State v. . Surles

Supreme Court of North Carolina

State v. . Surles

74 N.C. 330

DecidedJanuary 5, 1876

StatusPublished

This text of 74 N.C. 330 (State v. . Surles) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. . Surles, 74 N.C. 330 (N.C. 1876).

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Opinion

Settle, J.

The indictment charges the defendants with a forcible trespass, in taking and carrying away from the actual possession of the prosecutor, a certain stack of fodder, he, the prosecutor, being personally present forbidding the defendants so to do.

The defendant Surles says he cannot be convicted of this, offense, because he was the landlord of Norris, the prosecutor* and the whole crop, raised by the prosecutor, was vested in him, Surles, by force of the Act of 1874-’5, chap. 209, ratified the 19th day of March, A. D., 1875.

His Honor mentions the fact, that, at the request of the defendants, the whole evidence given on the trial, is sent up with the record.

From this it will be seen that Norris rented the land from Surles for the year 1875 ; that one-third of the fodder belonged to Surles ; that it had not been divided; and the agreement between them was to settle on the first day of January* 1876.

These facts are not controverted. Then, whatever rights-had accrued to either party, under the contract, could not be effected by the act ratified on the 19th day of March, A. D, 1875. To give it the effect contended for, would clearly violate the contract already made between the parties.

But even if this contract was embraced by the act, it provides, in terms, how a party claiming this constructive possession, shall proceed to enforce his demand before the courts, *334 which would seein to negative the idea that he could take redress in his own hands.

But the defendants further say they were not forbidden to take one-third of the fodder. We do not see how that helps them. It certainly did not amount to a license to take the other two-thirds. And the only bearing it would seem to have upon the case, is to aggravate the offence of the defendants. We need not notice the other points made in behalf of the ■defendants, further than to say that the charge of his Honor was a clear and concise statement of the law applicable to the •■case before him. We could not add to its force by repeating it.

The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.

Let this be certified, &c.

Peb CdbiAM. Judgment affirmed.

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Settle, J.

The indictment charges the defendants with a forcible trespass, in taking and carrying away from the actual possession of the prosecutor, a certain stack of fodder, he, the prosecutor, being personally present forbidding the defendants so to do.

The defendant Surles says he cannot be convicted of this, offense, because he was the landlord of Norris, the prosecutor* and the whole crop, raised by the prosecutor, was vested in him, Surles, by force of the Act of 1874-’5, chap. 209, ratified the 19th day of March, A. D., 1875.

His Honor mentions the fact, that, at the request of the defendants, the whole evidence given on the trial, is sent up with the record.

From this it will be seen that Norris rented the land from Surles for the year 1875 ; that one-third of the fodder belonged to Surles ; that it had not been divided; and the agreement between them was to settle on the first day of January* 1876.

These facts are not controverted. Then, whatever rights-had accrued to either party, under the contract, could not be effected by the act ratified on the 19th day of March, A. D, 1875. To give it the effect contended for, would clearly violate the contract already made between the parties.

But even if this contract was embraced by the act, it provides, in terms, how a party claiming this constructive possession, shall proceed to enforce his demand before the courts, *334 which would seein to negative the idea that he could take redress in his own hands.

But the defendants further say they were not forbidden to take one-third of the fodder. We do not see how that helps them. It certainly did not amount to a license to take the other two-thirds. And the only bearing it would seem to have upon the case, is to aggravate the offence of the defendants. We need not notice the other points made in behalf of the ■defendants, further than to say that the charge of his Honor was a clear and concise statement of the law applicable to the •■case before him. We could not add to its force by repeating it.

The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.

Let this be certified, &c.

Peb CdbiAM. Judgment affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)

74 N.C. 330, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-surles-nc-1876.