[Cite as State v. Sturdivant, 2026-Ohio-2074.]
IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT STARK COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO Case No. 2025-CA-00086
Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Stark County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2025CR0724C JORDAN WORTHEY-STURDIVANT Judgment: Affirmed Defendant - Appellant Date of Judgment Entry: June 2, 2026
BEFORE: Craig R. Baldwin, Kevin W. Popham, and David M. Gormley, Judges
APPEARANCES: Christopher A. Piekarski, for Plaintiff-Appellee; Mary Catherine Corrigan, for Defendant-Appellant
OPINION
Popham, J.,
{¶1} Appellant Jordan Worthey-Sturdivant (“Worthey-Sturdivant”) appeals his
conviction and sentence after a jury trial in the Court of Common Pleas for Stark County,
Ohio. For the reasons below, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} The Stark County Grand Jury indicted 19-year-old Worthey-Sturdivant on
one count of felonious assault, a second-degree felony. Worthey-Sturdivant filed a motion
to remand the case to juvenile court, arguing that, because he was in the custody of the
Ohio Department of Youth Services (“DYS”) at the time of the alleged incident, the
charges should have originated in juvenile court. {¶3} The case proceeded to a jury trial with two co-defendants, Carreyon Dukes
and Demonte Williams. Prior to voir dire, the trial court addressed Worthey-Sturdivant’s
motion to remand the case to the juvenile court:
Okay. We talked about that. I did not receive a copy of that yet, but
I’ve received the same motion in other cases ... And we talked about it at the
pretrial, and I indicated that I would deny that.
(1 Tr. 7-8.)1
{¶4} The parties stipulated to the admissibility of the victim’s medical records
and the surveillance videos. (2 Tr. 154-155.) Only two witnesses testified at trial.
Testimony of Trooper Jason Halstead
{¶5} Trooper Jason Halstead of the Ohio State Highway Patrol testified that he
works in the Office of Investigative Services, which functions as a detective bureau. (2 Tr.
at 159.) His duties include investigating crimes occurring within DYS facilities.
{¶6} Halstead testified that he was assigned to investigate an incident at the
Indian River Juvenile Correctional Facility, one of three male juvenile correctional
facilities in Ohio that houses youth ages fourteen through twenty-one. (2 Tr. 160.)
Halstead testified that he was notified two days after the incident had occurred. (2 Tr.
160-161.)
{¶7} The incident was captured on surveillance video, which was admitted into
evidence. (2 Tr. 154-155, 213-214; State’s Ex. 1.) The video contains no audio.
1 For clarity, the transcript of Worthey-Sturdivant’s jury trial will be referred to as “__Tr.__”
signifying the volume and page number. {¶8} According to Halstead, the video shows seven youths gathered in a common
area of the facility. The victim, A.M2., approached two seated individuals, appeared to
speak with them, and then sat on a stool. (2 Tr. 162-163.) Shortly thereafter, co-defendant
Dukes ran toward A.M., tackled him from the stool, and forced him to the floor. (2 Tr.
163.) Halstead identified this as the first assault. (2 Tr. at 168.)
{¶9} Halstead further testified that a juvenile corrections officer briefly entered
the room and then left. (2 Tr. 168-169.) After the officer exited, Dukes, Worthey-
Sturdivant, and co-defendant Williams began striking the victim. (2 Tr. 164.) Halstead
described this as the second assault, during which the victim was punched and kicked
multiple times. (2 Tr. 169.) Sturdivant — assisted by Dukes — lifted A.M. and then threw
him headfirst onto the carpeted concrete floor. Halstead testified that A.M. briefly lost
consciousness. (2 Tr. 164.)
{¶10} Halstead acknowledged that his understanding of the victim’s loss of
consciousness was based in part on medical notes made by the nurse for the facility. (2
Tr. 173.) Halstead also testified that other entries in the same records indicated no loss of
consciousness by A.M. (Id.)
{¶11} Halstead testified that, after A.M. was slammed head-first onto the floor,
one of the co-defendants, he was unsure of which one, retrieved a water bottle and poured
water on the victim’s face. (2 Tr. 164, 169.) Another individual examined the back of the
victim’s head and appeared to observe blood. (2 Tr. 169-170.)
{¶12} Halstead testified that the victim reported the incident to staff later that
night, between approximately 2:00 and 2:30 a.m. (2 Tr. 174, 177.)
