State v. Siler

2026 Ohio 130

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: January 15, 2026
• Docket: 25 CAA 07 0053
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Siler, 2026-Ohio-130.]

COURT OF APPEALS DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO Case No. 25 CAA 07 0053

Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry

-vs- Appeal from the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 24 CR I 10 GERALD SILER 0603

Defendant – Appellant Judgment: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry:January 15, 2026

BEFORE: CRAIG R. BALDWIN, P.J., ROBERT G. MONTGOMERY, J., KEVIN W. POPHAM, J., Appellate Judges

APPEARANCES: KATE MUNGER for Plaintiff-Appellee; APRIL F. CAMPBELL for Defendant-Appellant

OPINION

Popham, J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Gerald Siler (“Siler”) appeals from his conviction and

sentence following a jury trial in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas. For the

reasons noted below, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶2} On October 17, 2024, the Delaware County Grand Jury indicted Siler on

two counts of operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs (“OVI”), both

felonies of the fourth degree. One count alleged a violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) and

(G)(1)(d), asserting that Siler operated a vehicle while under the influence after three prior OVI convictions. The second count alleged a violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(2)(a), (A)(2)(b),

and (G)(1)(d), asserting that Siler refused to submit to a chemical test within ten years of

a prior OVI offense.

{¶3} The evidence presented at trial established the following.

{¶4} On April 13, 2024, between 10:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m., Teresa Garrett

observed a vehicle in a cornfield across from her residence on State Route 229 in Ashley,

Delaware County, Ohio1. 1T. at 149-150. The vehicle was several car lengths off the

roadway, its lights were illuminated, and an individual appeared to be inside. Id. Garrett

testified that she reported the vehicle to law enforcement using the non-emergency line.

Id. at 151.

{¶5} Sergeant Darius Patterson of the Ohio State Highway Patrol testified that,

at approximately 10:30 p.m., he was dispatched to a reported single-vehicle crash on

State Route 229 near Strine Road. 1T. at 158-159. Dispatch advised that the vehicle had

left the roadway and that the driver might be intoxicated. Id. Sergeant Patterson testified

that he arrived at the scene at approximately 10:55 p.m. and observed a vehicle in a

muddy field and Siler standing outside, removing items from the vehicle. 1T. at 160. The

encounter was recorded on Sergeant Patterson’s body-worn camera. State’s Exhibit 1.

{¶6} Siler told Sergeant Patterson that he had been texting while driving. 1T. at

161. Sergeant Patterson detected a strong odor of alcohol emanating from Siler,

observed glassy and bloodshot eyes, and noted that Siler briefly lost his balance while

attempting to remove mud from his shoes. 1T. at 168-172. Sergeant Patterson testified

that Siler made inconsistent statements regarding his direction of travel, destination, and

1 For clarity, the transcript of Siler’s jury trial will be referred to as “__T.__” signifying the volume

and page number. an alleged friend who was coming to assist. 1T. at 173. Sergeant Patterson further

testified that Siler believed he was on Route 29 rather than Route 229.

{¶7} In light of these observations, Sergeant Patterson requested that Siler

perform field sobriety tests. Siler refused. 1T. at 172. Based on the totality of the

circumstances, Sergeant Patterson placed Siler under arrest. Id. at 174.

{¶8} A search of a bag that Siler acknowledged belonged to him revealed an

open container of a “BuzzBall Cocktail” containing a small amount of liquid. 1T. at 175. A

tow truck was summoned to remove the vehicle from the scene.

{¶9} Sergeant Patterson advised Siler of the consequences of submitting to or

refusing a breath test by reading the BMV-2255 form in the presence of the tow truck

driver. 1T. at 176. Siler refused to sign the form, and Sergeant Patterson marked the

refusal. After completing the crash report, Sergeant Patterson transported Siler to the

Highway Patrol Post. Id. at 178.

{¶10} Sergeant Patterson testified that, at the post, Siler refused to submit to a

breath test. 1T. at 186-187. Sergeant Patterson then sought and obtained a warrant

authorizing a blood draw based on the indicators of impairment observed at the scene.

Id. at 187. Sergeant Patterson transported Siler to Grady Memorial Hospital to execute

the warrant.

{¶11} Despite the existence of a warrant, Siler resisted the blood draw. 1T. at 190-

191. Dasha Semenchuk, a phlebotomist, collected the blood sample using an Ohio State

Highway Patrol-issued kit. 1T. at 233-234. Semenchuk testified that she documented the

collection at 3:08 a.m. and transferred custody of the sample to Sergeant Patterson at 3:12 a.m. 1T. at 195, 234; State’s Exhibit 12. Semenchuk testified that she could not recall

whether she inverted the sample after collection. 1T. at 237-238.

