State v. Smathers, Unpublished Decision (11-8-2000)

CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedNovember 8, 2000
DocketC.A. No. 19936.
StatusUnpublished

This text of State v. Smathers, Unpublished Decision (11-8-2000) (State v. Smathers, Unpublished Decision (11-8-2000)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Smathers, Unpublished Decision (11-8-2000), (Ohio Ct. App. 2000).

Opinion

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Megan Smathers appeals her conviction on one count of felony childendangering following a jury trial in the Summit County Court of CommonPleas. This court affirms.

I.
On Tuesday July 13, 1999, Megan Smathers ("Megan") spent the day withher three children, Bethanie Gardner, Chelsea Gardner, and JefferySmathers Jr., in their home at 1930 Gardencourt Drive in Akron.Three-year old Bethanie and five-year old Chelsea were Megan's childrenfrom a previous marriage. Infant Jeffery Jr. was the child of Megan andMegan's husband Jeffery Sr. ("Smathers"). At 4:55 p.m., Megan left thechildren with Smathers and went to work. Shortly after 5 p.m., Smatherscalled EMS, reporting that Bethanie was unresponsive. The paramedicsrushed Bethanie to the hospital, where she died at 5:38 p.m. Bethaniewould have been four years old on July 22.

The medical examiner determined that the death was caused by a blunt force trauma to the abdomen that occurred within one-half hour before death. Given the time of the fatal injury and evidence of prior abuse to Bethanie, Megan was indicted for felony child endangering, in violation of R.C. 2919.22(A). A jury trial was held from November 22-24, 1999, and Megan was found guilty and sentenced to three years of imprisonment.

Megan filed the instant appeal, claiming that the conviction was basedon legally insufficient evidence and the conviction was against themanifest weight of the evidence.

II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ONE

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT APPELLANT'S CRIM R. 29 MOTION TO DISMISS THE CHARGE OF "ENDANGERING CHILDREN" AS A FELONY OF THE THIRD DEGREE.

At trial, Megan moved for a judgment of acquittal, both at the close of the state's case and at the close of all the evidence, pursuant to Crim.R. 29. In the first assignment of error Megan argues that the trial court erred in denying these motions because the evidence was legally insufficient, both at the close of the state's case and the close of all evidence, to support a conviction for felony child endangering.

The charge of endangering children is governed by R.C. 2919.22(A)-(E), which provides in relevant part:

No person, who is the parent, guardian, custodian, person having custody or control, or person in loco parentis of a child under eighteen years of age or a mentally or physically handicapped child under twenty-one years of age, shall create a substantial risk to the health or safety of the child, by violating a duty of care, protection, or support. * * *

R.C. 2919.22(A). "If the violation is a violation of division (A) of this section and results in serious physical harm to the child involved, [the offense is] a felony of the third degree." R.C. 2919.22(E)(1)(c). The culpable mental state for this crime is recklessness. See State v.McGee (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 193, syllabus; R.C. 2901.21(B). "A person is reckless with respect to circumstances when, with heedless indifference to the consequences, he perversely disregards a known risk that such circumstances are likely to exist." R.C. 2901.22(C).

Megan argues that the state was required to present evidence that, if believed, would have shown that Megan knew not only that Bethanie was being abused but also that the prior abuse was of the type that resulted in serious physical harm. Megan argues that if the evidence did not establish that the prior abuse caused serious physical harm, she could be convicted, at most, of misdemeanor child endangering. We disagree.

If Megan was on notice that Bethanie was the victim of abuse, she was obliged to protect her from that abuse. If, as a result of Megan's failure to protect her, Bethanie was exposed to further abuse that caused her death, Megan could be found guilty of felonious child endangering. See State v. Kamel (1982), 12 Ohio St.3d 306, 308-309, overruled in part on other grounds; State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, paragraph one of the syllabus.

We now review the legal sufficiency of the evidence. When an appellatecourt reviews for the sufficiency of the evidence, it must look at theevidence presented in the light most favorable to the prosecution and askwhether the evidence, if believed, would permit a rational trier of factto find that the prosecution had proved each element of the offensebeyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Jackson (1992),82 Ohio App.3d 667, 671; State v. Gasser (1993), 89 Ohio App.3d 544,547, citing State v. Bridgeman (1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 261, syllabus. These elements are that Megan (1) recklessly, that is, indifferent to a known risk (2) "violated a duty of care, protection, or support" for her minor child (3) which created a substantial risk to Bethanie's health and safety and (4) which violation of the duty of care caused serious physical harm to Bethanie. See R.C. 2919.22(A)-(E)(1)(c).

At trial, the state presented as witnesses the paramedics, police officers, medical examiner, Bethanie's father and great-grandmother, a neighbor, and a nurse from the Summit County Children's Services Board. The prosecution offered into evidence photographs of Bethanie, several taken post-mortem, the paramedic's report and the autopsy report. The state also presented a tape recording of police interrogation of Megan that took place after she was advised of her Miranda rights. The interview took place several hours after Bethanie's death.

According to Megan's statement to the police, she had been alone withthe children the entire day prior to leaving for work. Smathers returnedhome with the family car shortly before 5 p.m. on July 13, 1999. Meganadvised her husband that Bethanie was in Megan's bedroom, for a "timeout" because she had been misbehaving. Megan then left the house at 4:55p.m. and drove to work at a pizza shop in Fairlawn. She left the childrenin Smathers' care. Megan clocked in at the restaurant shortly after 5:00p.m. A few minutes later Megan got a call from Smathers, saying that sheshould return home because Bethanie was hurt. The paramedics testifiedthat Smathers was on the phone with Megan when the paramedics arrived atthe house, in response to Smathers' 911 call placed at approximately 5:04p.m. Smathers was the only adult in the house at the time. Theparamedics found Bethanie unconscious and barely breathing. They rushed

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Related

State v. Jackson
612 N.E.2d 1302 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1992)
State v. Martin
485 N.E.2d 717 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1983)
State v. Otten
515 N.E.2d 1009 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1986)
State v. Gasser
626 N.E.2d 127 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1993)
State v. Bridgeman
381 N.E.2d 184 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1978)
State v. Kamel
466 N.E.2d 860 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1984)
State v. Jenks
574 N.E.2d 492 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1991)
State v. McGee
79 Ohio St. 3d 193 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1997)

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Bluebook (online)
State v. Smathers, Unpublished Decision (11-8-2000), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-smathers-unpublished-decision-11-8-2000-ohioctapp-2000.