IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
2021-NCCOA-427
No. COA20-676
Filed 17 August 2021
Martin County, Nos. 18 CRS 346, 50842
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Plaintiff,
v.
ROBERT LOUIS STATON, Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 30 January 2020 by Judge
Wayland Sermons in Martin County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals
25 May 2021.
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General John Tillery, for the State.
Mark Hayes for Defendant.
GRIFFIN, Judge.
¶1 Defendant Robert Louis Staton (“Defendant”) appeals from a conviction of
discharging a firearm into an occupied vehicle while in operation. Defendant argues
that the court erred by not dismissing the charge because the bullet hit the toolbox
and not the truck. After review, we discern no error.
I. Factual and Procedural Background STATE V. STATON
Opinion of the Court
¶2 On 3 December 2018, Defendant was indicted for (1) discharging a firearm into
an occupied vehicle while in operation and (2) possession of a firearm by a felon. This
charge arose from an incident where Defendant fired three shots at the pickup truck
of Mr. John Griffin while both individuals were driving down the road.
¶3 At trial, Mr. Griffin testified that Defendant pulled onto the road behind him
and accelerated until Defendant positioned his vehicle closely behind Mr. Griffin’s
vehicle. Mr. Griffin stated that he saw Defendant stick his arm out the window of
Defendant’s vehicle with a small caliber gun and fire three shots at Mr. Griffin’s
pickup. Mr. Griffin immediately went to the police station and found no one present.
He then went to the magistrate’s office. When Mr. Griffin arrived at the magistrate’s
office, he saw one bullet hole in his toolbox. He testified that the hole came from the
Defendant’s shots at his vehicle. The State offered into evidence photographs of Mr.
Griffin’s truck, photographs of Mr. Griffin’s toolbox with a single hole from a gunshot,
and a photograph of the bullet that was pulled from Mr. Griffin’s toolbox. Mr. Griffin
testified that he was unaware of any damage to his toolbox prior to the interaction
with Defendant.
¶4 Defendant made an initial motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence
at the close of the State’s evidence. That motion was denied. Defendant’s motion to
dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence was renewed after all evidence had been
entered and was again denied by the trial court judge. STATE V. STATON
¶5 On 30 January 2020, a jury found Defendant guilty of (1) discharging a firearm
into an occupied vehicle while in operation and (2) possession of a firearm by a felon.
Defendant timely appeals.
II. Analysis
¶6 Defendant appeals from a jury verdict finding Defendant guilty of discharging
a firearm into an occupied vehicle while in operation, in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 14-34.1(b). Defendant contends that the trial court erred by not granting
Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of evidence. Defendant argues that under N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 14-34.1(b), the bullet must, at a minimum, strike an exterior wall of the
vehicle to be a violation of the statute. Defendant also argues that N.C. Gen. Stat. §
14-34.1(b) was not violated because the toolbox is not included as part of the truck for
the purposes of the statute. We disagree.
¶7 Defendant properly preserved the denial of the motion to dismiss for
insufficiency of the evidence for appeal at the trial court level. See N.C. R. App. P.
10(a)(3) (stating a party who wishes to preserve for appeal a motion to dismiss for
insufficiency of the evidence must make a motion to dismiss at the close of the State’s
evidence and again at the close of all evidence).
A. Standard of Review
¶8 “This Court reviews the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss de novo.”
State v. Smith, 186 N.C. App. 57, 62, 650 S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007) (citing State v. STATE V. STATON
Mckinnon, 306 N.C. 288, 298, 293 S.E.2d 118, 125 (1982)). “Upon defendant’s motion
for dismissal, the question for the Court is whether there is substantial evidence (1)
of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense included
therein, and (2) of defendant’s being the perpetrator of the offense. If so, the motion
is properly denied.” State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 378, 526 S.E.2d 451, 455 (quoting
State v. Barnes, 334 N.C. 67, 75, 430 S.E.2d 914, 918 (1993)), cert. denied, 531 U.S.
890, 148 L. Ed. 2d 150 (2000). “In making its determination, the trial court must
consider all evidence admitted, whether competent or incompetent, in the light most
favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of every reasonable inference and
resolving any contradictions in its favor.” State v. Rose, 339 N.C. 172, 192, 451 S.E.2d
211, 223 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1135, 132 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1995).
B. The Motion to Dismiss
¶9 The trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss. The
evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, substantially showed
that each element of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-34.1(b) had been met and that Defendant
was the perpetrator.
¶ 10 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-34.1(b) requires a defendant to “(1) willfully and wantonly
discharg[e] (2) a firearm (3) into property (4) while it is occupied.” State v. Rambert,
341 N.C. 173, 175, 459 S.E.2d 510, 512 (1995). The “into property” element includes STATE V. STATON
any “building, structure, vehicle, aircraft, or other conveyance, device, equipment,
erection, or enclosure[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-34.1(a) (2019).
¶ 11 Defendant does not contest the sufficiency of the State’s evidence as to the
elements of willfully and wantonly discharging a firearm or that the vehicle was
occupied. Defendant only argues that the State failed to prove that any shot went
“into” the vehicle.
¶ 12 “[T]he ‘into [property]’ element is satisfied when [a] bullet[] damage[s] the
exterior of a building, even though there is no evidence that the bullet[] penetrated
to the interior.” State v. Canady, 191 N.C. App. 680, 689, 664 S.E.2d 380, 385 (2008)
(citations omitted). Further, “[t]here is no requirement that the defendant have a
specific intent to fire into the occupied building, only that he . . . (1) intentionally
discharged the firearm at the occupied building with the bullet(s) entering the
occupied building, or (2) intentionally discharged the firearm at a person with the
bullet(s) entering an occupied building.” Id. at 686, 664 S.E.2d at 383-84 (citation
omitted).
¶ 13 In State v. Miles, 223 N.C. App. 160, 733 S.E.2d 572 (2012), the defendant
alleged that he had not violated N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-34.1(b) when he discharged a
firearm that struck a porch because the porch was not part of the house. State v.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
2021-NCCOA-427
No. COA20-676
Filed 17 August 2021
Martin County, Nos. 18 CRS 346, 50842
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Plaintiff,
v.
ROBERT LOUIS STATON, Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 30 January 2020 by Judge
Wayland Sermons in Martin County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals
25 May 2021.
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General John Tillery, for the State.
Mark Hayes for Defendant.
GRIFFIN, Judge.
¶1 Defendant Robert Louis Staton (“Defendant”) appeals from a conviction of
discharging a firearm into an occupied vehicle while in operation. Defendant argues
that the court erred by not dismissing the charge because the bullet hit the toolbox
and not the truck. After review, we discern no error.
I. Factual and Procedural Background STATE V. STATON
Opinion of the Court
¶2 On 3 December 2018, Defendant was indicted for (1) discharging a firearm into
an occupied vehicle while in operation and (2) possession of a firearm by a felon. This
charge arose from an incident where Defendant fired three shots at the pickup truck
of Mr. John Griffin while both individuals were driving down the road.
¶3 At trial, Mr. Griffin testified that Defendant pulled onto the road behind him
and accelerated until Defendant positioned his vehicle closely behind Mr. Griffin’s
vehicle. Mr. Griffin stated that he saw Defendant stick his arm out the window of
Defendant’s vehicle with a small caliber gun and fire three shots at Mr. Griffin’s
pickup. Mr. Griffin immediately went to the police station and found no one present.
He then went to the magistrate’s office. When Mr. Griffin arrived at the magistrate’s
office, he saw one bullet hole in his toolbox. He testified that the hole came from the
Defendant’s shots at his vehicle. The State offered into evidence photographs of Mr.
Griffin’s truck, photographs of Mr. Griffin’s toolbox with a single hole from a gunshot,
and a photograph of the bullet that was pulled from Mr. Griffin’s toolbox. Mr. Griffin
testified that he was unaware of any damage to his toolbox prior to the interaction
with Defendant.
¶4 Defendant made an initial motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence
at the close of the State’s evidence. That motion was denied. Defendant’s motion to
dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence was renewed after all evidence had been
entered and was again denied by the trial court judge. STATE V. STATON
¶5 On 30 January 2020, a jury found Defendant guilty of (1) discharging a firearm
into an occupied vehicle while in operation and (2) possession of a firearm by a felon.
Defendant timely appeals.
II. Analysis
¶6 Defendant appeals from a jury verdict finding Defendant guilty of discharging
a firearm into an occupied vehicle while in operation, in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 14-34.1(b). Defendant contends that the trial court erred by not granting
Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of evidence. Defendant argues that under N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 14-34.1(b), the bullet must, at a minimum, strike an exterior wall of the
vehicle to be a violation of the statute. Defendant also argues that N.C. Gen. Stat. §
14-34.1(b) was not violated because the toolbox is not included as part of the truck for
the purposes of the statute. We disagree.
¶7 Defendant properly preserved the denial of the motion to dismiss for
insufficiency of the evidence for appeal at the trial court level. See N.C. R. App. P.
10(a)(3) (stating a party who wishes to preserve for appeal a motion to dismiss for
insufficiency of the evidence must make a motion to dismiss at the close of the State’s
evidence and again at the close of all evidence).
A. Standard of Review
¶8 “This Court reviews the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss de novo.”
State v. Smith, 186 N.C. App. 57, 62, 650 S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007) (citing State v. STATE V. STATON
Mckinnon, 306 N.C. 288, 298, 293 S.E.2d 118, 125 (1982)). “Upon defendant’s motion
for dismissal, the question for the Court is whether there is substantial evidence (1)
of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense included
therein, and (2) of defendant’s being the perpetrator of the offense. If so, the motion
is properly denied.” State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 378, 526 S.E.2d 451, 455 (quoting
State v. Barnes, 334 N.C. 67, 75, 430 S.E.2d 914, 918 (1993)), cert. denied, 531 U.S.
