OPINION
DIETZEN, Justice.
Appellant State of Minnesota challenges a district court order granting the motion of respondent Janet Sue Shriner (Shriner) to suppress evidence of a warrantless blood draw obtained after she caused a car accident. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that in order for a warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw to meet the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, there must be probable cause and exigent circumstances as demonstrated by an officer’s evaluation of the totality of the circumstances. State v. Shriner, 739 N.W.2d 432, 440 (Minn.App.2007). The issue on this appeal is whether the evanescent nature of alcohol in the blood constitutes “single-factor” exigent circumstances sufficient to justify a warrantless blood draw when there is probable cause to arrest a suspect for operating a vehicle in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.21 (2006). We granted review and now reverse and remand to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
On May 8, 2006, at approximately 9:26 p.m., Shriner was involved in a car accident when she drove her car into oncoming traffic on McAndrews Road in Burnsville, Minnesota, hit another car in a head-on collision, and continued driving until she was forced to stop by a Burnsville squad car. The squad car bumped Shriner’s vehicle, causing it to spin and go onto a cement median. Burnsville police requested that Shriner voluntarily leave her vehicle, but she refused. Police then forcibly removed her from the car after breaking a window and opening the door.
At that point, police observed that Shriner was not injured and that she smelled of alcohol, had blood-shot eyes that were glazed over, and was unable to stand without assistance. An officer then placed Shriner under arrest and put her in the [540]*540back seat of his squad car. Shortly thereafter, he learned from other officers at the scene of the accident that the driver of the other vehicle had sustained head and leg injuries. The officer then took Shriner to a nearby hospital for the purpose of obtaining a blood sample. The officer did not invoke the implied-consent procedure or read the implied-consent advisory.
Medical personnel drew a blood sample from Shriner approximately 45 minutes after the accident. The State represented that subsequent analysis of Shriner’s blood sample indicated her blood-alcohol content was 0.33.1 Before directing medical personnel to take the blood sample, the police did not obtain, or attempt to obtain, a search warrant.
The State charged Shriner with seven criminal counts, including first-degree driving while impaired and criminal vehicular operation resulting in bodily harm. Before trial, Shriner moved to have the results of the blood draw suppressed. At the omnibus hearing, Shriner conceded that there was probable cause to believe that she violated the criminal vehicular operation statute, but she argued that the State did not show exigent circumstances that would justify a warrantless, noncon-sensual blood draw. The officer who transported Shriner to the hospital for the blood draw admitted that he was not worried that Shriner was “about to slip under the legal limit.”
Following the hearing, the district court granted Shriner’s motion to suppress, finding that there was probable cause to believe “that a blood alcohol test would result in the discovery of evidence relevant to prosecuting [Shriner] for a violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.21,” but that the State failed to present evidence of exigent circumstances or that an emergency existed justifying a warrantless blood draw. Due to a lack of probable cause to support the charges, the court dismissed the counts of first-degree driving while impaired and criminal vehicular operation resulting in bodily harm.
The court of appeals affirmed the district court in a published 2-1 decision.2 State v. Shriner, 739 N.W.2d 432, 440 (Minn.App.2007). The majority concluded that the “Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution precludes using the results of a warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw in a criminal prosecution unless law enforcement has probable cause to believe criminal conduct has occurred and there are exigent circumstances in addition to evidence of alcohol consumption.” Id. The majority applied a “totality-of-the-circumstances” test to determine whether exigent circumstances existed to necessitate conducting the blood draw without a warrant. Id. at 438. We granted the State’s petition for further review.
I.
The State contends that the district court erred in suppressing the results of the blood draw. “When reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, we may independently review the facts and determine whether, as a matter of law, the district court erred in suppressing or not suppressing the evidence.” State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 359 (Minn.2004).
[541]*541The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution contains a parallel provision.
Taking a person’s blood is considered a search under the Fourth Amendment. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). It is a basic principle of constitutional law that warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable. State v. Licari, 659 N.W.2d 243, 250 (Minn.2003). “Nevertheless, because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’ the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions.” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006).
