[Cite as State v. Stackhouse, 2025-Ohio-5464.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT SENECA COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 13-25-06
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
TYRICE STACKHOUSE, OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Seneca County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. 24 CR 0170
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: December 8, 2025
APPEARANCES:
Brian A. Smith for Appellant
Stephanie J. Kiser for Appellee Case No. 13-25-06
ZIMMERMAN, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Tyrice Stackhouse (“Stackhouse”), appeals the
January 14, 2025 judgment entry of sentence of the Seneca County Court of
Common Pleas. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶2} This case stems from a single-vehicle accident in Fostoria, Ohio, where
Stackhouse was found therein unresponsive. The vehicle, which was registered to
his then girlfriend, April Iannantuono (“Iannantuono”), contained large quantities
of drugs that Stackhouse initially claimed were his, allegedly to protect
Iannantuono.
{¶3} On June 20, 2024, the Seneca County Grand Jury indicted Stackhouse
on Count One of aggravated possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A),
(C)(1)(c), a second-degree felony; Count Two of possession of cocaine in violation
of R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(4)(e), a first-degree felony; and Count Three of possession
of a fentanyl-related compound in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(11)(b), a
fourth-degree felony. On August 28, 2024, Stackhouse appeared for arraignment
and pleaded not guilty.
{¶4} The case proceeded to a jury trial on December 16-17, 2024. Before
the presentation of evidence, the State moved to exclude evidence of Iannantuono’s
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prior criminal (drug) conduct that resulted in an intervention in lieu of conviction.1
On December 17, 2024, the jury found Stackhouse guilty of all three counts alleged
in the indictment.
{¶5} On January 14, 2025, the trial court sentenced Stackhouse to a
minimum term of 6 years to a maximum term of 9 years in prison on Count One; to
a minimum term of 8 years to a maximum term of 12 years in prison on Count Two;
and to 16 months in prison on Count Three. The trial court ordered the sentences
imposed as to Counts One and Two to be served consecutively, and the sentence for
Count Three to be served concurrently to the others, for an aggregate indefinite
prison term of 14 to 18 years. The trial court also ordered this aggregate sentence
to be served consecutively to a sentence that Stackhouse was already serving in a
Wood County case.
{¶6} Stackhouse filed his notice of appeal on January 14, 2025. He raises
three assignments of error for our review.
First Assignment of Error
Because the jury lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice in convicting Appellant, Appellant’s convictions, with respect to all counts, were against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶7} In his first assignment of error, Stackhouse argues that his convictions
are against the manifest weight of the evidence. In particular, Stackhouse contends
1 Even though Stackhouse subpoenaed Iannantuono to testify at trial, she did not appear to testify.
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that the weight of the evidence reflects that Iannantuono was the one who actually
possessed the drugs.
Standard of Review
{¶8} Manifest “weight of the evidence and sufficiency of the evidence are
clearly different legal concepts.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 389
(1997). In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the
evidence, a reviewing court must examine the entire record, “‘weigh[] the evidence
and all reasonable inferences, consider[] the credibility of witnesses and determine[]
whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way
and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be
reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Id. at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio
App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983). A reviewing court must, however, allow the trier
of fact appropriate discretion on matters relating to the weight of the evidence and
the credibility of the witnesses. State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231 (1967).
When applying the manifest-weight standard, “[o]nly in exceptional cases, where
the evidence ‘weighs heavily against the conviction,’ should an appellate court
overturn the trial court’s judgment.” State v. Haller, 2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.),
quoting State v. Hunter, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119.
Analysis
{¶9} Stackhouse was convicted of aggravated possession of drugs,
possession of cocaine, and possession of a fentanyl-related compound. Ohio’s drug
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possession statute provides, in its relevant part, that “[n]o person shall knowingly
obtain, possess, or use a controlled substance or a controlled substance analog.”
R.C. 2925.11(A). To secure a conviction for drug possession under R.C.
2925.11(A), the State must prove the defendant “knowingly” possessed a controlled
substance. “A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is
aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably
be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when the person
is aware that such circumstances probably exist.” R.C. 2901.22(B).
{¶10} On appeal, Stackhouse argues his convictions are against the manifest
weight of the evidence, contending that the evidence suggesting Iannantuono
possessed the drugs is more compelling than the evidence against him. “‘Possess’
or ‘possession’ means having control over a thing or substance, but may not be
inferred solely from mere access to the thing or substance through ownership or
occupation of the premises upon which the thing or substance is found.” R.C.
