[Cite as State v. Sprinkle, 2022-Ohio-3182.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
WARREN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, : CASE NO. CA2022-02-004
Appellee, : OPINION 9/12/2022 : - vs - :
TYLER KEITH SPRINKLE, :
Appellant. :
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM WARREN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. 19CR036034
David P. Fornshell, Warren County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kirsten A. Brandt, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Michael J. Trapp, for appellant.
M. POWELL, P.J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Tyler Sprinkle, appeals his conviction in the Warren County Court
of Common Pleas for trafficking in cocaine. For the reasons stated below, we affirm his
conviction.
{¶ 2} During the summer of 2019, the Warren County Drug Task Force was
investigating Bowdie Reek for drug trafficking. A detective on the task force, working in an Warren CA2022-02-004
undercover capacity, made two prior cocaine purchases from Reek and arranged for a third
purchase to occur in the parking lot of a Meijer store. Reek informed the undercover
detective that he would arrive in a silver Mercury vehicle.
{¶ 3} Reek arranged for appellant's girlfriend, Corey Jewell, the owner of the silver
Mercury, to drive him to the store in exchange for $60. Reek also gave appellant a small
amount of heroin, which he used in the car on the way to the store. Appellant rode in the
front passenger seat while Reek and Reek's girlfriend rode in the back of the car. Jewell
drove the car into the parking lot of the Meijer store and stopped at the front doors. She
exited the vehicle and entered the store. Appellant then moved from the passenger seat to
the driver's seat, drove to a parking space in the parking lot, and parked the car.
{¶ 4} After Reek informed the undercover detective of his arrival and location in the
parking lot, the detective drove his vehicle into the parking lot and parked behind the silver
Mercury, just a few parking spaces away. Reek exited the car, walked to the detective's
vehicle, and then entered the vehicle to complete the drug transaction. Appellant and
Reek's girlfriend remained in the silver Mercury. After Reek completed the sale and
returned to the silver Mercury, both he and appellant were arrested, and a search of the
vehicle yielded additional drugs and drug paraphernalia.
{¶ 5} Appellant was indicted for complicity to trafficking in cocaine and the matter
proceeded to a jury trial. At the close of the state's evidence, the trial court denied
appellant's Crim.R. 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal. The trial court found appellant
guilty and sentenced him to a mandatory prison term of three to four and one-half years.
Appellant now appeals, raising a single assignment of error.
{¶ 6} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶ 7} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF APPLLEANT BY
ENTERING A JUDGMENT THAT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.
-2- Warren CA2022-02-004
{¶ 8} In his assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court's conviction for
trafficking in cocaine was not supported by sufficient evidence. Specifically, appellant
asserts that the state failed to prove that he knowingly aided, abetted, or assisted Reek in
the drug transaction. In support, appellant argues that he had no knowledge of why Reek
needed a ride to the Meijer store. Appellant also argues that the act of driving the silver
Mercury a short distance from the front of the Meijer store to a parking space in the lot “did
nothing to assist Reek to sell cocaine," and that he did not drive to the "ultimate location" of
the drug transaction. Appellant contends that he was merely present at the scene.
{¶ 9} When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court examines
the evidence to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would support a conviction.
State v. Boles, 12th Dist. Brown No. CA2012-06-012, 2013-Ohio-5202, ¶ 34. The relevant
inquiry is whether, “after viewing the evidence in light most favorable to the prosecution,
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond
a reasonable doubt.” State v. Diar, 120 Ohio St.3d 460, 2008-Ohio-6266, ¶ 113.
{¶ 10} Appellant was convicted of trafficking in cocaine under R.C. 2925.03(A)(1),
which forbids an individual from knowingly selling a controlled substance. He was convicted
under Ohio's complicity statute, which states that “[n]o person, acting with the kind of
culpability required for the commission of an offense, shall * * * [a]id or abet another in
committing the offense.” R.C. 2923.03(A)(2). Thus, a conviction for trafficking in violation
of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), based on a complicity theory, requires proof that the defendant
“knowingly” aided and abetted the principal in committing the offense. State v. Davis, 12th
Dist. Madison No. CA2015-05-015, 2016-Ohio-1166, ¶ 48. A person acts “knowingly” when
he is aware that such circumstances probably exist. R.C. 2901.22(B).