One such exception is exigent circumstances. “ ‘[Warrants are generally required to search a person’s home or his person unless ‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.’ ” Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403, 126 S.Ct. 1943 (alteration in original) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978)). “The U.S. Supreme Court has not adopted a definite test for determining when exigent circumstances exist.” State v. Gray, 456 N.W.2d 251, 256 (Minn.1990). The Court, however, has recognized such emergency conditions exist in a few situations, including the hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, the destruction of evidence, an ongoing fire, and the rendering of emergency aid. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984); Gray, 456 N.W.2d at 256.
Initially, when this court discussed whether exigent circumstances existed to justify a warrantless search, we looked to the totality of circumstances and considered six factors that were articulated by the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in the case of Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (1970).3 See State v. Lasley, 306 Minn. 224, 232, 236 N.W.2d 604, 609 (1975) (citing the six factors outlined in Dorman for determining whether “exigent circumstances” justified entering a suspect’s home without a warrant). Determining whether exigent circumstances exist under the “totality of the circumstances” is a “flexible approach that encompasses all relevant circumstances.” State v. Hummel, 483 N.W.2d 68, 73 (Minn.1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In State v. Gray, we refined our jurisprudence regarding exigent circumstances. We concluded “[t]here generally are two types of tests for exigent circumstances: (1) single factor exigent circumstances, and (2) in the absence of any of these factors, a ‘totality of the circum[542]*542stances’ test.” 456 N.W.2d 251, 256 (Minn.1990). We have described the test for single-factor exigent circumstances as one in which “the existence of one fact alone creates exigent circumstances.” In re Welfare of D.A.G., 484 N.W.2d 787, 791 (Minn.1992) (emphasis added). It is only when “none of the single factor exigent circumstances is clearly implicated” that we apply a “totality of the circumstances” test to determine whether exigent circumstances are present. Gray, 456 N.W.2d at 256; see also In re Welfare of B.R.K., 658 N.W.2d 565, 579 (Minn.2003) (“When a ‘single factor’ exigent circumstance does not exist, we apply a totality of the circumstances test.”); D.A.G., 484 N.W.2d at 791. Thus, this court has acknowledged for nearly 20 years that the existence of one fact alone can create exigent circumstances that justify a warrantless search, and that in such a situation, we do not rely upon the totality of the circumstances in considering whether a warrantless search was proper.
We have recognized single-factor exigent circumstances justifying a war-rantless search in cases involving hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, imminent destruction or removal of evidence, protection of human life, likely escape of the suspect, and fire. Gray, 456 N.W.2d at 256. More importantly, we have stated that a war-rantless search is permissible “when the delay necessary to obtain a warrant might result in the loss or destruction of the evidence.” State v. Richards, 552 N.W.2d 197, 203 (Minn.1996). Whether exigent circumstances exist is an objective determination, and the individual officer’s subjective state of mind is irrelevant. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 404-05, 126 S.Ct. 1943 (holding that whether exigent circumstances existed because the police needed to render emergency aid was an objective determination where the subjective motivation of the officer was irrelevant); cf. State v. Olson, 482 N.W.2d 212, 214 (Minn.1992) (holding that “if there is an objective legal basis” for a search, it will be upheld, “even if the officer * * * conducting the search based his or her action on the wrong ground or had an improper motive”). It is the State’s burden to provide facts to support its theory that the evidence “the officer thought was present” would be destroyed or disappear. See D.A.G., 484 N.W.2d at 791 (rejecting State’s contention that warrantless entry into home was justified by the imminent destruction of evidence because the State had “not advanced a theory” and had “failed to provide facts” explaining how the drugs the officers saw “would have suddenly disappeared”).
A. Single-factor exigent circumstances
The State argues that when police have probable cause to believe that a defendant committed criminal vehicular operation resulting in homicide or injury,4 they may take a blood draw without a warrant because the evanescent nature of alcohol in the blood creates a single-factor exigent circumstance. The single-factor exigent circumstance the State relies on is the imminent destruction of evidence.
