State v. T. L. C.

Opinion

746 September 2, 2026 No. 853

This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In the Matter of T. L. C., a Youth.

STATE OF OREGON,

Respondent,

v. T. L. C., Appellant.

Malheur County Circuit Court 24JU05133; A187188

Erin K. Landis, Judge. Submitted June 17, 2026. Ginger Fitch and Youth, Rights & Justice filed the brief for appellant.

Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General, and Patricia G. Rincon, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.

Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and Leith, Senior Judge.

LEITH, S. J. Affirmed.

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 352 Or App 746 (2026) 747

LEITH, S. J. Youth, T, appeals from a juvenile court judgment finding him within the court’s jurisdiction for acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute assault in the fourth degree. T argues that the state did not present sufficient evidence to prove that charge beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm.

T does not request that we review the record de novo.

Therefore, we review the juvenile court’s legal conclusions for errors of law and, in doing so, we review the record to determine whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the adjudication. State v. D. B. O., 326 Or App 384, 385, 532 P3d 921 (2023). We do not weigh the evidence to reach our own verdict, but instead view the evidence in the light most favorable to the state and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 386. We state the facts in that light, drawing from the juvenile court’s express findings, the testimony, and the bus surveillance video that was the sole exhibit at trial.

At the relevant time, T and the victim were both high school students. T was 14 years old. The incident occurred on a school bus. T was seated toward the back of the bus. To get off the bus at his stop, T had to walk down the aisle past the victim. There is some evidence that he feared that the victim might try to trip him, based on his understanding of her past actions. T carried an item with both hands, one hand gripping a handle on top and one hand securing the bottom. While the testimony describes the item as a binder or notebook, the video surveillance from the bus seems to show something more akin to a structured or padded bag. A red object resembling a water bottle with a silver cap was affixed to or in a pouch on the outside of the bag, facing the victim. As T walked past the victim, he thrust the bag into her face. The victim testified that T did so with all his force. She immediately put her face down against the bus seat and began crying. Her face was bruised purple and blue. It continued to hurt a lot the next day.

A person commits assault in the fourth degree if the person knowingly causes physical injury to another person.

748 State v. T. L. C.

ORS 163.160(1)(a). A person acts knowingly for those purposes if the person is aware of the assaultive nature of their conduct. State v. Sheikhuna, 312 Or App 57, 67, 492 P3d 659 (2021), rev den, 369 Or 209 (2022). The state must also prove that the person acted with at least criminal negligence with respect to the risk that the conduct would cause physical injury. State v. Raney, 331 Or App 693, 701-02, 547 P3d 172 (2024); ORS 161.085(10). Moreover, where, as here, the person asserts the justification of self-defense, the state must prove that self-defense does not apply. ORS 161.055(1).

The juvenile court found that T “clearly knew what he was doing in terms of causing the contact.” That is, the contact was deliberate, not accidental. The court also found the victim’s testimony credible with respect to her injuries . The court concluded that the victim’s injuries met the standard for physical injury as an element of assault in the fourth degree. The court further concluded that T was aware of the assaultive nature of his conduct and was reckless as to the risk of physical injury to the victim.1 Finally, the court concluded that the force used by T was not justified by self-defense.

T challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to his knowledge of the assaultive nature of his conduct, as to his criminal negligence toward the risk of physical injury, and on the state’s burden to disprove his claim of self-defense. We assume without deciding that each of those assignments of error is properly preserved by counsel’s closing argument at trial.

We address T’s arguments relating to the mens rea elements first. T contends that his mental state must be viewed in relation to his immaturity. See State v. L. J. G., 339 Or App 681, 683, 568 P3d 1032 (2025) (record demonstrated that the middle-school youth acted thoughtlessly but not with the requisite intent). He maintains that, viewed through that lens, and considering the “minimal” force used, the evidence is insufficient to support an inference that he was aware of the assaultive nature of his conduct or that he 1 The juvenile court applied a higher standard of culpability than the law required. The law required only proof of criminal negligence. Raney, 331 Or App at 701-02.

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 352 Or App 746 (2026) 749

acted with criminal negligence as to the risk of the resulting injury.

The evidence does not compel T’s characterization of the force used as minimal. It is true that T did not rear back to hit the victim, as the victim initially testified. Instead, the strike involved only a thrust to the victim’s face. But after being corrected on that point, the victim reaffirmed that T hit her “with all his force.” That evidence would support a finding that more than “minimal” force was used. Furthermore, the bag that T used as a weapon clearly had characteristics capable of inflicting physical injury (given that it did cause physical injury), whether because of a rigid water bottle or other item attached to it or because of its other characteristics.

With those predicates, we must decide whether the juvenile court rationally could infer T’s awareness of the assaultive nature of his conduct from his deliberate, twohanded , forceful thrust of such an item into the victim’s face. We must also decide whether the juvenile court rationally could infer that, by striking the victim in that manner, T acted with criminal negligence with respect to the risk of causing physical injury. This appears to be a case of classically assaultive conduct. See State v. English, 269 Or App 395, 401, 343 P3d 1286 (2015) (describing punching someone in the face as classically assaultive conduct). Even allowing for T’s immaturity, a rational trier of fact could find on this record that T was aware of the assaultive nature of his conduct and was criminally negligent with respect to the risk of causing physical injury.

We turn to the sufficiency of the evidence to disprove T’s claim of self-defense. A person who reasonably believes that another will use unlawful force may use that degree of force reasonably necessary for self-defense. ORS 161.209; State v. J. M. W., 340 Or App 44, 47, 569 P3d 702, rev den, 374 Or 419 (2025).

T maintained at trial that the force he used was intended to prevent the victim from tripping him. T testified that others had told him that the victim previously tripped people on the bus, and he did not want to be tripped. He 750 State v. T. L. C.

acknowledged that he did not see the victim’s legs in the aisle on this occasion. The victim testified that she brought her legs in from the aisle to allow others to pass. Indeed, the person in front of T walked past the victim without incident.

The juvenile court rationally could conclude on this record that T lacked a reasonable belief that the victim was going to trip him. His understanding that she had previously tripped others could not, by itself, provide a reasonable basis for such a belief. The court, also, rationally could conclude that, even if the victim had intended to trip T, the force that T used to prevent her from doing so was not reasonable . Sufficient evidence supported the juvenile court’s ruling that self-defense did not apply here.

Affirmed.