State v. Sida

2025 Ohio 2021

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 5, 2025
• Docket: 2024CA00096
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Sida, 2025-Ohio-2021.]

COURT OF APPEALS STARK COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES: : Hon. Andrew J. King, P.J. Plaintiff - Appellee : Hon. Kevin W. Popham, J. : Hon. David M. Gormley, J. -vs- : : JAVIER IVAN SIDA : Case No. 2024 CA 00096 : Defendant - Appellant : OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Stark County Court of Common Pleas Case No. 2024 CR 0533

JUDGMENT: Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT: June 5, 2025

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant

Kyle L. Stone George Urban Stark County Prosecuting Attorney 116 Cleveland Avenue N.W. Vicki L. DeSantis Suite 808 Assistant Prosecuting Attorney Canton, Ohio 44702 110 Central Plaza South, Ste. 510 Canton, Ohio 44702 Gormley, J.

{¶1} Defendant Javier I. Sida appeals his burglary, disrupting-public-services,

and assault convictions following his jury trial in Stark County. Sida argues that his

convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence and that they were against the

manifest weight of the evidence. For the reasons explained below, we affirm Sida’s

convictions.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶2} M.S. and C.S. are a married elderly couple who owned several townhouses

in Massillon, Ohio and who rented out those townhouses to tenants. Though Sida was

not a tenant at any of their properties, the couple knew Sida because he was dating a

woman named Sherilyn, who was the sister of one of the couple’s tenants, Russel

Maxhimer. According to his trial testimony, M.S. had spoken to Sida on approximately

eight to ten occasions prior to the incident at issue in this case. The couple evicted

Maxhimer in December 2023.

{¶3} In March 2024, the couple were making repairs to the unit that Maxhimer

had been evicted from. One of the repairs included fixing a broken lock on the front door

of the unit. While he was working on the front door, M.S. saw Sida coming across the

front porch toward him. M.S. — according to his trial testimony — attempted to close and

lock the door, but he was prevented from doing so when Sida grabbed the door and held

it open.

{¶4} M.S. testified at trial that when Sida first approached him, Sida began asking

him where Sherilyn was. Despite being told by M.S. that Maxhimer had been evicted and

that Sherilyn was not at the residence, Sida refused to believe that M.S. did not know where Sherilyn was. After M.S. told his wife to call the police because Sida would not

leave, Sida forced his way inside the apartment and punched and kicked M.S. Both C.S.

and M.S. testified that Sida then walked over to C.S. — who was holding her phone and

about to call the police — and said something to the effect of “call the police, bitch” before

punching C.S. in the face. The impact caused C.S.’s phone to fly out of her hand and her

glasses to slide off her face.

{¶5} After he punched C.S., Sida left the residence and slid into the front

passenger seat of a black Jeep that was parked nearby. Donald Lance, the neighborhood

mailman, witnessed the altercation through one of the windows at the townhouse and

contacted the police to provide them with the license plate number of the black Jeep that

Sida had entered. C.S. was able to call the police after Sida left, and officers responded

to the scene to take statements from M.S., C.S., and Donald Lance.

{¶6} Sida was arrested later that same evening for an unrelated incident at a

nearby tavern. At the time of his arrest, Sida was with the owner of a black Jeep that

matched the license plate number that had been provided to the police.

{¶7} Sida was indicted on one count of burglary, one count of disrupting public

services, and two counts of assault in connection with the incident that occurred at the

elderly couple’s townhouse. Sida was convicted on all four counts at his jury trial. He

now appeals.

Sida’s Convictions Were Supported by Sufficient Evidence

{¶8} In his first assignment of error, Sida argues that the state failed to present

sufficient evidence to support convictions on each of the four charges. In his third

assignment of error, Sida similarly contends that the trial court erred when it denied his Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal. Because his first and third assignments of error both

relate to the sufficiency of the evidence presented at the trial, we will address them

together.

