State v. St. Fleurant

District Court of Appeal of Florida

State v. St. Fleurant

523 So. 2d 788, 13 Fla. L. Weekly 984, 1988 Fla. App. LEXIS 1573, 1988 WL 34669

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedApril 21, 1988

DocketNo. 87-1983

StatusPublished

This text of 523 So. 2d 788 (State v. St. Fleurant) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. St. Fleurant, 523 So. 2d 788, 13 Fla. L. Weekly 984, 1988 Fla. App. LEXIS 1573, 1988 WL 34669 (Fla. Ct. App. 1988).

Pincite

Opinion

COBB, Judge.

The issue in this case is whether the trial court erred in granting Sam St. Fleurant’s [789]*789motion to suppress evidence obtained from his vehicle after a search by police officers.

St. Fleurant’s car was stopped by a police officer after he was observed following other vehicles too closely.¹ The validity of the search depends on whether St. Fleu-rant’s admitted verbal consent to a search of his vehicle was induced by coercion. We find no evidence that St. Fleurant’s consent was the result of coercion or duress, or that it was in any manner involuntary. Indeed, St. Fleurant did not even testify at the suppression hearing. Accordingly, the trial court’s order granting St. Fleurant’s motion to suppress is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

DAUKSCH and COWART, JJ., concur.

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COBB, Judge.

The issue in this case is whether the trial court erred in granting Sam St. Fleurant’s [789]*789motion to suppress evidence obtained from his vehicle after a search by police officers.

St. Fleurant’s car was stopped by a police officer after he was observed following other vehicles too closely.¹ The validity of the search depends on whether St. Fleu-rant’s admitted verbal consent to a search of his vehicle was induced by coercion. We find no evidence that St. Fleurant’s consent was the result of coercion or duress, or that it was in any manner involuntary. Indeed, St. Fleurant did not even testify at the suppression hearing. Accordingly, the trial court’s order granting St. Fleurant’s motion to suppress is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

DAUKSCH and COWART, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

523 So. 2d 788, 13 Fla. L. Weekly 984, 1988 Fla. App. LEXIS 1573, 1988 WL 34669, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-st-fleurant-fladistctapp-1988.