2925.01(K). “The issue of whether a person charged with drug possession
knowingly possessed a controlled substance ‘is to be determined from all the
attendant facts and circumstances available.’” State v. Brooks, 2012-Ohio-5235, ¶
45 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Teamer, 82 Ohio St.3d 490, 492 (1998).
{¶11} “Possession of drugs can be either actual or constructive.” State v.
Bustamante, 2013-Ohio-4975, ¶ 25 (3d Dist.). “‘A person has “actual possession”
of an item if the item is within his immediate physical possession.’” Id., quoting
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State v. Williams, 2004-Ohio-1130, ¶ 23 (4th Dist.). “A person has ‘constructive
possession’ if he is able to exercise dominion and control over an item, even if the
individual does not have immediate physical possession of it.” Id. “For constructive
possession to exist, ‘[i]t must also be shown that the person was conscious of the
presence of the object.’” Id., quoting State v. Hankerson, 70 Ohio St.2d 87, 91
(1982).
{¶12} “[T]he State may prove the existence of the various elements of
constructive possession of contraband by circumstantial evidence alone.” Id. See
also Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d at 272-273. “Readily usable drugs in close proximity to
an accused may constitute sufficient circumstantial evidence to support a finding of
constructive possession.” State v. Ruby, 2002-Ohio-5381, ¶ 36 (2d Dist.). “Absent
a defendant’s admission, the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the
defendant’s actions, are evidence that the trier of fact can consider in determining
whether the defendant had constructive possession.” State v. Voll, 2012-Ohio-3900,
¶ 19 (3d Dist.).
{¶13} Consequently, since it is the only element that he challenges, we will
address the weight of the evidence supporting whether Stackhouse possessed the
drugs. Here, Stackhouse points to the evidence that the violent collision could have
dislodged the drugs from a concealed part of the vehicle, meaning he never
knowingly possessed them. He further contends that his on-scene admission was a
false statement made only to protect Iannantuono, whose own drug history and
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failure to testify at trial (even though Stackhouse subpoenaed her to testify) suggest
that the contraband belonged to her.
{¶14} Decisively, the evidence presented at trial reflects that Stackhouse
actually possessed the drugs because he admitted to Officer Jared Lindig (“Officer
Lindig”) of the Fostoria Police Department that the drugs were his. Accord State v.
Pollard, 2025-Ohio-1706, ¶ 24 (11th Dist.). Indeed, Officer Lindig testified at trial
that he was dispatched to the scene of a single vehicle accident where he found
Stackhouse unresponsive and slumped across the front seat of the damaged vehicle.
According to Officer Lindig, as he approached the passenger side of the vehicle, he
immediately saw two bags of a white powdery substance in plain view on the
passenger seat, in the proximate location where Stackhouse was found. After
rousing Stackhouse by shaking him, Officer Lindig observed Stackhouse move his
hands toward the area where the suspected drugs were located. He further testified
that, after being read his Miranda rights and asked about the packages, Stackhouse
first asked, “how much”—which Officer Lindig understood to be a question about
the quantity of drugs found—and then admitted, “It’s mine.” (Dec. 16, 2024 Tr. at
114). Officer Lindig also testified that Stackhouse admitted to using cocaine earlier
that evening.
{¶15} Nevertheless, Stackhouse contends that his on-scene statements
should be given little weight because he was disoriented from the accident and had
just been woken up. Specifically, he argues that his question of “how much” was
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one of genuine confusion, not an admission of knowledge. He further asserts that
his confession should have been discounted because he later revoked it, testifying
that he was falsely “taking the hit” to protect Iannantuono.
{¶16} “Although we review credibility when considering the manifest
weight of the evidence, the credibility of witnesses is primarily a determination for
the trier of fact.” State v. Banks, 2011-Ohio-5671, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.). “The trier of
fact is best able ‘to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures[,] and
voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the credibility of the
proffered testimony.’” Id., quoting State v. Wilson, 2007-Ohio-2202, ¶ 24.
{¶17} In this case, the jury was presented with two competing narratives.
Specifically, the jury was free to credit, based on Stackhouse’s explicit admission
of ownership, along with the drugs’ placement in plain view and his admission of
recent drug use, that he actually possessed the contraband. Alternatively, the jury
was free to accept Stackhouse’s testimony that he was merely “taking the hit” for
Iannantuono. However, the jury was free to disbelieve his explanation, just as it is
free to reject any defendant’s claim that another person is responsible for
contraband. Compare Ruby, 2002-Ohio-5381, at ¶ 44 (2d Dist.) (holding that
Ruby’s conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the
jury, as the arbiter of witness credibility, was free to disbelieve the defendant’s claim
that a known drug dealer who was also in the vehicle was responsible for the
contraband).
