[Cite as State v. Sweeting, 2019-Ohio-1970.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NOS. C-170512 C-170513 Plaintiff-Appellant, : TRIAL NO. B-1700599
vs. : O P I N I O N. DEIONANDREA SWEETING, :
Defendant-Appellee. :
Criminal Appeals From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgments Appealed From Are: Reversed and Cause Remanded in C-170513; Appeal Dismissed in C-170512
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: May 22, 2019
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula E. Adams, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellant,
Law Office of Angela Glaser and Angela Glaser, for Defendant-Appellee. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
ZAYAS, Judge. {¶1} On February 1, 2000, in Michigan, defendant-appellee Deionandrea
Sweeting was convicted of two counts of criminal sexual misconduct, fourth-degree
misdemeanors. He served three years in prison and was required under Michigan
law to register as a sex offender quarterly for 25 years. He moved to Ohio in 2006.
The Hamilton County Sheriff’s Office classified Sweeting as a sexually-oriented
offender under Ohio’s version of Megan’s Law. After Ohio enacted the Adam Walsh
Act, the Hamilton County sheriff notified Sweeting that he was classified as a Tier III
sex offender and lifetime registrant.
{¶2} Sweeting filed a petition to contest reclassification in the Hamilton
County Court of Common Pleas in the case numbered SP-0800428. He also filed in
that case a motion to terminate his registration requirement on the basis that he had
“completed the 10 year registration, and finish[ed] the Sex Offender Program.”
Ultimately, on February 7, 2011, the trial court in the case numbered SP-0800428
entered an order determining that Sweeting was classified as a sexually-oriented
offender under Ohio’s version of Megan’s Law, which required him to register
annually for ten years. The order noted that Sweeting had been released from prison
in Michigan on August 2, 2003, “triggering the period of registration for the
underlying charges of his reporting requirement.” The trial court went on in its
order to find that Sweeting had been incarcerated various times in Ohio, which tolled
the reporting requirement pursuant to former R.C. 2950.07(D), and therefore,
Sweeting was required to register annually “until at least May 7, 2017,” and that any
additional periods of incarceration would toll the reporting requirements.
{¶3} On February 3, 2017, in the present case, Sweeting was indicted for
failing to provide periodic verification of his current address on or about December
2 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
27, 2016. Sweeting filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing that his ten-
year duty to register had expired, which the trial court granted. The trial court also
entered an order captioned “Entry Denying Motion for Credit of Time and Terminate
Registration,” which in the body states that the “motion is well taken, and is herein
GRANTED.” The state has appealed from the order granting the motion to dismiss
the indictment in the appeal numbered C-170513 and from the order on the credit of
time and the termination of the duty to register in the appeal numbered C-170512.
{¶4} The state’s first assignment of error alleges that the trial court erred in
granting Sweeting’s motion to dismiss the indictment. The state argues that
Sweeting already sought and obtained out-of-state registration credit in the case
numbered SP-0800428, and that the trial court in that case correctly applied former
R.C. 2950.07(D)’s tolling provisions and calculated Sweeting’s registration credit.
Further, the state argues that the court’s order in that case required Sweeting to
register “until at least May 7, 2017,” and that since Sweeting was indicted for failing
to register on or about December 27, 2016, the trial court in the present case clearly
erred in dismissing the indictment.
{¶5} In the case numbered SP-0800428, Sweeting filed a petition for
reclassification under former R.C. 2950.09(F) and a motion to terminate his
registration requirement pursuant to former R.C. 2950.07(E). In his motion to
terminate his registration requirement, he requested credit for the time he had
registered in Michigan and argued that he had completed his registration
requirement. The court ultimately granted Sweeting’s petition for reclassification,
entering an order classifying him as a sexually-oriented offender. The court’s order
also addressed the credit against his registration period that Sweeting had requested.
The court applied R.C. 2950.07(D) and determined that Sweeting had a duty to
register “once per year, until at least May 7, 2017.” The order also stated, “Any
3 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
additional periods of incarceration will toll reporting requirements according to
[former R.C.] 2950.07(D).”
