State v. Snyder

426 N.W.2d 662, 1988 Iowa App. LEXIS 58, 1988 WL 79108
CourtCourt of Appeals of Iowa
DecidedMay 31, 1988
Docket87-977
StatusPublished

This text of 426 N.W.2d 662 (State v. Snyder) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Snyder, 426 N.W.2d 662, 1988 Iowa App. LEXIS 58, 1988 WL 79108 (iowactapp 1988).

Opinion

HAYDEN, Judge.

Defendant, Dwight W. Snyder, appeals his conviction of second-degree robbery. He asserts the adjudication of him as a habitual offender, pursuant to Iowa Code section 902.8, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because it was based on relatively old prior convictions. We affirm.

Iowa Code section 902.8 provides for a sentencing procedure by which punishment is enhanced for one who is convicted of his third felony; it does not define a separate crime. State v. Popes, 290 N.W. 2d 926, 927 (Iowa 1980). The enhancement is that a habitual offender “shall not be eligible for parole until [he] has served the minimum sentence of confinement of three years.” Iowa Code § 902.8.

On May 1, 1987, the trial court found Snyder to be a habitual offender, after he pleaded guilty to second-degree robbery. The court based its determination on Snyder’s conviction of arson, on December 15, 1969, and conviction of receiving stolen property, on January 26, 1971. The court therefore imposed the habitual offender enhancement to Snyder’s sentence. Snyder contends the previous convictions are so remote in time that to rely on them to justify enhancing his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.

Snyder bears the burden of proving the unconstitutionality of Iowa Code section 902.8, as applied to him. See State v. Kramer, 235 N.W.2d 114, 116 (Iowa 1975). He must prove the statute is clearly, palpably, and without doubt violative of his constitutional rights. Id. at 117. Generally the offenses which trigger a habitual offender statute and the sentence of confinement given a habitual offender are matters for the discretion of the legislature. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 285, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 1145, 63 L.Ed.2d 382, 397 (1980).

We are not persuaded the absence of a time limit on the use of previous felony convictions in a habitual offender determination constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Snyder cites no cases to the contrary and we have none. See Hammers v. State, 502 N.E.2d 1339, 1345 (Ind.1987) (imposition of five additional years of confinement not cruel and unusual punishment where prior felonies, with one exception, were more than twenty-five years old); Pace v. State, 407 So.2d 530, 535 (Miss.1981) (consideration of convictions more than ten years old not cruel and unusual punishment); see also Long v. State, 446 So.2d 658, 660 (Ala.Cr.App.1983) (trial court did not err in considering thirteen-year-old convictions); State v. Sullivan, 644 S.W.2d 429, 430 (Tenn.Cr.App.1982) (trial court erred by dismissing recidivist charge based upon convictions over ten years old). We affirm Snyder’s conviction and sentence.

AFFIRMED.

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Related

Rummel v. Estelle
445 U.S. 263 (Supreme Court, 1980)
Pace v. State
407 So. 2d 530 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 1981)
State v. Kramer
235 N.W.2d 114 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1975)
Long v. State
446 So. 2d 658 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama, 1983)
Hammers v. State
502 N.E.2d 1339 (Indiana Supreme Court, 1987)
State v. Popes
290 N.W.2d 926 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1980)
State v. Sullivan
644 S.W.2d 429 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee, 1982)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
426 N.W.2d 662, 1988 Iowa App. LEXIS 58, 1988 WL 79108, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-snyder-iowactapp-1988.