{¶9} “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court does

not ask whether the evidence should be believed but, rather, whether the evidence, ‘if

believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt.’” State v. Pountney, 2018-Ohio-22, ¶ 19, quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d

259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. “‘The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’”

State v. Howell, 2020-Ohio-174, ¶ 28 (5th Dist.), quoting Jenks at paragraph two of the

syllabus. A “verdict will not be disturbed unless the appellate court finds that reasonable

minds could not reach the conclusion reached by the trier-of-fact.” State v. Dennis, 79

Ohio St.3d 421, 430 (1997).

Conviction for Burglary

{¶10} In his challenge to the evidence supporting his burglary conviction, Sida

claims that the state failed to present sufficient evidence of any intent on his part to commit

a criminal offense in the townhouse owned by the elderly couple.

{¶11} To prove the R.C. 2911.12(A)(1) burglary charge in Sida’s case, the state

was required to introduce evidence that Sida, by force, stealth, or deception, “trespass[ed]

in an occupied structure . . . when another person other than an accomplice of the

offender [wa]s present, with purpose to commit in the structure . . . any criminal offense.”

R.C. 2911.12(A)(1). Trespass “is defined as knowingly and without privilege entering or remaining on the premises of another.” State v. Ramunas, 2021-Ohio-3191, ¶ 15 (5th

Dist.), citing R.C. 2911.21(A)(1).

{¶12} The Supreme Court of Ohio — in interpreting the “purpose” element of

aggravated burglary — has explained that “a defendant may form the purpose to commit

a criminal offense at any point during the course of a trespass.” State v. Fontes, 87 Ohio

St.3d 527, 530 (2000). Our court has applied that principle to the crime of burglary.

Ramunas at ¶ 15 (“Because the language concerning ‘purpose to commit . . . any criminal

offense’ is also found in R.C. 2911.12, defining burglary, the rule of law set forth in Fontes

also applies to the offense of burglary.”).

{¶13} “A person acts purposely when it is the person’s specific intention to cause

a certain result.” R.C. 2901.22(A). “It is a fundamental principle that a person is

presumed to intend the natural, reasonable, and probable consequences of his voluntary

acts.” State v. Johnson, 56 Ohio St.2d 35, 39 (1978). The intent with which an act is

committed may be inferred from the doing of the act itself. State v. Asp, 2023-Ohio-290,

¶ 40 (5th Dist.).

{¶14} The state presented sufficient evidence that Sida acted with a purpose to

commit assault in the townhouse. Both M.S. and C.S. testified at trial that Sida forced his

way into the townhouse and assaulted them. M.S. testified that Sida punched and kicked

him, and C.S. testified that she was punched in the face and that Sida was her attacker.

Sida’s act of striking the two elderly townhouse owners was, in and of itself, sufficient

evidence from which the jurors could infer that Sida, during the trespass, acted with the

purpose of assaulting the couple. {¶15} In support of his contrary view here, Sida points out that M.S. testified that

Sida initially came to the townhouse looking for Sherilyn, which Sida argues was his

“purpose” in going to the townhouse. As explained above, however, the state was not

required to show that Sida went to the townhouse with the purpose of assaulting the

elderly couple inside. Evidence that Sida decided to assault his victims while he was

committing the trespass was enough.

{¶16} The state presented sufficient evidence at Sida’s trial on each element of

the burglary charge.

Conviction for Disrupting Public Services

{¶17} Sida argues that the state failed to offer any proof that he had the requisite

mental state to support a conviction for disrupting public services under R.C.

2909.04(A)(1).

{¶18} Before Sida could be convicted of disrupting public services, the state was

required to prove that Sida “purposely by any means or knowingly by damaging or

tampering with any property . . . interrupt[ed] or impair[ed] . . . police, fire, or other public

service communications.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2909.04(A)(1). We note, initially, that

Sida appears to misinterpret the text of R.C. 2909.04(A). The statute prescribes two ways

in which Sida could have violated the statute in this case: (1) purposely, by any means,

interrupting or impairing telephone service or police communications, or (2) knowingly, by

damaging or tampering with any property, interrupting or impairing telephone service or

police communications. R.C. 2909.04(A)(1).

