at the time he or she signed the warrant." Statev. Duntz, 223 Conn. 207, 216, 613 A.2d 224 (1992); State v. Barton,219 Conn. 529, 548, 594 A.2d 917 (1991); State v. Shifflett, 199 Conn. 718,746, 508 A.2d 718 (1986). However, common sense should not be precluded in such a review by a hypertechnical application of the four-corners rule. State v. Rosario, supra, 238 Conn. 387.

The application for the warrant in this case specifies the defendant as well as his residence as being the person and place upon whom, or within which, the affiants had probable cause to believe that the property to be seized would be found. Additionally, the person and place at issue were sufficiently identified and described in numerous places throughout the body of the affidavit. All five pages of the affidavit are signed by both police officers requesting the warrant, and Judge Klaczak signed the jurat on all these pages, as well.

The order page contains a verbatim recitation of the person, place and property descriptions found on the application page.4 The order page, signed by Judge Klaczak, grants both a search and seizure warrant and a dispensation, for a two-week period, of the delivery requirement of the CT Page 9610 affidavit to the subject of the warrant. That order page is complete, except for the failure to mark either of the two boxes next to the place and person descriptions.

The defendant's reliance on State v. Surowiecki, 184 Conn. 95,440 A.2d 798 (1981) (warrant fatally defective because judge did not sign warrant) and State v. Cook, 183 Conn. 520, 441 A.2d 41 (1981) (arrest warrant signed by assistant clerk of the Superior Court fatally defective) is misplaced. In the present case, the issuing judge reviewed the application, affidavit and warrant, and properly signed all pages requiring a signature. There is no indication within the four corners of the warrant that the issuing judge did not intend to grant the warrant as to both the person and place in question. The court finds that the effect of not marking either box on the order page to be the same as if both boxes had been marked. There is no indication that the warrant should not extend to both the person and the place, since both were the proper and intended objectives of the authorized warrant.

The court finds the lack of markings in the boxes akin to a clerical error or a scrivener's oversight, which does not render the warrant fatally defective. State v. Cobb, 251 Conn. 285, 521, 743 A.2d 1 (1999) (warrant valid notwithstanding that a signature was in the wrong place);State v. Colon, 230 Conn. 24, 36, 644 A.2d 877 (1994) (failure of judge to sign jurat does not render warrant fatally defective if extrinsic evidence proves supporting affidavit properly sworn to by complainants). This finding is further supported by the affidavit of Judge Klaczak, which was marked as State's Exhibit B in the hearing on the Motion to Suppress.5

To summarize, the court finds that the lack of a marking in the boxes next to the person and place descriptions on the order page does not rise to the level of rendering the warrant fatally defective. The issuing judge, by not indicating any intent whatsoever to deny the warrant as to either the person or the place in question, granted a warrant authorizing searches as to both.

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Related

State v. Cook
441 A.2d 41 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1981)
State v. Surowiecki
440 A.2d 798 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1981)
State v. Shifflett
508 A.2d 748 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1986)
State v. Marsala
579 A.2d 58 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1990)
State v. Barton
594 A.2d 917 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1991)
State v. Duntz
613 A.2d 224 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1992)
State v. Diaz
628 A.2d 567 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1993)
State v. Colon
644 A.2d 877 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1994)
State v. Rosario
680 A.2d 237 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1996)
State v. Cobb
743 A.2d 1 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1999)

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Bluebook (online)
2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 9608, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-tavano-no-cr99-0067778-aug-9-2000-connsuperct-2000.