State v. Stukes

Court of Appeals of South Carolina

State v. Stukes

DecidedJanuary 22, 2014

Docket2014-UP-027

StatusUnpublished

This text of State v. Stukes (State v. Stukes) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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State v. Stukes, (S.C. Ct. App. 2014).

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THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Dantae Stukes, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2012-211706

Appeal From Greenville County C. Victor Pyle, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2014-UP-027 Submitted October 1, 2013 – Filed January 22, 2014

AFFIRMED

George R. McElveen, III, of McElveen & McElveen, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant Attorney General Julie Kate Keeney, both of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Quarles, 261 S.C. 413, 417, 200 S.E.2d 384, 386 (1973) ("A motion to amend the date alleged in an indictment is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial [court], and the burden of showing an abuse of discretion and resulting prejudice is upon the party adversely affected by [its] ruling thereon."); State v. Means, 367 S.C. 374, 387, 626 S.E.2d 348, 356 (2006) ("[A] motion to amend an indictment should be granted when the proposed amendment does not change the nature of the offense or affect the sufficiency of the indictment."), abrogated on other grounds by Talley v. State, 371 S.C. 535, 640 S.E.2d 878 (2007); Morris v. State, 371 S.C. 278, 283, 639 S.E.2d 53, 56 (2006) ("The trial court's refusal of a motion for continuance in a criminal case will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice to the appellant."); Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964) ("The matter of continuance is traditionally within the discretion of the trial [court], and it is not every denial of a request for more time that violates due process . . . .").

AFFIRMED.1

FEW, C.J., and PIEPER and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

1 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.

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THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Dantae Stukes, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2012-211706

Appeal From Greenville County C. Victor Pyle, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2014-UP-027 Submitted October 1, 2013 – Filed January 22, 2014

AFFIRMED

George R. McElveen, III, of McElveen & McElveen, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant Attorney General Julie Kate Keeney, both of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Quarles, 261 S.C. 413, 417, 200 S.E.2d 384, 386 (1973) ("A motion to amend the date alleged in an indictment is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial [court], and the burden of showing an abuse of discretion and resulting prejudice is upon the party adversely affected by [its] ruling thereon."); State v. Means, 367 S.C. 374, 387, 626 S.E.2d 348, 356 (2006) ("[A] motion to amend an indictment should be granted when the proposed amendment does not change the nature of the offense or affect the sufficiency of the indictment."), abrogated on other grounds by Talley v. State, 371 S.C. 535, 640 S.E.2d 878 (2007); Morris v. State, 371 S.C. 278, 283, 639 S.E.2d 53, 56 (2006) ("The trial court's refusal of a motion for continuance in a criminal case will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice to the appellant."); Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964) ("The matter of continuance is traditionally within the discretion of the trial [court], and it is not every denial of a request for more time that violates due process . . . .").

AFFIRMED.1

FEW, C.J., and PIEPER and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

1 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.

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