{¶19} “The statute is aimed at conduct which prevents a victim from using public

services to seek emergency assistance.” State v. Galindo, 2012-Ohio-3626, ¶ 17 (5th Dist.). The act of “damaging . . . a single private telephone or cellular telephone” can fall

within the statute’s reach. State v. Robinson, 2009-Ohio-5937, ¶ 32. And because the

statute indicates that the crime can be committed “purposely by any means,” the state

need not prove that a phone or other property was actually damaged or destroyed. State

v. Walters, 2018-Ohio-3456, ¶ 26 (5th Dist.) (“Although he did not damage the cell phone,

[defendant] prevented [the victim] from making the call and placed the phone out of her

reach”).

{¶20} A person acts purposely when “it is the person’s specific intention to cause

a certain result.” R.C. 2901.22(A). “A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when

the person is aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will

probably be of a certain nature.” R.C. 2901.22(B). “The intent with which an act is

committed may be inferred from the act itself and the surrounding circumstances,

including acts and statements of a defendant.” Asp, 2023-Ohio-290, at ¶ 40 (5th Dist.),

citing State v. Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d 49, 60 (1995). “When a person breaks into a

residence and their first act is to deprive the occupant of their means for contacting the

outside world, a natural and probable inference is that they did so with the intention of

preventing the occupant from calling the police.” State v. Jackson, 2019-Ohio-170, ¶ 80

(3d Dist.).

{¶21} M.S. — according to his testimony at trial — told his wife to call the police

because Sida would not leave the townhouse. C.S. in turn testified that she was holding

her phone and dialing the Massillon Police Department when Sida walked over to her and

said “call the cops, bitch” before punching her in the face. After C.S. was struck, her phone flew out of her hand. That disruption necessarily interrupted C.S.’s effort to

summon help.

{¶22} The trial testimony of both M.S. and C.S. gave the jury sufficient evidence

to determine whether Sida’s conduct met either one of the culpable mental states required

by the statute. The jury could have found that Sida acted purposely to interrupt or impair

C.S.’s ability to use her phone or to contact the police by punching her in the face, with

that purpose being evident from Sida’s conduct itself and from his statement about her

calling the police. The jury, too, could have determined that Sida knowingly tampered

with C.S.’s cell phone and impaired her use of it when he decided to punch her — an

elderly woman — in the face while she was holding her phone and attempting to call the

police. Certainly, the jury could have concluded that Sida was aware that his conduct

would impair or interrupt C.S.’s ability to call for help.

{¶23} We are unpersuaded by Sida’s argument that he “permitted” C.S. to contact

law enforcement and did not damage or tamper with her cell phone in any way. As noted

above, the state need not necessarily prove that the phone was damaged or destroyed.

The state’s evidence in this case, when viewed in a light most favorable to the state, was

certainly sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. From the elderly couple’s testimony, the

jury could conclude that Sida was aware that a probable result of his decision to punch

C.S. in the face would be that her phone would be knocked out of her hand just as she

was about to use that phone to summon the police. We therefore reject Sida’s sufficiency

challenge to his disrupting-public-services conviction. Convictions for Assault

{¶24} Sida also argues that the state failed to present sufficient evidence to prove

that Sida was the person who allegedly struck M.S. and C.S. To prove the two assault

charges, the state was required, under R.C. 2903.13(A), to show that Sida “knowingly

cause[d] or attempt[ed] to cause physical harm” to the two alleged victims.

{¶25} “[T]he testimony of one witness, if believed by the jury, is sufficient to

support a conviction.” State v. Williams, 2017-Ohio-803, ¶ 54 (5th Dist.). M.S. testified

at the trial that he knew who Sida was because he had interacted with Sida on

approximately eight to ten occasions prior to the townhouse encounter. When asked

during direct-examination if he had any doubt that Sida was the man who attacked him,

M.S. replied “none whatsoever, one hundred percent.”

{¶26} C.S. also testified during the trial that Sida was the man who punched her.

A recording of C.S.’s 9-1-1 call was played for the jury, and the jury heard C.S. tell the

dispatcher that Sida had attacked her and her husband. Additionally, both elderly victims

made in-court identifications of Sida as the man who attacked them.

{¶27} We find that the state presented sufficient evidence to support a guilty

verdict on each of the two assault charges. Sida’s first assignment of error is overruled.

