State v. Stevenson

• Court: Superior Court of Delaware
• Decided: June 13, 2024
• Docket: 1201020817A
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE, ) ) v. ) ID. No. 1201020817A ) LAMOTT STEVENSON, ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Date Submitted: May 13, 2024 Date Decided: June 13, 2024

Upon Consideration of Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief, DENIED

Upon Consideration of Defendant’s Request for Appointment of Counsel, DENIED AS MOOT

Upon Consideration of Defendant’s Motion for Discovery, DENIED AS MOOT

Luke Raber, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State.

Lamott Stevenson, pro se Defendant.

JURDEN, P.J. I. INTRODUCTION

On November 9, 2012, a jury found Lamott Stevenson (“Stevenson”) guilty

of one count Burglary First Degree, two counts Robbery First Degree, one count

Assault First Degree, three counts Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the

Commission of a Felony (“PDWDCF”), two counts Possession of a Firearm During

the Commission of a Felony (“PFDCF”), one count Conspiracy Second Degree, and

one count Wearing a Disguise During the Commission of a Felony, arising from a

violent home invasion.1 Stevenson has now filed a third Motion for Postconviction

Relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Motion”).2 He also filed a Motion

for Appointment of Counsel and a Motion for Discovery.3 For the reasons set forth

below, Stevenson’s third Motion for Postconviction Relief is DENIED, and

Stevenson’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel and Motion for Discovery are

DENIED AS MOOT.

1 D.I. 54. 2 D.I. 161. 3 Id., D.I. 162. II. BACKGROUND

On December 15, 2011, Michael Gallagher (“Michael”) was sitting in his

living room when he heard a commotion in the kitchen.4 Upon walking into the

kitchen, he was confronted by three individuals wearing ski masks and hoods.5 A

fight ensued during which Michael was hit over the head with a crowbar and

rendered unconscious.6 When his wife, Kathleen, (who was in the back of the house

watering plants) heard their dogs bark in distress, she went to investigate and saw

someone emerge from the kitchen.7 One of the masked individuals chased her out

onto the back deck where he held her at gunpoint.8 Meanwhile, inside, Michael

regained consciousness and grabbed a pistol that he kept on top of the refrigerator.9

As the other two masked individuals came down the stairs, Michael fired four shots

at them.10 Michael testified at trial that he thought he must have hit someone because

there was no shattered glass from the front door which likely would have indicated

that he missed them.11 Upon hearing the gunshots, the individual holding Kathleen

at gunpoint fled.12

4 D.I. 54, Trial Tr. vol. 2, 10-22. 5 Stevenson v. State, 83 A.3d 738 (TABLE) (Del. 2013). 6 Trial Tr. vol. 2, 11-12. 7 Id. at 15-21. 8 Id. 9 Trial Tr. vol. 2, 13. 10 Id. at 13-14. 11 Id. 12 Id. at 15-21. Michael called 911 and police responded.13 The police photographed blood

throughout the residence and found a crowbar.14 Police traced the crowbar to an Ace

Hardware Store in Elkton, Maryland and, after reviewing surveillance footage and

speaking with employees, determined that the purchasers were Stevenson and

Johnmika Daniels (“Daniels”).15 Stevenson and Daniels traveled to the Ace

Hardware Store in a dark Crown Victoria registered to Bryant Brown (“Brown”) and

Daniels.16 After looking into the car registration, police discovered that at the time

of the home invasion, Stevenson was listed as living at the same address as Brown

and Daniels.17

The morning following the home invasion, a patient claiming to be Brown

was admitted to Crozer-Chester Hospital for gunshot wounds.18 Based on video

surveillance, police determined that the individual being treated was not Brown, it

was actually Stevenson using Brown’s name.19 Video surveillance also captured

Daniels—the same woman who was with Stevenson for the Ace Hardware Store

purchase—picking up Stevenson from the hospital.20 That same day, Michael’s

neighbor alerted him to a blood trail on the sidewalk in front of the Gallagher’s