{¶6} The Ohio Supreme Court has stated, “In our jurisprudence, there is a
firm and longstanding principle that final judgments are meant to be just that—
final.” Ohio Pyro, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, Div. of State Fire Marshal, 115
Ohio St.3d 375, 2007-Ohio-5024, 875 N.E.2d 550, ¶ 22. Collateral estoppel, also
known as issue preclusion, “precludes the relitigation of an issue that has been
‘actually and necessarily determined in a prior action.’ ” Fort Frye Teachers Assn.,
OEA/NEA v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 102 Ohio St.3d 283, 2004-Ohio-2947, 809
N.E.2d 1130, ¶ 10, citing Krahn v. Kinney, 43 Ohio St.3d 103, 107, 538 N.E.2d 1058
(1989), quoting Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 2 Ohio St.3d 193, 195,
443 N.E.2d 978 (1983).
{¶7} The court’s determinations as to the amount of registration credit to
which Sweeting was entitled and the length of his remaining reporting period were
actually litigated and determined in the case numbered SP-0800428 and were valid
and necessary parts of the court’s final judgment in that case. Therefore, Sweeting is
precluded by collateral estoppel from challenging them in the present case.
{¶8} Because the court in the case numbered SP-0800428 ordered that
Sweeting’s registration period runs “until at least May 7, 2017,” the trial court in the
present case erred in dismissing the indictment, which alleged that Sweeting had
failed to verify his current address in December of 2016. The first assignment of
error is sustained.
{¶9} The state’s second assignment of error alleges, “The trial court erred to
the extent that its ‘entry denying motion for credit of time and terminate registration’
indicates that the motion is granted.” The court’s order states in the caption that the
motion is denied, but states in the body that it is granted. The record shows that the
4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
trial court overruled the motion. The court stated, “So your two motions to credit
time, denied. I’m dismissing your case. * * * I’m just dismissing this charge that he’s
got in case number B-1700599. If he still has to register, that’s not – I didn’t order
anything on that. I’m just dismissing this charge.
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[Cite as State v. Sweeting, 2019-Ohio-1970.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NOS. C-170512 C-170513 Plaintiff-Appellant, : TRIAL NO. B-1700599
vs. : O P I N I O N. DEIONANDREA SWEETING, :
Defendant-Appellee. :
Criminal Appeals From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgments Appealed From Are: Reversed and Cause Remanded in C-170513; Appeal Dismissed in C-170512
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: May 22, 2019
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula E. Adams, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellant,
Law Office of Angela Glaser and Angela Glaser, for Defendant-Appellee. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
ZAYAS, Judge. {¶1} On February 1, 2000, in Michigan, defendant-appellee Deionandrea
Sweeting was convicted of two counts of criminal sexual misconduct, fourth-degree
misdemeanors. He served three years in prison and was required under Michigan
law to register as a sex offender quarterly for 25 years. He moved to Ohio in 2006.
The Hamilton County Sheriff’s Office classified Sweeting as a sexually-oriented
offender under Ohio’s version of Megan’s Law. After Ohio enacted the Adam Walsh
Act, the Hamilton County sheriff notified Sweeting that he was classified as a Tier III
sex offender and lifetime registrant.
{¶2} Sweeting filed a petition to contest reclassification in the Hamilton
County Court of Common Pleas in the case numbered SP-0800428. He also filed in
that case a motion to terminate his registration requirement on the basis that he had
“completed the 10 year registration, and finish[ed] the Sex Offender Program.”
Ultimately, on February 7, 2011, the trial court in the case numbered SP-0800428
entered an order determining that Sweeting was classified as a sexually-oriented
offender under Ohio’s version of Megan’s Law, which required him to register
annually for ten years. The order noted that Sweeting had been released from prison
in Michigan on August 2, 2003, “triggering the period of registration for the
underlying charges of his reporting requirement.” The trial court went on in its
order to find that Sweeting had been incarcerated various times in Ohio, which tolled
the reporting requirement pursuant to former R.C. 2950.07(D), and therefore,
Sweeting was required to register annually “until at least May 7, 2017,” and that any
additional periods of incarceration would toll the reporting requirements.
{¶3} On February 3, 2017, in the present case, Sweeting was indicted for
failing to provide periodic verification of his current address on or about December
2 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
27, 2016. Sweeting filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing that his ten-
year duty to register had expired, which the trial court granted. The trial court also
entered an order captioned “Entry Denying Motion for Credit of Time and Terminate
Registration,” which in the body states that the “motion is well taken, and is herein
GRANTED.” The state has appealed from the order granting the motion to dismiss
the indictment in the appeal numbered C-170513 and from the order on the credit of
time and the termination of the duty to register in the appeal numbered C-170512.
