State v. Sidwell, 07-Coa-008 (2-5-2008)

2008 Ohio 460
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedFebruary 5, 2008
DocketNo. 07-COA-008.
StatusPublished

This text of 2008 Ohio 460 (State v. Sidwell, 07-Coa-008 (2-5-2008)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Sidwell, 07-Coa-008 (2-5-2008), 2008 Ohio 460 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008).

Opinion

OPINION *Page 2
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Craig R. Sidwell appeals his sentence entered by the Ashland County Court of Common Pleas following his plea of guilty to one count of non-support of dependents, a fifth degree felony. Plaintiff-appellee is the State of Ohio.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
{¶ 2} On January 25, 2007, the Ashland County Court of Common Pleas sentenced Appellant to a maximum term of one year incarceration following his plea of guilty to one count of non-support of dependants, a fifth degree felony.

{¶ 3} Appellant now appeals, assigning as error:

{¶ 4} "I. THE IMPOSITION OF A PRISON SENTENCE IN THIS CASE IMPOSES AN UNNECESSARY BURDEN ON STATE RESOURCES."

{¶ 5} In State v. Foster (2006), 109 Ohio St.3d 1, the Ohio Supreme Court held trial courts have full discretion to impose a prison sentence within the statutory range and are no longer required to make findings or give their reasons for imposing maximum, consecutive, or more than minimum sentences.

{¶ 6} An abuse of discretion implies the court's attitude is "unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable." State v. Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151.

{¶ 7} In State v. Mathis 109 Ohio st.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, the Supreme Court held:

{¶ 8} "As we have held in Foster, however, trial courts have full discretion to impose a prison sentence within the statutory range and are no longer required to make findings or give their reasons for imposing maximum, consecutive, or more than the minimum sentences. Now that such findings are no longer mandated, on resentencing, *Page 3 the trial court will have discretion to sentence within the applicable range, following R.C. 2929.19 procedures."

{¶ 9} "* * *

{¶ 10} "Although after Foster the trial court is no longer compelled to make findings and give reasons at the sentencing hearing because R.C.2929.19(B)(2) has been excised, nevertheless, in exercising its discretion, the court must carefully consider the statutes that apply to every felony case. Those include R.C. 2929.11, which specifies the purposes of sentencing, and R.C. 2929.12, which provides guidance in considering factors relating to the seriousness of the offense and recidivism of the offender. In addition, the sentencing court must be guided by statutes that are specific to the case itself."

{¶ 11} Section 2929.12 provides:

{¶ 12} "(A) Unless otherwise required by section 2929.13 or 2929.14 of the Revised Code, a court that imposes a sentence under this chapter upon an offender for a felony has discretion to determine the most effective way to comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing set forth in section 2929.11 of the Revised Code. In exercising that discretion, the court shall consider the factors set forth in divisions (B) and (C) of this section relating to the seriousness of the conduct and the factors provided in divisions (D) and (E) of this section relating to the likelihood of the offender's recidivism and, in addition, may consider any other factors that are relevant to achieving those purposes and principles of sentencing.

{¶ 13} "(B) The sentencing court shall consider all of the following that apply regarding the offender, the offense, or the victim, and any other relevant factors, as *Page 4 indicating that the offender's conduct is more serious than conduct normally constituting the offense:

{¶ 14} "(1) The physical or mental injury suffered by the victim of the offense due to the conduct of the offender was exacerbated because of the physical or mental condition or age of the victim.

{¶ 15} "(2) The victim of the offense suffered serious physical, psychological, or economic harm as a result of the offense.

{¶ 16} "(3) The offender held a public office or position of trust in the community, and the offense related to that office or position.

{¶ 17} "(4) The offender's occupation, elected office, or profession obliged the offender to prevent the offense or bring others committing it to justice.

{¶ 18} "(5) The offender's professional reputation or occupation, elected office, or profession was used to facilitate the offense or is likely to influence the future conduct of others.

{¶ 19} "(6) The offender's relationship with the victim facilitated the offense.

{¶ 20} "(7) The offender committed the offense for hire or as a part of an organized criminal activity.

{¶ 21} "(8) In committing the offense, the offender was motivated by prejudice based on race, ethnic background, gender, sexual orientation, or religion.

{¶ 22} "(9) If the offense is a violation of section 2919.25 or a violation of section 2903.11, 2903.12, or 2903.13 of the Revised Code involving a person who was a family or household member at the time of the violation, the offender committed the offense in the vicinity of one or more children who are not victims of the offense, and the offender *Page 5 or the victim of the offense is a parent, guardian, custodian, or person in loco parentis of one or more of those children.

{¶ 23} "(C) The sentencing court shall consider all of the following that apply regarding the offender, the offense, or the victim, and any other relevant factors, as indicating that the offender's conduct is less serious than conduct normally constituting the offense:

{¶ 24} "(1) The victim induced or facilitated the offense.

{¶ 25} "(2) In committing the offense, the offender acted under strong provocation.

{¶ 26} "(3) In committing the offense, the offender did not cause or expect to cause physical harm to any person or property.

{¶ 27} "(4) There are substantial grounds to mitigate the offender's conduct, although the grounds are not enough to constitute a defense.

{¶ 28} "(D) The sentencing court shall consider all of the following that apply regarding the offender, and any other relevant factors, as factors indicating that the offender is likely to commit future crimes:

{¶ 29} "(1) At the time of committing the offense, the offender was under release from confinement before trial or sentencing, under a sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or under post-release control pursuant to section 2967.28

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Related

State v. Adams
404 N.E.2d 144 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1980)
State v. Foster
845 N.E.2d 470 (Ohio Supreme Court, 2006)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2008 Ohio 460, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-sidwell-07-coa-008-2-5-2008-ohioctapp-2008.