State v. Sterling

723 S.E.2d 176, 396 S.C. 599, 2012 WL 652455, 2012 S.C. LEXIS 41
CourtSupreme Court of South Carolina
DecidedFebruary 29, 2012
Docket27096
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 723 S.E.2d 176 (State v. Sterling) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Sterling, 723 S.E.2d 176, 396 S.C. 599, 2012 WL 652455, 2012 S.C. LEXIS 41 (S.C. 2012).

Opinions

Justice PLEICONES.

Appellant was charged with three criminal offenses: securities fraud in violation of S.C.Code Ann. § 35-1-501(3) (Supp. 2010);1 making false or misleading statements to the State Securities Commission in violation of S.C.Code Ann. § 35-1-505 (Supp.2010); and criminal conspiracy in violation of S.C.Code Ann. § 16-17-^110 (2003). He was convicted of securities fraud, acquitted of making a false or misleading statement and conspiracy, and received a five-year sentence. He now appeals, alleging the trial judge abused his discretion in permitting testimony from investors, that he erred in denying appellant’s directed verdict motion, and that he committed reversible error in charging the jury. We affirm.

FACTS

Appellant and several other businessmen invested in a company in the 1970s that leased railroad box cars. That company eventually declared bankruptcy, but emerged with one asset: a deferred tax asset (DTA). This DTA, which could be carried forward on a company’s books to offset future profits, fluctuated in value depending on whether the company anticipated making a profit. This post-bankruptcy company was known as NRUC. In 1991, NRUC acquired a Pickensbased company, Carolina Investors, Inc. (Cl).

Cl had been founded in 1963, originally for the purpose of making loans to individuals purchasing cemetery plots. Cl, which was funded by notes and subordinated debentures sold exclusively to South Carolina investors, eventually began making small household loans and, by 1970, was involved in nonconforming subprime mortgages. Non-conforming and sub-prime mortgages are made to persons who cannot qualify for regular (conforming) mortgages: non-conforming mortgages [602]*602carry a higher interest rate reflecting the greater risk of default.

Cl had a policy of allowing investors to redeem their debentures at any time prior to maturity upon fifteen minutes’ notice, albeit at a reduced interest rate. Cl’s investments were not federally insured, but because it made loans to persons who could not meet the credit standards required by conforming mortgage lenders, it paid higher than average interest rates on the notes and debentures.

NRUC was subsequently renamed Emergent and later HomeGold Financial (HGFin).2 HGFin, the parent company, acquired a number of other financial subsidiaries, one of which, HomeGold, Inc. (HGInc), became a subprime lender. Thereafter, while Cl continued to raise monies through the sale of notes and debentures, those funds were loaned to HGFin and its other subsidiaries, and used primarily to expand business operations and pay business expenses of those entities.

During the period 1995-97, the HGFin companies were very profitable. In 1996, HGFin went public, divesting itself of several subsidiaries and becoming a pure financial services entity. In late 1997, HGInc, the subprime lender subsidiary, lost its leader, who took much of his team with him. That loss, coupled with a worldwide credit crisis in 1998, caused HGInc to suffer enormous losses. In an effort to recover economic viability, HGFin sold most of its other financial service subsidiaries, keeping only HGInc and CL From 1998 until HGFin declared bankruptcy in 2003, HGFin and HGInc3 never had an operating profit.

The retail mortgage lending business relies on “warehouse lines” from large lenders in order to operate. Essentially, the warehouse lines provide the working capital for the lending business, and the stability of those lines, which is dependent upon the large bank’s confidence in the lender, is critical to the mortgage lender’s business.

[603]*603In its efforts to keep HGInc operational, with the hope it could repay to Cl all the monies loaned by Cl to HGInc (the intercompany debt), HGFin shrank both the number of subsidiaries and the operational aspects of HGInc. Eventually, HGFin began to look for a merger partner for HGInc in order to save the business. After several merger prospects fell through, HGFin settled upon a Lexington, South Carolina, subprime lender called HomeSense, which was owned by Ronald Sheppard. Appellant, who at the time of the 2000 merger between HomeSense and HGInc was CEO of both HGFin and HGInc, chairman of the board of both HGFin and HGInc, and on Cl’s board, was the leading proponent of the HomeSense merger.

The HomeSense-HGInc merger was not a success. First, due diligence completed after the merger demonstrated that HomeSense had significantly overstated its net worth. HGInc and Sheppard subsequently canceled a mutual indemnity agreement in exchange for Sheppard’s remaining a guarantor on certain HomeSense debts. Second, Sheppard proved to be an abrasive leader whose leadership style and aggressive accounting maneuvers caused a number of HGInc and HGFin officers and executives to leave. Sheppard also placed personal expenses on the company books using HGInc to subsidize his extravagant lifestyle.

After the merger, appellant ceased to be an employee, but remained as chair of both the HGFin and HGInc boards, and remained on Cl’s board. He continued to be supplied with an office, an administrative assistant, and a salary. Over the next three years, the financial decisions made on behalf of HGInc resulted in numerous resignations by CFOs and others. In addition, the HGInc-HomeSense merger permitted HGInc’s largest warehouse lender (CIT) to end the relationship.4 As a result of the loss of CIT’s warehouse line, HGFin and HGInc’s continued financial woes, and their reliance on Cl investor money to stay in business, it became increasingly difficult for HGInc to obtain sufficient warehouse lines to fund its loans even as it began to increase its share of the subprime mortgage market. HGFin and HGInc continued to struggle [604]*604and began moving debts and assets among the companies in order to hide its financial difficulties.

Appellant’s defense was predicated in large part on the fact that the financial maneuvers that took place were approved by-outside auditors, and that the Wyche Law Firm vetted and approved all of the companies’ governmental filings and prospectuses. As stated above, the jury acquitted appellant of making false or misleading statements to the State Securities Division. Reliance upon the outside auditors’ approval, however, is misleading. For example, the outside auditors agreed to an increase in the value of the DTA from $12 million to $22 million, as urged by appellant, in HGInc’s unaudited third quarter 2000 10-Q. The auditor testified, however, that had he been told that this change in valuation was being made because HGInc needed to show a positive net equity in that quarter in order for it to renew its state mortgage licenses, that information would have “raised a red flag” and alerted him to the precarious nature of HGFin’s finances.

Similarly, while the auditor was aware that CIT, HGInc’s largest warehouse lender, was withdrawing its line of credit following the HomeSense merger, the auditor was never told that this secured lender had told appellant and others that it was ending the relationship because it “didn’t want to be standing in front of a little old lady in Pickens County during a bankruptcy proceeding.” Again, this information would have raised a red flag for the auditors, indicating that a secured creditor was fearful of HGInc’s financial worth. Moreover, there was evidence that the auditors were not informed of certain regulatory inquiries, in violation of their management letter.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
723 S.E.2d 176, 396 S.C. 599, 2012 WL 652455, 2012 S.C. LEXIS 41, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-sterling-sc-2012.