{¶12} Sergeant Patterson transported the sealed specimen to the Franklin County

Post of the Ohio State Highway Patrol, completed the required documentation, and

mailed the sample to the Ohio State Highway Patrol Crime Lab using first-class tracked

mail at approximately 6:10 a.m. on April 14, 2024. 1T. at 195. The Ohio State Highway

Patrol Crime Lab received the sealed kit on April 16, 2024, at 12:42 p.m. 2T. at 265-266.

The sample was in the analyst’s possession for testing by April 19, 2024. Id.

{¶13} Latisha Pipes, a criminalist with the Ohio State Highway Patrol Crime Lab,

testified that she performed the toxicological analysis of Siler’s blood sample. The results

reflected a blood alcohol concentration of 0.135 grams per one hundred milliliters of whole

blood at the time of the draw, plus or minus 0.009 grams. 2T. at 266.

{¶14} The State also presented expert testimony from Robert G. Topmiller of the

Hamilton County Coroner’s Office2. 2T. at 317. Topmiller prepared a report admitted as

State’s Exhibit 15. Id. at 331. In forming his opinion, Topmiller assumed that alcohol

absorption had ceased by 10:28 p.m. and that Siler consumed no alcohol after 10:48 p.m.

2T. at 338. Based on those assumptions, Topmiller opined that Siler’s blood alcohol

concentration at the time of dispatch was approximately 0.26 grams per one hundred

milliliters of blood. 2T. at 341.

{¶15} Topmiller further testified that, at this level of intoxication, Siler would have

been incapable of safely operating a motor vehicle. 2T. at 344-345. He explained that

such impairment would manifest as disorientation, impaired visual processing, delayed

2 Topmiller was not testifying in his official capacity, but rather, as a paid expert witness. 2T. at 346-

347. reaction times, diminished decision-making, and reduced judgment and vehicle control.

Id. at 342-345.

{¶16} The defense presented no evidence. The jury found Siler guilty on both

counts. At the sentencing hearing on June 13, 2024, the trial court merged the offenses

and, on the count alleging refusal to submit to a chemical test, imposed a 16-month prison

term, a three-year driver’s license suspension, and a fine.

Assignment of Error

{¶17} Siler raises one assignment of error,

{¶18} “I. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS PREJUDICIALLY INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING

TO FILE A MOTION TO SUPPRESS: BECAUSE THE BLOOD WAS DRAWN BY A

HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONAL BUT NOT ANALYZED BY ONE, AND THE

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS AT ISSUE WERE NOT SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED

WITH, THE BLOOD-TEST RESULTS WERE INADMISSIBLE AT TRIAL EVEN WITH AN

EXPERT.”

I.

{¶19} In his sole assignment of error, Siler contends that he was denied the

effective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to file a motion to suppress

the blood-alcohol test results and related testimony. We disagree.

Standard Governing Ineffective Assistance Claims

{¶20} To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must

satisfy the two-prong test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688

(1984). The defendant must demonstrate that (1) counsel’s performance fell below an

objective standard of reasonable representation, and (2) counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense, resulting in an unreliable or fundamentally unfair outcome. Id. A

failure to establish either prong is fatal to the claim. Strickland at 697; State v. Madrigal,

87 Ohio St.3d 378 (2000).

{¶21} A trial attorney’s decision not to file a motion to suppress does not, standing

alone, constitute ineffective assistance. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d at 389; State v. Toure,

2023-Ohio-2559, ¶ 35 (5th Dist.); State v. Ortiz, 2016-Ohio-354, ¶ 56 (5th Dist.). Counsel

may be found ineffective only where the record demonstrates that the motion would have

been granted and that there is a reasonable probability the outcome of the proceedings

would have been different. State v. Lavelle, 2008-Ohio-3119, ¶ 47 (5th Dist.); State v.

Cheatam, 2007-Ohio-3009, ¶ 86 (5th Dist.); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375

(1986); State v. Santana, 90 Ohio St.3d 513 (2001).

{¶22} Accordingly, resolution of this assignment of error turns on whether a motion

to suppress the blood-alcohol evidence would have been meritorious.

Governing Statutes and Administrative Regulations

{¶23} R.C. 4511.19 governs the admissibility of chemical-test evidence in

prosecutions for operating a vehicle under the influence. As relevant here, R.C.

