State v. Stelljes

CourtSuperior Court of Delaware
DecidedNovember 28, 2018
Docket1702005851
StatusPublished

This text of State v. Stelljes (State v. Stelljes) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Stelljes, (Del. Ct. App. 2018).

Opinion

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

RICHARD F. STOKES SUSSEX COUNTY COURTHOUSE RESIDENTJUDGE 1 Tl-IE cIRCLE, SUITE 2 GEORG ETOWN, DE 19947 TELEPHONE (302) 856-5264

November 28, 2018

N448 STATE l\/IAIL

Mr. Michael C. Stelljes

SBI: 00543789

Howard R. Young Correctional Institution 1301 E. 12lh Street

Wilmington, DE 19801

RE: State of Delaware v. Michael C. Sl;elljes Case ID: 1702005851

Dear Mr. Stelljes:

I have reviewed your motion for postconviction relief, and it is denied.l

You pled guilty to driving under the influence and two counts of vehicular assault on September 20, 2018. The sentence reflected the plea agreement On the driving under the influence charge, you were imprisoned for 18 months with the balance suspended after serving 90 days under the provisions of 11 Del.C. § 4204(1<) for level 2 probation. On each of the vehicular assault in the second

1 This motion was submitted under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. The Rule apeaks of “judgment of conviction” which technically is a guilty verdict after trial. An admission at a violation is not a guilty verdict, and the motion is summarily dismissed The use of a Rule 61 application to attack the sentence received for a violation of probation is inappropriate State v. Berry, 2007 WL 2822928 at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 25, 2007). On the other hand, Rule 61 consideration was given to violation of probation proceedings in State v. Phillips, 2002 WL 524281 (Del. Super. Ct. March 4, 2002); Phillips v. Kearney, 2003 WL 2004392 at *2 (D. Del. April 21, 2003). However, even if Rule 61 applies, which it does not in my view, the motion would nonetheless be denied for the reasons discussed above.

degree charges, a one year sentence was entered suspended for probation.2

Upon release from level 5, you started probation. On January 18, 2018, your probation officer filed a violation report.3 lt alleged that you violated conditions 1, 2, 3, 7 and 9. Condition 1 reported an arrest for shoplifting which was pending in Kent County, Case ID #1801003194; The docket is attached as Exhibit B. You made reference to a drug paraphernalia charge in Court of Common Pleas Kent County Case ID 1802008651. The docket is attached as Exhibit C. There was no mention of the charge in the violation report. Condition 2 alleged that you failed to report the shoplifting arrest and police contact; Condition 3 claimed you failed to report to probation on 12/19/17; Condition 7 alleged you tested positive for illegal drugs without a prescription and Condition 9 alleged a violation of a zero tolerance condition related to the drug use. A hearing was held on February 23, 2018 and you were represented by Mr. Jeffery McLane, Esquire, a public defender.4 At his request, Condition 1 was not adjudicated because the charge was pending. You admitted violating all the remaining conditions. A TASC evaluation was requested by me to learn further information,

and sentencing was deferred.

On March 23, 2018, a sentencing hearing was held.5 Again, you were represented by the public defender’s office. TASC assessed you and presented a verbal report. Your background with drugs was discussed. The recommendation was for closer supervision. This could be at either the Crest Program or at level 4 home confinement with TASC and an lntensive Outpatient Program (“IOP”). Your probation officer recommended the Crest Program. Ultimately, you were sentenced to level 5 imprisonment suspended for completion of Crest.

On March 28, 2018, you arrived at the Central Violation of Probation Center to begin the Residential Substance Abuse Treatment Program. On April 2, 2018, you were discharged for refusing to participate. Your refusal was the basis for a second violation of probation report. On April 9, 2018, a hearing was held

2 State v. Michael C. Stelljes, Del. Super. Ct. Crim. Dkt. No. 1702005851, at Docket Item (“D.l.”) 15 attached as ExhibitA.

3 D.I. 16. 4 D.l. 21, 23.

5 D.l. 25.

and you were again represented by the public defender’s office6 As you refused to do the program you were resentenced to the level 5 Key Program as recommended by your probation officer.

On your appearances for the three hearing dates , your public defender advised you of the appeal rights to the Supreme Court.7 No appeal was filed. However, you did file two requests for reduction of the sentence under Rule 35 which were denied.8 A Supreme Court appeal was not filed from them. Presently, you continue to be in the Key Program.

In your Rule 61 motion, you claim your public defender was ineffective The statement is made: “counsel never told me to or advised me if l wanted to wait the charges to be dealt with ...” This claim necessarily focuses on the February 23 date Apparently, you surmise that the hearing would have been postponed; you would not have been sent to the Crest Program, and, therefore, you would not have been in a position to refuse to participate

Such vague, speculative and conclusory allegations are never sufficient for Rule 61 relief. Further, the pending shoplifting charge played no role in the proceedings Your admissions to violating the remaining conditions provided an ample basis to support the new sentence Furthermore, your hearing would never have been postponed to await a decision on the shoplifting charge where you have an illegal drug and failure to comply with supervision background The Court has authority to adjudicate new charges in a violation hearing because trial and probation standards are different lndeed a later acquittal of new charges after an earlier violation of them in a probation hearing does not change the result.9

Moreover, to prevail on an ineffectiveness of counsel basis, the two-prong test laid out by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington"° must be satisfied. Somerville v. State explained the applicable standard in the

6 D.I. 31.

7 D.I. 22, 26, 32.

8 D.I. 34, 35, 36, 37.

9 State v. Diaz, 113 A.3d 1081 (Del. 2015).

10 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

context of a guilty plea that is roughly analogous to a probation admission:

Strickland requires a defendant to show that: ( l) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) counsel’s actions were so prejudicial that there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial...[R]eview is subject to a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was professionally reasonable The purpose of this presumption is to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight in examining a strategic course of conduct that may have been within the range of professional reasonableness at the time11

You have not met either prong of the analysis. You made no showing to prove that your counsel acted below an objective standard of reasonableness when providing assistance at the time of the violation hearing. No judge would have delayed the violation proceedings, and defense counsel made no error and acted within recognized standards of competence There is no showing that you would not have admitted the violation but for counsel’s alleged error in not seeking a postponement

You also complain about the lack of access to a law library. This kind of claim is procedurally barred under Criminal Rule 61(i)(3),12 (with the exception of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim).

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Related

Strickland v. Washington
466 U.S. 668 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Flamer v. State
585 A.2d 736 (Supreme Court of Delaware, 1990)
Younger v. State
580 A.2d 552 (Supreme Court of Delaware, 1990)
Somerville v. State
703 A.2d 629 (Supreme Court of Delaware, 1997)
Blackwell v. State
736 A.2d 971 (Supreme Court of Delaware, 1999)

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Bluebook (online)
State v. Stelljes, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-stelljes-delsuperct-2018.