State v. . Sinodis

127 S.E. 601, 189 N.C. 565, 1925 N.C. LEXIS 355
CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina
DecidedApril 29, 1925
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 127 S.E. 601 (State v. . Sinodis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. . Sinodis, 127 S.E. 601, 189 N.C. 565, 1925 N.C. LEXIS 355 (N.C. 1925).

Opinion

The defendants, Cornelius Sinodis, Tony Alfonzo, Nick Zrakas and Minnie Alfonzo, were indicted for a violation of the prostitution statutes.

The jury convicted three of the defendants, Cornelius Sinodis, Nick Zrakas and Tony Alfonzo, and rendered a verdict of not guilty as to the defendant Minnie Alfonzo, and the sentence of the court was that the three defendants named be confined in jail for a term of six months each to be assigned to work on the roads of Wake County. The defendants, Cornelius Sinodis, Tony Alfonzo and Nick Zrakas, excepted, assigned errors and appealed to the Supreme Court. Cornelius Sinodis, Nick Zrakas and Tony Alfonzo, were, at September Term, 1924, of Wake Superior Court, convicted of aiding and abetting in prostitution at the Raleigh Cafe.

The defendants were indicted under separate bills, but by consent, the cases were tried together.

The bills of indictment against the defendants were drawn under C. S., as follows:

C. S., 4357. "The term `prostitution' shall be construed to include the offering or receiving of the body for sexual intercourse for hire, and shall also be construed to include the offering or receiving of the body for indiscriminate sexual intercourse without hire. The term `assignation' shall be construed to include the making of any appointment or engagement for prostitution or any act in furtherance of such appointment or engagement."

C. S., 4358. "It shall be unlawful:

1. To keep, set up, maintain, or operate any place, structure, building or conveyance for the purpose of prostitution or assignation.

2. To occupy any place, structure, building, or conveyance for the purpose of prostitution or assignation; or for any person to permit any place, structure, building or conveyance owned by him or under his control to be used for the purpose of prostitution or assignation, with knowledge or reasonable cause to know that the same is, or is to be, used for such purpose.

3. To receive, or to offer or agree to receive any person into any place, structure, building, or conveyance for the purpose of prostitution or assignation, or to permit any person to remain there for such purpose. *Page 567

4. To direct, take, or transport, or to offer or agree to take or transport, any person to any place, structure, or building or to any other person, with knowledge or reasonable cause to know that the purpose of such directing, taking or transporting is prostitution or assignation.

5. To procure, or to solicit, or to offer to procure or solicit for the purpose of prostitution or assignation.

6. To reside in, enter, or remain in any place, structure, or building, or to enter or remain in any conveyance, for the purpose of prostitution or assignation.

7. To engage in prostitution or assignation, or to aid or abet prostitution or assignation by any means whatsoever."

At the close of the State's evidence defendants made the motion as of nonsuit. The court reserved its ruling, but later refused the motion. The motion was again made at the close of all the evidence, and again denied by the court.

"On a motion to nonsuit, the evidence is to be taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, and he is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable intendment upon the evidence and every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom. Christman v. Hilliard, 167 N.C. 6; Oil Co. v. Hunt,187 N.C. 157; Hanes v. Utilities Co., 188 N.C. 465." Lindsey v. LumberCo., ante, 119.

Evidence of a crime may be circumstantial as well as direct. Prostitution is an offense usually committed in secret, and sometimes circumstantial evidence is the only kind that can be obtained. It is sufficient to show facts and circumstances from which the jury may reasonably infer the guilt of the parties. State v. Eliason, 91 N.C. 564. From the facts and circumstances, it is a substantial right that the jury must be satisfied of the guilt of the defendants beyond a reasonable doubt.State v. Palmore, ante, 538.

All the convicted defendants rely chiefly on the lack of sufficient evidence to go to the jury to warrant a conviction and that the motion of nonsuit should have been granted. Nick Zrakas also seriously contends that there was error in the charge of the court as to him and he should be granted a new trial. A discussion of the evidence to determine its sufficiency under such motion, therefore, becomes necessary.

The three defendants were engaged in running the Raleigh Cafe, which included an eating house below and rooms for lodgers above, in a building on Martin Street in Raleigh. Each has a one-third interest in the business. Zrakas says: "I keep the books and buy the stuff and look after the cafe and dining room. I work there all the time." He had bought into the business about four months before. The other two had been there some time before. *Page 568

C. S., 4347 and 4360, deals with the reputation of a place.

C. S., 4347. "On a prosecution in any court for keeping a disorderly house or bawdy-house, or permitting a house to be used as a bawdy-house, or used in such a way as to make it disorderly, or a common nuisance, evidence of the general reputation or character of the house shall be admissible and competent; and evidence of the lewd, dissolute and boisterous conversation of the inmates and frequenters, while in and around such house, shall be prima facie evidence of the bad character of the inmates and frequenters, and of the disorderly character of the house. The manager or person having the care, superintendency or government of a disorderly house or bawdy-house is the `keeper' thereof, and one who employs another to manage and conduct a disorderly house or bawdy-house is also `keeper' thereof."

C. S., 4360. "In the trial of any person charged with a violation of any of the provisions of this article, testimony of a prior conviction, or testimony concerning the reputation of any place, structure, or building, and of the person or persons who reside in or frequent the same, and of the defendant, shall be admissible in evidence in support of the charge."

The record discloses conditions which must have put an owner of the business on notice as to what was going on. The statute is directed against one who permits a building to be so used "with knowledge or reasonable cause to know that the same is, or is to be, used for such purpose." C. S., 4358, latter part subsec. 2.

Margaret King testified that she went to the cafe on the first of May and stayed until this trouble came up. At another place she said: "I was there for thirty days." She was not at work. She says: "Neal (Sinodis) would say, `There's a fellow out there who wants a date.' There was nothing to keep him from knowing what I went for. He would come and tell me there were men who wanted to go out riding, and if I saw fit to go, I went. You could hear most any kind of language in there. I have heard cursing and profanity going on in there. They would use it before anyone who would be in there, women and others. I have never heard any other language in there other than cursing and profanity. I went on just like I pleased, and I saw the rest doing the same. I have been in the back part of the cafe and seen people drinking in there."

Jackie Mays testified that she had a room at the cafe. "I had dates with men and others for immoral purposes. Neal would tell me there were young men who wanted to go riding, and if I wanted to go, I went.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
127 S.E. 601, 189 N.C. 565, 1925 N.C. LEXIS 355, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-sinodis-nc-1925.