In the landmark case of Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 758-59, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), the United States Supreme Court considered whether the taking of a blood sample from a non-consenting driver violated his right under [543]*543the Fourth Amendment to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. Schmerber, who was the driver of a car involved in an accident, was suspected by an investigating officer at the accident scene to be under the influence of alcohol. Id. at 768-69, 86 S.Ct. 1826. At the hospital, the officer placed Schmerber under arrest and, without first obtaining a warrant or Schmerber’s consent, directed hospital staff to take a blood sample. Id. at 758-59, 768, 86 S.Ct. 1826. The Supreme Court held that the blood tests were admissible, concluding that probable cause existed to arrest the driver, id. at 768, 86 S.Ct. 1826, and that
[t]he officer in the present case * * * might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened the destruction of evidence. We are told that the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it from the system. Particularly in a case such as this, where time had to be taken to bring the accused to a hospital and to investigate the scene of the accident, there was no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant. Given these special facts, we conclude that the attempt to secure evidence of blood-alcohol content in this case was an appropriate incident to petitioner’s arrest.
Id. at 770-71, 86 S.Ct. 1826 (citation and quotation marks omitted). It is unclear whether the Supreme Court justified the warrantless search because of the “threatened destruction of evidence” caused by the rapid dissipation of alcohol in the defendant’s bloodstream or because the search was a reasonable search incident to a lawful arrest.
Then in the case of Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 292-93, 93 S.Ct. 2000, 36 L.Ed.2d 900 (1973), the Supreme Court considered whether taking scrapings from the fingernails of a defendant, who the police suspected had murdered his wife, violated the Fourth Amendment when the defendant had not been arrested. During an interview with the defendant, officers noticed a dark substance on the defendant’s finger that they believed to be blood. Id. at 292, 93 S.Ct. 2000. The defendant refused a request for a sample of his fingernail scrapings and immediately placed his hands behind his back and appeared to rub them together. Id. at 296, 93 S.Ct. 2000. He then placed his hands in his pockets, at which point the officers heard “a metallic sound, such as keys or change rattling.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The officers detained the defendant and, without first obtaining a warrant, took a sample from under his fingernails. Id. at 292-93, 93 S.Ct. 2000. This sample contained skin and blood cells from the victim. Id. at 292, 93 S.Ct. 2000. Relying in part on Schmerber, the Court upheld the search, concluding that the police had probable cause to arrest the suspect for murder, id. at 293, 93 S.Ct. 2000, and were “justified” in subjecting him “to the very limited search necessary to preserve the highly evanescent evidence they found under his- fingernails.” Id. at 296, 93 S.Ct. 2000 (emphasis added).
Subsequent cases of the Supreme Court have recognized Schmerber as a case in which exigent circumstances justified a warrantless search. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759, 105 S.Ct. 1611, 84 L.Ed.2d 662 (1985) (discussing Schmerber and explaining that “[bjecause the case fell within the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, no warrant was necessary”); Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750, 104 S.Ct. 2091 (discussing examples of exigent circumstances the Supreme Court has recognized and citing Schmerber as one such example, based on the “destruction of evidence”).
[544]*544This court has also concluded that a warrantless blood draw is justified if supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances. State v. Aguirre, 295 N.W.2d 79, 81 (Minn.1980). Further, we have upheld warrantless blood draws in eases involving the offense of criminal vehicular homicide when exigent circumstances existed that required immediate action to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence. See id. at 82; State v. Oevering, 268 N.W.2d 68, 74 (Minn.1978).
In Oevering, we rejected a Fourth Amendment challenge to the admission of blood-alcohol content evidence when a blood sample was taken without the defendant’s consent or a warrant and when the officer had probable cause to believe that the defendant, while under the influence of alcohol, had caused a traffic accident resulting in a fatality. 268 N.W.2d at 69, 74. Applying the rule articulated by the Supreme Court in Cupp, we stated that the blood draw could be conducted without a warrant if, among other things, “the evidence sought will be forever lost absent the search.” Id. at 73. We stated that “it is beyond question that with the passage of time, normal physiological functions eliminate the alcohol content of an inebriate’s blood.” Id. at 74. We concluded that, due to the passage of time after the accident, immediate action was required to avoid the loss of blood-alcohol content evidence. Id.
