[Cite as State v. Stowers, 2015-Ohio-4846.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-150095 TRIAL NO. B-1400038 Plaintiff-Appellant, :
vs. : O P I N I O N.
TODD STOWERS, :
Defendant-Appellee. :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Cause Remanded
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: November 25, 2015
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula E. Adams, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellant,
Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Marguerite Slagle, Assistant Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellee.
Please note: this case has been removed from the accelerated calendar. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
CUNNINGHAM, Presiding Judge. {¶1} Plaintiff-appellant state of Ohio has appealed the judgment of the
common pleas court granting defendant-appellee Todd Stowers’s motion to dismiss
the indictment for failing to provide notice of an address change and ordering that
Stowers’s name be removed from the sex-offender registry. We reverse the trial
court’s judgment and remand the cause for further proceedings.
Facts and Procedure
{¶2} On May 11, 1978, Stowers was convicted of attempted rape and
sentenced to two to 15 years’ incarceration. He was paroled on July 19, 1981. On
March 4, 1982, Stowers was convicted of two counts of theft and sentenced to
concurrent terms of two to five years. Because Stowers had committed the thefts
while on parole, the term for the theft offenses was required to be served
consecutively to the sentence for attempted rape pursuant to former R.C.
2929.41(B)(3). There were various other instances where Stowers was paroled and
returned to prison.
{¶3} Effective July 1, 1997, the General Assembly enacted former R.C.
Chapter 2950 (“Megan’s Law”). See Am.Sub.H.B. No. 180, 146 Ohio Laws, Part II,
2560, enacted in 1996, amended in 2003 by Am.Sub.S.B. No. 5, 150 Ohio Laws, Part
IV, 6556. Former R.C. 2950.04(A)(1)(a) provided that “[r]egardless of when the
sexually oriented offense was committed,” an offender who had been sentenced to a
prison term for a sexually oriented offense and “on or after July 1, 1997,” was
released “in any manner” from the prison term was required to register as a sex
offender. Stowers was ordered back to the trial court for a sexual-predator hearing
under former R.C. 2950.09. The trial court adjudicated him a sexual predator,
requiring him to register every 90 days for life. Stowers appealed his sexual-predator
2 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
classification on constitutional grounds. We affirmed his classification, holding that
former R.C. Chapter 2950 did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United
States Constitution, the prohibition against retroactive laws in the Ohio Constitution,
or the prohibition against double jeopardy, and that it was not unconstitutionally
vague. See State v. Stowers, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-970423 (Mar. 27, 1998).
Stowers was finally released from prison on December 3, 1997, after serving 16 years
and 346 days.
{¶4} In 2005, the Ohio Supreme Court decided State v. Champion, 106
Ohio St.3d 120, 2005-Ohio-4098, 832 N.E.2d 718, which held at the syllabus that
A person whose prison term for a sexually oriented offense was
completed before July 1, 1997, is not required to register under
[former] R.C. 2950.04(A)(1)(a) or periodically verify a current address
under [former] R.C. 2950.06(A), even if the person returns to prison
on a parole violation for a term served concurrently with the sexually
oriented offense.
{¶5} In 2006, Stowers filed a motion to set aside the order requiring him to
register as a sex offender. Citing Champion, Stowers argued that he had finished
serving his sentence for the attempted rape prior to July 1, 1997, and therefore, he
had not been in prison for a sex offense when former R.C. Chapter 2950 became
effective and the registration provisions could not be applied to him. The trial court
overruled Stowers’s motion, and Stowers did not appeal from that judgment.
{¶6} On January 7, 2014, Stowers was indicted for failing to give notice of
an address change. Stowers’s 1978 conviction for attempted rape was the basis of his
registration duty. Stowers, citing Champion, filed a motion to dismiss the
indictment on the ground that the registration statutes did not apply to him because
he had finished serving his sentence for attempted rape prior to July 1, 1997, and
3 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
therefore, the court had had no authority to order him to register as a sex offender.
The state argued that res judicata prevented Stowers from challenging his duty to
register. Stowers argued that res judicata did not bar him from challenging his duty
to register, because the order requiring him to register was void for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction. The trial court granted Stowers’s motion to dismiss the
indictment and ordered that his name be removed from the sex-offender registry,
finding that Stowers had finished serving his prison term for the attempted rape
prior to July 1, 1997, and therefore, he “never had a duty to register as a sex
offender.” The state has appealed.
Analysis
{¶7} The state’s sole assignment of error alleges that the trial court erred in
granting Stowers’s motion to dismiss the indictment and ordering that his name be
removed from the sex-offender registry. The state argues that the issue of whether
Stowers is required to register as a sex offender is res judicata, because that issue was
decided when the trial court overruled his 2006 motion, and he did not appeal from
that judgment.
