IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED NOVEMB ER SESSION, 1997 February 4, 1998
Cecil W. Crowson STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) Appellate Court Clerk C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9701-CC-00022 ) Appellee, ) ) ) WILLIAMSON COUNTY VS. ) ) HON . DON ALD P . HARR IS STACY LYNN COLLIER, ) JUDGE ) Appe llant. ) (DUI)
ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
VANESSA P. BRYAN JOHN KNOX WALKUP Assistant Public Defender Attorney General and Reporter P.O. Box 68 Franklin, TN 37065 JANIS L. TURNER Assistant Attorney General 425 5th Avenu e North Nashville, TN 37243
JOE D. BAUGH, JR. District Attorney General
JOHN BARRINGER Assistant District Attorney General P.O. Box 937 Franklin, TN 37065-0937
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED
DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE OPINION
The Defe ndan t, Stacy Lynn C ollier, ap peals as of rig ht purs uant to Rule 3
of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. She was convicted by a
Williamson County jury of driving un der the influence of an intoxicant (“DU I”).1
The trial court sen tenced her to thirty da ys in the co unty jail, all suspended except
for forty-eight hours, and eleven months and twenty-nine days of supervised
probation. The trial co urt also im posed a fine of thre e hund red fifty dollars
($350), revoke d the D efend ant’s d river’s license for one year, and ordered that
she use an ignition interlock during he r probationary period.2 In this appeal, the
Defendant argues that the evidence was legally insufficient to support her
conviction, that the trial court erred in admitting the result of an Intoximeter 3000
breath test, and that the trial court erred in admitting testimo ny concern ing a
horizontal gaze nystagmus (“HGN”) field sobriety test. After reviewing the record,
we conclude that the Defendant’s issues provide no basis for the reversal of her
conviction . Accord ingly, we affirm the judgm ent of the tria l court.
The State’s proof at trial consisted of the testimony of two officers of the
Fairview, Tennessee Police Department. Officer Joe Singer testified that he had
been a police o fficer for two and one-half years and had received specialized
training in DUI detection. At approximately 4:30 a.m. on the morning of May 14,
1995, Singer was driving his marked patrol car north on Highway 96 in Fairview.
He observe d a vehicle traveling tow ard him with the left fron t tire on the center
1 Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-401. 2 The trial court noted that the Defendant would be eligible for a restricted driver’s license.
-2- line. As the car pa ssed him, h e swe rved slig htly but wa s able rema in in his lane.
After the car had passed him, he watche d the vehicle throu gh his rearview m irror.
Singer saw the car drift over the center line of the highway to the point where the
vehicle ’s mid-line w as over th e cente r line. After obs erving the movem ents of the
vehicle, Singer suspected that the driver was potentially intoxicated or asleep at
the wheel. He turned his patrol car around, pursued and caught up with the
vehicle in question. He initiated an investigatory stop. The Defendant was the
driver of the vehicle.
Officer Singer n oted tha t the Defe ndant p ulled over onto the side of the
road abruptly. Upon approaching the Defendant, he noticed a moderate odor of
alcoh ol. According to Singer, the Defendant staggered upon exiting her vehicle.
Singer informed the Defendant why he had stopped her and asked he r to perform
a series of field sobriety tests. The Defendant had been wearing high heels that
night but chose not to wear them during the field sobriety tests.
Singer first performed an HGN test on the Defendant. Singer testified that
the Defendant’s eyes did not smoothly pursue the pen as he moved it, that he
noticed nystagm us at m aximum deviation, a nd that he noticed the onset of
nystagmus before an angle of forty-five degrees from the Defendant’s line of
sight. He then ask ed the D efenda nt to perform a walk and turn test, consisting
of nine heel-to-toe steps along the fog line of the highway, followe d by a turn and
nine heel-to-toe steps bac k alon g the lin e, all the while w ith the D efend ant’s
hands at her sides. According to Singer, the Defendant missed placing her heel
to her toe on every step, swayed and brought her arms up to maintain balance,
stepped off the white fog line on her first step bac k, and perform ed a military turn
-3- instead of the type o f turn instruc ted. Sing er then a sked the Defen dant to
perform a one-legged stand test, consisting of lifting either of her feet
appro ximate ly six inches off the ground and holding it there w hile coun ting to
thirty, all the while with her hands at her sides. According to Singer, the
Defendant was very unsteady, lifted her arms to maintain balance and put her
foot down five times. He stopped the test before its completion for the
Defenda nt’s safety.