Two years later in Aguirre, we held that a nonconsensual, warrantless removal of a suspect’s blood did not violate the Fourth Amendment when an officer “had probable cause to believe that defendant driver was not only intoxicated but had just committed the felony offense of criminal negligence resulting in death.” 295 N.W.2d at 82 (citing Minn.Stat. § 609.21 (1978)). We reasoned that the officer was confronted with a situation in which “he knew that it was essential that he obtain the blood sample without delay and without regard to whether defendant would consent to the removal of a blood sample.” Id.
We did not use the terminology “single-factor exigent circumstances” or “totality of the circumstances” in either Oevering or Aguirre. But we had not adopted the two separate tests for exigent circumstances until after these cases were decided. See Gray, 456 N.W.2d at 256 (first recognizing in 1990 the distinction between single-factor exigent circumstances and the totality of the circumstances test for determining exigent circumstances). Instead, Oevering and Aguirre rested on the determination that “the evidence sought will be forever lost absent the search” because “with the passage of time, normal physiological functions eliminate the alcohol content of an inebriate’s blood.” Oevering, 268 N.W.2d at 73-74; see also Aguirre, 295 N.W.2d at 82 (finding it was “essential” the officer obtain the blood sample without regard to whether the defendant would consent to the blood draw). But our analysis in Oe-vering and Aguirre still focused on the imminent destruction of evidence — the rapid dissipation of alcohol content in the defendant’s bloodstream was the disposi-tive factor on which we based our conclusion that evidence in those cases would be lost without an immediate search. Consequently, our holdings in Oevering and Aguirre support the conclusion that the rapid dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream may be a single-factor exigent circumstance based on the imminent destruction of evidence.
In State v. Paul, this court held that the police, who were in hot pursuit of a suspected DWI offender, could make a war-rantless entry into the defendant’s home in order to effectuate arrest. 548 N.W.2d 260, 265 (Minn.1996). We concluded, among other things, that the rapid dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream constitutes a single-factor exigent circumstances [545]*545exception to the warrant requirement. Specifically, we found that “the need to preserve evidence of [the defendant’s] blood alcohol level is a compelling exigent circumstance under the ‘destruction of evidence’ exception to the warrant requirement first recognized [in Schmerber ].” Id. at 266. We further noted, in summarizing Schmerber, that the warrantless removal of blood is “necessary to prevent the destruction of the most probative evidence of [a defendant’s] offense” because “ ‘the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it from the system.’ ”5 Id. at 267 (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770, 86 S.Ct. 1826); see also State v. Heaney, 689 N.W.2d 168, 173 n. 2 (Minn.2004) (describing in dicta that Schmerber and Oevering, “due to the natural exigency involved in obtaining blood-alcohol evidence, recognize the power of a peace officer to compel a blood sample from a driver where there is probable cause to believe the driver has violated a criminal vehicular operation law”); State v. Speak, 339 N.W.2d 741, 745 (Minn.1983) (holding “[ejxigent circumstances were clearly present” that justified warrantless, nonconsensual breathalyzer test where defendant was suspected of fatally hitting pedestrian while driving under the influence of alcohol).
Consequently, we conclude that when officers have probable cause to believe a defendant has committed the offense of criminal vehicular homicide or operation under Minn.Stat. § 609.21, it is important that the defendant’s blood be tested within 2 hours of the accident causing injury to or the death of another.6 With every passing minute, the most probative evidence of this crime is subjected to destruction by the body’s natural processes. The rapid, natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood creates single-factor exigent circumstances that will justify the police taking a warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw from a defendant, provided that the police have probable cause to believe that defendant committed criminal vehicular operation.7
[546]*546B. Totality of the circumstances
Shriner argues that this court should look at the totality of the circumstances to determine whether exigent circumstances exist to support a warrantless blood draw. Shriner contends that the holding of Schmerber requires this court to look at more than the evanescent nature of blood-alcohol content in determining whether exigent circumstances exist that would justify a warrantless blood draw. Shriner relies heavily on State v. Rodriguez, 156 P.3d 771 (Utah 2007), to support her argument. There the Utah Supreme Court concluded that Schmerber did not create a single-factor exception to the warrant requirement, that the availability of telephonic warrants cuts against adopting a single-factor exigency exception, and that a single-factor exigency exception would deter the pursuit of progressive approaches to warrant acquisition. Id. at 776, 778-79.
