State v. Sumpter

Court of Appeals of South Carolina

State v. Sumpter

513 S.E.2d 373, 334 S.C. 369, 1999 S.C. App. LEXIS 22

CourtCourt of Appeals of South Carolina

DecidedFebruary 8, 1999

Docket2939

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 513 S.E.2d 373 (State v. Sumpter) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. Sumpter, 513 S.E.2d 373, 334 S.C. 369, 1999 S.C. App. LEXIS 22 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Respondent, Harry Lee Sumpter (Sumpter) was convicted of two counts of breach of trust with fraudulent intent. He was sentenced to serve eight years, suspended upon the service of eighteen months and five years probation. Sumpter was charged with violation of his probation. At the probation revocation hearing, it was determined Sumpter had only 30 days left on his probation sentence. Nevertheless, the trial court ordered Sumpter to remain in jail until he was accepted at a Restitution Center. The court further ordered that Sumpter spend six months at the Restitution Center, apparently as a condition of his probation. The State appeals, asserting the trial court’s order violates S.C.Code Ann. § 24-21 — 440 1 because it requires the Department of Probation, *371 Pardon, and Parole to supervise Sumpter for a longer period of time than the statute authorizes. 2

Here it is clear that the trial court’s order extending Sumpter’s probation beyond the five years authorized by statute is an illegal sentence and must be reversed. See generally Horn v. Davis Elec. Constructors, Inc., 307 S.C. 559, 416 S.E.2d 634 (1992) (when construing a statute, courts must determine the intent of the legislature); First Baptist Church of Mauldin v. City of Mauldin, 308 S.C. 226, 417 S.E.2d 592 (1992) (the words of a statute must be given their plain and ordinary meaning); and Whiteside v. Cherokee Co. School Dist. No. 1, 311 S.C. 335, 428 S.E.2d 886 (1993) (statutes as a whole must receive practical, reasonable and fair interpretation consonant with the purpose, design, and policy of lawmakers).

REVERSED.

CURETON, GOOLSBY and HOWARD, JJ., concur.

1

. This section provides that the "period of probation ... shall not exceed a period of five years ... and may be continued or extended within the above limit.”

2

. Because oral argument would not aid the court in resolving the issues on appeal, we decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.

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PER CURIAM:

Respondent, Harry Lee Sumpter (Sumpter) was convicted of two counts of breach of trust with fraudulent intent. He was sentenced to serve eight years, suspended upon the service of eighteen months and five years probation. Sumpter was charged with violation of his probation. At the probation revocation hearing, it was determined Sumpter had only 30 days left on his probation sentence. Nevertheless, the trial court ordered Sumpter to remain in jail until he was accepted at a Restitution Center. The court further ordered that Sumpter spend six months at the Restitution Center, apparently as a condition of his probation. The State appeals, asserting the trial court’s order violates S.C.Code Ann. § 24-21 — 440 1 because it requires the Department of Probation, *371 Pardon, and Parole to supervise Sumpter for a longer period of time than the statute authorizes. 2

Here it is clear that the trial court’s order extending Sumpter’s probation beyond the five years authorized by statute is an illegal sentence and must be reversed. See generally Horn v. Davis Elec. Constructors, Inc., 307 S.C. 559, 416 S.E.2d 634 (1992) (when construing a statute, courts must determine the intent of the legislature); First Baptist Church of Mauldin v. City of Mauldin, 308 S.C. 226, 417 S.E.2d 592 (1992) (the words of a statute must be given their plain and ordinary meaning); and Whiteside v. Cherokee Co. School Dist. No. 1, 311 S.C. 335, 428 S.E.2d 886 (1993) (statutes as a whole must receive practical, reasonable and fair interpretation consonant with the purpose, design, and policy of lawmakers).

REVERSED.

CURETON, GOOLSBY and HOWARD, JJ., concur.

1

. This section provides that the "period of probation ... shall not exceed a period of five years ... and may be continued or extended within the above limit.”

2

. Because oral argument would not aid the court in resolving the issues on appeal, we decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.

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513 S.E.2d 373, 334 S.C. 369, 1999 S.C. App. LEXIS 22, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-sumpter-scctapp-1999.

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