State v. Sosa-Valdez

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: March 18, 2026
• Docket: 25-464
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Judge Chris Dillon

Opinion

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA 25-464

Filed 18 March 2026

Mecklenburg County, Nos. 22CR219282-590; 22CR219286-590

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

CRISTIAN JEREMI SOSA-VALDEZ, Defendant.

Appeal by defendant from final judgments entered 8 March 2024 by Judge

Robert C. Ervin in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of

Appeals 15 January 2026.

Vitrano Law Office, PLLC, by Sean P. Vitrano, for defendant-appellant.

Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Special Deputy Attorney General Rachel G. Posey, for the State.

DILLON, Chief Judge.

Defendant Cristian Jeremi Sosa-Valdez appeals from final judgment entered

upon a jury’s verdict finding Defendant guilty of trafficking in cocaine and possession

with intent to sell or deliver cocaine. On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court’s

failure to make express findings of fact in its order denying Defendant’s pre-trial

motion to suppress evidence of a firearm found in Defendant’s vehicle during a traffic STATE V. SOSA-VALDEZ

Opinion of the Court

stop is error because there is a material conflict in the evidence. For the reasons set

forth below, we hold Defendant received a fair trial, free from reversible error.

I. Background

The State’s evidence showed: On 15 June 2022, Officer Marmol and Officer

Nicholas with the Charlotte Mecklenburg Police Department pulled over a vehicle

with a broken taillight on North Sharon Amity Road. Officer Marmol approached the

driver’s side door and encountered Defendant, the sole occupant of the vehicle, with

his window down. On approach, Officer Marmol indicated Defendant was sweaty,

seemed nervous, and smelled an odor generally associated with marijuana emanating

from Defendant’s vehicle. Officer Nicholas, who approached the passenger side door

side, motioned Officer Marmol to ask Defendant to roll down his tinted passenger

side window, Defendant did not comply.

Officer Marmol asked Defendant for his license and registration to which

Defendant responded he did not have a license but moved to open the glove

compartment for the vehicle’s registration. When Defendant reached for the vehicle’s

registration, Officer Nicholas observed a bong fall out of the glove compartment.

Officer Nicholas alerted Officer Marmol of this observation and Officer Marmol

detained Defendant.

Relevant here, Officer Marmol conducted a search of Defendant’s vehicle and

found a loaded 9-millimeter handgun underneath the driver’s seat. Officer Marmol

alerted Officer Nicholas to the handgun and Officer Nicholas arrested Defendant.

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After Officer Nicholas placed Defendant under arrest, Officer Marmol found

additional items in Defendant’s vehicle: marijuana, hard rock-like substance believed

to be crack-cocaine, a white powdery substance later confirmed to be cocaine, and an

Altoids tin holding individually wrapped baggies of the cocaine.

The trial court denied Defendant’s pre-trial motion to suppress the search of

Defendant’s vehicle. A jury convicted Defendant of trafficking in cocaine and

possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine. Defendant appeals.

II. Analysis

Defendant argues the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress without

making express findings of fact is error because a material conflict in the evidence is

present. For the foregoing reasons, we disagree.

The standard of review in assessing a denial of a motion to suppress when, “the

facts are not disputed and the trial court did not make specific findings of fact either

orally or in writing, [the findings are inferred] from the trial court’s decision and [we]

conduct a de novo assessment of whether those findings support the ultimate legal

conclusion reached by the trial court.” State v. Nicholson, 371 N.C. 284, 288 (2018)

(footnote omitted).

When a trial court must determine whether evidence should be suppressed, it

must “make findings of fact and conclusions of law which shall be included in the

record.” N.C.G.S. § 15A-974(b); see also id. § 15A-977(f). However, express findings—

written or oral—are not required under G.S. 15A-977(f) when “(1) the trial court

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provides its rationale from the bench, and (2) there are no material conflicts in the

evidence at the suppression hearing. State v. Baker, 208 N.C. App. 376, 380 (2010)

(citations omitted). “A material conflict in the evidence . . . [is] one that potentially

affects the outcome of the suppression motion[.]” State v. Bartlett, 368 N.C. 309, 312

(2015) (citations omitted) (emphasis omitted). For example, in Bartlett, our Supreme

Court held a material conflict existed because (1) two expert witnesses disagreed

about the defendant’s impairment level; and (2) such impairment provided probable

cause for the defendant’s arrest. 368 N.C. at 312. Absent a material conflict, “the

trial court’s findings can be inferred from its decision.” Id. (citation omitted).

Here, the trial court did not make express findings of fact and orally denied

Defendant’s motion to suppress concluding the officers had probable cause to search

Defendant’s vehicle because “the odor of marijuana is still sufficient . . . [and the]

observation of paraphernalia independently is sufficient.” Defendant contends the

trial court’s oral conclusion runs afoul of G.S. 15A-974(b) and G.S. 15A-977(f) because

a State Bureau of Investigation memorandum (“Memo”) and the credibility of Officer

Nicholas’s testimony affected the outcome of the suppression motion.1

We disagree. The definition of material conflict and its use in North Carolina

1 The Memo is undated and unsigned internal guidance for police officers and related state

agencies based on recent legislation legalizing hemp for some purposes. See An Act to Recognize the Importance and Legitimacy of Industrial Hemp Research, to Provide for Compliance with Portions of the Federal Agricultural Act of 2014, and to Promote Increased Agricultural Employment, S.L. 2015- 299, § 2, 2015 N.C. Sess. Laws 1483, 1486.