{¶8} Stowers counters that the order requiring him to register as a sex
offender was void ab initio and subject to collateral attack at any time. It is true that
a judgment that is void because the court exceeded its jurisdiction may be attacked at
any time. See Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d
992, ¶ 11; Lyttle v. State, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2010-04-089, 2012-Ohio-3042,
citing State v. Wozniak, 172 Ohio St. 517, 520, 178 N.E.2d 800 (1961), and State v.
Williams, 53 Ohio App.3d 1, 5, 557 N.E.2d 818 (10th Dist.1998). But that judgment
may not be attacked repeatedly.
{¶9} In Claxton v. Simons, 174 Ohio St. 333, 189 N.E.2d 62 (1963),
paragraph four of the syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court stated,
4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Where a person appears in an action for the purpose of contending
that a judgment is void as a judgment against him, such person
thereby submits to the court for its determination whether such
judgment is or is not void as a judgment against him; and, if the court
determines that such judgment is not void as a judgment against him,
even though that determination is erroneous on the facts and on the
law, the determination is res judicata between the parties and can only
be attacked directly by an appeal therefrom.
{¶10} In Claxton, the trial court overruled the defendant’s motion to vacate a
default judgment on the basis of lack of proper service.
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[Cite as State v. Stowers, 2015-Ohio-4846.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-150095 TRIAL NO. B-1400038 Plaintiff-Appellant, :
vs. : O P I N I O N.
TODD STOWERS, :
Defendant-Appellee. :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Cause Remanded
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: November 25, 2015
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula E. Adams, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellant,
Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Marguerite Slagle, Assistant Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellee.
Please note: this case has been removed from the accelerated calendar. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
CUNNINGHAM, Presiding Judge. {¶1} Plaintiff-appellant state of Ohio has appealed the judgment of the
common pleas court granting defendant-appellee Todd Stowers’s motion to dismiss
the indictment for failing to provide notice of an address change and ordering that
Stowers’s name be removed from the sex-offender registry. We reverse the trial
court’s judgment and remand the cause for further proceedings.
Facts and Procedure
{¶2} On May 11, 1978, Stowers was convicted of attempted rape and
sentenced to two to 15 years’ incarceration. He was paroled on July 19, 1981. On
March 4, 1982, Stowers was convicted of two counts of theft and sentenced to
concurrent terms of two to five years. Because Stowers had committed the thefts
while on parole, the term for the theft offenses was required to be served
consecutively to the sentence for attempted rape pursuant to former R.C.
2929.41(B)(3). There were various other instances where Stowers was paroled and
returned to prison.
{¶3} Effective July 1, 1997, the General Assembly enacted former R.C.
Chapter 2950 (“Megan’s Law”). See Am.Sub.H.B. No. 180, 146 Ohio Laws, Part II,
2560, enacted in 1996, amended in 2003 by Am.Sub.S.B. No. 5, 150 Ohio Laws, Part
IV, 6556. Former R.C. 2950.04(A)(1)(a) provided that “[r]egardless of when the
sexually oriented offense was committed,” an offender who had been sentenced to a
prison term for a sexually oriented offense and “on or after July 1, 1997,” was
released “in any manner” from the prison term was required to register as a sex
offender. Stowers was ordered back to the trial court for a sexual-predator hearing
under former R.C. 2950.09. The trial court adjudicated him a sexual predator,
requiring him to register every 90 days for life. Stowers appealed his sexual-predator
2 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
classification on constitutional grounds. We affirmed his classification, holding that
former R.C. Chapter 2950 did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United
States Constitution, the prohibition against retroactive laws in the Ohio Constitution,
or the prohibition against double jeopardy, and that it was not unconstitutionally
vague. See State v. Stowers, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-970423 (Mar. 27, 1998).
Stowers was finally released from prison on December 3, 1997, after serving 16 years
and 346 days.
{¶4} In 2005, the Ohio Supreme Court decided State v. Champion, 106
Ohio St.3d 120, 2005-Ohio-4098, 832 N.E.2d 718, which held at the syllabus that
A person whose prison term for a sexually oriented offense was
completed before July 1, 1997, is not required to register under
[former] R.C. 2950.04(A)(1)(a) or periodically verify a current address
under [former] R.C. 2950.06(A), even if the person returns to prison
on a parole violation for a term served concurrently with the sexually
oriented offense.
{¶5} In 2006, Stowers filed a motion to set aside the order requiring him to
register as a sex offender. Citing Champion, Stowers argued that he had finished
serving his sentence for the attempted rape prior to July 1, 1997, and therefore, he
had not been in prison for a sex offense when former R.C. Chapter 2950 became
effective and the registration provisions could not be applied to him. The trial court
overruled Stowers’s motion, and Stowers did not appeal from that judgment.