{¶ 11} To be complicit by aiding and abetting, “the evidence must show that the
defendant supported, assisted, encouraged, cooperated with, advised, or incited the
-3- Warren CA2022-02-004
principal in the commission of the crime, and that the defendant shared the criminal intent
of the principal.” Davis at ¶ 49. It is not enough that an individual be merely present at the
scene of a crime. State v. Slayer, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2006-03-039, 2007-Ohio-1659,
¶ 27. Instead, “[t]here must be some level of active participation by way of providing
assistance or encouragement.” Id. This rule exists to protect innocent bystanders who
have no connection to the crime other than simply being present. State v. Johnson, 93
Ohio St.3d 240, 243 (2001). Aiding and abetting may be shown through direct or
circumstantial evidence, and “participation in criminal intent may be inferred from presence,
companionship, and conduct before or after the offense is committed.” State v. Grevious,
12th Dist. Butler No. CA2018-05-093, 2019-Ohio-1932, ¶ 13.
{¶ 12} After a review of the record, we find that the evidence produced at trial was
sufficient to convict appellant of trafficking in cocaine. The state presented sufficient
circumstantial evidence that appellant knowingly aided and abetted Meek in the commission
of the offense.
{¶ 13} The trial court admitted appellant's post-arrest interview with Robert Marchiny,
a special agent who observed the events of the drug transaction. The jury watched the
interview, in which the appellant stated that he “had an idea” as to why Reek asked Jewell
to drive him to the Meijer store, which was to “drop something off.” Appellant stated that he
knew Reek returned from Chicago the previous day and that he saw drugs in Reek's home.
Appellant also stated that he and Jewell, on more than one previous occasion, assisted
Reek in dropping off either girls or drugs and that “this time it was drugs.” Appellant
explained, “that's why I did it—money keeps her happy and I got the drugs.” Further,
appellant made clear that while he may have been unaware of the amount of cocaine Reek
was selling, he would have “asked for more” heroin if he knew it was “going to be that much.”
Appellant stated that he saw the drugs before Reek exited the vehicle, and he correctly
-4- Warren CA2022-02-004
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[Cite as State v. Sprinkle, 2022-Ohio-3182.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
WARREN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, : CASE NO. CA2022-02-004
Appellee, : OPINION 9/12/2022 : - vs - :
TYLER KEITH SPRINKLE, :
Appellant. :
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM WARREN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. 19CR036034
David P. Fornshell, Warren County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kirsten A. Brandt, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Michael J. Trapp, for appellant.
M. POWELL, P.J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Tyler Sprinkle, appeals his conviction in the Warren County Court
of Common Pleas for trafficking in cocaine. For the reasons stated below, we affirm his
conviction.
{¶ 2} During the summer of 2019, the Warren County Drug Task Force was
investigating Bowdie Reek for drug trafficking. A detective on the task force, working in an Warren CA2022-02-004
undercover capacity, made two prior cocaine purchases from Reek and arranged for a third
purchase to occur in the parking lot of a Meijer store. Reek informed the undercover
detective that he would arrive in a silver Mercury vehicle.
{¶ 3} Reek arranged for appellant's girlfriend, Corey Jewell, the owner of the silver
Mercury, to drive him to the store in exchange for $60. Reek also gave appellant a small
amount of heroin, which he used in the car on the way to the store. Appellant rode in the
front passenger seat while Reek and Reek's girlfriend rode in the back of the car. Jewell
drove the car into the parking lot of the Meijer store and stopped at the front doors. She
exited the vehicle and entered the store. Appellant then moved from the passenger seat to
the driver's seat, drove to a parking space in the parking lot, and parked the car.
{¶ 4} After Reek informed the undercover detective of his arrival and location in the
parking lot, the detective drove his vehicle into the parking lot and parked behind the silver
Mercury, just a few parking spaces away. Reek exited the car, walked to the detective's
vehicle, and then entered the vehicle to complete the drug transaction. Appellant and
Reek's girlfriend remained in the silver Mercury. After Reek completed the sale and
returned to the silver Mercury, both he and appellant were arrested, and a search of the
vehicle yielded additional drugs and drug paraphernalia.
{¶ 5} Appellant was indicted for complicity to trafficking in cocaine and the matter
proceeded to a jury trial. At the close of the state's evidence, the trial court denied
appellant's Crim.R. 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal. The trial court found appellant
guilty and sentenced him to a mandatory prison term of three to four and one-half years.
Appellant now appeals, raising a single assignment of error.
{¶ 6} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶ 7} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF APPLLEANT BY
ENTERING A JUDGMENT THAT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.
