State v. Sumpter

• Court: Court of Appeals of South Carolina
• Decided: September 25, 2003
• Docket: 2003-UP-545
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

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The State,        Respondent,

v.

Alvin William Sumpter,        Appellant.

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Appeal From Orangeburg County
James C. Williams, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

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Unpublished Opinion No. 2003-UP- 545
Submitted July 15, 2003 – Filed September 25, 2003   

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AFFIRMED

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Senior Assistant Appellate Defender Wanda H. Haile, of Columbia, for Appellant

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster; Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh;  Assistant Deputy Attorney General Charles H. Richardson, of Columbia, Walter M. Bailey, Jr., of Summerville, for Respondent(s).

PER CURIAM:  Alvin William Sumpter was indicted for attempted armed robbery.  He was convicted and sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. Sumpter appeals, arguing the trial judge erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict where there was no evidence of intent to commit attempted armed robbery.  We affirm.

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Catherine E. Winningham worked for Home Insurance Agency.  Her office was divided into two distinct offices:  one room with a waist-high counter where she handled insurance matters and a separate room where Western Union exchanges were handled.   At around 4:00 p.m. on the afternoon of September 24, 2001, a tall black male and a short black male walked into the insurance agency.  The tall male stood by the front door while the short male approached the counter and asked Winningham for a quote on insurance.   Winningham walked to her computer to get a quote, and she turned around to ask the short male some information.  At that point, the short male jumped over the counter and pointed a gun in Winningham’s face.  Winningham began to scream, ignoring the short male’s orders to be quiet and get on the floor.  Her screams alerted Mary Jane Goodine in the parking lot, and the two males fled the building without taking anything.   Nearby police officers witnessed the two men running from the office and a chase ensued.  Sumpter, who had a gun, and John Henry Chancy were arrested a short time thereafter.   The next day, Winningham identified Sumpter as the short male and Chancy as the tall male from a photo lineup.  

Winningham testified at trial that she observed the short male wearing a blue shirt and dark jeans and the tall male wearing jeans and a light gray sweatshirt.   Winningham testified that after the short male jumped over the counter, she knew that the man did not want a quote and she was going to be robbed.  She stated that cash was not kept in the insurance office because there was a separate room where it was kept.  When asked whether the gunman ever asked her for cash or her purse, Winningham stated: “He couldn’t get me to stop screaming enough, I don’t think, to ask me anything.”  

Mary Jane Goodine testified that as she was leaving the insurance agency, she passed the two males entering.  She stated she was standing in the parking lot when she heard Winningham start to scream.   Goodine screamed “robbery, robbery, robbery,” to get the attention of the nearby police officer directing traffic before she approached the insurance office.  The two men bumped into Goodine as they ran out of the insurance agency.  Goodine described the two men to police as a short male wearing a blue jogging jacket or shirt and a taller male wearing a dark gray sweatshirt.  In court, Goodine identified Sumpter as the short male.    

After the presentation of the State’s case, Sumpter moved for a directed verdict, arguing there was no evidence of intent to commit a robbery because there was no request for money. The trial judge denied the motion, finding there was substantial circumstantial evidence that Sumpter’s intent was to commit a robbery.  Sumpter renewed his motion after testifying and presenting the testimony of two alibi witnesses.   The trial judge again denied the motion.   Sumpter was convicted of the charge and he appeals.  

ISSUE

Whether the trial court erred in denying Sumpter’s motion for a directed verdict on the charge of attempted armed robbery because there was no proof of any attempt to take goods from the victim?

DISCUSSION

Sumpter argues the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for a directed verdict because there was no evidence that the gunman intended to take money or goods or that there was any money or goods to take in order to commit a robbery. 