4511.19(D)(1)(b) permits the admission of blood-alcohol evidence obtained pursuant to

a valid search warrant, provided the sample is withdrawn and analyzed in accordance

with methods approved by the Director of Health. The statute also limits who may

withdraw blood and requires that analysis be conducted by an individual holding a valid

permit issued under R.C. 3701.143. The blood must also be withdrawn within three hours

of the time of the alleged violation. R.C. 4511.19 (D)(1)(b). However, the Supreme Court

of Ohio has held that "[a] blood sample taken outside the time frame set out in R C. 4511.19(D) is admissible to prove that a person was under the influence of alcohol as

proscribed by R C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) in the prosecution for a violation of R.C. 2903.06

[aggravated vehicular homicide], provided that the administrative requirements of R.C.

4511.19(D) are substantially complied with and expert testimony is offered." State v.

Hassler, 2007-Ohio-4947, syllabus (emphasis added).

{¶24} Pursuant to these statutory directives, the Director of Health promulgated

Ohio Adm.Code 3701-53-06, which sets forth standards governing the collection, sealing,

handling, and storage of blood samples.

Substantial Compliance Standard

{¶25} The Supreme Court of Ohio has consistently held that strict compliance with

the Department of Health regulations is not required. State v. Plummer, 22 Ohio St.3d

292, 294 (1986). Rather, the State must demonstrate substantial compliance, and test

results are admissible absent prejudice to the defendant. Id.

{¶26} The State’s burden extends only to those regulatory provisions specifically

placed at issue by the defendant. State v. Johnson, 137 Ohio App.3d 847, 851 (12th Dist.

2000); State v. Crothers, 2004-Ohio-2299, ¶ 10 (12th Dist.). When a defendant raises

only generalized claims of noncompliance, the State may satisfy its burden through

general testimony establishing substantial compliance. State v. Bissaillon, 2007-Ohio-

2349, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.); State v. Embry, 2004-Ohio-6324, ¶ 24 (12th Dist.). This Court has

reaffirmed these principles. State v. Bordeau, 2023-Ohio-2040 (5th Dist.); State v.

Benefield, 2025-Ohio-1116 (5th Dist.). Application to the Present Case

{¶27} It is undisputed that Siler’s blood was drawn by Dasha Semenchuk, a

licensed phlebotomist employed by Grant Medical Center, a statutorily defined health-

care provider. See R.C. 2317.02. It is likewise undisputed that the blood sample was

analyzed by the Ohio State Highway Patrol Crime Lab. Further, it is undisputed that the

sample was withdrawn outside the three-hour time limitation. Accordingly, the State was

required to demonstrate substantial compliance with the applicable administrative

regulations and to present expert testimony. State v. Hassler, 2007-Ohio-4947, syllabus

{¶28} The record reflects such compliance. Criminalist Latisha Pipes, a qualified

analyst, testified that she performed the toxicological analysis of Siler’s blood sample and

determined his blood-alcohol concentration to be 0.135 grams per one hundred milliliters.

2T. at 267. The State also presented expert testimony from Robert Topmiller, who

explained the significance of the test results and opined that Siler was impaired at the

time he operated the vehicle. 2T. at 338-345. Topmiller opined that Siler’s blood alcohol

concentration at the time of dispatch was approximately 0.26 grams per one hundred

{¶29} Siler’s sole asserted basis for suppression is that the phlebotomist could not

recall whether she inverted the blood sample after collection, which he claims is required

by Ohio Adm.Code 3701-53-06. Appellant’s brief at 7. We are not persuaded by this

argument. The regulation contains no requirement that a blood sample be inverted after

collection. Ohio Adm.Code 3701-53-06 prescribes procedures for collection, sealing,

labeling, and storage, but it does not mandate inversion of the sample as a condition of

admissibility. {¶30} Even if such a step were contemplated by laboratory protocol, the failure to

recall whether it occurred would, at most, constitute a minor procedural deviation. Minor

deviations do not render test results inadmissible absent prejudice. State v. Mayl, 2005-

Ohio-4629, ¶49; State v. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 34. Siler presented no evidence

or expert testimony to establish that the failure to invert the blood sample would affect the

test results in a significant manner.

Ineffective Assistance Determination

{¶31} Because the State substantially complied with the governing statutes and

administrative regulations and presented competent expert testimony, there is no

reasonable probability that a motion to suppress the blood-alcohol evidence would have

been granted. Siler therefore cannot establish either deficient performance or prejudice

under Strickland.

{¶32} Siler’s sole assignment of error is overruled. For the reasons stated in our Opinion, the judgment of the Delaware County Court

of Common Pleas is affirmed. Costs to Appellant, Gerald Siler.

By Popham, J.,

Baldwin, P.J., and

Montgomery, J., concur