State v. Swartz

• Court: Court of Appeals of Oregon
• Decided: May 6, 2026
• Docket: A186246
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

350 May 6, 2026 No. 383

This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ROBERT CHARLES SWARTZ, Defendant-Appellant. Coos County Circuit Court 24CR26735; A186246

Andrew E. Combs, Judge. Submitted March 13, 2026. Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Nora Coon, Deputy Public Defender, and Erik Blumenthal, Deputy Public Defender, filed the brief for appellant. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General, and Carson L. Whitehead, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Lagesen, Chief Judge, and Egan, Judge.* EGAN, J. Affirmed.

______________ * Determined by a two-judge department as authorized by ORS 2.570(2)(b). Nonprecedential Memo Op: 349 Or App 350 (2026) 351

EGAN, J. Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for one count of felon in possession of a firearm, ORS 166.270. On appeal, in his only assignment of error, defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion for judgment of acquit- tal on the grounds that, as applied here, Oregon’s felon-in- possession statute, ORS 166.270, violates Article I, section 27, of the Oregon Constitution and the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. We affirm. Defendant contends ORS 166.270 is unconstitu- tional as applied to him, because, “[a]t most, the historical tradition of both [the United States and Oregon] constitu- tions might support limited disarmament of persons with violent felonies,” but here, “the state convicted defendant for having unlawfully possessed a firearm while having only a single prior, nonviolent felony conviction: unlawful posses- sion of methamphetamine.” Defendant acknowledges that State v. Parras, 326 Or App 246, 531 P3d 711 (2023), rev dismissed as improv- idently allowed, 373 Or 284 (2025), and State v. Shelnutt, 309 Or App 474, 483 P3d 53, rev den, 368 Or 206 (2021), “foreclose his constitutional arguments.” He argues, how- ever, that those cases are “wrongly decided because they failed to address the controlling issues adequately, did not consider all the arguments presented herein, and did not have the benefit of recent changes in the law surrounding the right to bear arms.” On the latter point, in particular, defendant points to the United States Supreme Court deci- sion in United States v. Rahimi, 602 US 680, 699, 144 S Ct 1889, 219 L Ed 2d 351 (2024).1 Having considered the parties’ arguments, we agree that defendant’s constitutional challenges are fore- closed by Parras and Shelnutt, and we are not persuaded that our decisions in Parras or Shelnutt are “plainly wrong.” That is a “rigorous standard” that, in our view, defendant 1 We note that defendant preserved his Second Amendment challenge to ORS 166.270, but did not preserve his Article I, section 27 challenge. Regarding the latter, he asks us to review for plain error. But as is evident from our analysis in this opinion, even if defendant had preserved his Article I, section 27 chal- lenge, it would not change the disposition in this case. 352 State v. Swartz

has not met. See State v. Civil, 283 Or App 395, 417, 388 P3d 1185 (2017) (holding “due regard for stare decisis and our predecessors’ collegial commitment demands that ‘plainly wrong’ be a rigorous standard, satisfied only in exceptional circumstances”). In reaching that conclusion, we note that in United States v. Rahimi, 602 US 680, 144 S Ct 1889, 219 L Ed 2d 351 (2024), on which defendant relies, the United States Supreme Court explained that under the Second Amendment “prohi- bitions, like those on the possession of firearms by felons * * * are presumptively lawful.” Id. at 699 (internal quota- tion marks omitted). And, subsequent to Rahimi, in State v. Ivey, 342 Or App 649, 577 P3d 884 (2025), rev den, 374 Or 616 (2025), we reaffirmed the continuing viability of our analysis Parras. Ivey, 342 Or App at 658 (noting “Parras is both controlling and correct”). Further, in Ivey, we rejected the defendant’s as-applied Second Amendment challenge to ORS 166.270, reasoning that the defendant’s crime of conviction in that case—unlawful use of a motor vehicle—was “closely analo- gous to well-established historical offenses including lar- ceny, horse rustling, or trespass to chattels,” and as a result, defendant’s as-applied challenge failed. Ivey, 342 Or App at 658. On appeal, defendant does not explain why, if even after Rahimi as we have interpreted it, a felon can be con- stitutionally prohibited from owning firearms on the basis of a conviction for unlawful use of a motor vehicle, as we concluded in Ivey, he cannot be constitutionally prohibited from owning firearms on the basis of felony possession of methamphetamine. Consequently, we affirm. Affirmed.