IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-357
Filed 18 March 2026
Buncombe County, Nos. 23CR338100-100, 23CR000260-100
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
RICHARD NATHAN SMATHERS
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 4 April 2024 by Judge Karen
Eady-Williams in Buncombe County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals
17 February 2026.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Solicitor General Nicholas S. Brod and Solicitor General Fellow Meighan R. Parsh, for the State
Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Wyatt Orsbon, for defendant
ARROWOOD, Judge.
Richard N. Smathers (“defendant”) appeals from judgment after jury trial
where he was convicted of failure to report an online identifier with the registering
sheriff and being a habitual felon. Defendant asks us to reverse his conviction
because the statutory reporting requirement is facially unconstitutional. For the
following reasons, we disagree and find no error.
I. Background
As in all 50 states, convicted sex offenders are subject to statutory registration STATE V. SMATHERS
Opinion of the Court
and reporting requirements in North Carolina. In 2010, a jury in Buncombe County
Superior Court convicted defendant of taking indecent liberties with a child.
Therefore, he was subject to these requirements.
On 21 December 2022, as he began post-release supervision after an unrelated
imprisonment, defendant visited the Buncombe County Sheriff’s Department to
register as required. The office gave him a “Duty to Register” packet listing the
registration and reporting requirements. Paragraph 14 reads as follows:
ONLINE IDENTIFIERS 14-208.7(b)(7), 14-208.9, and 14- 208.9A(a)(3):
I am required to provide and verify my use of any Online Identifiers with the registering sheriff’s office.
“Online Identifier” means electronic mail address, instant message screen name, user ID, chat or other Internet communication name, but it does not mean social security number, date of birth, or pin number [NCGS 14-208.6(1n)].
I understand that if I change an online identifier, or obtain a new online identifier, then I must report IN-PERSON within 10 days to the registering sheriff to provide the new or changed online identifier information.
Defendant marked each paragraph, including the above language, with his initials.
He also signed two forms acknowledging receipt of the packet, that he had an
opportunity to ask questions about it, and that he understood its contents. On this
date, defendant reported only two online identifiers: a Gmail address and “Grinder
[sic] Richard Smathers.”
Melissa Whiteside (“Ms. Whiteside”), an administrator with the Sheriff’s
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Department, certified that he completed the paperwork and entered his online
identifiers in the state database, making them accessible to law enforcement. She
testified that she knew defendant because he registered as required for years and had
already seen and filled out this packet numerous times. Both Ms. Whiteside and
Detective Tonya Reeves (“Detective Reeves”) of the Sheriff’s Department confirmed
in testimony that they had discussed the requirements with defendant.
On 16 June 2023, defendant had a scheduled meeting with Officer Amy Cleary
(“Officer Cleary”), a probation and parole officer with the Department of Adult
Corrections. The conditions of defendant’s post-release supervision included
warrantless searches of his electronic devices. While searching defendant’s phone,
Officer Cleary saw two social media applications with reportable online identifiers:
Grindr and Snapchat. In the Snapchat app, she saw an account with the username
“Nathan_Smathers” created on 8 January 2023. She photographed the account
information on defendant’s phone. When she asked if he had reported this account,
defendant said he intended to do so that day. Defendant admitted that he was using
Snapchat to send pictures of his penis. Officer Cleary contacted Detective Reeves,
who confirmed that defendant had not reported the account username.
Defendant was arrested and charged for failing to report his online identifiers
and with being a habitual felon. When the case came to trial, defendant moved to
dismiss the substantive charge on First Amendment grounds, and after a pretrial
motions hearing on 2 April 2024, the court denied this motion. Defense counsel
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renewed the motion to dismiss on the same grounds at the close of the State’s evidence
and at the close of all evidence, and the court again denied the motions. The jury
convicted defendant of the substantive charge and the status offense, and defendant
appealed.
II. Discussion
On appeal, defendant argues that the reporting requirements, N.C.G.S. §§ 14-
208.7(b)(7), 14-208.9(e), are facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
A. Standard of Review
We review constitutional challenges to statutes de novo. N.C. Ass’n of
Educators, Inc. v. State, 368 N.C. 777, 786 (2016). Accordingly, we consider the
constitutional question anew and freely substitute our conclusion for that of the trial
court. State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632–33 (2008). “This Court presumes that
statutes passed by the General Assembly are constitutional, and duly passed acts will
not be struck unless found unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt[.]” N.C. Ass’n
of Educators, Inc., 368 N.C. at 786 (citations omitted).