{¶4} The state’s first assignment of error alleges that the trial court erred in
granting Sweeting’s motion to dismiss the indictment. The state argues that
Sweeting already sought and obtained out-of-state registration credit in the case
numbered SP-0800428, and that the trial court in that case correctly applied former
R.C. 2950.07(D)’s tolling provisions and calculated Sweeting’s registration credit.
Further, the state argues that the court’s order in that case required Sweeting to
register “until at least May 7, 2017,” and that since Sweeting was indicted for failing
to register on or about December 27, 2016, the trial court in the present case clearly
erred in dismissing the indictment.
{¶5} In the case numbered SP-0800428, Sweeting filed a petition for
reclassification under former R.C. 2950.09(F) and a motion to terminate his
registration requirement pursuant to former R.C. 2950.07(E). In his motion to
terminate his registration requirement, he requested credit for the time he had
registered in Michigan and argued that he had completed his registration
requirement. The court ultimately granted Sweeting’s petition for reclassification,
entering an order classifying him as a sexually-oriented offender. The court’s order
also addressed the credit against his registration period that Sweeting had requested.
The court applied R.C. 2950.07(D) and determined that Sweeting had a duty to
register “once per year, until at least May 7, 2017.” The order also stated, “Any
3 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
additional periods of incarceration will toll reporting requirements according to
[former R.C.] 2950.07(D).”
{¶6} The Ohio Supreme Court has stated, “In our jurisprudence, there is a
firm and longstanding principle that final judgments are meant to be just that—
final.” Ohio Pyro, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, Div. of State Fire Marshal, 115
Ohio St.3d 375, 2007-Ohio-5024, 875 N.E.2d 550, ¶ 22. Collateral estoppel, also
known as issue preclusion, “precludes the relitigation of an issue that has been
‘actually and necessarily determined in a prior action.’ ” Fort Frye Teachers Assn.,
OEA/NEA v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 102 Ohio St.3d 283, 2004-Ohio-2947, 809
N.E.2d 1130, ¶ 10, citing Krahn v. Kinney, 43 Ohio St.3d 103, 107, 538 N.E.2d 1058
(1989), quoting Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 2 Ohio St.3d 193, 195,
443 N.E.2d 978 (1983).
{¶7} The court’s determinations as to the amount of registration credit to
which Sweeting was entitled and the length of his remaining reporting period were
actually litigated and determined in the case numbered SP-0800428 and were valid
and necessary parts of the court’s final judgment in that case. Therefore, Sweeting is
precluded by collateral estoppel from challenging them in the present case.
{¶8} Because the court in the case numbered SP-0800428 ordered that
Sweeting’s registration period runs “until at least May 7, 2017,” the trial court in the
present case erred in dismissing the indictment, which alleged that Sweeting had
failed to verify his current address in December of 2016. The first assignment of
error is sustained.
{¶9} The state’s second assignment of error alleges, “The trial court erred to
the extent that its ‘entry denying motion for credit of time and terminate registration’
indicates that the motion is granted.” The court’s order states in the caption that the
motion is denied, but states in the body that it is granted. The record shows that the
4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
trial court overruled the motion. The court stated, “So your two motions to credit
time, denied. I’m dismissing your case. * * * I’m just dismissing this charge that he’s
got in case number B-1700599. If he still has to register, that’s not – I didn’t order
anything on that. I’m just dismissing this charge. That’s all.” The state is not
aggrieved by the court’s order overruling the motion, and therefore, cannot appeal
from it. See Contract Carriers Assn. v. Pub. Util. Comm. of Ohio, 140 Ohio St. 160,
42 N.E.2d 758 (1942), syllabus (“Appeal lies only on behalf of a party aggrieved by
the final order appealed from.”); Young v. UC Health, West Chester Hosp., LLC,
2016-Ohio-5526, 61 N.E.3d 34, ¶ 17 (1st Dist.). The state’s appeal from the court’s
order overruling the motion must be dismissed.1
{¶10} In the appeal numbered C-170513, the judgment of the trial court
dismissing the indictment is reversed, and this cause is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with law and this opinion. The appeal numbered C-170512 is
dismissed. We point out that the entry appealed from in C-170512 contains a clerical
error in the body that should be corrected by the trial court.
Judgment accordingly.
MOCK, P.J., and BERGERON, J., concur.
Please note: The court has recorded its own entry this date.
1We note that the state filed a motion, which this court granted, for leave to appeal from the trial court’s order “to the extent that the entry grants the defendant’s motion.” A review of the record shows that the trial court overruled the motion in its entirety. Therefore, the state is not an aggrieved party and there is no basis on which the state may prosecute an appeal from the court’s order.