[Cite as State v. Stafford, 2026-Ohio-1378.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 115414 v. :
TYLER STAFFORD, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 16, 2026
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case Nos. CR-24-691606-A, CR-25-700742-B, and CR-25-701171-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Tasha L. Forchione, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Thomas T. Lampman, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. EMANUELLA D. GROVES, P.J.:
Defendant-appellant Tyler Charles Stafford (“Stafford”) appeals from
his guilty plea to having weapons while under disability in violation of R.C.
2923.13(A)(2). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Factual and Procedural History
In June 2025, Stafford entered into a plea agreement with the State
under Cuyahoga C.P. Nos. CR-24-691606-A, CR-25-700742-B, and CR-25-701171-
A (respectively, “CR-24-691606,” “CR-25-700742,” and “CR-25-701171”).
Relevant to this appeal, in CR-24-691606, Stafford pleaded guilty to
having weapons while under disability pursuant to R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), a felony of
the third degree, and the State dismissed the remaining counts. The State alleged
that at the time of the offense, Stafford was under indictment in Summit County for
involuntary manslaughter and therefore, was not permitted to possess a firearm.1
In CR-25-700742, a 15-count indictment, Stafford pleaded guilty to
five counts, including failure to comply with the order or signal of a police officer,
obstruction of official business, vandalism, tampering with evidence, and drug
possession. The State dismissed the remaining ten counts.
In CR-25-701171, Stafford pleaded guilty to felonious assault with a
one-year firearm specification, and the State dismissed the remaining count.
1 Stafford’s counsel acknowledged that his client was indicted for voluntary manslaughter but notified the court that the case was subsequently tried and Stafford was convicted of a misdemeanor assault. The court proceeded to sentencing on all cases immediately after the
plea, imposing nine months on the having-weapons-while-under-disability charge
in CR-24-691606, and additional penalties on the remaining charges resulting in an
aggregate sentence of 16 years in prison.
The trial court reconvened in July 2025 for a hearing. The trial court
explained that it agreed to delay journalizing the sentences in each case to allow the
defense to submit case law regarding the mandatory consecutive sentence for failure
to comply with the order or signal of a police officer. The parties informed the court
that they agreed that the consecutive sentence for a violation of R.C. 2921.331 only
applied to that count and did not mandate consecutive sentences on the other
charges. The trial court then imposed nine months on the having-weapons-while-
under-disability charge. The aggregate sentence on all charges was 15 years, 9
months in prison.
Stafford appeals raising the following assignments of error for our
review.
Assignment of Error No. 1
It was plain error to allow Stafford to plead guilty to a crime, which this court had already held facially unconstitutional.
Assignment of Error No. 2
Advising Stafford to plead guilty to an unconstitutional offense was ineffective assistance. In this appeal, Stafford’s sole challenge is to his conviction under CR-
24-691606 for having weapons while under disability pursuant R.C. 2923.13(A)(2);
therefore, we confine our review to that conviction.
Stafford argues that because of this court’s decision in State v.
Philpotts, 2025-Ohio-1179 (8th Dist.), which found R.C. 2923.13(A)(2) facially
unconstitutional, the trial court plainly erred when it accepted his plea and his trial
counsel committed ineffective assistance by advising him to enter the plea. The
State points out that Philpotts was stayed by the Ohio Supreme Court; and therefore,
the opinion had no precedential value at the time Stafford entered his plea. Further,
the State argues that Stafford voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly entered his
plea, thus the conviction should not be reversed.2
When a party fails to object to an error at the trial-court level, they are
limited to arguing plain error on appeal. State v. Bouyer, 2023-Ohio-4793, ¶ 62
(8th Dist.). In order to establish plain error, the appellant has the burden of
establishing that (1) an error occurred; (2) the error was obvious; and (3) but for the
error the outcome of the proceeding would be different. Id. Further, it is generally
recognized that an appellate court should be cautious when finding plain error, and
only do so when reversal is necessary to correct a manifest miscarriage of justice. Id.
2 The State also challenges our holding in Philpotts. We note that Stafford’s arguments on appeal do not challenge the constitutionality of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), but challenge whether the Philpotts decision should have been considered when the court accepted his plea and when his counsel advised him about the plea. As it will be discussed, consideration of Philpotts was not required and thus, we need not address the State’s arguments here. However, failure to raise the issue in the trial court when the issue is readily
apparent constitutes a waiver, and this court need not address the issue for the first
time on appeal. Cleveland v. Clark, 2019-Ohio-1999, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.), citing
Cleveland v. Peoples, 2015-Ohio-674 (8th Dist.), citing Cleveland v. Meehan, 2014-
Ohio-2265, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.), citing Cleveland v. Taylor, 2013-Ohio-4708, ¶ 7-8 (8th
Dist.).
