State v. Standard Life Ass'n

38 Ohio St. (N.S.) 281
CourtOhio Supreme Court
DecidedJanuary 15, 1882
StatusPublished

This text of 38 Ohio St. (N.S.) 281 (State v. Standard Life Ass'n) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Standard Life Ass'n, 38 Ohio St. (N.S.) 281 (Ohio 1882).

Opinion

Johnson J.

This association was incorporated September 1, 1880. The record of the company shows that seven persons, to wit, D. R. Johnston, W. H. Carter, J. B. Netseher, Jerry Shank, Geo. W. Cole, S. W. Anderson and John F. Wood, met on that day in Mansfield for the purpose, as is stated, of organizing an association “ to furnish mutual protection and relief to its members,” under section 3630 of the Revised Statutes; Mr. Anderson was made chairman of the meeting, and he thereupon presented a plan of operations, which was unanimously adopted. What that plan was, does not appear from the record of the company, but is subsequently disclosed in the proceedings and acts of the association.

At the same meeting, those present drew up, and five of them executed, articles .of incorporation, which were subsequently authenticated and filed with the secretary of state, under which they became a body corporate.

Before adjourning, and of course before they had become incorporated, these seven persons proceeded to elect themselves “officers and trustees” of the association fqr one year, giving to each an office, and also appointed an executive committee from among themselves. It appears that by-laws were also adopted, but the record of the trustees is silent as to their provisions. This record and the books of the association show they proceeded to transact business as a corporation soon after.

The certificate of incorporation, after stating the name and place of business, states the purpose of the association to be, “ to receive money, either by voluntary donation, or contribution, or to collect the same by assessment of its members, and to distribute and appropriate the same to the families or heirs of its deceased members, in such manner as may be prescribed by the rules and regulations of the association, not inconsistent with the laws of Ohio, and so as to carry out the objects and purposes of the association as above expressed.” The section of the Revised Statutes authorizing such a corporation is as follows:

“ Seo. 3630. A company or association may be organized for the mutual protection and relief of its members, and for [287]*287the payment of stipulated sums of money to the families or heirs of the deceased members of such company or association, and may receive money, either by voluntary donation or con-, tribution, or collect the same by assessment on its members, and may distribute, invest and appropriate the same in such manner as it may deem proper; but the aggregate sum stipulated to be paid to the family or heirs of any member at his decease shall in no case exceed seven thousand dollars, nor shall any assessment on account of the death of any member be made against any surviving member exceeding one-fifth of one per centum stipulated to be paid to such survivor at his decease ; and such association shall not be subject to the proceeding sections of this chapter.”

It will be noticed that this section authorizes such corporation for the mutual protection and relief of its members, and also for the payment of stipulated sums of money to the family or heirs of deceased members. The certificate of incorporation is silent as to furnishing mutual protection and relief to members. It limits the scheme, so far as relief is concerned, to the distribution of its funds to the family or heirs of deceased members.

It does not purport, therefore, to afford any relief or protection to its members, but only to provide for their family or heirs after their decease. It is in no sense, therefore, according to the charter, a mutual aid association to members, but a mutual insurance company of members, for the benefit of the family or heirs of members.

It has issued what are termed certificates of membership, but the real nature of the contract is that of insurance.

The so-called member, for in fact he is not treated as a' member of the corporate body, contracts to pay an admission fee, and annual dues of specified amounts, and a stated assessment for each death in the class to which he belongs, in consideration of which, the company agrees to pay his beneficiary named the assessment collected (less the deductions stated hereafter), not exceeding the amount of insurance named in the certificate, which is either $2,000 or $3,000.

In Commonwealth v. Wetherbe, 105 Mass. 119, it was held, [288]*288that such a contract was one of insurance, whatever be the terms of payment of the consideration by the assured, or the mode of payment of the sum to be paid in the event of loss, and although the object of the insurer, in making the contract, is benevolent and not speculative.

It was further held in that case that it was none the less a contract of mutual insurance because the amount to be paid is not a gross sum, but one graduated by the number of members, nor because a portion of the premiums are to be paid upon uncertain periods of the death of members, nor because in case of non-payment of assessments the contract provides no mode of enforcing payment thereof, but merely declares the contract forfeited.

From the specific terms of the charter, as well as from the tenor of certificates of membership, the contract entered into is one of insurance on the lives of members, and not one for the mutual protection and relief of its members.

Whether it is competent to become a corporation for that single purpose when the statute authorizes such corporations for the double purpose of mutual protection and relief of its members, and also for life insurance for the benefit of the family or heirs of such members, is a question we need not now stop to answer, as the petition admits that the association was duly incorporated.

Section 3630 provides, however, that these corporations shall not be subject to the preceding sections of the chapter, relating to life insurance companies on the mutual or stock-plan.” Chapter 10, sections 3587 to 3629 Rev. Stat.

This leads to the inquiry, to what extent they are regulated by law, and to what extent such associations may adopt their own rules and regulations %

Though not subject to the provisions relating to life insurance in chapter 10, they are subject to the general provisions relating to corporations found in chapter 1 of title 11 of the Revised Statutes.

That chapter provides for two classes of corporations, (1) those for jprofit which must have a capital stock, and (2) those not for profit, which need not have such capital stock.

[289]*289If it is of the first kind, its name must begin with ££ The,” and end with Company,” and in eacli kind the place of business and purpose for which it is formed must be stated in the certificate. R. S. § 3226. By section 3240, a majority of the'subscribers to the articles of incorporation of a corporation, other than for profit, may elect not less than five trustees, who shall hold their offices till the. next eléction, or until their successors are elected and qualified. In the case at bar, the incorporators elected seven trustees for one y.ear.

By section 3246, unless the regulations otherwise provide the annual election for trustees or directors shall be held (this section applies as well to corporations not for profit as those for profit), on the first Monday in January of each year. It further contemplates that the elective body consists of the ££ members ” of the corporation in those not for profit, and the

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Bluebook (online)
38 Ohio St. (N.S.) 281, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-standard-life-assn-ohio-1882.