State v. Stanfil

Opinion

1 This memorandum opinion was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Reports. Please 2 see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. 3 Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated 4 errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does 5 not include the filing date.

6 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

7 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 8 Plaintiff-Appellee, 9 v. NO. 29,841 10 JULIE STANFIL, 11 Defendant-Appellant.

12 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OTERO COUNTY 13 Jerry H. Ritter, District Judge

14 Gary K. King, Attorney General 15 Santa Fe, NM

16 for Appellee

17 Liane E. Kerr 18 Albuquerque, NM

19 for Appellant 20 MEMORANDUM OPINION 21 WECHSLER, Judge. 22 Defendant appeals from the district court’s order denying her motion to modify

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1 her sentence. We proposed to affirm in a notice of proposed summary disposition, 2 and pursuant to an extension, Defendant has filed a timely memorandum in 3 opposition. Remaining unpersuaded by Defendant’s memorandum, we affirm.

4 CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED PRIOR TO TRANSFER TO THE NM 5 DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (DOC)

6 Defendant claims that the district court erred in refusing to modify her sentence 7 to correctly reflect the time served while in the Otero County Detention Center 8 (OCDC) after she was sentenced on December 22, 2008, but before she was 9 transferred to the DOC on February 9, 2009. [DS 1-2; MIO 2-3] We review 10 sentencing issues for abuse of discretion to determine if the sentence imposed is 11 authorized by law. See State v. Cumpton, 2000-NMCA-033, ¶ 10, 129 N.M. 47, 1 12 P.3d 429. 13 Under NMSA 1978, Section 31-20-12 (1977), a defendant held in “official 14 confinement” is entitled to presentence confinement credit. See State v. Clah, 15 1997-NMCA-091, ¶ 9, 124 N.M. 6, 946 P.2d 210. In the judgment and sentence, the 16 district court credited Defendant with the time spent in presentence confinement from 17 October 22, 2008 to December 22, 2008, but did not credit Defendant for time served 18 in the OCDC after December 22, 2008, until the judgment and sentence was filed 19 January 29, 2009, and she was transferred to the DOC on February 9, 2009. [RP 49] 20 Defendant filed a motion to amend the judgment and sentence to include

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1 preconfinement credit for the time between December 22, 2008 until February 9, 2009 2 and claims that the district court erred in refusing to amend her sentence to add this 3 credit. [RP 54; MIO 3] We disagree. 4 In our notice of proposed summary disposition, we agreed with Defendant that 5 she is entitled to credit for the entire time she was in the OCDC before being 6 transferred to the DOC. However, we proposed to hold that the sentence entered by 7 the district court on December 22, 2008 does not deprive her of that credit because 8 Defendant’s sentence “took effect” on December 22, 2008, meaning that each day 9 served after December 22 counts toward satisfying the term of Defendant’s entire 10 sentence. See NMSA 1978, § 33-2-38 (1999) (stating that a defendant’s term of 11 incarceration “shall be computed from and include the day on which [the defendant’s] 12 sentence took effect” while noting that this section is not intended “to deprive a 13 prisoner of any reduction of time to which he may be entitled pursuant to the 14 provisions of [NMSA 1978, Sections 31-20-11 (1967), 31-20-12 (1967), and 33-2-34 15 (2006)]”). 16 In our notice, we directed Defendant’s attention to this Court’s opinion in Clah. 17 In Clah, the district court entered a commitment order on December 11, requiring the 18 defendant to begin serving his term of imprisonment on December 27 in the San Juan 19 County Detention Center, and the defendant appeared and started serving his sentence

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1 on that day. 1997-NMCA-091, ¶ 3. The district court did not enter the formal 2 judgment and sentence until February 6 when it sentenced the defendant to the DOC 3 for a period of eighteen months, but suspended a portion and required the defendant 4 to serve 364 days in the San Juan County Detention Center. Id. ¶¶ 3, 5. In discussing 5 the credit to which the defendant was entitled, this Court noted that the defendant 6 started serving his sentence on December 27, and thus any time after that date could 7 not be considered “presentence credit.” Id. ¶ 17. 8 Defendant claims that our proposed reliance on Clah is misplaced because in 9 that case the defendant was never transported to the DOC so the issue of whether the 10 time between sentencing and arrival at the detention facility was not considered. 11 [MIO 3] We are unpersuaded that the factual differences in Clah warrant a different 12 result. 13 In this case, as in Clah, the time served by Defendant after sentencing should 14 not be considered presentence confinement but instead be considered time served on 15 her sentence. See § 33-2-38. Therefore, the district court did not need to modify 16 Defendant’s sentence to grant presentence confinement for the time period before she 17 was transferred to the DOC. 18 GOOD TIME CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED IN THE OCDC 19 Defendant also claims that the district court erred in refusing to award her good

