State v. Tajuddin

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: October 15, 2025
• Docket: 24-1104
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA 24-1104

Filed 15 October 2025

Guilford County, No. 22CRS071117-400

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

NAAZIR TAJUDDIN, Defendant.

Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 19 April 2024 by Judge Lora

Christine Cubbage in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals

13 August 2025.

Jackie Willingham for defendant-appellant.

Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Assistant Attorney General Scott A. Conklin, for the State.

DILLON, Chief Judge.

Defendant Naazir Tajuddin appeals from judgment consistent with the jury’s

verdict convicting him of robbery with a dangerous weapon arising from an alleged

incident where he stole property from an employee of a U-Haul facility by force.

I. Background

The evidence at trial tended to show as follows: Defendant, accompanied by a STATE V. TAJUDDIN

Opinion of the Court

friend, rented a truck from a U-Haul dealer in Greensboro. The U-Haul dealer

directed Defendant to a second U-Haul dealer operated by the alleged victim, due to

the fact that the first dealer did not have the dolly Defendant needed.

When the Defendant and his friend arrived at the second facility, the victim

(who worked at the second facility) informed them they would need to pay about

sixteen dollars for the dolly. The two men refused to pay the victim, explaining they

paid to rent the dolly at the initial U-Haul facility. Defendant and his friend,

however, did not provide the victim with any documentation verifying their payment

for the dolly rental.

Defendant and his friend placed the dolly in their rented U-Haul truck. The

victim attempted to remove the dolly from the U-Haul truck, but the men hit and

grabbed him. The victim incurred facial injuries and was rendered unconscious.

Regaining consciousness, the victim noticed his phone was gone. He tried to

take the dolly from the truck again. However, Defendant began reversing his truck

in his direction, forcing him to jump back. Defendant hit the victim with the vehicle.

After Defendant and his friend left, the victim called the police. Later that day,

Defendant returned the U-Haul truck and the dolly to the first location.

Defendant was indicted for several crimes based on his interaction with the

victim. A jury convicted Defendant of one count of robbery with a dangerous weapon.

Defendant appeals.

I. Analysis

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On appeal, Defendant presents two issues, which we address in turn.

A. Sufficiency of evidence

Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss

because there was no evidence Defendant intended to permanently deprive the owner

of the dolly’s use.

Our court reviews a trial court’s denial to grant a motion to dismiss de novo.

State v. Smith, 186 N.C. App. 57, 62 (2007). In reviewing the sufficiency of the

evidence for a motion to dismiss, our Court considers whether substantial evidence,

that which a “reasonable mind” might find “adequate to support a conclusion,”

corroborates each element of the charged crime. State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78

(1980). On appeal, evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State. State

v. Beck, 385 N.C. 435, 438 (2023).

Under North Carolina law, to prove robbery, the State must put forth evidence

that the defendant had the intent at the time he took the property to permanently

deprive another of his property. State v. Mann, 355 N.C. 294, 303-304 (2002).

According to our Supreme Court, “[a]lthough a person may wrongfully take the goods,

yet unless he intended to assume the property in them, and to convert them to his

own use, it will amount to a trespass only, and not to a felony.” State v. Sowls, 61

N.C. 151, 153 (1867).

When a defendant fails to demonstrate any concern for restoring the stolen

property to the owner’s possession, this Court infers the defendant intended to

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permanently deprive the owner of his property. Mann, 355 N.C. at 304.

Furthermore, the act of abandonment demonstrates complete indifference to the

owner regaining possession of his property. Id. In contrast, evidence demonstrating

a defendant removed an item from the owner’s possession for “some period of time”

does not equate to permanent deprivation of personal property. State v. Spera, 290

N.C. App. 207, 219 (2023).

Here, there was evidence Defendant took possession of the dolly and removed

it from the second U-Haul facility where the victim worked without ever paying either

facility a rental fee for the dolly. It may be that the jury could infer from the fact he

ultimately returned the dolly to the first location that he did not intend to

permanently deprive that location of the dolly. However, the jury could, in the

alternative, infer from the evidence that Defendant did have intent to keep the dolly

permanently and only changed his mind later that day. Though there was strong

evidence showing Defendant did not intend to permanently deprive U-Haul of the

dolly, we conclude the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State,

was sufficient to submit this issue to the jury.

Defendant also contends there was insufficient evidence to establish that he

knew he was not entitled to the property. Again, in the light most favorable to the

State, we conclude the jury could infer from the circumstances that Defendant knew

he had not paid for the dolly and was thus not entitled to the property. When a party’s

reasons for withholding payment are not “convincing,” and the party has deliberately

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and intentionally avoided payment, a jury may reasonably find the party’s “failure to

pay was intentional, in bad faith, and not due to innocent mistake or honest

disagreement.” Lovell v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 108 N.C. App. 416, 422 (1993).

And here, there was evidence that the victim told Defendant the dolly rental required

separate payment from the U-Haul truck rental.

Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s

motion to dismiss.

B. Flight instruction

Defendant contends the trial court erred in instructing the jury on flight.

“Because Defendant did not object to the jury instructions at trial, we review

for plain error.” State v. Simpson, 230 N.C. App. 119, 123 (2013) (citation omitted).

“To show plain error, a defendant must demonstrate that a fundamental error

occurred at trial. To show that an error was fundamental, a defendant must establish

prejudice—that, after examination of the entire record, the error had a probable

impact on the jury’s finding that the defendant was guilty.” Id. (internal quotations

omitted).

We conclude there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s

instruction on flight, as there was evidence Defendant struck the victim with his

rented U-Haul truck and fled as the victim was attempting to regain possession of

the dolly. If the instruction was error, the instruction may have constituted

prejudicial error. But because the other evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s

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verdict, we conclude any error by the trial court in giving the instruction did not rise

to the level of plain error. See, e.g., State v. Reber, 386 N.C. 153, 160–61 (2024).

III. Conclusion

Though there was strong evidence that Defendant did not commit the crime

for which he was convicted, the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to

the State was sufficient to allow the jury to consider the charge. Further, the evidence

was sufficient for the trial court to instruct on flight. The jury made their call.

Accordingly, we conclude Defendant received a fair trial, free from reversible error.

NO ERROR.

Judge WOOD concurs.

Judge COLLINS concurs in result only.

Report per Rule 30(e).

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