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{¶18} Furthermore, the jury observed Stackhouse’s testimony and was made
aware of Iannantuono’s refusal to testify. “‘“A verdict is not against the manifest
weight of the evidence because the [jury] chose to believe the State’s witnesses
rather than the defendant’s version of the events.”’” State v. Missler, 2015-Ohio-
1076, ¶ 44 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Bean, 2014-Ohio-908, ¶ 15 (9th Dist.),
quoting State v. Martinez, 2013-Ohio-3189, ¶ 16 (9th Dist.). Thus, that the jury
afforded more weight to the State’s evidence than Stackhouse’s version of events
does not render his convictions against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶19} For these reasons, we conclude that the trier of fact did not lose its way
in determining that the evidence that Stackhouse did not possess the drugs is not
more compelling and credible than the evidence that he committed the offenses of
which he was convicted. Therefore, Stackhouse’s convictions are not against the
manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶20} Stackhouse’s first assignment of error is overruled.
Second Assignment of Error
The trial court abused its discretion in granting the State’s Motion in Limine to exclude records from April Iannantuono’s prior case in the Seneca County Court of Common Pleas, case number 18 CR 0292, in violation of Appellant’s right to Due Process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution.
{¶21} In his second assignment of error, Stackhouse argues that the trial
court abused its discretion by excluding the records from Iannantuono’s prior
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criminal case. Specifically, he contends that the evidence of Iannantuono’s prior
intervention in lieu of conviction for trafficking in cocaine was essential to his
constitutional right to present a complete defense by showing that a third party had
motive and opportunity to possess the drugs found in the vehicle.
{¶22} Generally, the admission or exclusion of evidence lies within the trial
court’s discretion, and a reviewing court should not reverse absent an abuse of
discretion and material prejudice. State v. Conway, 2006-Ohio-2815, ¶ 62. See also
State v. Boyd, 2025-Ohio-3248, ¶ 101 (6th Dist.) (acknowledging that a trial court’s
decision to grant or deny a motion in limine is reviewed under an abuse-of-
discretion standard). An abuse of discretion implies that the trial court acted
unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably. State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151,
157-158 (1980).
{¶23} A motion in limine is a pretrial request requesting a court to prohibit
the opposing side from presenting evidence that is so prejudicial that no instruction
from the judge could cure the damage. State v. Miller, 2018-Ohio-4648, ¶ 8 (3d
Dist.). See also State v. French, 72 Ohio St.3d 446, 449 (1995). “‘A ruling on a
motion in limine reflects the court’s anticipated treatment of an evidentiary issue at
trial and, as such, is a tentative, interlocutory, precautionary ruling.’” Id., quoting
French at 450. “‘The established rule in Ohio is that the grant or denial of a motion
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in limine is not a ruling on the evidence.’” Id., quoting State v. Thompson, 2005-
Ohio-2053, ¶ 26 (3d Dist.). “‘In deciding such motions, the trial court is at liberty
to change its ruling on the disputed evidence in its actual context at trial.’” Id.,
quoting Defiance v. Kretz, 60 Ohio St.3d 1, 4 (1991). “Therefore, when a motion
in limine is granted, finality does not attach.” State v. Foster, 2025-Ohio-2942, ¶
41 (3d Dist.)
{¶24} “In order to preserve for appeal any error in the trial court’s resolution
of a motion in limine, the objecting party must ‘seek the introduction of the evidence
by proffer or otherwise’ at trial ‘to enable the court to make a final determination as
to its admissibility.’” Miller at ¶ 9, quoting State v. Grubb, 28 Ohio St.3d 199
(1986), paragraph two of the syllabus. “Then, ‘[a]n appellate court will . . . review
the correctness of the trial court’s ruling on the objection rather than the ruling on
the motion in limine.’” Id., quoting State v. Wild, 2010-Ohio-4751, ¶ 29 (2d Dist.).
{¶25} Here, prior to the presentation of evidence, the State made an oral
motion in limine to exclude evidence of Iannantuono’s prior intervention in lieu of
conviction for trafficking in cocaine for conduct that occurred in 2018. In particular,
Stackhouse sought to have the clerk of courts testify to authenticate the criminal
case documents. The trial court granted the State’s motion after determining that
the evidence of Iannantuono’s prior drug conduct was over five years old and did
not tend to prove or disprove a material fact in the current case.
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{¶26} At trial, Stackhouse’s counsel proffered the evidence of Iannantuono’s
prior conviction. Although the State argued in its appellate brief that Stackhouse
failed to preserve this issue, it conceded at oral argument that a proper proffer was,
in fact, made. Therefore, the issue is preserved for our review, and we will address
the merits of the trial court’s decision.