After the completion of the tests, Officer Singer believed that the results
indicated that the Defendant’s driving ability was impaired due to the use of an
intoxican t. He placed her under arrest for DUI. The Defendant agreed to take
a breath test at the Williamson County Jail. Officer Singer drove on the trip to the
jail, the Defendant rode in the backseat directly behind him and Officer Chris Ivey
rode in the backseat next to her. Officer Ivey rode in the backseat for the express
purpose of obser ving the D efenda nt prior to the breath te st. Although Officer
Singer did not observe the Defendant during the entire trip, he testified that he did
not witness the Defendant cough, regurgitate, drink, smoke, or place any foreign
material in her mouth. Once they had arrived at th e W illiamso n Cou nty Jail,
Officer Singer administered a breath test on the Intoximeter 3000. Singer
testified that the result of the breath test indicated that the Defendant had a
0.15% blood alc ohol con tent.
On cr oss-e xamin ation, S inger a dmitte d that h is repo rt would not indica te
any factors or clue s from the field sobrie ty tests s uppo rting the Defe ndan t’s
sobriety, such as her attentiveness during instructions for the various tests. He
also admitted that he was unaware that the Defendant had asthma. Singer
-4- testified that the Defendant was carrying a purse, which he placed on the front
seat d uring th e trip to th e jail.
Officer Chris Ivey testified to es sentially the same facts as Officer Singe r.
Officer Ivey corroborated Officer’s Singer’s testimony concerning the
circumstances surrounding the stop of the Defendant’s vehicle. Ivey noticed an
odor of alco holic beverage and stated that the Defendant was unsteady on her
feet as she exited her car. Ivey observed Officer Singer as he gave the
Defendant the field sobriety tests. Ivey corrob orated Singer’s testimo ny with
regard to the walk and turn test and the one-legged stand test. Ivey stated that
he was not in a po sition to observe the Defenda nt’s eyes during the HG N test.
Officer Ivey testified that during the trip to the jail, he sat in the backseat of the
patrol car next to the Defendant and observed her continuously in anticipation of
the breath te st. Accord ing to Office r Ivey, the D efendant d id not burp , vomit,
smoke, or consume alcohol or food. Ivey also stated that he did not observe the
Defendant using an inhaler for her asthma.
On cross-examination, Officer Ivey admitted that he was unaware that the
Defendant had as thma. Ive y stated tha t to the bes t of his recollection, the
Defendant was carrying a purse that night, but that he neve r had cu stody of it.
Officer Ivey testified that although the Defendant was hand cuffed, her wrists we re
sma ll enough for her to slip her hands out of the handcuffs, which she did on at
least one occasion. The Defendant informed the officers of this fact and even put
her han ds bac k in the ha ndcuffs a fter they ha d slipped out.
-5- The Defendant testified in m arked con trast to Officers Singe r and Ivey.
She stated that at the time of the offense, she was a student and also worked at
Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute. She worked from 3:00 p.m. to 11:00
p.m. on Saturday, May 13, 1995. After her shift ende d at 11:00 p.m., she met a
friend, Shannon Batey, and followed her to a nearby dance club known as “Big
Dadd y’s.” They arrived at Big Daddy’s at approximately 11:30 p.m. and remained
there until 2:45 a.m. on Sunday morning. During that time, the Defendant
consumed two Icehouse brand beers and drank water. Upon leaving Big
Daddy’s, the Defendant drove to a Waffle House restaurant and ate breakfast
with friends. Sh e did not c onsum e any alco hol with breakfa st. After brea kfast,
she drove home along Interstate 40, exiting at Highway 96. She was pulled over
by Officers Singer and Ivey on Highway 96.
The Defendant denied driving across the center line of the highway. She
also denied being unsteady on her feet upon exiting her vehicle. It is undisputed
that she knew both officers from h igh school. Sh e testified that the officers we re
sarca stic with her and that she fo und th eir demeanor to be somewhat rude and
intimidating. With regard to the HGN test, she stated that although she was
facing away from the patrol car, she found the flashing emergency lights to be
distracting. With reg ard to the walk and turn test, she stated that she performed
this test in her bare feet on broken, rocky pavement and, as a result, her feet hurt
during the test. She admitted that she pe rformed a military turn during the test,
but stated that Officer Singer never instructed her to do a particular type of turn.
According to the De fendant, she was never asked to perform the one-legged
stand tes t.
-6- After her arrest, the Defendant rode to the Williamson County Jail in the
backseat of the patrol car. She testified that Officer Singer drove the patrol car
and Officer Ivey rode in the front pa sseng er seat. A ccording to the De fendan t,
Officer Ivey did not observe her during the trip to the jail. Instead, he and Officer
Singer carried on a conversation. The Defendant testified that although she was
handcuffed, the handcuffs were too large for her wrists. A s a result, she w as ab le
to slip her ha nds ou t of the han dcuffs. During the trip to the jail, she slipped her
hands ou t of the handcu ffs and used a n asthma inhaler.
Shannon Batey testified for the defense. Her testimony corroborated the
Defe ndan t’s testimony concerning the first half of the evening. In particular,
Batey testified that she had met the Defendant at Middle Tennessee Mental
Health Institute at approximately 11:00 p.m. on May 13, 1995. They drove a
short distance to a da nce c lub kn own a s Big Dadd y’s, arrivin g at ap proxim ately
11:30 p.m. Batey and the Defendant each had two beers during the evening.
Batey stated she was sure the Defendant had consumed only two beers because
they had been together the entire time for safety purposes. They left Big D addy’s
at 2:30 to 2:45 a.m. on May 14, 1995. Batey followed the Defe ndan t to a W affle
House restaurant, where they parted company. Batey testified that the
Defe ndan t’s driving on the way to th e W affle H ouse was n orma l.
The Defendant was indicted on one count of DUI. She was tried on
November 11, 1996. After considering the proof presented at trial, the jury found
the De fendan t guilty as cha rged. Sh e now a ppeals to this Cou rt.
-7- In her first issue on appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was
legally insufficient to suppo rt her con viction. The Defendant contends that the
evidence does not demonstrate that her ability to drive was impaired through the
use of intoxicants . She po ints to her testimony, co rroborated by S hannon Batey,
that she consumed only two beers over the course of three hours. Moreover, she
contes ts the testimony of Officers Singer and Ivey regarding the results of her
field sobriety tests. Furthermore, she argues that the results of her breath test
are not re liable bec ause s he use d an as thma in haler prior to the test.
When an accused challenges th e sufficiency of the convicting evidence,
the standard is whe ther, aft er revie wing th e evide nce in the ligh t mos t favora ble
to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
eleme nts of the crime beyond a reaso nable d oubt. Jack son v. V irginia, 443 U.S.
307, 319 (1979). Questions concern ing the credibility of the witnesses, the
weight and valu e to be given the evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by
the evidence, are resolved by the trier of fa ct, not this co urt. State v. Pappas, 754
S.W.2d 620, 623 (T enn. Crim. A pp. 1987). N or may this cou rt reweigh or
reevalua te the evide nce. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 197 8).
A jury verdict approved by the trial judge accredits the State’s witnesses
and resolves all conflicts in fa vor of the S tate. State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474,
476 (Tenn. 1973). On appeal, the State is entitled to the strongest legitimate
view of the evid ence and a ll inference s therefro m. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d at 835.
Because a verdict of guilt removes the presumption of innocence and replaces
it with a presumption of guilt, the accused has the burden in this court of
-8- illustrating why the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict returned by the
trier of fact. State v. Tug gle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982); Grace, 493
S.W.2d at 476.
In the case sub judice, the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of
the charged offense as follows:
Any person who commits the offense of driving under the influence of an intoxicant is guilty of a crime. For you to find the defend ant guilty of th is offense , the state must have proven beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the following essential elements: (1) that the defendant was driving or was in physical control of an automobile or motor driven vehicle; (2) that this act occurred on a public road or highw ay or pu blic street or alley; and, (3) that the defendant was under the influence of an intoxicant to the extent her ability to operate an automobile was impaired. ... You have he ard from the proo f that at the time of the defendant’s arrest, she consented to and was given a test for the purpose of determining the alcohol content of her blood. Evidence from the test that there was, at the time alleged, ten- hundredths of one percent (.10% ) or mo re by w eight o f alcoh ol in the defendant’s blood, creates an inference that the defendant was under the influence of such intoxicant, and that her ability to drive was impaired. If you find from the proof that the defendan t was found by means of a blood test or brea th test to have ten-hundredths of one percent (.10%) or more by weight of alcohol in her blood, you, the jury, are permitted to infer that the defendant was under the influence of such intoxicant, and that her ability to drive was therefore impaired sufficiently to constitute a violation of the law again st driving unde r the influ ence of alco hol. Howeve r, you are never required to mak e this infere nce. It is the exclusive p rovince o f the jury to determ ine whe ther the fac ts and circumstances shown by the evidence in this case warrant any inference which the law permits you the jury to draw from any blood or breath test result. Also, the inference may be rebutted by other evidence and circumstances. It is for the jury to determine, after a consideration of all the evidence, whether to make the inference which the law permits, the correctness of such in ference , and wh at weigh t is to be given to such evidence.
-9- See T.P.I. -- Crim. 38.01, 38.05, 38.05(a ); see also Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-10-
401; 55-10-408. The Defendant does not challenge the elements that she was
driving an automobile or that she was driving on a public high way. Her complaint
focuses solely on the issue of impairment by intoxication.
Reviewing the evid ence in the lig ht most favorable to the State, we can
only conclude that the proof w as leg ally suffic ient to s uppo rt the D efend ant’s
conviction. Officers Singer and Ivey testified that they observed the Defe ndan t’s
vehicle being operated in an unsafe manner, crossing over the center line of
Highway 96. According to the State’s proof, the Defendant was unsteady on her
feet and had an odor of alcohol about her. The Defendant performed a series of
field sobriety tes ts, the resu lts of which indicated impairm ent in the opinion of
Officer Singer. T he De fendan t was then transpo rted to the W illiamson Coun ty
Jail where she was administered a breath test on an Intoximeter 3000. The
results of the breath test revealed that the Defendant had a 0.15% blood alcohol
conten t.
Of course, the Defendant contests the testimony of Officers Singer and
Ivey regarding her manner of driving on th e night of th e offense and the results
of the field sob riety tests. The resolution of the conflicting testimo ny, however,
was a ma tter for th e jury to r esolve . The ju ry reso lved the issue against the
Defen dant, finding he r guilty. In addition, although the Defendant testified that
she had used an asthma inhaler prior to her brea th test, she offered no expert
proof concerning the effects that the inhalant might have on the results of her
breath test. It was for the jury to dec ide wh ether to accre dit the D efend ant’s
testimony regarding her use of an asthma inhaler and whether her testimony
-10- created any doubt about the validity of the breath test results. Once again, the
jury resolved the issue against the Defendant. From our review of the record, we
believe that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. The
Defen dant’s first issu e lacks m erit.
In her second issue on app eal, the Defen dant argue s that the trial court
erred in adm itting the result of the Intoxim eter 3000 bre ath test. More
specifically, she contends that the State did not demonstrate that she was
observed for twenty m inutes im media tely prior to the breath te st. See State v.
Sensing, 843 S.W.2d 412, 416 (Tenn. 1992). Prior to trial, the Defendant filed
a motion to suppress the result of the breath test. The trial court treated the
motion to suppress as a motion in limine and conducted a hearing on July 29,
1996. At the hearing, the Defendant, Officer Singer and Officer Ivey all testified.
At the conc lusion of th e hearin g, the trial cou rt denied the Defe ndant’ s motion,
ruling that the result of the breath test was admissible.
In Sensing, our Supreme Court set forth the criteria for the admissibility of
breath test results, holding that the testing officer must be able to testify to the
following:
(1) that the tes ts were performed in accordance with the standards and operating pro cedure promulgated by the forensic services division of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, (2) that he was prope rly certified in accordance with those standards, (3) that the evidentiary breath testing instrument used was certified by the forens ic services division, was tested regularly for accuracy and was working properly when the breath test was performed, (4) that the motorist was observed for the requisite 20 minutes prior to the te st, and during this period, he did not have foreign matter in his mouth, did not co nsum e any a lcoho lic beverage, smoke, or regurgitate, (5) evidence that he followed the prescribed operational procedure, (6) identify the printout record offered in evidence as the result of the test given to the person tested.
-11- Sensing, 843 S.W.2d at 416. The Defendant’s cha llenge in this ap peal is
directe d sole ly at the fourth requirement, the twenty-minute observation period.
In the present case, it is undisputed that the period between the
Defenda nt’s arrest an d the ad ministratio n of the bre ath test exc eeded twenty
minutes. The focus of the dispute centers instead upon exactly what occurred
during that period of time. O fficer Singer testified that during the trip from the
scene of the arrest to the jail, Officer Ivey sat in the backseat of the patrol car
next to the Defendant for the express purpose of observing her prior to the breath
test. Likewise, Officer Ivey testified that he sat in the backseat of the patrol car
during the trip to the jail and observed the Defenda nt. According to O fficer Ivey,
the Defendant did not cough, regurgitate, consume liquids, use her inhaler or put
anything in her mouth during the period of observation. O fficer Singer
adm inistere d the b reath te st to the Defe ndan t upon their arr ival at the jail.
In contrast, the Defendant testified that Officer Ivey sat in the front
passenger seat of the patrol ca r during the tr ip to the jail. She testified further
that Ivey and S inger we re carrying on a con versation during the trip, not
observing her. In fact, the Defendant stated that s he was able to remove the
handcuffs from her hands and use her asthma inhaler during the trip.
After hearing the conflicting testimony at the pretrial motion hearing and
evaluating credibility, the trial c ourt foun d that the tw enty-minute observation
requirement had b een m et and ruled th at the D efend ant’s breath test result was
admissible. The trial court was in a better p osition to e valuate credib ility than th is
Court. We believe this record does contain sufficient proof to establish that the
-12- twenty-minu te observa tion period was sa tisfied. According ly, we cannot conclude
that the trial court erred in admitting the result of the breath test. The Defe ndan t’s
secon d issue la cks m erit.
In her third issue on appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred
in admitting testimon y conce rning the HGN field sobriety test. In particular, she
contends that the HGN test is scientific evidence and that the State did not
present proof that the HGN test meets the standard of general acceptance in the
scien tific comm unity. See Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Thus,
because the State did not establish the reliability of HGN testing through
acceptance in the scientific community, Officer Singer’s testimony concerning the
results of the HGN test performed upon the Defendant should not have been
admitted.
Prior to trial, the Defendant filed a motion in limine to preclude the State
from offering tes timony re garding the resu lts of the HG N test with out first
requiring the State to demonstrate that the HGN test is ge nerally acce pted in the
scien tific comm unity. The trial court ruled that the results of H GN testing a re not
scien tific evidence and, therefore, the State was not required to prove
acceptanc e in the scientific com munity.
Our supreme court recently provided guidance on this issue in State v.
Murphy, 953 S.W .2d 200 (Tenn . 1997). C ontrary to the trial c ourt’s ru ling in the
case at bar, our supreme court held in Murphy that the HGN test is a s cientific
test. Murphy, 953 S.W.2d at 201. As such, HGN evidence must satisfy the
admis sibility requirem ents applicab le to scientific e vidence . Id. Contrary to the
-13- Defe ndan t’s argument in the present case, howe ver, the applic able admis sibility
requirem ents do not stem from Frye. Rather, the 1991 adoption of Rules 702
and 703 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence superseded the general
acceptance test of Frye. McDaniel v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257,
265 (Tenn. 1997). In explaining the admissibility requirements for scientific
evidence set forth in Rules 702 and 703, our supreme court stated the following:
In Tennessee, under the recent rules, a trial court must determine whether the evid ence will substantially assist the trier of fact to determine a fact in issue and whether the facts and data underlying the evidence indicate a lack of trustworthiness. The rules together nece ssarily require a determination as to the scientific validity or reliability of the evidence. Simply put, unless the scientific evidence is valid, it will not su bstan tially ass ist the trie r of fact, n or will its underlying facts and data appear to be trustworthy, but there is no requirement in the rule that it be generally accepted.
Although we do n ot expres sly adop t Daube rt [v. Merrell Dow Phar mac eutica ls, 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)], the non-exclus ive list of factors to determine reliability are useful in applying our Rules 7 02 and 703. A Tennes see trial court may consider in determining reliability: (1) whether scientific evidence has been tested and the methodology with which it has been tested; (2) whether the evidence has been subjected to peer review or publication; (3) whether a potential rate of error is known; (4) whether, as formerly requ ired by Frye, the evid ence is gene rally accepted in the sc ientific co mm unity; an d (5) w hethe r the ex pert’s research in the field has been conducted independent of litigation.
Id.
In the case sub judice, the trial court found that the results of the HGN test
did not co nstitute scientific evidence. In light of o ur sup reme court’s holdin g in
Murphy, the trial cour t’s finding wa s errone ous. See Murphy, 953 S.W.2d at 201.
The trial judge, because he did not find HGN evidence to be scientific, obviou sly
made no determination with regard to whether the HGN evidence satisfied the
admis sibility requirem ents ap plicable to scientific evidence. From the record now
-14- before us, we are un able to determ ine wh ether th e app licable adm issibility
requirem ents we re met. See Murphy, 953 S.W.2d at 201-02.
Considering the record in its entirety, however, we do not believe that the
admis sibility of Officer Singer’s testimony concerning the results of the
Defe ndan t’s HGN test appears to have affected the result of the trial on the
merits. The State offered a great deal of evidence other than the results of the
HGN test in support of the guilt of the Defendant. Officers Singer and Ivey
testified that the Defendant’s car crossed the center line of Highway 96, that the
Defendant was unsteady on her feet, and that they noticed an odor of alcohol
about the Defendant. In addition, Officer Singer testified that the results of the
walk and turn test and the one-legged stand test indicated that the Defendant
was impaired due to intoxication. Furthermore, Officer Singer testified that the
result of the breath test administered to the Defendant revealed that she had a
The Defenda nt contested n umerou s aspects of the State’s evidence,
including the testimony regarding her manner of driving, whether she was steady
on her feet, her performance on the walk and turn test and whether the one-
legged stand test was even p erform ed. Mo reove r, the D efend ant su cces sfully
cross-examined Officer Singer regardin g his kno wledge of the HG N test.
Although Officer Sin ger testified on direct e xamina tion that he was trained and
certified to administer the HGN test, cross-examination revealed that Sin ger did
not recall having been taught about the effect various prescription drugs might
have on nystagmus. Singer admitted that he did not know if some drugs might
cause early or exagge rated nystagm us or that fatigue might have an effect on
-15- nystagmus. In short, the cross-examination of Officer Singer was vigorous and
called into q uestion th e depth of his kno wledge of the HG N test.
In spite of the Defendant’s rigorous cross-examination concerning the HGN
test and her own testimony contradicting the observations of Officers Singer and
Ivey, it is clear from the guilty verdict that the jury simply did not accredit the
Defendant’s version of the facts. The jury performed its function of evaluating
credibility and res olving con tradictory tes timony, e ventually find ing that the State
had established the Defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In view of the
volume of evidence other than the HGN test offered by the State to support the
guilt of the Defendant, we conclude that any error on the pa rt of the tr ial cou rt in
admitting the HGN evidence was harmless under the circumstances of this case.
See Tenn. R . App. P. 36(b); T enn. R. Crim . P. 52(a).
For the reasons set forth in the discussion above, we conclude that the
Defe ndan t’s issues on appeal provide no basis for the reversal of her conviction.
We therefore affirm the ju dgme nt of the trial co urt.
____________________________________ DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
-16- CONCUR:
___________________________________ JOHN H. PEAY, JUDGE
___________________________________ JOSEPH M. TIPTON, JUDGE
-17-