2 A.M. did not testify at trial. {¶13} Halstead testified that on March 4, 2025, he interviewed the victim and
observed a laceration on his head. (2 Tr. 169-170.)
{¶14} Halstead also interviewed Worthey-Sturdivant and Williams. Both
described the incident as “horseplay.” (2 Tr. 171.) Worthey-Sturdivant stated that the
victim “got squirrelly” and “ended up” on the floor when Worthey-Sturdivant attempted
to lift him. (Id.) Halstead testified that Dukes declined to be interviewed.
Testimony of Dr. Scott Poland
{¶15} Dr. Scott Poland, a physician affiliated with the Cleveland Clinic and
practicing at Mercy Hospital in Canton, Ohio, testified that he treated the 17-year-old
victim on March 2, 2025. (2 Tr. 180-181.) Dr. Poland testified that the victim presented
with complaints of head, neck, and upper back pain, as well as vomiting. (2 Tr. 182-183.)
{¶16} Dr. Poland testified that he ordered multiple diagnostic tests, including CT
scans of the head, cervical spine, and thoracic spine. (2 Tr. 190-192, 203-205.) The results
revealed no skull fractures, intracranial bleeding, or spinal misalignment. (2 Tr. 206,
208.)
{¶17} Dr. Poland testified that the victim sustained a superficial laceration that
did not require stitches. (2 Tr. 183-184.) He provided the victim with written discharge
instructions. (2 Tr. 193, 198-200.)
{¶18} Dr. Poland testified that, based upon his observations and what A.M.
relayed to him, he concluded at the time A.M.’s head injury could be classified as a
concussion, although Dr. Poland acknowledged that he did not include a diagnosis of
concussion in his “after-visit summary.” The doctor testified that the listed diagnoses in
that kind of document are often “complaint based,” but he did provide concussion
precautions to A.M. at the conclusion of A.M.’s hospital visit. {¶19} Dr. Poland testified that he recommended neurological follow-up, and he
was unaware whether such follow-up occurred. (2 Tr. 185.) He further explained that the
long-term effects of a closed-head injury cannot be predicted with certainty. (2 Tr. 199-
200.)
Defense Case and Jury Deliberations
{¶20} The defense rested without presenting evidence. Following closing
arguments, the jury began deliberations during which the jury submitted several
questions, including requests to define “aiding and abetting” and “incapacitated,” and
inquiries regarding the scope of complicity. (2 Tr. 268-269.) The trial court instructed the
jury to rely on the evidence and the previously provided jury instructions. (Id.)
Verdict and Post-Trial Motion
{¶21} On June 11, 2025, the jury found Worthey-Sturdivant and Dukes guilty of
felonious assault. The jury found co-defendant Williams guilty of the lesser offense of
misdemeanor assault3. (2 Tr. 271-272.)
{¶22} On June 16, 2025, Worthey-Sturdivant filed a motion for a new trial or,
alternatively, modification of the verdict. He argued that the verdicts were inconsistent,
that the evidence was insufficient, and that a manifest miscarriage of justice had occurred.
Sentencing
{¶23} Sentencing occurred on June 16, 2025. The trial court denied the motion for
a new trial, concluding that the verdicts were not inconsistent and that the jury could
reasonably have distinguished between two separate incidents. (Sent. Tr. 8-9.)
3 The jury was instructed on the offense of misdemeanor assault as a lesser included offense of
felonious assault. (2 Tr. 221-222.) {¶24} The trial court sentenced Worthey-Sturdivant to an indefinite prison term
of a minimum of eight years and a potential maximum of twelve years. (Sent. Tr. 15.)
Assignments of Error
{¶25} Worthey-Sturdivant appealed and raises four assignments of error for our
consideration,
{¶26} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE APPELLANT'S
MOTION TO REMAND TO JUVENILE COURT.”
{¶27} “II. THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A FINDING OF
GUILT.”
{¶28} “III. THE CONVICTIONS [sic.] ARE AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT
OF THE EVIDENCE.”
{¶29} “IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO GRANT THE
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR MODIFICATION OF VERDICT.”
I.
{¶30} In his first assignment of error, Worthey-Sturdivant argues that the trial
court erred in denying his pretrial motion to remand the matter to juvenile court. He
contends that, because he was a “felony delinquent” in the custody of the Ohio
Department of Youth Services (“DYS”) at the time of the alleged offense, the juvenile court
retained continuing jurisdiction over him, thereby depriving the general division of
jurisdiction. We disagree.