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1 time credit for the time she served in the OCDC pending transfer to the DOC. [MIO 2 3-6; DS 5] As more fully discussed in our notice of proposed summary disposition, 3 good time credits for sentences served in the OCDC are governed by the Earned 4 Meritorious Deductions Act (EMDA), NMSA 1978, § 33-2-34 (2006). As Defendant 5 concedes, the determination of the amount of good time credits earned by an inmate 6 is an administrative matter that is not part of the judgment and sentence. See State v. 7 Rudolfo, 2008-NMSC-036, ¶ 37, 144 N.M. 305, 187 P.3d 170. A sentencing court’s 8 only role in administering the EMDA is making the initial determination of whether 9 a given offense constitutes a serious violent offense such that good time credits are 10 limited. See id.; § 33-2-34(A)(1). The courts have no other role in administering the 11 EMDA or in determining the amount of good time that a defendant may earn as to any 12 offense. Rudolfo, 2008-NMSC-036, ¶ 37. 13 In our notice of proposed summary disposition, we proposed to hold that the 14 district court did not err in refusing to modify Defendant’s sentence in order to grant 15 her good time credit for the time served in the OCDC because it is not the sentencing 16 court’s function to determine the amount of good time credits to be awarded. Cf. id. 17 ¶¶ 38-39 (striking in its entirety the portion of the defendant’s sentence regarding 18 eligibility for good time credits because none of the convictions required the court to 19 determine if they were serious violent offenses, and, thus, “there was no role for the

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1 court to perform in this case with respect to good time eligibility”). In our proposed 2 notice, we also recognized that a defendant sentenced to a county jail such as the 3 OCDC may also be entitled to good time credit. See NMSA 1978, § 33-3-9(A) (1995) 4 (stating that the jail administrator “with the approval of the committing judge or 5 presiding judge,” grants credit against a prisoner’s sentence for good behavior and 6 establishes the rules for accrual of good time credits); cf. State v. Wyman, 2008- 7 NMCA-113, ¶ 7, 144 N.M. 701, 191 P.3d 559 (recognizing that although the 8 sentencing judge must permit the opportunity to earn good time credit, the procedures 9 established by the jail administrator govern the award and revocation of the inmate’s 10 credit), cert. granted, 2008-NMCERT-008, 145 N.M. 255, 195 P.3d 1267. However, 11 we proposed to hold that because Defendant was sentenced to serve her time in the 12 DOC, she was not entitled to good time credit for her time in the OCDC. Cf. State v. 13 Aqui, 104 N.M. 345, 349-50, 721 P.2d 771, 775-76 (1986) (recognizing that New 14 Mexico’s statutory scheme does not allow good time credit for presentence 15 confinement and that district courts do not have the jurisdiction to award good time 16 credit for presentence confinement), limited in part on other grounds by Brooks v. 17 Shanks, 118 N.M. 716, 719-20, 885 P.2d 637, 640-41 (1994). 18 Defendant seeks to distinguish Aqui because that case only concerns whether 19 a defendant is entitled to good time credits for time served before sentencing. [MIO

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1 5-6] See generally Aqui, 104 N.M. at 346-50, 721 P.2d at 772-76. She argues that she 2 is being deprived of good time credit for the “limbo time” between sentencing on 3 December 22 and her arrival at the DOC on February 6. [MIO 4] She notes that 4 Section 33-2-34 does not address this “limbo time” while a defendant awaits transport 5 or entry of the judgment and sentence and claims she is being unfairly deprived of this 6 time, which she earned during this interim period. [MIO 4] She further notes that the 7 OCDC administrator, Captain Jenkins, made a determination that Defendant was 8 entitled to good time credits against her sentence commencing on December 22, based 9 upon her good behavior while incarcerated in the OCDC. [MIO 4; RP 62, 71] She 10 then argues that the district court erred in refusing to award good time credits by 11 failing to recognize Captain Jenkins’ determination in its judgment and sentence and 12 in assuming that the DOC would properly allot the good time. [MIO 4] 13 Assuming without deciding that Defendant could be entitled to good time credit 14 for the time spent in the OCDC after sentencing but before transport, we nonetheless 15 are not persuaded that the district court erred in refusing to amend Defendant’s 16 sentence to award good time credits for this time period. We agree that Aqui does not 17 control in this case because the defendants in Aqui were not in a limbo situation but 18 instead seeking good time credits for presentence confinement. [MIO 5-6] However, 19 unless and until the DOC determines the amount of good time credits to which

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1 Defendant is entitled, we are of the opinion Defendant has stated no grounds for relief 2 based on her contentions that the district court should have awarded the good time 3 credit. See Rudolfo, 2008-NMSC-036, ¶¶ 38-39. 4 If Defendant is entitled to any relief, it must come pursuant to a habeas corpus 5 petition that Defendant may file after DOC officials have denied her good time credits. 6 [MIO 1; RP 62] Cf. Lopez v. LeMaster, 2003-NMSC-003, ¶ 23, 133 N.M. 59, 61 P.3d 7 185 (filed 2002) (stating that habeas corpus relief extends to prison disciplinary 8 proceedings based on an inmate’s liberty interest in good-time credits); Brooks, 118 9 N.M. at 717-18, 885 P.2d at 638-39 (reversing the dismissal of a petition for habeas 10 corpus in recognition that the defendant had a right to judicial review of the DOC’s 11 decision to deprive him of good time credits because deprivation of good time credits 12 must be accomplished in compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements); 13 Wyman, 2008-NMCA-113, ¶ 6 (recognizing that Brooks pertains to the forfeiture of 14 earned good time credits and whether prison officials complied with procedural due 15 process in depriving an inmate of credit earned, not the discretion of a sentencing 16 judge to award or deny the opportunity to earn good time credits). To summarize, at 17 this juncture we need not decide whether Defendant is entitled to good time credits for 18 the time served in the OCDC after sentencing but before transport. [MIO 5] 19 For the foregoing reasons as well as those set forth in our notice of proposed

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1 disposition, we affirm the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to modify her 2 sentence. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED.

4 _______________________________ 5 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge 6 7 WE CONCUR:

8 ___________________________________ 9 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge

10 ___________________________________ 11 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge