State v. Spillman

468 P.2d 376, 105 Ariz. 523, 1970 Ariz. LEXIS 311
CourtArizona Supreme Court
DecidedApril 16, 1970
Docket1930
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 468 P.2d 376 (State v. Spillman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Arizona Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Spillman, 468 P.2d 376, 105 Ariz. 523, 1970 Ariz. LEXIS 311 (Ark. 1970).

Opinion

HAYS, Justice.

Defendant Erich Spillman was charged by information with two counts of forcible rape of Marguerite Basko. Count II of the complaint alleged that defendant raped *524 Margie Basko, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-611-, and- Count I charged that defendant .aided and abetted another rape of Miss Basko by one- Gilbert Felix, in violation of A.R.S. §§ 13-139 and 13-611. Trial on both charges was held in the Maricopa County Superior Court, at which the jury returned a verdict of guilty to Count I. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on Count II. The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of not less than five nor more than seven years at the Arizona State Prison. Defendant appeals from this conviction and sentence.

The alleged crimes purportedly took place in a downtown Phoenix flower shop around 11:00 p. m. on the night of April 4, 1967. Margie Basko, eighteen and a half years of age and a student at Arizona State University, was living at home with her parents near 40th Street and Thomas Road in East Phoenix. About 9 p. m. that evening, she received a telephone call from her former boyfriend, Bill Dickerson, who related that he had shown her picture to a couple of male acquaintances who wanted to, drive over to her house to meet her. Margie agreed to their coming over, and about a half hour later, defendant and Gilbert Felix arrived at the Basko home and identified themselves as Dickerson’s •friends. Margie had never met either of the young men before, but invited them into the house, conversed with them for a few minutes, and introduced them to her parents. Afterward, the two men asked her to go out with them for a coke. Margie received permission from her mother to go out for a few minutes, and left the Basko home with defendant and Felix in defendant’s Jaguar automobile. They drove from her home to a flower shop where defendant worked in downtown Phoenix.

After looking around the flower shop for about five minutes, the three went upstairs to the office of the shop, which was furnished with a couch and desk. While Margie sat on-the couch, defendant Spillman, showed her a copy of Playboy-magazine and a book called “Sexes.”- i Felix went downstairs to fix a drink, and Spill-man moved next to Margie on the couch and tried to kiss her. Margie thwarted the gesture by pushing him away, and defendant did not persist. Felix returned with a drink, and defendant immediately proceeded downstairs.

While defendant was downstairs, Felix attempted several times to kiss Margie. Each time she told him to stop and pushed him away. She got up from the couch and started to walk away, but Felix pursued her over to a corner and held her against the wall. At this time the lights went out. Felix somehow got Margie back over to the couch, where he allegedly forcibly raped her. Margie testified at defendant’s trial that while Felix was having intercourse with her, defendant Spillman returned upstairs, knelt beside her on the couch, and said “What’s the matter.” Felix then got off of her, and Margie stood up from the couch and pulled up her pants. Defendant forced her back down on the couch and allegedly proceeded to rape her.

Defendant and Felix drove Margie back to her home, and let her off around midnight. -Margie went inside and reported the incident to her mother. The police were called shortly thereafter, and defendant was' arrested the next day, April 5. Gilbert Felix was not apprehended until several months later.

- The information filed against Gilbert Felix was identical to that' filed against defendant, that is, Count II of rape and Count I of aiding and abetting a rape. Felix was tried separately from and subsequent to defendant. At the time of Felix’ trial, Count I, the aiding and abetting charge was dropped, and the jury subsequently found Felix not guilty of rape. In this appeal, defendant Spillman contends that his conviction of aiding and abetting Felix’ rape cannot stand 'for the reason that Felix, the actual perpetrator of the alleged rape, was acquitted. The argument is made that where, as here, there is no question as to the identity- of the party allegedly committing the forcible rape, the *525 acquittal of the principal establishes that no forcible rape took place at all, thus invalidating the conviction for aiding and abetting. We do not agree.

Our criminal statute concerning the aiding and abetting of a crime, A.R.S. § 13-139, reads partially as follows:

“All persons concerned in the commission of a crime whether it is a felony or a misdemeanor, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission, or, not being present, have advised and encouraged its commission, * * * are principals in any crime so committed.”

We have previously held, in State v. Bearden, 99 Ariz. 1, 405 P.2d 885 (1965), that:

“(a)iding and abetting means simply to assist in the commission of an act, either by active participation in it or in some manner advising or encouraging it. State v. Roberts, 85 Ariz. 252, 254, 336 P.2d 151. Aiding and abetting contemplates some positive act in aid of the commission of the offense; an active force physical or moral joined with that of the perpetrator in producing it. The aider or abettor must stand in the same relation to the crime as the criminal, approach it from the same angle, touch it at the same point and possess criminal intent.” 99 Ariz. at 3, 405 P.2d at 886.

Aiding and abetting is an independent and distinct substantive offense, and it is not necessary to try and convict the perpetrator of a criminal act before an aider and abettor can be tried. See People v. Blackwood, 35 Cal.App.2d 728, 96 P.2d 982 (1939). But where a principal has been acquitted of a criminal act, can his accomplice, in a separate trial, be convicted of aiding and abetting that criminal act? We hold that he can.

The State is never required to prove more than the allegations contained in an information in order to sustain the conviction of an aider and abettor. Where, as here, a principal and an aider and abettor are jointly charged in the same information, and the aider and abettor is tried first, there can be no truthful allegation that the principal has been convicted of the crime. What is required at the trial of the aider and abettor is proof, complete and convincing, of the guilt of the principal. Justice demands that the principal crime be fully proved, since the guilt of the aider and abettor depends upon the commission of the principal crime. Thus, whether or not the principal is convicted or acquitted in a separate trial can have no bearing on the trial of the aider and abettor, if the evidence shows the latter guilty. Society is no less injured by the illegal acts of the • aider and abettor even though the principal himself escapes conviction.

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Bluebook (online)
468 P.2d 376, 105 Ariz. 523, 1970 Ariz. LEXIS 311, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-spillman-ariz-1970.