B. Facial Challenges to Statutes on First Amendment Grounds
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const. amend. I. “Encroachment of
First Amendment protections” are “permitted for appropriate reasons.” Elrod v.
Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360 (1976). However, “[s]ignificant impairment of First
Amendment rights must survive exacting scrutiny.” Id. at 362. Generally, litigants
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mounting a constitutional facial challenge to a statute “must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid.” United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
Defendant does not claim that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to the
facts of his own case. However, he need not do so to establish standing in the instant
case, although he invokes only the rights of third-party convicted sex offenders whose
conduct the statute governs. Litigants to whom a statute is lawfully applied have
standing to argue the statute violates the First Amendment on its face because it is
overbroad. United States v. Hansen, 599 U.S. 762, 769–70 (2023).
“The Constitution gives significant protection from overbroad laws that chill
speech within the First Amendment’s vast and privileged sphere.” Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002). An unconstitutionally overbroad statutory
scheme “prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech relative to its plainly
legitimate sweep” such that “society’s interest in free expression outweighs its
interest in the statute’s lawful applications.” Hansen, 599 U.S. at 769–70 (cleaned
up) (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008)). However, it must
be noted that “[w]e seldom uphold facial challenges because it is the role of the
legislature, rather than this Court, to balance disparate interests and find a workable
compromise among them.” Beaufort Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Beaufort Cnty. Bd. of
Comm’rs, 363 N.C. 500, 502 (2009).
C. Level of Scrutiny
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As threshold matters, we must determine whether the challenged statutory
scheme implicates First Amendment activity, and which level of scrutiny to apply,
which depends upon whether the statutes are content-neutral. Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
1. The Reporting Requirements Implicate First Amendment Activity
First Amendment protections apply in full to the internet, which is today the
major forum for the exchange of ideas and the exercise of our First Amendment
rights. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. 98, 104–107 (2017); see also Reno
v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997). Laws that do not directly prohibit speech may
nevertheless burden its exercise, as the “distinction between laws burdening and laws
banning speech is but a matter of degree.” United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc.,
529 U.S. 803, 812 (2000). Therefore, “scrutiny is necessary even if any deterrent effect
on the exercise of First Amendment rights arises, not through direct government
action, but indirectly as an unintended but inevitable result of the government’s
conduct.” Elrod, 427 U.S. at 362 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 65 (1976)).
With these fundamental principles in mind, we look at the statutes to determine
whether they burden any First Amendment activity, whether directly or indirectly.
Anyone convicted of a reportable conviction must register with the sheriff in
their county of residence. N.C.G.S. § 14-208.7(a). Generally, reportable convictions
encompass all sexually violent offenses towards victims, certain offenses against
minors (such as kidnapping), substantially similar offenses committed in other
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jurisdictions, as well as attempts, solicitations, and conspiracies to commit such
crimes. Id. § 14-208.6(a)(4). In addition to addresses and other identifying
information such as height and weight, all offenders must report in person “[a]ny
online identifier that the person uses or intends to use.” Id. § 14-208.7(b)(7). The
term “online identifier” is defined as follows: “Email address, instant message screen
name, user ID, chat or other internet communication name, but it does not mean
social security number, date of birth, or pin number.” Id. § 14-208.6(1n). Whenever
the offender obtains or changes an online identifier, he must report it to the sheriff
within ten days. Id. § 14-208.9(e). Failure to timely report online identifiers is a
Class F felony. Id. § 14-208.11(10).
Much of the reported information is freely available as public record through
the statewide sex offender registry, including the offender’s address and photo, but
not the online identifiers. Id. §§ 14-208.10(a), 14-208.15(a). An offender’s online
identifiers are released publicly in only three ways. First, the sheriff or Department
of Public Safety (“DPS”) “shall release any other relevant information that is
necessary to protect the public concerning a specific person.” Id. §§ 14-208.10(a), 14-
208.15(a). Second, “any person may obtain a copy of an individual’s registration form,
a part of the county registry, or all of the county registry, by submitting a written
request for the information to the sheriff” or DPS. Id. §§ 14-208.10(b), 14-208.15(b).
After developing standards regarding their release and use, the DPS “may release
registry information regarding a registered offender’s online identifier to an entity
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for the purpose of allowing the entity to prescreen users or to compare the online
identifier information with information held by the entity” who applies, pays a fee,
and complies with the DPS criteria. Id. § 14-208.15. The entity must cross-check
that information and make a report whenever it receives complaints that a user is
soliciting sex with a minor or transmitting child pornography. Id.
What this means in practice is that once a sex offender is convicted, a vast
amount of their internet use, and therefore their potential First Amendment activity,
is subject not only to frequent reporting but to law enforcement monitoring. Some
reportable online identifiers are for services that could put juveniles at risk, such as
social networking sites or dating apps. Some are for web services less likely to lead
to sex crimes, such as user IDs for blogging, watching YouTube, or commenting on
news articles. All these services share the ability to host lawful speech and
expression protected by the First Amendment.
Conditioning lawful speech activity on an “affirmative obligation” to report it
to the government “is almost certain to have a deterrent effect” and is an indirect
burden in conflict with the First Amendment’s purpose. Lamont v. Postmaster
General, 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965). It necessarily follows that these statutes place an
indirect burden with a likely deterrent effect upon offenders’ exercise of certain First
Amendment rights. The First Amendment also protects anonymous speech.
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995). The statutes abridge
this protection, because the statutes provide a means for the public to acquire
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offenders’ online identifiers. Therefore, the reporting requirements raise genuine
First Amendment issues.
2. The Reporting Requirements are Content-Neutral and Must Satisfy Intermediate Scrutiny
Next, we ask “whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech
because of [agreement or] disagreement with the message it conveys.” Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). Laws which “impose burdens on speech
without reference to the ideas or views expressed are in most instances content
neutral.” Turner, 512 U.S. at 643. A content-based regulation is presumptively
unconstitutional and can only survive strict scrutiny if it “promote[s] a compelling
interest” and “chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.”
Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). Alternately, a content-
neutral regulation receives intermediate scrutiny, which is “less demanding but still
rigorous.” State v. Bishop, 368 N.C. 869, 874 (2016). The State must prove that the
statute is “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.” Ward, 491
U.S. at 796.
The reporting requirement makes no reference to the content of the online
identifiers, merely their type or format, such as e-mail addresses. N.C.G.S. § 14-
208.6(1n). They do not prohibit the communication of any specified ideas or subject
matter. Therefore, intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate standard upon which to
judge their constitutionality.
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D. Analysis
Statutes regulating conduct while incidentally burdening speech are “valid
provided that they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest,
and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the
information.” Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). We
discuss the government’s interest and then the parties’ arguments that the statutes
are overbroad or narrowly tailored.
1. The Reporting Requirements Further Important Government Interests
“It is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State’s interest in
safeguarding the physical and psychological wellbeing of a minor is compelling.” New
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756–57 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Recidivism presents tremendous challenges unique to sex crimes. “When convicted
sex offenders reenter society, they are much more likely than any other type of
offender to be rearrested for a new rape or sexual assault.” McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S.
24, 33 (2002) (plurality opinion); accord United States v. Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. 387,
395 (2013).
When the Legislature enacted these statutes in 1995, home internet access was
a relatively new phenomenon. The internet posed novel threats to child safety but
provided new opportunities for preventing sex crimes by known offenders.
Identifying as its concern that community protection was “impaired by the lack of
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information available to law enforcement agencies about convicted offenders who live
within the agency’s jurisdiction,” the Legislature sought to “require the exchange of
relevant information about those offenders among law enforcement agencies, and to
authorize the access to necessary and relevant information about those offenders[.]”
N.C.G.S. § 14-208.5. It is therefore beyond dispute that the statute addresses a
government interest of the greatest importance.
The government “must do more than simply posit the existence of the disease
sought to be cured” but must demonstrate that this “regulation will in fact alleviate
these harms in a direct and material way.” Turner, 512 U.S. at 664. Although
offenders must report identifiers for platforms that pose limited risks to children,
they must also report identifiers for websites frequently used for nefarious reasons,
such as Snapchat, hence why defendant cannot dispute that the statutes were
constitutionally applied against him. This conduct is precisely what legislatures and
law enforcement have a duty to monitor, and mandatory disclosure empowers them
to do so. Here, the State has sufficiently demonstrated that the statutes further the
stated goal of alleviating an information shortage that hinders crime prevention.
Statutory strategies which “prevent a sex offender from engaging in conduct
that often presages a sexual crime, like contacting a minor or using a website to
gather information about a minor . . . must be the State’s first resort to ward off the
serious harm that sexual crimes inflict.” Packingham, 582 U.S. at 107. Accordingly,
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we have no doubt this statute furthers important purposes unrelated to the
suppression of protected speech.
2. Defendant Argues the Statutes are Overbroad and Not Narrowly Tailored
In arguing overbreadth, defendant must establish that the scheme “prohibits
a substantial amount of speech relative to its plainly legitimate sweep.” Hansen, 599
U.S. at 770. These unconstitutional applications must be “realistic, not fanciful” and
their relative disproportionateness must be substantial. Id. (citations omitted). To
determine whether “society’s interest in free expression outweighs its interest in the
statute’s lawful applications,” we are guided by the principle that overbroad laws
“may deter or ‘chill’ constitutionally protected speech,” and if would-be speakers
remain silent, society will lose their contributions to the “marketplace of ideas.” Id.
(quoting Williams, 553 U.S. at 292 and Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118–19
(2003)).
Defendant offers three reasons why the statutory scheme is overbroad. First,
he argues that the statutes are “categorical” and “indiscriminately sweep up too much
online activity,” obliging offenders to report all their online identifiers, including
those “associated with internet platforms that can’t reasonably be used to commit sex
crimes” and “apply to broad swaths of lawful speech.” Second, they provide no
exception for offenders who “have never engaged in the sort of online activity that the
government seeks to deter” and thereby “impermissibly fail to account for
individualized risk.” Third, he argues that there is no “meaningful limitation on law
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enforcement agencies’ use of an offender’s online identifiers” or any “constraining
principle” on their public release when deemed necessary for their protection, or upon
written request. None of these reasons is sufficient to show that the statute is
overbroad on its face.
First, to pursue its stated aim of information gathering, the Legislature is not
required to make exceptions for offenders who did not use the internet to facilitate
their conviction offense. It would be naïve and dangerous to legislate in this area
with rose-colored glasses, assuming that an offender who met his first young victim
in a public park would therefore be unlikely to pursue his next victim online. The
State’s use of the Static-99 forensic procedure to assess individualized risk is indeed
valuable, but only for making classifications between offenders. Defendant does not
show that the Static-99 alone is sufficient to further the Legislature’s stated goal.
Therefore, the reporting requirements are not overbroad in the number or categories
of offenders covered. Nor, for reasons we discuss below, are they overbroad in the
number or categories of online identifiers they require offenders to report.
However, defendant’s argument does allow us to illustrate a realistic scenario
raising legitimate constitutional concerns. Imagine the following. A convicted sex
offender, fully compliant with the reporting requirements, publishes an article on his
popular local politics blog challenging untrue statements from an official’s recent
press conference. The offender rightly believes that blogging under his legal name
would overshadow the substance of his political posts, because his name and offense
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are public record and stigma is a “collateral consequence” of sex offender registries.
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 99 (2003). And like many political writers before him,
including Thomas Paine and the authors of the Federalist Papers, he believes that
publishing under his pseudonym makes him a more effective critic. See Talley v.
California, 362 U.S. 60, 64–65 (1960). The offender is no Alexander Hamilton, but
he nevertheless exercises his right to a forum where “a writer who may be personally
unpopular [can] ensure that readers will not prejudge [his] message simply because
they do not like its proponent.” McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342. Although a member of the
public who requests sex offenders’ online identifiers could plausibly unmask him, only
the offender and a handful of local officers know the blogger’s identity.
The sheriff happens to live in the offender’s neighborhood. Like many parents,
he carefully oversees his children’s internet use. As sheriff, he also has access to the
online identifiers of local sex offenders, and he keeps tabs on the offenders who live
nearby. But after the blog criticizing the press conference, word gets around within
the sheriff’s department that the anonymous blogger and the sex offender are one and
the same. Although the blog is protected speech, the sheriff decides to release all the
offender’s online identifiers, arguing that they fall under his statutory mandate to
“release any other relevant information that is necessary to protect the public
concerning a specific person.” N.C.G.S. § 14-208.10(a). A city paper writes up the
report, and the offender loses his de facto anonymity, so he shuts down the blog and
stops commenting on local politics.
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It would be challenging to argue on these hypothetical facts that it was
necessary to unmask the pseudonym for the public’s protection, so the sheriff’s
decision in this hypothetical could constitute a First Amendment violation.
Accordingly, the broadness of the statutory scheme makes possible both legitimate
and unconstitutional applications, and defendant’s argument that release of online
identifiers “may deter or ‘chill’ constitutionally protected speech” is both plausible
and well-grounded.
But “[t]he fact that a statute might operate unconstitutionally under some
conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid.” State v.
Bryant, 359 N.C. 554, 564 (2005) (quoting State v. Thompson, 349 N.C. 483, 491
(1998)). Defendant has not shown that the public’s interest in preventing plausible
unconstitutional applications, like the one illustrated above, is substantially
disproportionate relative to its overriding interest in ensuring law enforcement can
perform the statutes’ constitutional applications. The offender’s interest in
anonymous online speech and the public’s interest in hearing it are both important
but they cannot overcome the public’s interest in online safety and effective policing.
To explain why, we turn now to the State’s argument that the statute is not
overbroad and is sufficiently narrowly tailored to survive intermediate scrutiny.
3. The State Argues the Statutes are Narrowly Tailored to Further an Important Government Interest Unrelated to Speech
The State argues, and we agree, that the amount of speech deterred or chilled
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is neither substantial nor disproportionate relative to the scheme’s “plainly legitimate
sweep,” although it could be “adequately served” if the legislature approved “some
less-speech-restrictive alternative.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 800. In this context, narrow
tailoring does “not turn on whether [courts] agree with the Government’s conclusion
that its chosen regulatory path is best or most appropriate.” TikTok, Inc. v. Garland,
604 U.S. 56, 78 (2025) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). We “accord
substantial deference to the [legislature’s] predictive judgments” here, because
“sound policymaking often requires legislators to forecast future events and to
anticipate the likely impact of these events based on deductions and inferences for
which complete empirical support may be unavailable.” TikTok, 604 U.S. at 69–70
(citing Turner, 512 U.S. at 665). This is especially crucial in the present inquiry, as
we are mindful that the internet is a global project in constant evolution, where novel
platforms continue to lead revolutionary advances overnight, providing new tools for
legislatures, law enforcement, and sex offenders alike. See Packingham, 582 U.S. at
105.
i. Reporting Requirements Deter Some Speech Without Prohibiting It
First, the State argues that the reporting requirements do not categorically
prohibit sex offenders from speaking on the internet. This distinguishes this statute
from the law the United States Supreme Court struck down in Packingham, through
which North Carolina had made it a felony for sex offenders to use any “commercial
social networking Web site” where he knows minor children are permitted to create
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accounts. There, the Supreme Court held that “the State may not enact this complete
bar to [offenders’] exercise of First Amendment rights on websites integral to the
fabric of our modern society and culture.” Packingham, 582 U.S. at 109. In the
instant case, however, offenders retain the right to use the internet to engage in
public discourse, so long as they have reported the identifier used, or timely report a
new one within ten days.
Furthermore, disclosure requirements, when previously challenged on First
Amendment grounds, have been found “a less restrictive alternative to more
comprehensive regulations of speech.” Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558
U.S. 310, 369 (2010); see also Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns. of Supreme Ct.
of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (finding that, although “unjustified or unduly
burdensome disclosure requirements might offend the First Amendment by chilling
protected commercial speech,” disclosure requirements “trench much more narrowly”
on the speaker’s interests than do “flat prohibitions on speech.”). Here, the State
already requires offenders to verify their addresses, names, and online identifiers in
person every six months, and the legislature grants sheriffs the authority to require
these in-person verifications even more regularly. N.C.G.S. § 14-208.9A. Offenders
must weigh some of their online speech against the requirement to disclose new or
changed online identifiers within ten days, but where offenders already report in
person on a regular basis to disclose or verify other information, the inconvenience
imposed is not unduly onerous, nor is it unjustified. Less frequent reporting would
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foreseeably create loopholes benefiting online offenders and erecting obstacles to
more diligent online monitoring.
Importantly, the internet is not the only place a person can express views
anonymously. The offender may be deterred from making some anonymous online
speech, but the First Amendment protects a huge bundle of speech rights. He can
create a Substack account for his anonymous blog, but if he is deterred from doing so
due to the possibility that a citizen who requests online identifiers will someday cross-
check his username against his disclosed registration packet, this does not mean the
public can never hear his speech. Newspapers often publish anonymous op-eds,
lawful protesters often wear masks nowadays, and the Supreme Court has extensive
jurisprudential history protecting the right to distribute anonymous handbills and
campaign materials or retain anonymity while canvassing door-to-door. See generally
Talley v. California, 361 U.S. 60 (1960); McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334; Watchtower Bible
and Tract Soc’y of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002). Even
assuming arguendo the implausible hypothetical that, because of these reporting
requirements, all offenders are always deterred from making any online anonymous
speech, they nonetheless retain every anonymous “alternative channel of
communication” that continues alongside the internet.
ii. Statutory Construction
Second, the State counsels us to apply a narrowing construction of the
definition for “online identifier.” The statute reads: “Email address, instant message
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screen name, user ID, chat or other internet communication name, but it does not
mean social security number, date of birth, or pin number.” Id. § 14-208.6(1n). The
State claims that the statute “targets online identifiers associated with accounts like
email or instant messaging that allow for private, person-to-person communication”
i.e. usernames for platforms by which offenders are most likely to recidivate.
Although the State admits that the term “user ID” does not necessarily encompass
only such online accounts, it counsels that we should apply the noscitur a sociis canon,
construing “user ID” in the context of “email address,” “instant message screen
name,” and “chat or other internet communication name” such that the requirement
“focus[es] on identifiers that enable private, person-to-person communications.” We
should apply this narrow construction, the State argues, because “user ID” is “a
general phrase [that] can be given a more focused meaning by the terms linked to it.”
Fischer v. United States, 603 U.S. 480, 488 (2024).
But in statutory interpretation, we always begin by reading the plain language
before we apply such canons of construction. We always “presume that the means
employed by the Legislature to express its will are adequate to the purpose and do
express that will correctly.” State v. Barco, 150 N.C. 792, 796 (1909) (cleaned up).
Therefore, we may not “interpret what has no need of interpretation and, when the
words have a definite and precise meaning, [we cannot] go elsewhere in search of
conjecture in order to restrict or extend the meaning.” Id. (cleaned up). “The primary
objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the legislature.”
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First Bank v. S & R Grandview, L.L.C., 232 N.C. App. 544, 546 (2014) (internal
citations omitted). “[W]e first examine the plain words of the statute because the text
of the statute is the best indicia of legislative intent.” Sturdivant v. N.C. Dep’t of Pub.
Safety, 386 N.C. 939, 944 (2024) (cleaned up). “If the plain language of the statute is
unambiguous, we apply the statute as written.” Id. (cleaned up).
Any time the legislature explicitly sets out definitions for its terms, we must
respect them as “virtually conclusive.” Happel v. Guilford Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 387
N.C. 186, 208 (2025) (quotes omitted); accord Sturdivant, 386 N.C. at 947 (“[I]t would
be quite abnormal for the General Assembly to define a term and then decline to use
that definition . . . . Doing so undermines the very reason that the General Assembly
would add a statutory definition in the first place.”). Undefined words of a statute
will be given their natural, approved, and recognized meaning. Black v. Littlejohn,
312 N.C. 626, 638 (1985) (citing In Re Appeal of Martin, 286 N.C. 66 (1974)); accord
In re Clayton-Marcus Co., 286 N.C. 215, 219 (1974) (Undefined words “must be given
their common and ordinary meaning.”). To determine the intended meaning of the
language, courts may resort to dictionaries to determine definitions of undefined
words within statutes. Id. at 638.
Here, we seek the plain meaning of the undefined word “user ID” within a
definition statute. Cambridge Business English Dictionary defines
“username . . . (also user ID)” as “a name or other information that you enter, usually
with a password . . . in order to use a computer system, website, etc.” Username,
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CAMBRIDGE BUSINESS ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1st ed. 2011). This definition is indeed
broad, but we agree that it is the common, ordinary, plain, and unambiguous meaning
of the term “user ID.”
Additional principles of statutory interpretation underline this broad
interpretation. We always seek to interpret the meaning intended upon the statute’s
enactment. State v. Rankin, 371 N.C. 885, 889 (2018). And because this is a statute
imposing affirmative obligations and criminal penalties, we must construe the
statute “with regard to the evil which it is intended to suppress.” In re Banks, 295
N.C. 236, 238 (1978); accord O&M Indus. v. Smith Eng’g Co., 360 N.C. 263, 268 (2006)
(We “consider the policy objectives prompting passage of the statute and should avoid
a construction which defeats or impairs [its] purpose. . . . A remedial statute must be
construed broadly in the light of the evils sought to be eliminated, the remedies
intended to be applied, and the objective to be attained.” (cleaned up)).
The Legislature enacted this statute to remedy “lack of information available
to law enforcement agencies about convicted offenders” by requiring those offenders
to register, requiring agencies to exchange registration information, and by
authorizing access for “others” to whatever information is “necessary and relevant.”
N.C.G.S. § 14-208.5. The Legislature of 1995 was no more able to reliably predict the
coming of social media and the iPhone than the Founders were able to predict
penicillin and commercial space travel. Their stated purpose and the statutory
language used are both broad and therefore prudent. Requiring offenders to only
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report their usernames on more specific categories of websites or platforms would
have required knowing exactly what type of platforms would arise in the distant
future, or which types of platforms would evolve and become more useful to offenders.
We also lack a crystal ball. Accordingly, we will not adjust the meaning of an
unambiguous term to correspond with present understandings. That is the
Legislature’s prerogative, not ours.
Defendant is correct that the statute reaches beyond the principal evil
legislators intended or expected to address, but “the fact that a statute is applied in
situations not expressly anticipated does not demonstrate ambiguity; instead, it
simply demonstrates the breadth of a legislative command.” Bostock v. Clayton Cnty.,
Ga., 590 U.S. 644, 674 (2020) (internal quotes removed) (cleaned up). Presuming that
the Legislature carefully chose “user ID” for its prognosticative generality, we will
not narrow our construction and limit enforcement to usernames on platforms meant
for user-to-user messaging.
Reading the rest of the definition for “online identifiers” only confirms this
holding. The State asks us to apply noscitur a sociis using the words “or other
internet communication name” but overlooks the words that follow: “but it does not
mean social security number, date of birth, or pin number.” N.C.G.S. § 14-208.6(1n).
We must “give every word of the statute effect, presuming that the legislature
carefully chose each word used.” N.C. Dep’t of Corr. v. N.C. Med. Bd., 363 N.C. 189,
201 (2009). Had the Legislature not intended the preceding words of the definition
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to be read broadly, it would not have deemed it necessary to expressly include three
highly specific exceptions.
Finally, we note that offenders must report only one’s current online
identifiers. This means that any names used to speak online in the past are not
covered, and that speech is unaffected. On the other hand, it is somewhat ironic that
offenders must report any alias they have been known by in the real world,
presumably including aliases under which they exercised their speech rights. And
though these aliases are widely available on the online registry, only online
identifiers are challenged in the instant case.
iii. Public Release of Online Identifiers is Properly Circumscribed
The State’s third argument discusses the public disclosure provisions, which it
argues confirm the reporting requirement’s narrow tailoring. The State points out
that the online identifiers are only disclosed to members of the public in a separate
time and place from offenders’ anonymous online speech, either on an individual’s
written request or to protect the public from a specific offender, and argues that these
public disclosures are “precisely targeted to the State’s public safety interests” and
“empower the public, if it wishes, to make the informed decision” to avoid interacting
with offenders online. Further, disclosure to the private companies who apply for
access to the online identifiers is integral to their statutory obligation to report user
complaints about child pornography and soliciting minors.
First, use of online identifiers by law enforcement and their release to private
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companies, such as social media apps, is essential to the ongoing communication and
information-gathering that protects minors online. The Legislature also established
clear standards forbidding disclosure to entities for “any purpose other than for
prescreening its users or comparing the database of registered users . . . against the
list of online identifiers[.]” N.C.G.S. § 14-208.15A(d). In setting a restricted
disclosure framework while simultaneously serving the public’s interest in online
safety, the statutes releasing online identifiers to law enforcement and private
entities easily pass intermediate scrutiny.
The public disclosure provisions pose a closer question, but we are satisfied
that their narrow tailoring allows for sufficiently limited unconstitutional
application. The public has free access to offenders’ other registration information,
including their home addresses, conviction offenses, and a recent photograph. Online
identifiers are never published on the state’s sex offender registry website. If a
member of the public wants an offender’s online identifiers, they must request in
writing the registration information of either a specific individual offender or the
entire state registry, which contains approximately 25,000 offenders. And to ensure
one’s database of online identifiers is entirely up to date, one must make a new
written request at least once every ten days. The sheriff may charge the costs of
duplication and shipping.
Clearly, the time, effort, and cost required for a member of the public to
maintain a full and current database of offenders’ online identifiers is not negligible.
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Further, the amount of online identifiers involved is overwhelming. If this civilian
database actually deterred an offender from making protected anonymous online
speech, the offender would have to presume that its keeper constantly and repeatedly
searches tens of thousands of identifiers to indiscriminately monitor or expose
offenders. Accordingly, such an unlikely scenario has little effect on our analysis.
The relevant provision need not be more narrowly tailored in light of this hypothetical
deterrence.
In the case of public requests for individual offenders’ registration materials,
other considerations come into play. One can easily understand why individual
requests are in the public interest. An offender’s previous victim may want her
abuser’s online identifiers to know if he contacts her under another name. A parent
may search the online registry for offenders in her neighborhood and wish to know
their online identifiers out of an abundance of caution. Those who run youth
programs, camps, or local sports leagues may want to maintain situational awareness
in case a local offender tries to enter their communities’ associated Facebook groups.
And if someone believes an offender is already stalking or grooming their child online,
confirming his online identifiers will help protect the child and preserve evidence.
People have every right to make informed choices about their online activity.
Wherever it is proper and constitutional for law enforcement and the public to
exchange information to prevent sex offenses, the State has an affirmative duty to
make it possible. Accordingly, these public interests are essential to our analysis.
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We are satisfied that public release of individual offenders’ materials on
written request is narrowly tailored. Importantly, the statute provides that the
public may write to request a specific offender’s online identifiers, but not vice versa:
one cannot inquire whether a specific online identifier is associated with an offender.
Therefore, the statute only unmasks an offender’s protected anonymous online speech
to members of the public who request either the whole database or the specific
individual’s file. It never allows someone who takes issue with the online speech to
find out whether the person behind the username has a criminal history. When
someone requests an individual offender’s file, it is very likely because she already
has reason to believe the offender poses risks to her own safety or the safety of those
towards whom she owes a duty of care. In relation to the offender’s speech rights, the
public release provisions allow for transparency “to inform the public for its own
safety,” not as a “scheme forcing an offender to appear in public with some visible
badge of past criminality” when he speaks anonymously. Smith, 538 U.S. at 99
(2003). Accordingly, this provision is sufficiently narrowly tailored.
Otherwise, an online identifier is only released when the sheriff or DPS deems
disclosure necessary to protect the public from an individual offender. It was sensible
for the Legislature to grant law enforcement discretion on the question, rather than
impose a limiting principle. Because these statutes cover such a wide variety of
reportable convictions and offenders, it is reasonable that certain provisions in the
reporting requirements accord discretion and deference to law enforcement as they
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respond in individual circumstances. The public release provision is no exception. As
we discussed above, such disclosure may not be strictly necessary to public safety in
every individual instance and would thereby incur constitutional scrutiny. But we
are unconvinced that this provision must be narrowed by a limiting principle where
public release of online identifiers is already so circumscribed.
4. The Statutory Scheme is Narrowly Tailored
In furthering law enforcement’s information gathering for sex crime
prevention, the requirements as to online identifiers cover neither too much activity
nor too many offenders, and the associated public disclosure provisions impose
sufficient limits on release. The statutes impose no speech restrictions, preferring
instead to deter recidivist online conduct by mandating regular disclosures. This may
incidentally burden some speech activity, but this possible encroachment is
insufficient to override other relevant public interests, and it does not establish that
the Legislature failed to narrowly tailor its requirements. It is not our role to
determine whether this was the best regulatory method to confront this challenge,
and the First Amendment does not require the Legislature to choose the least
restrictive method available. In these analyses, where the Legislature has balanced
competing interests and struck a workable compromise, we show their solutions
ample deference.
Therefore, we are satisfied that the reporting requirements are facially
constitutional. Defendant did not bring an as-applied challenge here, and any such
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case would pose a different set of questions which we do not answer here.
III. Conclusion
For the above reasons, we find no error and affirm defendant’s conviction.
NO ERROR.
Judge WOOD concurs.
Judge GRIFFIN concurs in the result.
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