13 Id. 14 Id. at 77-78; Trial Tr. vol. 1, 23. 15 Trial Tr. vol. 1, 7; Trial Tr. vol. 2, 181-83. 16 Trial Tr. vol. 2, 66. 17 Trial Tr. vol. 2, 67-68. 18 Trial Tr. vol. 2, 111-12. 19 Trial Tr. vol. 2, 109-11. 20 Id., Trial Tr. vol. 3, 181-83. residence.21 DNA testing established the blood stains were consistent with

Stevenson’s blood.22

III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 9, 2012, a jury found Stevenson guilty on all charges.23 After

the trial, the State moved to have Stevenson declared a habitual offender.24 The

Court granted the motion on March 22, 2013.25 Stevenson was declared a habitual

offender on Robbery First Degree (IN12-02-0737), Robbery First Degree (IN12-02-

0738), PFDCF (IN12-02-0739), PFDCF (IN12-02-1978), PDWDCF (IN12-02-

0740), PDWDCF (IN12-02-1977), PDWDCF (IN12-02-1980), and Burglary First

Degree (IN12-02-0741) and was sentenced that same day to 192 years of

unsuspended Level V time due to his habitual offender status. 26 Stevenson was

sentenced as follows: for Robbery First Degree, 25 years at Level V; for Robbery

First Degree, 25 years at Level V; for Assault First Degree, 2 years at Level V; for

PFDCF, 25 years at Level V; for PFDCF, 25 years at Level V; for PDWDCF, 25

years at Level V; for PDWDCF, 25 years at Level V; for PDWDCF, 25 years at

Level V; for Burglary First Degree, 15 years at Level V; for Wearing a Disguise

During the Commission of a Felony, 1 year at Level V, suspended for 1 year at Level

21 Trial Tr. vol. 2, 21-22. 22 Id. 87-89. 23 D.I. 54. 24 Id. 25 D.I. 67, 69. 26 Id. III; and for Conspiracy Second Degree, 1 year at Level V, suspended for 1 year at

Level III.27

On April 17, 2013, Stevenson appealed his conviction to the Delaware

Supreme Court.28 On January 13, 2014, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior

Court’s judgment.29

On April 2, 2014, Stevenson filed his first pro se motion for postconviction

relief and appointment of counsel.30 On April 15, 2014, the Court granted

Stevenson’s request for counsel.31 On September 29, 2014, with the help of

appointed counsel, Stevenson filed an amended motion for postconviction relief,

raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.32 On May 26, 2015, the Court

denied the motion.33 Stevenson appealed, and the Supreme Court affirmed the denial

of the Superior Court on February 10, 2016.34

Stevenson filed his second motion for postconviction relief on February 17,

202135 along with a motion for appointment of counsel.36 The Court denied

27 D.I. 72. 28 D.I. 71. 29 D.I. 90. 30 D.I. 95, 97. 31 D.I. 96. 32 D.I. 114. 33 D.I. 128. 34 D.I. 136. 35 D.I. 144. 36 D.I. 145. Stevenson’s request for appointment of counsel,37 and on March 7, 2023, summarily

dismissed Stevenson’s second postconviction relief motion.38

On January 29, 2024, Stevenson filed the instant third Motion for

Postconviction Relief and Motion for Appointment of Counsel.39 On March 7, 2024,

Stevenson filed the instant Motion for Discovery.40 The State submitted a response

to his Motion on April 17, 202441 which Stevenson replied to on May 13, 2024.42

IV. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Rule 61 governs postconviction relief.43 Under Rule 61, an incarcerated

individual may seek to dismiss his conviction by establishing a lack of jurisdiction,

or alternative ground, that sufficiently provides a factual and legal basis for a

collateral attack upon the conviction.44 While “Rule 61 is intended to correct errors

in the trial process, [it does] not allow defendants unlimited opportunities to

relitigate their convictions.”45

Before considering the merits of any postconviction relief claims, the Court

must first consider whether any procedural bars exist.46 Rule 61(i) establishes four