Subject-matter jurisdiction
{¶31} Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to a court’s constitutional or statutory
authority to adjudicate a class of cases. Pratts v. Hurley, 2004-Ohio-1980, ¶ 11-12. It is determined without regard to the rights of the parties and instead focuses on whether the
court itself is competent to hear the controversy. Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 2014-Ohio-
4275, ¶ 19; State v. Harper, 2020-Ohio-2913, ¶ 23.
{¶32} Because subject-matter jurisdiction concerns the court’s fundamental
authority, it cannot be waived or forfeited and may be raised at any time. United States v.
Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002); State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70,
75 (1998). In the absence of such jurisdiction, a court lacks authority to act and may do
nothing other than dismiss the case. Pratts at ¶ 21; In re K.K., 2022-Ohio-3888, ¶ 49.
{¶33} Accordingly, arguments based on waiver, res judicata, or lack of prejudice
cannot confer subject-matter jurisdiction where it does not exist. State v. Clay, 2018-
Ohio-985, ¶ 39 (7th Dist.). See also State ex rel. Holman v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 2023-
Ohio-692, ¶ 10 (A direct appeal or a writ of prohibition may issue to correct the result of
a prior jurisdictionally unauthorized action if an inferior tribunal patently and
unambiguously lacked jurisdiction.); State ex rel. Baker v. State Personnel Bd. of Rev.,
85 Ohio St.3d 640, 642 (1999); Hinkle v. Mingo, 2024-Ohio-1665, ¶ 7 (10th Dist.).
Juvenile court jurisdiction
{¶34} The jurisdiction of Ohio courts of common pleas is defined by statute. Ohio
Constitution, Article IV, Section 4(B); In re K.K. at ¶ 52. As a general matter, the court of
common pleas has original jurisdiction over all criminal offenses. R.C. 2931.03; State v.
Hudson, 2022-Ohio-1435, ¶ 23.
{¶35} Juvenile courts, as a division of the courts of common pleas, possess
exclusive original jurisdiction over certain matters defined by statute. R.C. 2151.23; R.C.
2152.02. Relevant here, a “child” is generally defined as a person under eighteen years of age, subject to limited exceptions. See, R.C. 2152.02(C)(3). An “adult” is defined as an
individual who is eighteen years of age or older. See, R.C. 2151.011(D)(2).
{¶36} Under this statutory framework, juvenile courts retain exclusive jurisdiction
over individuals who commit acts while under the age of eighteen that would constitute
felonies if committed by an adult. Hudson at ¶ 3. However, that jurisdiction is predicated
on the offender’s age at the time of the offense.
Analysis
{¶37} Worthey-Sturdivant was nineteen years old at the time he committed the
offense in this case. Thus, he was an adult under Ohio law when the alleged conduct
occurred. Because the offense was not committed while he was a juvenile, the statutory
provisions governing juvenile court jurisdiction do not apply.
{¶38} His argument that the juvenile court retained “continuing jurisdiction”
based on his prior delinquency adjudication and DYS commitment is unpersuasive. While
the juvenile court may retain jurisdiction over prior delinquency matters, that jurisdiction
does not extend to new criminal conduct committed after the individual reaches the age
of majority. The dispositive inquiry is the offender’s age at the time of the charged offense,
not his custodial status.
{¶39} Accordingly, because Worthey-Sturdivant committed the charged offense
as an adult, jurisdiction properly lies with the general division of the court of common
pleas. The trial court therefore did not err in denying the motion to remand the case to
juvenile court.
{¶40} Worthey-Sturdivant’s first assignment of error is overruled. II. & III.
{¶41} In his second and third assignments of error, Worthey-Sturdivant
challenges the evidentiary basis for his conviction, arguing both that the evidence was
legally insufficient and that the jury’s verdict was against the manifest weight of the
evidence. Although these claims are analytically distinct, they arise from the same core
contention - the State failed to establish that he caused serious physical harm to the
victim. We address them in turn.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
{¶42} A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence presents a question of law,
which we review de novo. State v. Walker, 2016-Ohio-8295, ¶ 30. The dispositive
question is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense proven beyond
a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the
syllabus.
{¶43} Worthey-Sturdivant was convicted of felonious assault under R.C.
