State v. SUROWSKI

212 P.3d 229, 42 Kan. App. 2d 304, 2009 Kan. App. LEXIS 763
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kansas
DecidedJuly 17, 2009
Docket100,121
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 212 P.3d 229 (State v. SUROWSKI) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. SUROWSKI, 212 P.3d 229, 42 Kan. App. 2d 304, 2009 Kan. App. LEXIS 763 (kanctapp 2009).

Opinion

Caplinger, J.:

The State challenges the order of the district court dismissing Count I against defendant Katherine Surowski. The State argues the district court erroneously concluded that the unlawful possession of Lortab is a misdemeanor under K.S.A. 65-4109(d) rather than a felony under K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 65-4160(a). We agree, and we find that under the plain language of K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 65-4160(a), possession of narcotics is a felony. Because neither party disputes that Lortab contains hydrocodone, a narcotic, the district court erred in finding that possession of Lortab is not a felony under K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 65-4160(a).

Factual and procedural background

Count II charged Surowski with theft in violation of K.S.A. 21-3701(a)(1). Count I charged that Surowski

“unlawfully, feloniously and intentionally possessed, or exerted control over, an opiate drug [to wit: hydrocodone, a schedule II substance identified at K.S. A. 65- *305 4107(b)(l)(N)]. In violation of K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 65-4160(a): POSSESSION OF HYDROCODONE, a drug severity level 4, nonperson felony.”

At the preliminary hearing, Kelly Goracke, a Wal-Mart manager, testified that Surowski was observed diverting hydrocodone from the Junction City Wal-Mart pharmacy where she was employed as a licensed pharmacist. Goracke further testified that Surowski subsequently admitted to taking 20-40 pills per month.

Following the preliminaiy hearing, Surowski moved to dismiss Count I, arguing that although she was charged with possession of a schedule II narcotic under K.S.A. 65-4107(b)(l)(N), she admitted only to possessing Lortab, a schedule III narcotic listed in K.S.A. 65-4109(d)(4). Surowski contended she was improperly charged with a felony under K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 65-4160(a) because possession of a schedule III narcotic is only a class A misdemeanor under K.S.A. 65-4127c.

The State argued that because both hydrocodone and Lortab, which contains hydrocodone and acetaminophen, are narcotics, and because K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 65-4160 makes it a felony to possess any narcotic, Surowski was appropriately charged with a felony.

The district court agreed with Surowski, finding that possession of Lortab, hydrocodone, a schedule III drug listed in K.S.A. 65-4109(d), is a misdemeanor rather than a felony. The court therefore dismissed Count I and invited the State to refile an amended charge.

Discussion

In this appeal of the dismissal of Count I, the State challenges the district court’s determination that unlawful possession of Lortab constitutes a misdemeanor rather than a felony under K.S.A. 65-4160(a).

We conduct a de novo review of the evidence when considering a trial court’s probable cause finding. State v. Kraushaar, 264 Kan. 667, 670, 957 P.2d 1106 (1998). Further, we exercise unlimited review over a question of statutory interpretation. Foster v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 281 Kan. 368, 374, 130 P.3d 560 (2006). In conducting this review, we are mindful of the fundamental rule of statutory construction, i.e., the intent of the legislature governs *306 when that intent can be ascertained from the statute. Further, when a statute is plain and unambiguous, we must give effect to the intention of the legislature rather than determine what the law should or should not be. State v. Moler, 269 Kan. 362, 363, 2 P.3d 773 (2000).

Surowski was charged with a felony under K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 65-4160(a), which provides:

“Except as authorized by the uniform controlled substances act, it shall be unlawful for any person to possess or have under such person’s control any opiates, opium or narcotic drugs, or any stimulant designated in subsection (d)(1), (d)(3) or (f)(1) ofK.S.A. 65-4107 and amendments thereto. Any person who violates this subsection shall he guilty of a drug severity level 4 felony.” (Emphasis added.)

The district court concluded that a substance must be listed in K.S.A. 65-4107(d)(l), (d)(3), or (f)(1) in order to constitute a felony under K.S.A. 65-4160(a). We disagree.

Initially, we note that the title of K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 65-4160 indicates its application to several categories of drugs: “Unlawful acts relating to possession of opiates, opium, narcotic drugs or designated stimulants; penalties.” (Emphasis added.) The text of K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 65-4160(a) is equally clear, indicating its application to: (1) opiates, (2) opium or narcotic drugs, and (3) stimulants designated in K.S.A. 65-4107(d)(l), (d)(3), or (f)(1) (i.e., amphetamine, methamphetamine, and immediate precursors to amphetamine and methamphetamine). The statute does not suggest, as the trial court found, that a substance must be listed in K.S.A. 65-4107 in order to constitute a felony, except as it pertains to certain stimulants.

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Related

State v. Collins
280 P.3d 763 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 2012)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
212 P.3d 229, 42 Kan. App. 2d 304, 2009 Kan. App. LEXIS 763, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-surowski-kanctapp-2009.