37 D.I. 146. 38 D.I. 159. 39 D.I. 161, 162. 40 D.I. 164. 41 D.I. 166 (“State’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. for Postconviction Relief”). 42 D.I. 168 (“Def.’s Resp. to State’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. for Postconviction Relief”). 43 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(a)(1). 44 Id. 45 Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 820 (Del. 2013). 46 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). procedural bars to postconviction relief.47 Rule 61(i)(1) requires a motion for

postconviction relief must be filed within one year of a final judgment or

conviction.48 Rule 61(i)(2) bars successive motions for postconviction relief unless

certain conditions are met.49 Pursuant to Rule 61(i)(3) and (4), any ground for relief

not previously raised is deemed waived and any claims formerly adjudicated are

thereafter barred.50 Stevenson’s two other claims regarding his plea agreement have

been formally adjudicated or were not raised in his initial appeal.51

Rule 61(d)(2) sets forth exceptions to the bar to successive motions52:

a second or subsequent postconviction motion shall be summarily dismissed, unless the movant was convicted after a trial and the motion either: (i) pleads with particularity new evidence exists that creates a strong inference that the movant is actually innocent in fact of the acts underlying the charges for which he was convicted; or (ii) pleads with particularity a claim that a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the United States Supreme Court or the Delaware Supreme Court, applies to the movant's case and renders the conviction or death sentence invalid.53

Stevenson’s only potential path to relief is under Rule 61(d)(2)(i), in which:

47 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1)-(4). 48 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1). 49 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2). 50 This includes proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a postconviction proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5), (d)(2)(i), (ii). 51 See D.I. 90, 128, 136, 146. 52 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 60(i)(2)(i). 53 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 60(d)(2)(i)(ii). [Stevenson] must present additional evidence that was not available at trial and would not have been despite his exercise of due diligence. [He] must also convince us that the new evidence, when considered in the context of all the relevant evidence by a properly instructed jury, is such as will probably change the result if a new trial were granted.54

V. DISCUSSION

A. Motion for Postconviction Relief

To satisfy Rule 61(d)(2)(i), Stevenson must plead with particularity that new

evidence exists that creates a strong inference that he is actually innocent in fact of

the act underlying the charges for which he was convicted.55 Innocence of the acts

underlying the charges requires “more than innocence of intent; it requires new

evidence that a person other than the petitioner committed the crime.”56

Stevenson’s claim of actual innocence rests on an affidavit provided by

Stevenson’s co-defendant, Kevin Evans (“Evans”). Evans avers in his one-page

affidavit:

I have no knowledge and can say truthfully and clearly that Lamott Stevenson in no way have or had part taken into any crime with me in any case. It is clearly a case of mistaken identity when it comes to him as a co-defendant. In regards to our case together, I can assure and make

54 Purnell v. State, 254 A.3d 1053, 1060 (2021). 55 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(i). 56 Purnell, 254 A.3d at 1095 (citing State v. Taylor, 2018 WL 3199537, at *7 (Del. Super. June 28, 2018) (internal quotations omitted). aware that one person I did know and conclude was involved was [Johnmika] Daniels.57

According to the Supreme Court, to prevail under Rule 61(d)(2)(i), Stevenson must

show Evans’ affidavit is both “(1) new and (2) sufficiently persuasive.”58 The

Supreme Court in Purnell noted that “[s]atisfying the actual innocence test is, by

design, a heavy burden, and such meritorious claims are exceedingly rare.”59

i. The “newness” prong

The first prong of the actual innocence test requires Stevenson to present

evidence that was “not available at trial and would not have been despite [his]

exercise of due diligence.”60

In Purnell, the Supreme Court found that the defendant established the

newness requirement by showing that his trial counsel failed to defend Purnell by

not implicating a co-defendant.61 The Supreme Court held that while trial counsel

could have explored defense strategies that would point to the co-defendant’s guilt

as opposed to Purnell’s, his conflict of interest in representing the co-defendant

rendered that strategy impossible.62 The Supreme Court found that the conflict of