We disagree. We have concluded in previous cases that there are two separate tests for exigent circumstances, and that if one factor creates exigent circumstances, we do not review other factors under a totality of the circumstances test to determine whether exigent circumstances exist. B.R.K., 658 N.W.2d at 579; D.A.G., 484 N.W.2d at 791; Gray, 456 N.W.2d at 256. In D.A.G. we stated that the existence of “one fact alone” may create exigent circumstances under the single-factor test. 484 N.W.2d at 791. It is undisputed that as a result of the body’s physiological processes, the blood-alcohol content in a defendant’s blood dissipates with the passage of every minute. Thus, the rapid dissipation of blood-alcohol content caused by the body’s natural processes is a single factor that creates the exigent circumstances in the case of criminal vehicular operation to justify a warrantless blood draw.8
Schmerber does not prohibit our conclusion that the rapid dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream can create a single-factor exigent circumstance.9 First, the Supreme Court has stated in subsequent decisions that its holding in Schmerber justifies a warrantless blood draw based on the imminent destruction of alcohol caused by the natural processes of the body. In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 609, 624, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989), the Supreme Court found federal regulations that required toxicological testing of the blood or urine of all railroad employees directly involved in any train accident that resulted in a [547]*547reportable injury or damage to railroad property of $500,000 or more did not violate the Fourth Amendment and that a warrant was not a prerequisite to such searches of railroad employees. The Court cited Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71, 86 S.Ct. 1826, to support the conclusion that the purposes behind requiring post-accident blood testing of railroad employees would be frustrated by requiring a warrant because “alcohol and other drugs are eliminated from the bloodstream at a constant rate, and blood and breath samples taken to measure whether these substances were in the bloodstream when [an accident] occurred must be obtained as soon as possible.” Skinner, 489 U.S. at 623, 109 S.Ct. 1402 (citation omitted). After noting that some drugs are still detectable in the body “for longer periods of time,” the Court concluded that “the delay necessary to procure a warrant nevertheless may result in the destruction of valuable evidence.” 10 Id.; see also South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 559, 103 S.Ct. 916, 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983) (indicating that “Schmerber * * * clearly allows a State to force a person suspected of driving while intoxicated to submit to a blood-alcohol test”).
Further, the view urged by Shriner, which was also adopted by the court of appeals in its decision, is the minority view of Schmerber. Other courts have interpreted Schmerber as concluding that the naturally rapid dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream creates an emergency that justifies a warrantless blood draw.11
[548]*548When faced with the same issue presented here, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in State v. Bohling determined that the evanescent nature of alcohol in the blood was sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search. 173 Wis.2d 529, 494 N.W.2d 399, 406 (1993). The Wisconsin Supreme Court explained that
Schmerber can be read in either of two ways: (a) that the rapid dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream alone constitutes a sufficient exigency for a warrant-less blood draw to obtain evidence of intoxication following a lawful arrest for a drunk driving related violation or crime * * *; or (b) that the rapid dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream, coupled with an accident, hospitalization, and the lapse of two hours until arrest, constitute exigent circumstances for such a blood draw.
Id. at 402. The Bohling court concluded that the first of these readings of Schmer-ber was the more appropriate. Id.
The Bohling court based its conclusion on “(1) a logical reading of Schmerber, (2) the Supreme Court’s decision in Skinner * * *, (3) interpretations of Schmerber by other courts, and (4) an examination of [the State’s] interest in enforcing its drunk driving laws.” Id. Specifically related to the first reason, the Wisconsin Supreme Court noted that “[a] logical analysis of the Schmerber decision indicates that the exigency of the situation presented was caused solely by the fact that the amount of alcohol in a person’s bloodstream diminishes over time.” Id. While the Supreme Court noted other facts in Schmerber, such as the fact that an accident occurred and that the defendant was taken to the hospital, these other facts “did not increase the risk that evidence of intoxication would be lost.” Id. We agree with the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s analysis of Schmerber.