890, 148 L. Ed. 2d 150 (2000). “In making its determination, the trial court must
consider all evidence admitted, whether competent or incompetent, in the light most
favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of every reasonable inference and
resolving any contradictions in its favor.” State v. Rose, 339 N.C. 172, 192, 451 S.E.2d
211, 223 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1135, 132 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1995).
B. The Motion to Dismiss
¶9 The trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss. The
evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, substantially showed
that each element of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-34.1(b) had been met and that Defendant
was the perpetrator.
¶ 10 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-34.1(b) requires a defendant to “(1) willfully and wantonly
discharg[e] (2) a firearm (3) into property (4) while it is occupied.” State v. Rambert,
341 N.C. 173, 175, 459 S.E.2d 510, 512 (1995). The “into property” element includes STATE V. STATON
any “building, structure, vehicle, aircraft, or other conveyance, device, equipment,
erection, or enclosure[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-34.1(a) (2019).
¶ 11 Defendant does not contest the sufficiency of the State’s evidence as to the
elements of willfully and wantonly discharging a firearm or that the vehicle was
occupied. Defendant only argues that the State failed to prove that any shot went
“into” the vehicle.
¶ 12 “[T]he ‘into [property]’ element is satisfied when [a] bullet[] damage[s] the
exterior of a building, even though there is no evidence that the bullet[] penetrated
to the interior.” State v. Canady, 191 N.C. App. 680, 689, 664 S.E.2d 380, 385 (2008)
(citations omitted). Further, “[t]here is no requirement that the defendant have a
specific intent to fire into the occupied building, only that he . . . (1) intentionally
discharged the firearm at the occupied building with the bullet(s) entering the
occupied building, or (2) intentionally discharged the firearm at a person with the
bullet(s) entering an occupied building.” Id. at 686, 664 S.E.2d at 383-84 (citation
omitted).
¶ 13 In State v. Miles, 223 N.C. App. 160, 733 S.E.2d 572 (2012), the defendant
alleged that he had not violated N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-34.1(b) when he discharged a
firearm that struck a porch because the porch was not part of the house. State v.
Miles, 223 N.C. App. 160, 161, 733 S.E.2d 572, 573 (2012). This Court found no error
by the trial court in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to N.C. Gen. STATE V. STATON
Stat. § 14-34.1(b). Id. at 160, 733 S.E.2d at 573. This Court reasoned that the porch
fell into the meaning of “building” because it was attached to the house and shared
many of the same activities as the home. The Miles Court employed a broad
construction of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-34.1, applying the statute to “any building,
structure . . . or other conveyance, device, equipment, erection, or enclosure”, and
there was no reason to find that the porch was not part of the house, given the purpose
of the statute. Id. at 163-64, 733 S.E.2d at 574-75. “The purpose of [N.C. Gen. Stat.]
§ 14-34.1 is to protect occupants of the building, vehicle, or other property, described
in the statute.” Id. at 163, 733 S.E.2d at 575 (quoting State v. Mancuso, 321 N.C. 464,
468, 364 S.E.2d 359, 362 (1988)).
¶ 14 Here, the “into [property]” element was satisfied when the bullet struck the
truck’s toolbox. While the bullet did not enter the vehicle through a standard part of
the vehicle, such as the tailgate or the door, the bullet did strike the exterior of the
vehicle, via the toolbox. Similar to Miles, where this Court ruled that a bullet that
struck the outside of a porch satisfied the “into [property]” element, a bullet striking
a toolbox connected to an occupied vehicle is sufficient to satisfy the “into [property]”
element. In Miles, the porch was attached to the exterior of the house and shared a
common wall with the house. Miles, 223 N.C. App. at 163, 733 S.E.2d at 574. In the
case before us, the toolbox was similarly fastened to the exterior of the truck and even
sat inside the bed of the truck, adjacent to the wall of the truck’s passenger cabin. STATE V. STATON
¶ 15 The legislative purpose of the statute is clear. The purpose of the statute is to
protect the occupants of certain properties from being shot at. Mancuso, 321 N.C. at
468, 364 S.E.2d at 362. To hold that Defendant is not guilty would contradict the
purpose of the statute and frustrate the intent of the legislature.
¶ 16 We agree with the trial court that the State met its burden to proceed to the
jury on its theory that Defendant willfully discharged a firearm into an occupied
vehicle while in operation. The bullet striking the toolbox of the vehicle is sufficient
to meet the requirement of firing “into [property]”.
III. Conclusion
¶ 17 The trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge
of discharging a firearm into an occupied vehicle while in operation.
NO ERROR.
Chief Judge STROUD and Judge HAMPSON concur.