-2- Warren CA2022-02-004
{¶ 8} In his assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court's conviction for
trafficking in cocaine was not supported by sufficient evidence. Specifically, appellant
asserts that the state failed to prove that he knowingly aided, abetted, or assisted Reek in
the drug transaction. In support, appellant argues that he had no knowledge of why Reek
needed a ride to the Meijer store. Appellant also argues that the act of driving the silver
Mercury a short distance from the front of the Meijer store to a parking space in the lot “did
nothing to assist Reek to sell cocaine," and that he did not drive to the "ultimate location" of
the drug transaction. Appellant contends that he was merely present at the scene.
{¶ 9} When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court examines
the evidence to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would support a conviction.
State v. Boles, 12th Dist. Brown No. CA2012-06-012, 2013-Ohio-5202, ¶ 34. The relevant
inquiry is whether, “after viewing the evidence in light most favorable to the prosecution,
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond
a reasonable doubt.” State v. Diar, 120 Ohio St.3d 460, 2008-Ohio-6266, ¶ 113.
{¶ 10} Appellant was convicted of trafficking in cocaine under R.C. 2925.03(A)(1),
which forbids an individual from knowingly selling a controlled substance. He was convicted
under Ohio's complicity statute, which states that “[n]o person, acting with the kind of
culpability required for the commission of an offense, shall * * * [a]id or abet another in
committing the offense.” R.C. 2923.03(A)(2). Thus, a conviction for trafficking in violation
of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), based on a complicity theory, requires proof that the defendant
“knowingly” aided and abetted the principal in committing the offense. State v. Davis, 12th
Dist. Madison No. CA2015-05-015, 2016-Ohio-1166, ¶ 48. A person acts “knowingly” when
he is aware that such circumstances probably exist. R.C. 2901.22(B).
{¶ 11} To be complicit by aiding and abetting, “the evidence must show that the
defendant supported, assisted, encouraged, cooperated with, advised, or incited the
-3- Warren CA2022-02-004
principal in the commission of the crime, and that the defendant shared the criminal intent
of the principal.” Davis at ¶ 49. It is not enough that an individual be merely present at the
scene of a crime. State v. Slayer, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2006-03-039, 2007-Ohio-1659,
¶ 27. Instead, “[t]here must be some level of active participation by way of providing
assistance or encouragement.” Id. This rule exists to protect innocent bystanders who
have no connection to the crime other than simply being present. State v. Johnson, 93
Ohio St.3d 240, 243 (2001). Aiding and abetting may be shown through direct or
circumstantial evidence, and “participation in criminal intent may be inferred from presence,
companionship, and conduct before or after the offense is committed.” State v. Grevious,
12th Dist. Butler No. CA2018-05-093, 2019-Ohio-1932, ¶ 13.
{¶ 12} After a review of the record, we find that the evidence produced at trial was
sufficient to convict appellant of trafficking in cocaine. The state presented sufficient
circumstantial evidence that appellant knowingly aided and abetted Meek in the commission
of the offense.
{¶ 13} The trial court admitted appellant's post-arrest interview with Robert Marchiny,
a special agent who observed the events of the drug transaction. The jury watched the
interview, in which the appellant stated that he “had an idea” as to why Reek asked Jewell
to drive him to the Meijer store, which was to “drop something off.” Appellant stated that he
knew Reek returned from Chicago the previous day and that he saw drugs in Reek's home.
Appellant also stated that he and Jewell, on more than one previous occasion, assisted
Reek in dropping off either girls or drugs and that “this time it was drugs.” Appellant
explained, “that's why I did it—money keeps her happy and I got the drugs.” Further,
appellant made clear that while he may have been unaware of the amount of cocaine Reek
was selling, he would have “asked for more” heroin if he knew it was “going to be that much.”
Appellant stated that he saw the drugs before Reek exited the vehicle, and he correctly
-4- Warren CA2022-02-004
estimated the amount to be around two ounces. Appellant also remained in the driver's
seat of the car until the transaction was complete.
{¶ 14} Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that
a jury could reasonably conclude that appellant knowingly participated in the sale of
cocaine. Appellant was aware that the circumstances of a drug transaction probably existed
because he previously assisted Reek in dropping off drugs. A jury could reasonably
conclude that appellant actively assisted Reek in the transaction when appellant drove
Reek from the front of the Meijer store to a parking spot so Reek could complete the sale.
Appellant never got out of the car and never moved from the driver's seat after seeing Reek
exit the car with two ounces of cocaine. The jury determined that appellant was more than
an innocent bystander and was more than merely present during the transaction. Appellant
is unable to demonstrate that the evidence at trial, if believed, was not sufficient to support
a conviction. Accordingly, appellant's sole assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 15} Judgment affirmed.
PIPER and BYRNE, JJ., concur.
-5-