The dissent argues we have abandoned the requirement that in invoking “the imminent destruction or removal of evidence” as a single-factor exigency, the State must explain why the peace officer could reasonably believe that evidence would be destroyed. Because we have not abandoned this requirement, the dissent’s warning rings hollow. We are simply recognizing that when the police have probable cause to suspect a defendant committed criminal vehicular operation, it is objectively reasonable to conclude that the alcohol content in a defendant’s blood dissipates with the passage of time due to the human body’s natural, physiological processes. Our existing jurisprudence has already recognized this physiological process. Today we conclude that in the case of criminal vehicular operation the undisputed rapid dissipation of alcohol in the defendant’s blood creates a single-factor exigent circumstance.
The dissent also argues that “it is the length of the delay” in obtaining a warrant “that determines whether the evidence will disappear.” This argument rests on the contention that exigent circumstances are not present if it is possible to get a warrant before all the evidence is destroyed. But our existing jurisprudence has recognized that a warrantless search is justified based on the imminent destruction of evidence when there is the potential loss of evidence during the delay necessary to obtain a warrant. See Richards, 552 [549]*549N.W.2d at 203. Specifically, when the police have probable cause to believe a person has committed the serious crime of criminal vehicular operation, there is the potential loss of all blood-alcohol content evidence, and the ongoing, actual loss of such evidence with every passing minute from the time the accident occurred until the blood draw is taken. Because it is undisputed that this loss of the most probative evidence of criminal vehicular operation occurs during the time it takes to obtain a warrant, exigent circumstances are present based on the imminent destruction of evidence.
Further, requiring law enforcement to consider other factors places an unreasonable burden on law enforcement. For instance, though the officer may be familiar with the area in which the accident occurred, the officer has no control over how long it would take to travel to a judge or the judge’s availability. The officer also may not know the time of the suspect’s last drink, the amount of alcohol consumed, or the rate at which the suspect will metabolize alcohol. Finally, an officer cannot know how long it will take to obtain the blood sample once the suspect is brought to the hospital.12 Under a totality of the circumstances test, an officer would be called upon to speculate on each of these considerations and predict how long the most probative evidence of the defendant’s blood-alcohol level would continue to exist before a blood sample was no longer rehable.
Shriner also contends that police may obtain telephonic warrants quickly and, therefore, the police can easily obtain the relevant evidence they need with a warrant. Put another way, Shriner contends that the use of telephonic warrants makes any exigency disappear because the police will be able to obtain a blood sample well before the evidence is entirely gone. But the officer facing the need for a telephonic warrant cannot be expected to know how much delay will be caused by following the procedures necessary to obtain such a warrant.13 And during the time taken to obtain a telephonic warrant, it is undisputed that the defendant’s body is rapidly metabolizing and dissipating the alcohol in the defendant’s blood. We do not believe that the possibility of obtaining a telephonic warrant is sufficient to overcome the single-factor exigent circumstances of the rapid dissipation of alcohol in the defendant’s blood in this case. Shriner also raises the possibility that a blood draw may be taken hours after the accident and that qualified scientists can extrapolate the results back to the time of the accident. But respondent presents no evidence to support this contention and, therefore, we decline to address it.
II.
We hold that when law enforcement has probable cause to believe a defendant has committed the offense of criminal vehicular homicide or operation under Minn. Stat. § 609.21 (2006), it is important that the defendant’s blood be tested within 2 hours of the accident causing injury to or the death of another. The rapid, natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood creates single-factor exigent circumstances that will justify the police taking a warrant-less, nonconsensual blood draw from a defendant, provided that the police have probable cause to believe that defendant [550]*550committed criminal vehicular homicide or operation.
Reversed and remanded.