2903.11(A)(1), which requires proof that he knowingly caused serious physical harm to
another. “Serious physical harm” includes, among other things, harm involving
temporary, substantial incapacity. R.C. 2901.01(A)(5).
{¶44} The State presented evidence during the jury trial that Worthey-Sturdivant,
acting with two co-defendants, violently assaulted the victim, who did not fight back.
During the assault, Worthey-Sturdivant, assisted by Dukes, restrained the victim,
inverted him, and slammed him head-first onto a carpet-covered concrete floor. The
victim thereafter appeared limp and unresponsive, prompting the co-defendants to
attempt to revive him, including by pouring water on his face. The victim later reported vomiting and suffering from pain in his head, neck, and upper back, and sought medical
treatment.
{¶45} Construing this evidence in the State’s favor, a rational trier of fact could
find that the victim was rendered unconscious during the assault. Even brief
unconsciousness constitutes a temporary, substantial incapacity and, therefore, satisfies
the statutory definition of serious physical harm. See State v. Sales, 2011-Ohio-2505, ¶ 19
(9th Dist.); State v. Petty, 2012-Ohio-2989, ¶ 34 (10th Dist.); State v. Loy, 2025-Ohio-
5175, ¶ 17 (3d Dist.); State v. Redwine, 2007-Ohio-6413, ¶ 32 (12th Dist.).
{¶46} The absence of direct testimony from the victim does not render the
evidence insufficient. The State may prove serious physical harm through lay testimony
and circumstantial evidence. State v. Brown, 2019-Ohio-3486, ¶ 29-30 (5th Dist.). In this
case, the jury was able to review the events as they occurred in real time via the video
surveillance camera footage.
{¶47} Accordingly, the State presented sufficient evidence from which a rational
trier of fact could find all elements of felonious assault proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Manifest Weight of the Evidence
{¶48} Worthey-Sturdivant also contends that his conviction is against the
manifest weight of the evidence, primarily asserting that the evidence of the victim’s loss
of consciousness was inconsistent and, therefore, not credible.
{¶49} A manifest-weight challenge addresses the persuasive force of the evidence.
Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 19. In conducting this review, we examine the
entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, and consider witness
credibility. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997). Reversal is reserved for the exceptional case in which the jury clearly lost its way and created a manifest
miscarriage of justice. Id.
{¶50} Here, the jury was presented with both testimonial and objective evidence.
In addition to witness testimony describing the assault and its aftermath, the jury viewed
video footage capturing the incident as it occurred. The jury also considered medical
records reflecting the victim’s post-assault condition. This evidence corroborated the
State’s theory of the case.
{¶51} Although Worthey-Sturdivant emphasizes inconsistencies in the testimony
regarding whether the victim lost consciousness, the resolution of such conflicts lies
squarely within the province of the jury. The jury was free to credit the State’s evidence
and reject competing interpretations. Conflicting evidence does not render a conviction
against the manifest weight of the evidence. State v. Morris, 2018-Ohio-5252, ¶ 51 (10th
Dist.).
{¶52} Upon independently reviewing the entire record, we cannot conclude that
the jury lost its way. The evidence does not weigh heavily against conviction, nor does it
suggest a manifest miscarriage of justice. Rather, the record contains substantial, credible
evidence supporting the jury’s determination that Worthey-Sturdivant knowingly caused
serious physical harm to the victim.
Conclusion
{¶53} Because the conviction is supported by sufficient evidence and is not against
the manifest weight of the evidence, Worthey-Sturdivant’s second and third assignments
of error are overruled. IV.
{¶54} In his fourth assignment of error, Worthey-Sturdivant contends that the
trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial or, alternatively, modification of the
verdict.
Standard of Review and Governing Law
{¶55} Crim.R. 33(A) permits a trial court to grant a new trial on specified grounds
materially affecting a defendant’s substantial rights, including irregularity in the
proceedings, jury misconduct, error of law, or a verdict that is not sustained by sufficient
evidence or is contrary to law. See, Crim.R. 33(A)(1)-(6). The rule also authorizes
modification of a verdict where the evidence supports conviction on a lesser offense.
Crim.R. 33(A)(4).
{¶56} A motion for a new trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court. State v. Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d 49 (1995); State v. Glover, 35 Ohio St.3d 18 (1988).