57 Evans was the third person involved in the robbery that took place on December 15, 2011. D.I. 163. 58 Purnell, 254 A.3d at 1095. 59 Id. at 1100. 60 Id. at 1060. 61 Id. at 1105-06. 62 Id. interest made it unavailable to Purnell at trial, and therefore, the new evidence prong

was satisfied.63

Here, Evans’ testimony could not have been presented at Stevenson’s trial

because Evans, Stevenson’s co-defendant, was indicted for the same crimes as

Stevenson but had not yet taken a plea or gone to trial.64 It was impossible for

Evans—at the time of Stevenson’s trial—to testify that Stevenson was not a part of

the crime without implicating himself.65 Given this, the Court finds, and the State

concedes, that Stevenson has satisfied the first prong in the “actual innocence” test.66

ii. The “persuasiveness” prong

The second prong of the actual innocence test requires Stevenson to convince

the Court that the new evidence—when considered in the context of the evidence

submitted to the jury—is of such caliber that it would probably change the result of

a new trial if granted.67 In reaching this determination, the Court “must assess all of

the evidence, including that which was properly excluded and wrongfully

admitted.”68

63 Id. 64 Criminal Docket of Kevin A. Evans, ID No. 1205025088, D.I. 14. 65 Id. 66 D.I. 166. 67 Bass v. State, 299 A.3d. 336, 362-61 (Del. 2023). 68 Purnell, 254 A.3d at 1113. Stevenson has presented an affidavit from Evans in which Evans avers

Stevenson is innocent and Daniels was the third perpetrator in the crime.69 When

considered in the context of the evidence submitted to the jury, Evans’ averments

are not of such caliber that they would probably change the result in a new trial. For

instance, Evans’ affidavit does not discredit the evidence admitted at trial

establishing that Stevenson purchased the crowbar found at the scene, presented to

the hospital with gunshot wounds the morning after the home invasion, and used

Brown’s identity when seeking treatment. Nor does it discredit the video

surveillance showing Stevenson being picked up from the hospital by Daniels

following his treatment for the gunshot wounds.70 Nothing in Evans’ affidavit

discredits the DNA test results showing Stevenson’s DNA matched the blood trail

found outside of the Gallagher’s home or Michael’s testimony that he thought he

had shot someone based on the fact the glass on the front door was not shattered.

Evan’s conclusory affidavit does not—and cannot—explain away all the evidence

against Stevenson. The “caliber” of Evans’ affidavit, when considered in the context

of all the evidence admitted at trial, does not come close to convincing the Court that

a new jury would decide the case differently.

69 D.I. 163. 70 Stevenson argues in his response to the State’s response that the medical records from the hospital say that the person being treated had six gunshot wounds and that would lead a jury to find Stevenson innocent is incorrect. The jury was able to view the video surveillance and identify Stevenson in the courtroom, additionally, it does not explain why Stevenson’s blood was found outside the residence, nor why he bought a crowbar and sledgehammer. See D.I. 167. Stevenson fails to meet his high burden on the persuasiveness prong and his

Motion is therefore procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(2).

For the foregoing reasons, Stevenson’s third Postconviction Relief Motion is

DENIED.

B. Motion for Appointment of Counsel

Because Stevenson’s Third Motion for Postconviction Relief is procedurally

barred, his Motion for Appointment of Counsel is DENIED AS MOOT.

C. Motion for Discovery

Stevenson argues in his pro se Motion for Discovery that he has not been in

possession of his legal file since 2017.71 He submits that having access to a copy of

his file again would allow him to bolster his third Postconviction Relief Motion and

asks the Court to stay this matter until he has a chance to go through his file.72

Stevenson is unable to overcome the procedural bar that would entitle him to a merits

review of his motion for postconviction relief. As such, his Motion for Discovery

and request to stay are DENIED AS MOOT.

VI. CONCLUSION

Stevenson’s only path to postconviction relief is through the Rule 61(d)(2)(i)

71 D.I. 164. 72 Id. “new evidence” exception, but he has failed to satisfy the persuasiveness prong.

Consequently, his third Motion for Postconviction Relief is procedurally barred and

therefore DENIED, and his Motion for Appointment of Counsel and Motion for

Discovery are DENIED AS MOOT.

/s/ Jan R. Jurden Jan R. Jurden, President Judge

Original to Prothonotary