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case law creates the implication a defendant must put on evidence to contravene the

State’s evidence. Here, Defendant put on no evidence to contravene the State’s.2

As it relates to the Memo, this Court in State v. Parker previously held the

Memo does not create a “material issue of fact.” 277 N.C. App. 531, 538 (2021)

(emphasis in original). Thus, Defendant’s attempt to create a conflict based on the

Memo is overruled. As it relates to the credibility of Officer Nicholas’s testimony,

“[t]he trial judge who presides at a suppression hearing ‘sees the witnesses, observes

their demeanor as they testify and by reason of his more favorable position, he is

given the responsibility of discovering the truth.’ ” State v. Bartlett, 368 N.C. 309,

313 (2015) (quoting State v. Smith, 278 N.C. 36, 41 (1971)). It follows then, the trial

court judge was the sole decision maker in determining the credibility of Officer

Nicholas’s testimony during the suppression hearing. 3

Even when express findings of fact are not required, the trial court is still

required to provide conclusions of law. State v. McFarland, 234 N.C. App. 274, 284

(2014); see also N.C.G.S. § 15-977(f) (emphasis added) (“The judge must set forth in

the record his . . . conclusions of law.”). A conclusion of law mandates the “exercise of

2 Mere cross-examination of the State’s witnesses does not create a material conflict in the

evidence. See State v. Baker, 208 N.C. App. 376, 383 (2010). 3 Defendant makes this argument seemingly to paint the picture that only the odor of

marijuana or hemp prompted the search of Defendant’s vehicle. The issue of whether the smell of marijuana alone is permissible to search a vehicle is currently pending before our Supreme Court pursuant to recent litigation around the Memo. See State v. Schiene, 387 N.C. 422 (2025); State v. Dobson, 387 N.C. 420 (2025); State v. Rowdy, 387 N.C. 421 (2025) (determining whether marijuana odor alone provides reasonable suspicion or probable cause of criminal activity).

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judgment” to come to a determination, “or the application of legal principles” to the

facts of the case. State v. Parisi, 372 N.C. 639, 655 (2019) (citing McFarland, 234

N.C. App. at 284).

Here, the trial court’s conclusion relies on whether the officers had probable

cause to initiate the search of Defendant’s vehicle. Probable cause is present where

an officer’s knowledge of the facts and circumstances are sufficient to “support a

reasonable belief that [an] automobile . . . carries contraband materials.” State v.

Simmons, 278 N.C. 468, 471 (1971) (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,

158–59 (1925)).

Following Parker, this Court recognizes an officer’s determination for probable

cause for a traffic stop in the context of the odor which emanates from marijuana and

hemp is “whether an officer, based on his or her training and experience, had

reasonable grounds to believe that the suspect possessed marijuana . . . not whether

an officer can discern the difference between illegal marijuana or legal hemp.” In re

J.B.P., 919 S.E.2d 521, 525 (N.C. Ct. App. 2025); see State v. Little, 295 N.C. App.

541, 555 (2024) (citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983)) (“But the issue here

. . . for the purposes of probable cause . . . is only whether the officer, based upon his

training and experience, had a reasonable basis to believe . . .” incriminating evidence

could be found in the vehicle.).

Here, the trial court appropriately applied the probable cause standard to the

facts of this case. Combined, both officers have previously engaged in approximately

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sixty-five traffic stops regarding narcotics. Both officers testified based on their

experience and training that: bongs are generally used to smoke marijuana and each

classified bongs as drug paraphernalia; and Officer Marmol testified based on such

training he believed the smell coming from Defendant’s vehicle to be marijuana.

The State’s evidence tends to show the officers detained Defendant only after

smelling the odor and observing the bong fall from the glove compartment. Similarly,

the evidence tends to show the officers did not remove Defendant from his vehicle on

a smell consistent with marijuana alone. The officers’ actions comport with the facts

and holding in Parker dealing with a probable cause search based on smell plus other

circumstances. See 277 N.C. App. 531, 541 (2021) (stating the Court need not

examine whether the smell of marijuana alone is sufficient for probable cause to

search a vehicle because the officer had more than just odor to indicate illegal drugs

may be present). The trial court’s conclusion reflects these facts and law in stating:

“the odor of marijuana is still sufficient . . . [and the] observation of paraphernalia

independently is sufficient.”

Additionally, the trial court’s statement could be construed as recognizing the

officers could have removed and detained Defendant based on plain view of the bong

without regard to the smell emanating from Defendant’s vehicle. See State v. Grice,

367 N.C. 753, 756–57 (2015) (stating the four requirements for plain view exception

to warrantless searches in North Carolina and stating “[w]hen law enforcement

observes contraband in plain view . . . the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against

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unreasonable warrantless searches is not violated.”). See California v. Ciraolo, 476

U.S. 207, 213–15 (1986); see also State v. Lupek, 214 N.C. App. 146, 149–154 (2011)

(affirming trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence found in

the defendant’s home where an officer observed a bong in plain view and smelled

marijuana).

Thus, on de novo review, the trial court’s conclusion of law is supported by the

applicable legal principles and facts of this case.

III. Conclusion

Defendant received a fair trial, free from reversible error because there is no

material conflict in the evidence and the conclusions of law are supported both by

facts of the case and relevant legal principles.

NO ERROR.

Judges HAMPSON and MURRY concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).

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