Nevertheless, the record establishes there was no error. At the time
Stafford entered his plea, the Ohio Supreme Court had granted the State’s request
for a stay of this court’s order in Philpotts. The Ohio Supreme Court has found:
“The effect of a stay pending review in a criminal appeal is preventive in nature. It preserves the status quo of the litigation pending appellate review and suspends the power of the lower court to issue execution of the judgment or sentence.”
State v. Roberts, 2008-Ohio-3835, ¶ 24, quoting Loeb v. State, 387 So.2d 433, 435-
436 (Fla.App. 1980).
Thus, at the time of Stafford’s plea the statute was constitutional on
its face and remained in effect. The trial court did not plainly err when it accepted
Stafford’s plea. Accordingly, the first assignment of error is overruled.
Turning to Stafford’s second assignment of error, in order to establish
ineffective assistance of counsel, Stafford must demonstrate that (1) his counsel was
deficient in some aspect of his representation, and (2) there is a reasonable
probability that, were it not for counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would have
been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688 (1984). Moreover, “‘the failure to make a showing of either deficient performance or
prejudice defeats a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.’” State v. Harris, 2021-
Ohio-856, ¶ 21, citing In re S.A., 2019-Ohio-4782, ¶ 46, quoting State v. Davenport,
2018-Ohio-2933, ¶ 25, citing Strickland at 697. Furthermore, an attorney is entitled
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[Cite as State v. Stafford, 2026-Ohio-1378.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 115414 v. :
TYLER STAFFORD, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 16, 2026
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case Nos. CR-24-691606-A, CR-25-700742-B, and CR-25-701171-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Tasha L. Forchione, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Thomas T. Lampman, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. EMANUELLA D. GROVES, P.J.:
Defendant-appellant Tyler Charles Stafford (“Stafford”) appeals from
his guilty plea to having weapons while under disability in violation of R.C.
2923.13(A)(2). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Factual and Procedural History
In June 2025, Stafford entered into a plea agreement with the State
under Cuyahoga C.P. Nos. CR-24-691606-A, CR-25-700742-B, and CR-25-701171-
A (respectively, “CR-24-691606,” “CR-25-700742,” and “CR-25-701171”).
Relevant to this appeal, in CR-24-691606, Stafford pleaded guilty to
having weapons while under disability pursuant to R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), a felony of
the third degree, and the State dismissed the remaining counts. The State alleged
that at the time of the offense, Stafford was under indictment in Summit County for
involuntary manslaughter and therefore, was not permitted to possess a firearm.1
In CR-25-700742, a 15-count indictment, Stafford pleaded guilty to
five counts, including failure to comply with the order or signal of a police officer,
obstruction of official business, vandalism, tampering with evidence, and drug
possession. The State dismissed the remaining ten counts.
In CR-25-701171, Stafford pleaded guilty to felonious assault with a
one-year firearm specification, and the State dismissed the remaining count.
1 Stafford’s counsel acknowledged that his client was indicted for voluntary manslaughter but notified the court that the case was subsequently tried and Stafford was convicted of a misdemeanor assault. The court proceeded to sentencing on all cases immediately after the
plea, imposing nine months on the having-weapons-while-under-disability charge
in CR-24-691606, and additional penalties on the remaining charges resulting in an
aggregate sentence of 16 years in prison.
The trial court reconvened in July 2025 for a hearing. The trial court
explained that it agreed to delay journalizing the sentences in each case to allow the
defense to submit case law regarding the mandatory consecutive sentence for failure
to comply with the order or signal of a police officer. The parties informed the court
that they agreed that the consecutive sentence for a violation of R.C. 2921.331 only
applied to that count and did not mandate consecutive sentences on the other
charges. The trial court then imposed nine months on the having-weapons-while-
under-disability charge. The aggregate sentence on all charges was 15 years, 9
months in prison.
Stafford appeals raising the following assignments of error for our
review.
Assignment of Error No. 1
It was plain error to allow Stafford to plead guilty to a crime, which this court had already held facially unconstitutional.
Assignment of Error No. 2
Advising Stafford to plead guilty to an unconstitutional offense was ineffective assistance. In this appeal, Stafford’s sole challenge is to his conviction under CR-
24-691606 for having weapons while under disability pursuant R.C. 2923.13(A)(2);
therefore, we confine our review to that conviction.
Stafford argues that because of this court’s decision in State v.