{¶27} On appeal, Stackhouse argues the trial court abused its discretion by
excluding evidence of Iannantuono’s prior drug conduct, which he sought to
introduce as part of his third-party guilt defense strategy. The Constitution
guarantees every criminal defendant a meaningful opportunity to present a complete
defense. State v. Wesson, 2013-Ohio-4575, ¶ 59. “However, ‘[a] defendant’s right
to present relevant evidence is not unlimited, but rather is subject to reasonable
restriction.’” Id., quoting United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998). To
ensure that juries are presented with reliable evidence, the Constitution grants states
broad latitude to create rules that exclude certain evidence from criminal trials. Id.
Rules that exclude evidence are constitutionally permissible and do not violate a
defendant’s right to present a defense, provided they serve a legitimate purpose
without being arbitrary or disproportionate to that purpose and do not infringe on a
weighty interest of the accused. Id.
{¶28} “‘“A complete defense’ may include evidence of third-party guilt.’”
State v. Nurein, 2022-Ohio-1711, ¶ 38 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Gillispie, 2009-
Ohio-3640, ¶ 120 (2d Dist.). “But in making such a defense, the accused ‘must
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comply with established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both
fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence.’” Id., quoting
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973). “Thus, ‘criminal defendants
do not necessarily have a right to present all evidence of third-party guilt.’”
(Emphasis in original.) Id., quoting State v. Jones, 2018-Ohio-2332, ¶ 33 (2d Dist.).
Critically, evidence of third-party guilt may be excluded if it is not relevant,
meaning it is too speculative or remote to prove or disprove a material fact at trial
or to sufficiently connect the third party to the crime. Id. at ¶ 39. Evidence offered
to show a third party is guilty is frequently excluded if it is too remote from the
crime or fails to establish a sufficient connection. Id.
{¶29} In this case, the trial court did not prevent Stackhouse from presenting
a complete defense by excluding the evidence of Iannantuono’s prior criminal case.
Critically, consistent with the rule that evidence of third-party guilt must sufficiently
connect that person to the crime, the trial court properly excluded Iannantuono’s
five-year-old criminal conduct. Indeed, this prior conduct, which resulted in an
intervention in lieu of conviction, was properly excluded because Stackhouse did
not establish a direct link between her prior criminal conduct and the drugs found
in this specific incident. Accord id. at ¶ 42. That is, the evidence of Iannantuono’s
prior criminal conduct is too remote and does not sufficiently connect her to the
crimes at issue in this case.
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{¶30} Moreover, the trial court’s decision did not prevent Stackhouse from
presenting his complete defense because, through his testimony and his trial
counsel’s arguments, Stackhouse was able to assert his defense that Iannantuono
was the person who possessed the drugs at issue in this case. See id. In particular,
Stackhouse was able to support his defense theory with evidence that Iannantuono
owned the vehicle, had a history of drug use requiring court intervention, and
refused to testify at trial. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court’s decision was
a proper exercise of its discretion to exclude remote evidence that did not
sufficiently connect Iannantuono to the crimes at issue in this case.
{¶31} Stackhouse’s second assignment of error is overruled.
Third Assignment of Error
Because the trial court’s findings to impose consecutive sentences were, by clear and convincing evidence, not supported by the record, the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences was not supported by the record.
{¶32} In his third assignment of error, Stackhouse challenges the trial court’s
decision to impose consecutive sentences. He specifically contends that the record
does not support the trial court’s findings for imposing consecutive sentences.
{¶33} Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court will reverse a sentence
“only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not
support the trial court’s findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is
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otherwise contrary to law.” State v. Marcum, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 1. When
reviewing the imposition of consecutive sentences, “[t]he plain language of R.C.
2953.08(G)(2) requires an appellate court to defer to a trial court’s consecutive-
sentence findings, and the trial court’s findings must be upheld unless those findings
are clearly and convincingly not supported by the record.” State v. Gwynne, 2023-
Ohio-3851, ¶ 5. Clear and convincing evidence is that “‘which will produce in the
mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be
established.’” Marcum at ¶ 22, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954),
paragraph three of the syllabus.
{¶34} “Except as provided in * * * division (C) of section 2929.14, . . . a
prison term, jail term, or sentence of imprisonment shall be served concurrently with
any other prison term, jail term, or sentence of imprisonment imposed by a court of
this state, another state, or the United States.” R.C. 2929.41(A). R.C. 2929.14(C)
provides, in its relevant part, that
the court may require the offender to serve the prison terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public, and if the court also finds any of the following:
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.
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(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct.