Denial of Crim.R. 29 Motion for Acquittal

{¶28} In his third assignment of error, Sida argues that the trial court erred when

it denied his Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal. We disagree.

{¶29} Crim.R. 29(A) provides that a criminal defendant can ask the trial court, after

either party in a criminal case has finished its presentation of evidence, to “order the entry

of a judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment . . . if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses.” As we

explained above, the state presented evidence at the trial on each element of every

offense in the indictment, and that evidence was legally sufficient to support the jury’s

verdicts. Sida’s third assignment of error is overruled.

Sida’s Convictions Were Not Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence

{¶30} In his second assignment of error, Sida contends that his convictions were

against the manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶31} In determining whether a conviction was against the manifest weight of the

evidence, an appellate court acts “as a ‘thirteenth juror,’ and after ‘reviewing the entire

record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of

witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly

lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must

be [reversed] and a new trial ordered.’” State v. Hane, 2025-Ohio-120, ¶ 20 (5th Dist.),

quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997). The reversal of a conviction

on manifest-weight grounds should occur only in “the ‘exceptional case in which the

evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’” Id.

{¶32} “Weight of the evidence concerns ‘the inclination of the greater amount of

credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other.

It indicates clearly to the jury that the party having the burden of proof will be entitled to

their verdict, if, on weighing the evidence in their minds, they shall find the greater amount

of credible evidence sustains the issue which is to be established before them.’”

(Emphasis in original.) Thompkins at 387. “[A]n appellate court will leave the issues of weight and credibility of the evidence to the factfinder, as long as a rational basis exists

in the record for its decision.” State v. Sheppard, 2025-Ohio-161, ¶ 66 (5th Dist.).

{¶33} The testimony provided at trial, Sida argues, casts serious doubt on the

question of whether he was the person who assaulted the elderly couple. Though C.S.

testified at the trial that Sida was the person who attacked her, she identified a photograph

of another man as being a photograph of Sida. The trial judge also had to interrupt C.S.’s

testimony multiple times to stop her from discussing topics that were not relevant at the

trial, such as previous complaints about Sida from neighbors and previous interactions

that she had had with Sida. Sida contends that these issues undermined C.S.’s credibility

and ought to have prompted the jury to acquit him.

{¶34} Sida also points to the testimony of another trial witness — Donald Lance

— to support his claim that the jury lost its way. Lance was the mailman who witnessed

the alleged assaults through a window of the townhouse, and he testified at the trial that

he told the police that the assailant was a white man with tattoos. Lance also testified

that he saw the assailant for less than 20 seconds and that he could not recall what the

tattoos looked like. (The record does not tell us about Sida’s race or about any tattoos,

but the jury of course had an opportunity to see him and to weigh Lance’s testimony.)

{¶35} After reviewing the full record of the trial, we cannot say that the jury lost its

way. Lance’s testimony about the physical description of the assailant was based on his

brief glimpse through a window and later outside the townhouse as the assailant fled. As

for the victims themselves, both, with what they described as 100% certainty, testified

that Sida was the person who assaulted them, and they both testified that they knew who Sida was from prior interactions with him. Further, C.S., during her 9-1-1 call, identified

Sida as her attacker, and a recording of that call was played for the jury.

{¶36} “While the jury may take note of inconsistencies and resolve or discount

them accordingly, such inconsistencies alone do not render a conviction against the

manifest weight or sufficiency of the evidence.” State v. Wolters, 2022-Ohio-538, ¶ 20

(5th Dist.). Though there may have been hiccups in C.S.’s testimony at the trial, including

her identification of some other person in a photograph as being Sida, the jury was free

to weigh her credibility and consider her testimony as a whole.

{¶37} Having ourselves now evaluated the evidence and considered the credibility

of the witnesses and any inconsistencies in their testimony, we readily find that a rational

basis exists in the record for the jury’s determination that Sida was in fact the person who

assaulted the elderly couple. Sida’s second assignment of error is overruled.

{¶38} For the reasons explained above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

By: Gormley, J.

King, P.J. and

Popham, J. concur.