Philpotts, 2025-Ohio-1179 (8th Dist.), which found R.C. 2923.13(A)(2) facially
unconstitutional, the trial court plainly erred when it accepted his plea and his trial
counsel committed ineffective assistance by advising him to enter the plea. The
State points out that Philpotts was stayed by the Ohio Supreme Court; and therefore,
the opinion had no precedential value at the time Stafford entered his plea. Further,
the State argues that Stafford voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly entered his
plea, thus the conviction should not be reversed.2
When a party fails to object to an error at the trial-court level, they are
limited to arguing plain error on appeal. State v. Bouyer, 2023-Ohio-4793, ¶ 62
(8th Dist.). In order to establish plain error, the appellant has the burden of
establishing that (1) an error occurred; (2) the error was obvious; and (3) but for the
error the outcome of the proceeding would be different. Id. Further, it is generally
recognized that an appellate court should be cautious when finding plain error, and
only do so when reversal is necessary to correct a manifest miscarriage of justice. Id.
2 The State also challenges our holding in Philpotts. We note that Stafford’s arguments on appeal do not challenge the constitutionality of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), but challenge whether the Philpotts decision should have been considered when the court accepted his plea and when his counsel advised him about the plea. As it will be discussed, consideration of Philpotts was not required and thus, we need not address the State’s arguments here. However, failure to raise the issue in the trial court when the issue is readily
apparent constitutes a waiver, and this court need not address the issue for the first
time on appeal. Cleveland v. Clark, 2019-Ohio-1999, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.), citing
Cleveland v. Peoples, 2015-Ohio-674 (8th Dist.), citing Cleveland v. Meehan, 2014-
Ohio-2265, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.), citing Cleveland v. Taylor, 2013-Ohio-4708, ¶ 7-8 (8th
Dist.).
Nevertheless, the record establishes there was no error. At the time
Stafford entered his plea, the Ohio Supreme Court had granted the State’s request
for a stay of this court’s order in Philpotts. The Ohio Supreme Court has found:
“The effect of a stay pending review in a criminal appeal is preventive in nature. It preserves the status quo of the litigation pending appellate review and suspends the power of the lower court to issue execution of the judgment or sentence.”
State v. Roberts, 2008-Ohio-3835, ¶ 24, quoting Loeb v. State, 387 So.2d 433, 435-
436 (Fla.App. 1980).
Thus, at the time of Stafford’s plea the statute was constitutional on
its face and remained in effect. The trial court did not plainly err when it accepted
Stafford’s plea. Accordingly, the first assignment of error is overruled.
Turning to Stafford’s second assignment of error, in order to establish
ineffective assistance of counsel, Stafford must demonstrate that (1) his counsel was
deficient in some aspect of his representation, and (2) there is a reasonable
probability that, were it not for counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would have
been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688 (1984). Moreover, “‘the failure to make a showing of either deficient performance or
prejudice defeats a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.’” State v. Harris, 2021-
Ohio-856, ¶ 21, citing In re S.A., 2019-Ohio-4782, ¶ 46, quoting State v. Davenport,
2018-Ohio-2933, ¶ 25, citing Strickland at 697. Furthermore, an attorney is entitled
to the presumption that his ‘“conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance.”’ State v. Daniels, 2018-Ohio-1701, ¶ 23 (1st Dist.), quoting
Strickland at 689.
Stafford’s challenge hinges on whether his attorney erred when he did
not raise the constitutionality of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2) before the trial court. Stafford
suggests, based on a silent record, that his trial lawyer did not consider the
constitutionality of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2) or review it with Stafford prior to the plea.
However, it is well settled that alleged ineffectiveness must be apparent from the
record on appeal. State v. Rowe, 2011-Ohio-5739, ¶ 22 (3d Dist.). A party alleging
errors outside of the record may utilize a postconviction-relief petition to raise them.
Id., citing State v. Coleman, 85 Ohio St.3d 129, 134 (1999). A postconviction-relief
petition is a collateral attack on a judgment and allows a petitioner to submit
documentation and affidavits to support their argument. State v. Broom, 2016-
Ohio-1028, ¶ 28 and R.C. 2953.21(A)(1)(b).
Stafford’s attorney informed the court before the plea that he met
with his client, reviewed discovery and his client’s constitutional rights, and believed
Stafford was entering into the plea deal knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
When questioned, Stafford averred that he was satisfied with the performance of his counsel and understood his constitutional rights and the nature of his plea. Based
on the record before us, we do not find any evidence that overcomes the
presumption that Stafford’s lawyer’s conduct fell within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance.
Accordingly, the second assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s
conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case
remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
____ EMANUELLA D. GROVES, PRESIDING JUDGE
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., and KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR