State v. Singleton

2025 Ohio 1735

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 15, 2025
• Docket: 114336
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Singleton, 2025-Ohio-1735.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 114336 v. :

LEENEJA SINGLETON :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 15, 2025

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-22-668484-B

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Owen Knapp, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Susan J. Moran, for appellant. SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:

Lee’neja Singleton1 appeals the denial of a petition for

postconviction relief filed under R.C. 2953.21, in which she makes two claims: that

her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during her trial, or in the

alternative, that prosecutorial misconduct caused Singleton’s sister to falsely

testify at that trial. Because both of her claims could have been raised during the

direct appeal, the trial court did not err in denying the petition without conducting

a hearing. Accordingly, and based on the following, we affirm.

The facts of this case were thoroughly related in Singleton’s direct

appeal from her convictions for improper discharge into a habitation and felonious

assault. State v. Singleton, 2024-Ohio-465, ¶ 2-21 (8th Dist.). For this appeal, it

suffices to know that after getting into a physical and verbal altercation with a long-

time friend at a bar, Singleton and her sister Raneka confronted the friend and two

others at their home to continue the hostilities. The victims believed Singleton to

be armed at the time, and indeed, the victims witnessed Singleton fire a single shot

at the victims. The bullet entered a second-story window of the house, behind

where the victims were standing. Those events were memorialized on a doorbell

surveillance camera. The jury found Singleton guilty of the wrongful discharge and

three felonious assault counts, one for each named victim, along with several

1 The indictment spells Singleton’s first name differently from that which appears

in her affidavit and briefing, meaning the case is captioned as “Leeneja Singleton.” Neither party has identified any issues with the spelling of her name. attendant firearm specifications. The firearm specifications alone led to a

mandatory term of 11 years. The trial court then imposed concurrent two-year

terms on the underlying counts, resulting in the minimum aggregate prison term

of 13-14 years in consideration of an indefinite sentence under R.C. 2929.144. Id.

at ¶ 21.

It is important to note that Singleton declined the State’s pretrial

offer to amend the indictment to improper discharge and attempted felonious

assault, both second-degree felonies, with only a single three-year firearm

specification. The plea offer would have had the effect of reducing the minimum

prison term available to a five- to six-year indefinite term.

Following an unsuccessful direct appeal, Singleton filed a timely

petition for postconviction relief claiming that her trial attorneys rendered

ineffective assistance by (1) failing to share the video evidence before trial; (2)

failing to explain the mandatory minimum sentence created by the firearm

specifications; and (3) failing to call her mother as a witness to testify that she

never saw Singleton with a firearm on the night in question. Singleton also claims

that the prosecutor improperly forced Raneka to testify against Singleton in

exchange for a guilty plea, and to prove that, Singleton provided an affidavit in

which Raneka “recanted” her testimony regarding whether Singleton was armed

on the night of the shooting. Singleton ignores the very large elephant in the room. All of her

arguments were apparent from the record of the proceedings and, therefore, could

have been raised in her direct appeal.

A petition for postconviction relief is a creature of statute. It is “‘a civil

collateral attack on a criminal judgment, in which the petitioner may present

constitutional issues to the court that would otherwise be impossible to review

because the evidence supporting the issues is not contained in the record of the

petitioner’s criminal conviction.’” State v. Curry, 2019-Ohio-5338, ¶ 12, quoting

State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279, 281 (1999), and State v. Carter, 2013-Ohio-

4058, ¶ 15 (10th Dist.). “[C]ourts are not required to hold a hearing in every

postconviction case.” (Citations omitted.) State ex rel. Madsen v. Jones, 2005-

Ohio-4381, ¶ 10. Before granting a hearing on a petition for postconviction relief,

“the court shall determine whether there are substantive grounds for relief.”

R.C. 2953.21(D). “In making such a determination, the court shall consider, in

addition to the petition, the supporting affidavits, and the documentary evidence,

all the files and records pertaining to the proceedings against the petitioner . . . .”

(Emphasis added.) Id.

A trial court’s ruling on a petition for postconviction relief is reviewed

for abuse of discretion. Curry at ¶ 15, citing State v. Gondor, 2006-Ohio-6679, ¶ 45.

“The trial court does not abuse its discretion in dismissing a petition without a

hearing if (1) the petitioner fails to set out sufficient operative facts to establish

substantive grounds for relief, or (2) the operation of res judicata prohibits the claims made in the petition.” Id., citing State v. Abdussatar, 2009-Ohio-5232, ¶ 15

(8th Dist.). This appeal focuses on the latter.

A trial court reviewing a petition for postconviction relief may not

grant relief based on a claim that could have been presented at trial or raised on

direct appeal. State v. Blanton, 2022-Ohio-3985, ¶ 2, citing State v. Perry, 10 Ohio

St.2d 175, 180 (1967); State v. Cole, 2 Ohio St.3d 112, 114 (1982) (res judicata

precludes relief under a petition for postconviction relief unless the petitioner can

demonstrate that the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim solely depends on

evidence outside of the record). There are two notable, but ultimately inapplicable,

exceptions: (1) if counsel in the direct appeal represented the petitioner at trial, or

(2) if the petitioner must rely on evidence outside the record to prove the ineffective-

assistance-of-counsel claim. Id., citing Cole at 113-114. According to the record,

Singleton’s trial counsel did not represent her in the direct appeal. See Singleton,

2024-Ohio-465.

As to the only other arguable exception to res judicata, evidence

outside the record, Singleton largely glosses over the record of the trial court

proceeding. The transcript includes several on-the-record discussions pertaining to

her ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, which focus on the alleged failure of

counsel to share discovery videos with Singleton, to explain the ramifications of the

potential terms on the firearm specifications, or to call an alibi witness.

The only constitutional claim that can be gleaned from Singleton’s

postconviction arguments pertaining to her trial attorneys’ mistakes is ineffective assistance of counsel. A trial counsel can be deemed ineffective when, aware of a

plea offer, they either fail to inform the client of the offer or encourage the client to

reject the offer based on incorrect advice. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 145 (2012).

Thus, Singleton must demonstrate that but for the erroneous advice or failure to

share anticipated evidence, she would have accepted the plea offer.

In this case, however, the trial court discussed the failure of

Singleton’s counsel to review the video evidence with Singleton. Tr. 148:6-154:15.

Singleton’s trial counsel both conceded that Singleton had not been shown the

videos before the trial commenced — and after she had rejected the State’s plea offer.

Tr. 242:5-10. Upon hearing that concession, the trial court directed the attorneys to

provide Singleton with the opportunity to preview the videos the night before

opening arguments. Tr. 274:9-21. Upon returning to the record the following

morning, Singleton was again asked about the State’s plea offer in light of the

anticipated trial evidence. Her counsel indicated that the evidence was shared with

Singleton, and the trial proceeded. Tr. 276:4-9. Singleton has presented no

evidence outside the record necessary to resolve the arguments presented in this

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Any issues with respect to the State’s video

evidence and Singleton’s trial attorneys’ handling of that evidence are apparent from

the record. That issue could have been challenged in her direct appeal based on the

trial record.

Along those same lines, Singleton claims that her counsel was

ineffective for failing to advise her of the mandatory minimum, which is created by the statutory imposition of consecutive sentences for the firearm specifications.

According to her, that information would have better informed her plea decision.

Singleton’s claim that her counsel failed to properly advise her, however, is directly

refuted by the record.2 During a pretrial conference, Singleton expressly

acknowledged that her attorneys advised her of the mandatory nature of the lengthy

potential sentence based on the firearm specifications. Tr. 31:11-33:8. Then, for at

least the second time, before bringing the jury in for opening statements, the trial

court discussed the mandatory minimum sentence with Singleton. Tr. 276:22-

279:17. Singleton, once again, acknowledged that she understood the consequences

should the jury find her guilty of more than one of the counts with specifications.

Tr. 279:9-17. Any claims that her attorneys failed to disclose the ramifications of a

guilty verdict with respect to the mandatory terms on the firearm specifications are

directly contradicted by the record. Those claims, therefore, cannot form the basis

of granting postconviction relief.

As to the remainder of the ineffective-assistance claim, Singleton

claims her trial counsel should have called her mother, identified in the petition for

postconviction relief as Carol Singleton, to testify at trial. According to her affidavit

attached to the petition, Singleton’s mother would have testified that she never saw

2 Singleton attached a self-serving affidavit to her petition for postconviction relief;

however, that affidavit does not appear to have been properly notarized. Ma v. Gomez, 2023-Ohio-524, ¶ 3, fn. 1 (8th Dist.) (detailing the requirements for affidavits under Ohio law). The notarization occurred “via phone confirmation.” The State has not challenged the affidavit, so the issue is simply noted. Singleton with a firearm on the evening in question. This, despite the fact that her

mother was not present during the shooting or the altercation at the bar. The

mother’s statement, however, is not new information. Before trial, Singleton filed a

“notice of alibi” indicating her intent to call her mother to testify that Singleton was

at her house at the time of the shooting. In that notice, the alibi was identified as

“Carolyn” Singleton but was noted to be Singleton’s mother. Twice, the trial court

noted that Singleton’s mother was a potential witness. Tr. 41:20-22; 253:17-19.

Despite being identified as an alibi witness, Singleton’s mother never testified.

We can only hazard a guess as to why her mother was not called at

trial; however, the mother’s anticipated testimony is apparent from the record — she

would have vouched for her daughter’s innocence based on the notice of alibi filed.

In this situation, trial counsel’s decision to call or not call a witness at trial can be

directly appealed. See, e.g., State v. Vargas, 2012-Ohio-2767, ¶ 14-15 (8th Dist.)

(determining in the direct appeal that “[t]rial tactics and strategies do not constitute

a denial of effective assistance of counsel”), citing State v. Gooden, 2007-Ohio-2371,

¶ 38, and State v. Clayton, 62 Ohio St.2d 45 (1980); State v. Torres, 2022-Ohio-

3230, ¶ 31 (8th Dist.) (“‘In order to obtain a reversal on ineffective assistance of

counsel based on a failure to subpoena a witness, a defendant must demonstrate

that the testimony of the witness would be of significant assistance to the defense’”;

and because of the undisputed evidence that defendant was at the scene of the crime,

no alibi evidence would have altered the outcome of trial), quoting State v. Varner,

1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 4707 (5th Dist. Sept. 14, 1998). Because Singleton could have included in her direct appeal an assigned error with respect to the failure to call an

alibi witness when video evidence demonstrated her presence at the scene with a

firearm, that claim is precluded from forming the basis of postconviction relief.

Blanton, 2022-Ohio-3985, at ¶ 2, citing Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d at 180.

And finally, Singleton claims that Raneka’s testimony against her was

procured through prosecutorial misconduct because, according to Singleton,

Raneka was forced to testify to an untruth. Allegations of prosecutorial misconduct

implicate due-process concerns, but “[t]he touchstone of the analysis ‘is the fairness

of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.’” State v. Jones, 2012-Ohio-5677,

¶ 200, quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982). Singleton’s argument,

alleging ethical improprieties with the prosecutor’s conduct, is specious at best.

During trial, Raneka immediately backtracked from what the State

anticipated to be her testimony, that she knew Singleton was armed on the night of

the shooting. The State sought to declare her a hostile witness, but before the trial

court entertained that request, presumably in fear of jeopardizing Raneka’s plea deal

with the State, Raneka was given the opportunity to consult with her attorney.

Raneka’s counsel was present throughout Raneka’s testimony and the off-the-

record discussions with the State. Tr. 440:1–443:19. It was Raneka’s counsel who

recommended that she be given the opportunity to review her pretrial statements

before her testimony continued and included the inculpatory statements. Id.

Despite this opportunity and her direct testimony implicating

Singleton, Raneka expressly testified on cross-examination that her incriminating statements were untrue and she felt pressured by the weight of her own case to

testify otherwise. Tr. 458:10–459:8. Raneka has since served the imposed sentence

for her part in the shooting. Her latest affidavit attempting to claim that her

testimony was untruthful and a product of prosecutorial misconduct, which

according to the trial record would have occurred in front of Raneka’s counsel,

presents no new information. Instead, Raneka’s latest affidavit presents the same

testimony that was considered by the jury at Singleton’s trial. Any issues with

Raneka’s testimony are apparent from the record and immaterial, in light of the fact

that the jury heard that testimony at trial. Blanton, 2022-Ohio-3985, at ¶ 2, citing

Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d at 180.

In this appeal, Singleton has not addressed the trial court’s conclusion

that all of the claims presented in the petition for postconviction relief are barred by

the doctrine of res judicata or are otherwise immaterial to her guilt. Instead, she

vaguely claims some of the issues are outside the trial record, without expressly

identifying any issue not addressed by the transcript of the lower court proceedings.

“‘It is the duty of the appellant, not [an appellate court], to demonstrate [an]

assigned error through an argument that is supported by citations to legal authority

and facts in the record.’” Russo v. Gissinger, 2023-Ohio-200, ¶ 28 (9th Dist.),

quoting State v. Taylor, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 397, *3 (9th Dist. Feb. 9, 1999); see

also State v. Quarterman, 2014-Ohio-4034, ¶ 19, citing State v. Bodyke, 2010-Ohio-

2424, ¶ 78 (O’Donnell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In light of the

limitations with the arguments as presented, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in denying the petition for postconviction relief. See State v.

Lester, 41 Ohio St.2d 51, 55 (1975) (“If the trial court finds, on the facts of a case, that

a petitioner’s claim was fully litigated at trial or upon appeal, or that the claim could

have been fully litigated in an appeal, the court can summarily dismiss the claim as

barred by res judicata.”).

One final note, Singleton’s argument lamenting the length of the

mandatory sentence as compared to the fleeting nature of the act underlying her

convictions is acknowledged. It can indeed be unfortunate that a single, momentary

lapse in sensibility3 by a first-time offender has led to such a lengthy sentence, but

the legislature has established severe penalties for discharging firearms into

habitations. Couple that with the fact that Singleton simultaneously threatened

three individuals, with each of those offenses tied to additional enhancements, and

the majority of the imposed sentence is mandated by operation of law. Perhaps in

hindsight, a plea deal may have been the more reasoned course in light of the

overwhelming evidence of Singleton’s guilt, but at this stage, Singleton’s sentence is

beyond the reach of any court and has no bearing on the constitutional questions

raised in a petition for postconviction relief.

In light of the trial record and the arguments raised, the claims for

relief advanced in Singleton’s petition for postconviction relief are barred by the

doctrine of res judicata. We affirm.

3 Albeit, this was a huge lapse in judgment. It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

_______________________ SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J., and ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., CONCUR