State v. Square

Supreme Court of Louisiana

State v. Square

46 So. 3d 1239, 2010 La. LEXIS 2366, 2010 WL 4366911

CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana

DecidedNovember 3, 2010

DocketNo. 2010-KK-2414

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 46 So. 3d 1239 (State v. Square) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. Square, 46 So. 3d 1239, 2010 La. LEXIS 2366, 2010 WL 4366911 (La. 2010).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The ruling of the trial court is reversed.

The suppression of the statements that were “blurt[ed] out,” as the trial court found, runs contrary to this court’s ruling in State v. George, 371 So.2d 762, 766-371 (La.1979) (“[The] defendant was not subjected to police interrogation while in the patrol car enroute to jail. The inculpatory statements made by defendant were spontaneous and voluntary.... Under these circumstances ... the inculpatory statements and/or confessions were properly admitted in evidence.”). The trial court’s ruling also runs contrary to the larger body of jurisprudence on voluntariness. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473(1986) (a defendant’s mental condition, “by itself and apart from its relation to official coercion” does not render a confession involun[1240]*1240tary under the Due Process Clause). See also State v. Green, 94-0887 (La.5/22/95), 655 So.2d 272. In Green, noting that vol-untariness of a confession is an issue separate from the Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), analysis, this court ruled that a confession by a juvenile with mental retardation was voluntarily made. To prove a confession was involuntary required a showing of “misconduct or overreaching by the police.” Green, 94-0887, 655 So.2d at 280 n. 7 (quoting State v. Schrader, 518 So.2d 1024, 1027 (La.1988)).

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PER CURIAM.

The ruling of the trial court is reversed.

The suppression of the statements that were “blurt[ed] out,” as the trial court found, runs contrary to this court’s ruling in State v. George, 371 So.2d 762, 766-371 (La.1979) (“[The] defendant was not subjected to police interrogation while in the patrol car enroute to jail. The inculpatory statements made by defendant were spontaneous and voluntary.... Under these circumstances ... the inculpatory statements and/or confessions were properly admitted in evidence.”). The trial court’s ruling also runs contrary to the larger body of jurisprudence on voluntariness. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473(1986) (a defendant’s mental condition, “by itself and apart from its relation to official coercion” does not render a confession involun[1240]*1240tary under the Due Process Clause). See also State v. Green, 94-0887 (La.5/22/95), 655 So.2d 272. In Green, noting that vol-untariness of a confession is an issue separate from the Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), analysis, this court ruled that a confession by a juvenile with mental retardation was voluntarily made. To prove a confession was involuntary required a showing of “misconduct or overreaching by the police.” Green, 94-0887, 655 So.2d at 280 n. 7 (quoting State v. Schrader, 518 So.2d 1024, 1027 (La.1988)).

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46 So. 3d 1239, 2010 La. LEXIS 2366, 2010 WL 4366911, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-square-la-2010.

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