{¶6} On January 7, 2014, Stowers was indicted for failing to give notice of
an address change. Stowers’s 1978 conviction for attempted rape was the basis of his
registration duty. Stowers, citing Champion, filed a motion to dismiss the
indictment on the ground that the registration statutes did not apply to him because
he had finished serving his sentence for attempted rape prior to July 1, 1997, and
3 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
therefore, the court had had no authority to order him to register as a sex offender.
The state argued that res judicata prevented Stowers from challenging his duty to
register. Stowers argued that res judicata did not bar him from challenging his duty
to register, because the order requiring him to register was void for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction. The trial court granted Stowers’s motion to dismiss the
indictment and ordered that his name be removed from the sex-offender registry,
finding that Stowers had finished serving his prison term for the attempted rape
prior to July 1, 1997, and therefore, he “never had a duty to register as a sex
offender.” The state has appealed.
Analysis
{¶7} The state’s sole assignment of error alleges that the trial court erred in
granting Stowers’s motion to dismiss the indictment and ordering that his name be
removed from the sex-offender registry. The state argues that the issue of whether
Stowers is required to register as a sex offender is res judicata, because that issue was
decided when the trial court overruled his 2006 motion, and he did not appeal from
that judgment.
{¶8} Stowers counters that the order requiring him to register as a sex
offender was void ab initio and subject to collateral attack at any time. It is true that
a judgment that is void because the court exceeded its jurisdiction may be attacked at
any time. See Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d
992, ¶ 11; Lyttle v. State, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2010-04-089, 2012-Ohio-3042,
citing State v. Wozniak, 172 Ohio St. 517, 520, 178 N.E.2d 800 (1961), and State v.
Williams, 53 Ohio App.3d 1, 5, 557 N.E.2d 818 (10th Dist.1998). But that judgment
may not be attacked repeatedly.
{¶9} In Claxton v. Simons, 174 Ohio St. 333, 189 N.E.2d 62 (1963),
paragraph four of the syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court stated,
4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Where a person appears in an action for the purpose of contending
that a judgment is void as a judgment against him, such person
thereby submits to the court for its determination whether such
judgment is or is not void as a judgment against him; and, if the court
determines that such judgment is not void as a judgment against him,
even though that determination is erroneous on the facts and on the
law, the determination is res judicata between the parties and can only
be attacked directly by an appeal therefrom.
{¶10} In Claxton, the trial court overruled the defendant’s motion to vacate a
default judgment on the basis of lack of proper service. The defendant did not appeal
the court’s judgment. Subsequently, when the court entered a judgment against the
defendant’s insurer, the defendant appealed that judgment and attempted to argue
the merits of her motion to vacate. The Supreme Court held that the trial court’s
ruling on the jurisdictional question raised by the motion to vacate was binding
under the doctrine of res judicata.
{¶11} “Once [a] jurisdictional issue has been fully litigated and determined
by a court that has authority to pass upon the issues, said determination is res
judicata in a collateral action and can only be attacked directly by appeal.” State ex
rel. Arcadia Acres v. Ohio Dept. of Job and Family Servs., 123 Ohio St.3d 54, 2009-
Ohio-4176, 914 N.E.2d 170, citing Citicasters Co. v. Stop 26-Riverbend, Inc., 147
Ohio App.3d 531, 2002-Ohio-2286, 771 N.E.2d 317, ¶ 33 (7th Dist.), quoting Squires
v. Squires, 12 Ohio App.3d 138, 141, 468 N.E.2d 73 (12th Dist.1983). The
jurisdictional issue becomes binding upon the parties even if the determination is
wrong on the facts and the law. Rindfleisch v. AFT Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos.
84551, 84897 and 84917, 2005-Ohio-191, ¶ 6, citing Claxton at 337.
5 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶12} Stowers raised the issue of whether he was subject to sex-offender
registration in his 2006 motion. Citing Champion, he argued, as he does here, that
because he had served his sentence for attempted rape prior to July 1, 1997, the trial
court had acted outside its jurisdiction in ordering him to register as a sex offender,
and therefore the order was void. The issue of the court’s authority to order him to
register as a sex offender was directly at issue and fully litigated in the proceedings
on his 2006 motion. That issue was decided against him, and he did not appeal that
determination. Therefore, he is barred by res judicata from raising that issue again.
Conclusion
{¶13} We sustain the assignment of error. The judgment of the trial court
granting Stowers’s motion to dismiss the indictment and ordering that Stowers’s
name be removed from the sex-offender registry is reversed, and this cause is
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with law and this
opinion.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
DEWINE and STAUTBERG, JJ., concur.
Please note: The court has recorded its own entry this date.