State v. Stone

2019 Ohio 3214
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedAugust 9, 2019
DocketL-18-1144
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 2019 Ohio 3214 (State v. Stone) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Stone, 2019 Ohio 3214 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019).

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Stone, 2019-Ohio-3214.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY

State of Ohio/City of Maumee Court of Appeals No. L-18-1144

Appellee Trial Court No. 17TRC06995-A

v.

Sally A. Stone DECISION AND JUDGMENT Appellant Decided: August 9, 2019

*****

John B. Arnsby, Municipal Prosecutor, City of Maumee, for appellee.

Abbey M. Flynn, for appellant.

SINGER, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Sally Stone, appeals from the September 11, 2018 judgment of

the Maumee Municipal Court, where she was sentenced to 180 days of incarceration,

with 177 days suspended and 3 days in an intervention program, following her no-contest plea to operating a motor vehicle under the influence in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A), a

misdemeanor of the first degree. Finding error in the record below, we reverse and

remand.

Assignments of Error

{¶ 2} Appellant sets forth the following assigned errors:

1. The trial court committed reversible error when it denied the

motion to suppress.

2. The trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress because

the findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Facts

{¶ 3} Officer Sean Bakhsh of the Maumee Police Division testified that on

September 23, 2017, he observed appellant’s vehicle traveling 35 m.p.h. in a 50 m.p.h.

zone. He then observed her, at approximately 2:52 a.m., pulling into a gas station that he

believed, but could not confirm, was closed.

{¶ 4} As appellant’s vehicle left the gas station, Bakhsh turned on his patrol

camera and began to pursue her. He testified that the camera began recording 60 seconds

of footage before he turned it on. Bakhsh alleged that before appellant was in sight of the

camera, he witnessed her vehicle cross over a marked lane. He stated that appellant’s

back right tire crossed over the road’s far-right line by approximately five inches. He

claimed to have seen this through his right-side passenger window, and he admitted that

the patrol camera failed to capture it. Bakhsh did not stop appellant immediately after

this alleged violation, because he wanted to see a pattern of impaired driving.

2. {¶ 5} Bakhsh continued to follow appellant, and he said that she then almost

committed another marked-lanes violation, and that he initiated a traffic stop after he

observed this nearly second violation. After stopping appellant, both Bakhsh and his

partner approached her, and she stepped out of her vehicle. They then administered field

sobriety tests. According to Bakhsh and his police report, she failed the eye-nystagmus

test, the walk-and-turn test, the one-leg-stand test, and her body was noticeably swaying.

She was arrested and transported to the police station, where she failed a breathalyzer test

with a 0.164 g/210L BAC.

{¶ 6} Appellant was charged with operating a vehicle while under the influence in

violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), operating a vehicle with a prohibited concentration of

alcohol in breath in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(d), failure to drive within marked

lanes in violation of Maumee Ordinance 331.08, and expired plates in violation of

Maumee Ordinance 335.10.

{¶ 7} The police report listed the marked-lanes violation and appellant’s slow

speed as reasons for the traffic stop, and it states the expired plates were not observed

until the stop had been initiated. The other officer present in the patrol car with Bakhsh

during appellant’s pursuit and arrest did not testify in the record.

{¶ 8} Appellant moved to suppress all the evidence, including the field sobriety

and breathalyzer test results derived from the traffic stop and arrest. A suppression

hearing was held on March 7, 2018. The trial court found Bakhsh’s testimony to be

credible, and it denied the motion to suppress.

3. {¶ 9} On May 29, 2018, appellant entered a no-contest plea and was found guilty

of operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol pursuant to R.C.

4511.19(A)(1)(a). The court sentenced her to 180 days of incarceration, with 177 days

suspended and 3 days in a state certified driver’s intervention program. The court

imposed a one-year inactive community control sanction.

{¶ 10} The sentencing entry was journalized on September 11, 2018, and appellant

timely appeals.

Standard of Review

{¶ 11} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law

and fact. When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier

of fact.” State v. Roberts, 110 Ohio St.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-3665, 850 N.E.2d 1168, ¶ 100.

The appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if the facts are supported

by competent, credible evidence. State v. Steed, 2016-Ohio-8088, 75 N.E.3d 816, ¶ 11

(6th Dist.). This court applies a de novo standard to determine if facts satisfy the

applicable legal standard. State v. Bragg, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-07-1162, 2007-Ohio-

5993, ¶ 4.

Legal Analysis

{¶ 12} Appellant’s two assigned errors challenge the denial of her motion to

suppress, and we will address them simultaneously.

{¶ 13} Appellant first argues the motion was improperly denied because Bakhsh

did not have probable cause or reasonable, articulable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop

4. on September 23, 2017. Appellant also contends there is no competent, credible evidence

to support the denial of her motion to suppress.

{¶ 14} Appellee argues against both assigned errors, asserting that the motion to

suppress was properly denied because the evidence in the record supports that Bakhsh

had probable cause or reasonable, articulable suspicion to initiate the stop.

{¶ 15} “In order to conduct an investigative stop of a motor vehicle, a police

officer must have an articulable and reasonable suspicion that the motorist is engaged in

criminal activity or is operating his vehicle in violation of the law.” City of Sylvania v.

Comeau, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-01-1232, 2002-Ohio-529, ¶ 7, citing Delaware v. Prouse,

440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct.1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). “The propriety of an

investigative stop must be viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances.” State of

Ohio v. Marcum, 2013-Ohio-2652, 993 N.E.2d 1289, ¶ 12 (5th Dist.), citing State v.

Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d 177, 524 N.E.2d 489 (1988), paragraph one of the syllabus.

{¶ 16} Here, Bakhsh testified that he observed appellant driving slowly and in

violation of the marked-lanes law. The trial court found his testimony credible.

{¶ 17} Both R.C. 4511.33 and Maumee Ordinance 331.08, which codify the

marked-lanes law, provide:

(A) Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more

clearly marked lanes for traffic, or wherever within municipal corporations

traffic is lawfully moving in two or more substantially continuous lines in

the same direction * * * (1) A vehicle or trackless trolley shall be driven, as

nearly as is practicable, entirely within a single lane or line of traffic and

5. shall not be moved from such lane or line until the driver has first

ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.

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2019 Ohio 3214, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-stone-ohioctapp-2019.