Accordingly, we review the denial of such a motion for an abuse of discretion, which
connotes a decision that is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable, or one that reflects
a perversity of will, passion, prejudice, or a misapplication of law. Pons v. Ohio State Med.
Bd., 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621 (1993); State v. Beasley, 2018-Ohio-16, ¶ 12.
{¶57} Further, a new trial is not warranted unless the record affirmatively
demonstrates prejudice or that the defendant was denied a fair trial. Crim.R. 33(E).
{¶58} Worthey-Sturdivant’s motion was premised on two related claims: first,
that the jury failed to properly complete the verdict forms as to co-defendant Williams,
and second, that the verdicts among the co-defendants were inconsistent. {¶59} Following the announcement of the verdicts, counsel was expressly given
the opportunity to review the verdict forms. All counsel approached the bench and
examined the forms. When asked whether there were any issues requiring the court’s
attention before the jury was discharged, counsel for Worthey-Sturdivant affirmatively
responded that there were none. The jury was then polled, and each juror individually
confirmed the verdicts. Only after the jury was discharged did Worthey-Sturdivant raise
an objection and move for a new trial.
{¶60} This sequence undermines his claim of reversible error. Any alleged
irregularity in the verdict forms could have been addressed before the jury was
discharged. The failure to raise the issue at that time weighs heavily against a finding of
prejudice.
{¶61} Nor does the asserted inconsistency among the co-defendants’ verdicts
provide a basis for relief. Worthey-Sturdivant relies on State v. Huntley, 30 Ohio App.3d
29 (1st Dist. 1986), but that reliance is misplaced. In Huntley, the appellant and his
codefendant were tried together in a one-count indictment charging aggravated burglary.
The jury found Huntley guilty of burglary. The same jury concluded that the codefendant
was guilty of breaking and entering. In arriving at its verdict, the jury found the apartment
at issue to be an occupied structure as to Huntley, while it found the same premises to be
an unoccupied structure as to the codefendant. In Huntley, the same factual
determination, whether the structure was occupied, yielded directly contradictory
findings as to the co-defendants, creating a true legal inconsistency.
{¶62} No such inconsistency exists here. Although Williams undoubtedly joined
in the assault, the video reveals that his actions were less egregious than the actions of his
accomplices. The video evidence showed that Worthey-Sturdivant and Dukes actively escalated the violence by lifting the victim, inverting him, and slamming him head-first
onto a carpet-covered cement floor. Co-defendant Dukes not only initiated the initial
assault, but he put the victim in a headlock and tackled him down onto the carpet-covered
cement floor.
{¶63} By contrast, Williams’s conduct, as depicted in the same video, consisted of
attempting to revive and assist the victim after the assault. The video depicts Williams
rolling A.M. over after the assault and attempting to revive him. The video further shows
Williams retrieving a shirt and using it to wipe A.M.’s face. Williams is seen propping A.M.
a little more upright against a different chair, tapping A.M.’s face a few times to try to
rouse him, and then continuing to use the shirt to clean A.M.’s wound, as others look on.
These differing actions could reasonably support differing verdicts.
{¶64} Inconsistent verdicts among co-defendants do not, in any event, mandate
reversal. Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 345-346 (1981), citing United States v.
Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 279 (1943). Such outcomes may reflect the jury’s assessment
of individual culpability, or even lenity. Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 394 (1932).
The critical inquiry is whether the conviction at issue is supported by the evidence, not
whether it aligns with verdicts returned as to other defendants. State v. Castleberry,
2007-Ohio-5803, ¶17 (9th Dist.); State v. Kilgore, 2023-Ohio-1786, ¶16 (9th Dist.).
{¶65} As previously discussed, Worthey-Sturdivant’s conviction for felonious
assault is supported by sufficient evidence and is not against the manifest weight of the
evidence. He therefore cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by any alleged defect
in the verdict forms relating to a co-defendant. Conclusion
{¶66} The trial court acted within its discretion in denying the motion for a new
trial or modification of the verdict. Worthey-Sturdivant has failed to demonstrate any
irregularity that materially affected his substantial rights or deprived him of a fair trial.
{¶67} Accordingly, the fourth assignment of error is overruled.
{¶68} For the reasons set forth in the preceding Opinion, the judgment of the
Court of Common Pleas for Stark County, Ohio is affirmed.
{¶69} Costs to be paid by Appellant Jordan Worthey-Sturdivant.
By: Popham, J.
Baldwin, P.J. and
Gormley, J., concur