(c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender.
R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).
{¶35} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) requires a trial court to make specific findings on
the record before imposing consecutive sentences. State v. Hites, 2012-Ohio-1892,
¶ 11 (3d Dist.); State v. Peddicord, 2013-Ohio-3398, ¶ 33 (3d Dist.). Specifically,
the trial court must find: (1) consecutive sentences are necessary to either protect
the public or punish the offender; (2) the sentences would not be disproportionate
to the offense committed; and (3) one of the factors in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a), (b),
or (c) applies. Id.; Id.
{¶36} The trial court must state the required findings at the sentencing
hearing prior to imposing consecutive sentences and incorporate those findings into
its sentencing entry. State v. Sharp, 2014-Ohio-4140, ¶ 50 (3d Dist.), citing State v.
Bonnell, 2014-Ohio-3177, ¶ 29. A trial court “has no obligation to state reasons to
support its findings” and is not “required to give a talismanic incantation of the
words of the statute, provided that the necessary findings can be found in the record
and are incorporated into the sentencing entry.” Bonnell at ¶ 37.
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{¶37} In this case, Stackhouse does not dispute that the trial court made the
required statutory findings before imposing consecutive sentences. Instead, he
argues the findings are not supported by the record. Specifically, he contends that
the sentences are disproportionate to the seriousness of his conduct because there
was no evidence that he was trafficking or using the drugs, only possessing them.
He further argues that the trial court’s finding based on his criminal history—R.C.
2929.14(C)(4)(c)—is not supported by the record because he was never offered
treatment or diversion in his prior cases.
{¶38} Stackhouse’s arguments are without merit, and the trial court’s
imposition of consecutive sentences is supported by the record. To begin with,
Stackhouse’s claim that the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences is
disproportionate to the seriousness of his conduct is unpersuasive. Indeed, the
record reflects he was found with significant, trafficking-level quantities of
contraband—namely, 55.62 grams of methamphetamine, 71.3 grams of cocaine,
and 1.83 grams of a fentanyl-related compound. The sheer volume of these
substances belies the argument that this was a simple possession offense and
supports the trial court’s finding on the seriousness of Stackhouse’s conduct. See
State v. Johnson, 2024-Ohio-72, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.).
{¶39} Furthermore, the trial court’s finding that consecutive sentences are
necessary to protect the public under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(c) is supported by
Stackhouse’s history of criminal conduct. Critically, the presentence investigation
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report reflects Stackhouse’s lengthy criminal history, which includes not only
multiple prior convictions for drug possession and trafficking but also offenses of
violence. See State v. Combs, 2025-Ohio-1702, ¶ 5 (3d Dist.); State v. Gallant,
2025-Ohio-3182, ¶ 15 (3d Dist.).
{¶40} Nevertheless, Stackhouse asserts that his criminal history does not
justify consecutive sentences because he was never offered treatment—that is, he
contends that his previous sanctions were punitive and not rehabilitative.
Stackhouse’s argument is not persuasive. Rather, a trial court’s finding under R.C.
2929.14(C)(4)(c) is based on a defendant’s history of criminal conduct and his or
her failure to respond to past sanctions, not on the type of programming offered
during those sanctions. See State v. Windland, 2024-Ohio-1760, ¶ 50 (5th Dist.)
(“A plain reading of R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) reflects a legislative purpose to allow the
trial court to impose consecutive sentences on offenders with a lengthy criminal
history and a high rate of recidivism.”).
{¶41} In this case, Stackhouse’s own testimony confirmed this pattern of
recidivism. In particular, he testified at trial that he had been on post-release control
and probation multiple times, had violated the terms of his supervision repeatedly,
and was sent to a community-based correctional facility (“CBCF”) in 2023. This
history of repeated failures while under supervision—regardless of their label—is
precisely the evidence that the trial court can use to conclude that consecutive
sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime. See id. at ¶ 49-50
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(determining that consecutive sentences were supported by the record where the
defendant had a lengthy criminal history spanning most of his adult life and was on
supervision at the time of the new offense, rejecting the argument that a “failure to
rehabilitate” mitigates this history).
{¶42} Consequently, based on our review of the record, we conclude that the
trial court’s consecutive sentence findings are not clearly and convincingly
unsupported by the record.
{¶43} Stackhouse’s third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶44} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
MILLER and WILLAMOWSKI, J.J., concur.
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JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignments of error
are overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is hereby
rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of the
judgment for costs.
It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s
judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R.
27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the
proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.
William R. Zimmerman, Judge
Mark C. Miller, Judge
John R. Willamowski, Judge
DATED: /hls
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