On appeal from the denial of a directed verdict, an appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State.  State v. Lollis, 343 S.C. 580, 583, 541 S.E.2d 254, 256 (2001); State v. Burdette, 335 S.C. 34, 46, 515 S.E.2d 525, 531 (1999); State v. Kelsey, 331 S.C. 50, 62, 502 S.E.2d 63, 69 (1998).  When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court is concerned with the existence of evidence, not its weight.  Burdette, 335 S.C. at 46, 515 S.E.2d at 531; State v. Wakefield, 323 S.C. 189, 196, 473 S.E.2d 831, 835 (Ct. App. 1996).  “If there is any direct or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, an appellate court must find the case was properly submitted to the jury.”  Lollis, 343 S.C. at 584, 541 S.E.2d at 256.  Conversely, a trial court should grant a motion for a directed verdict when the evidence merely raises a suspicion the accused is guilty.  Id. 

“Robbery is defined as the felonious or unlawful taking of money, goods or other personal property of any value from the person of another or in his presence by violence or by putting such person in fear.”  State v. Bland, 318 S.C. 315, 317, 457 S.E.2d 611, 612 (1995) (citations omitted).  It is a felony to commit robbery while armed with a deadly weapon.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-330(A) (2003).  Attempted armed robbery is also a felony.  S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-330(B) (2003) (“A person who commits attempted armed robbery while armed with a pistol . . . or other deadly weapon, is guilty of a felony . . . .”).  Attempted armed robbery is defined as acts towards the commission of a robbery with the intent to commit the robbery, but the act falls short of actual completion.  See State v. Hiott, 276 S.C. 72, 80, 276 S.E.2d 163, 167 (1981).  The “act” towards the commission of the robbery is to be liberally construed, and it is sufficient if the act goes “far enough toward accomplishment of the crime to amount to the commencement of its consummation.”  State v. Quick, 199 S.C. 256, 259, 19 S.E.2d 101, 102 (1942).

This Court has addressed acts sufficient to constitute attempted armed robbery.  In State v. Nesbitt, 346 S.C. 226, 550 S.E.2d 864 (Ct. App. 2001), an armed and masked man approached the front door of a convenience store, waiving a gun.  The gunman did not point the gun at anyone, he did not enter the store, and he fled the scene within seconds.  Nesbitt was charged and convicted of attempted armed robbery.  In affirming the trial court’s denial of Nesbitt’s motion for a directed verdict, we addressed the intent requirements of attempt crimes:

Attempt crimes are generally ones of specific intent such that the act constituting the attempt must be done with the intent to commit that particular crime.  State v. Sutton, 340 S.C. 393, 532 S.E.2d 283 (2000).  “In the context of an ‘attempt’ crime, specific intent means that the defendant consciously intended the completion of acts comprising the choate offense.  In other words, the completion of such acts is the defendant’s purpose.”  Id. at 397, 532 S.E.2d at 285 (citing United States v. Calloway, 116 F.3d 1129 (6th Cir.1997)).  Additionally, the State must prove that the defendant’s specific intent was accompanied by some overt act, beyond mere preparation, in furtherance of the intent, and there must be an actual or present ability to complete the crime.  State v. Evans, 216 S.C. 328, 57 S.E.2d 756 (1950);  State v. Quick, 199 S.C. 256, 19 S.E.2d 101 (1942).  “The preparation consists in devising or arranging the means or measures necessary for the commission of the crime; the attempt or overt act is the direct movement toward the commission, after the preparations are made.”  Quick, 199 S.C. at 260, 19 S.E.2d at 103.

Nesbitt, 346 S.C. at 231, 550 S.E.2d at 866.  This Court determined a jury could infer from the evidence that “an armed robbery was immediately forthcoming, or that the attempt had begun.”  Id. at 234, 550 S.E.2d at 868.

Viewing the evidence in this case in the light most favorable to the State, substantial evidence existed that Sumpter had the intent to commit armed robbery.  Sumpter jumped over the counter, pointed a gun at Winningham, and demanded that she get down on the floor.  Although Sumpter fled the scene prior to making a demand for money and any money available was located in another room, the act of pointing the gun at Winningham was an overt act towards completing the crime of armed robbery.  As in Nesbitt, the jury in the present case could infer from the evidence that the gunman was attempting to commit armed robbery. 

Because the intent to commit armed robbery can be inferred from the circumstantial evidence in this case, we find the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in submitting this case to the jury.

Accordingly, the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for a directed verdict is

AFFIRMED.

HEARN, C.J., CONNOR and ANDERSON, JJ., concur.