State v. Shirilla

2026 Ohio 830

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 12, 2026
• Docket: 115101
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Shirilla, 2026-Ohio-830.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 115101 v. :

MACKENZIE SHIRILLA, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 12, 2026

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-23-679612-A

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Tim Troup, Allison McGrath, and Anthony T. Miranda, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.

Friedman, Nemecek, Long & Grant L.L.C. and Eric C. Nemecek, for appellant.

ANITA LASTER MAYS, J.:

Defendant-appellant Mackenzie Shirilla (“Shirilla”) appeals from the

trial court’s entry dismissing her petition for postconviction relief as untimely. For

the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s decision. I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

The underlying convictions stem from a high-speed automobile

collision on July 31, 2022, in Strongsville, Ohio. Shirilla, then 17 years old, drove

her vehicle at speeds reaching 100 miles per hour before striking a brick building,

resulting in the deaths of her two passengers.

Following a bindover hearing in juvenile court and a subsequent

bench trial in the court of common pleas, Shirilla was convicted of four counts of

murder, four counts of felonious assault, and two counts of aggravated vehicular

homicide. She was sentenced to an aggregate term of 15 years to life in prison. This

court affirmed her convictions on direct appeal in State v. Shirilla, 2024-Ohio-4674

(8th Dist.).

During that direct appeal, the trial transcripts were filed on October

23, 2023. Transcripts from the juvenile court bindover proceedings were filed later,

on December 15, 2023.

On October 24, 2024, Shirilla filed a petition for postconviction relief

under R.C. 2953.21. In the direct appeal, the clerk docketed the criminal-trial

transcripts as filed on October 24, 2023. The trial court dismissed the petition as

time-barred on May 1, 2025, concluding it was filed one day past the 365-day

jurisdictional deadline.

II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Shirilla raises the following assignments of error for our review: Assignment of Error 1

The trial court erred when it concluded that the petition to vacate or set aside convictions was untimely.

Assignment of Error 2

Any error in calculating the deadline for filing the petition to vacate or set aside the convictions should be excused.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate an

untimely postconviction petition is a question of law, which this court reviews de

novo. State v. Kennedy, 2024-Ohio-66, ¶ 30 (8th Dist.). Under this standard, we

provide a fresh review of the jurisdictional timeline without deference to the lower

court’s legal conclusions. Id.

IV. LAW AND ANALYSIS

R.C. 2953.21(A)(2)(a) requires a petition for postconviction relief to

be filed no later than 365 days after the date the trial transcript is filed in the court

of appeals in the direct appeal. State v. Johnson, 2024-Ohio-134, ¶ 9. The Supreme

Court of Ohio has reiterated that this deadline is jurisdictional, and an untimely

petition may be entertained only if the petitioner satisfies R.C. 2953.23. State v.

Parker, 2019-Ohio-3848, ¶ 18-19.

A. The “Trial Transcript” Trigger

In Shirilla’s first assignment of error, she contends that the trial court

erred when it concluded that the petition to vacate or set aside convictions were

untimely. Shirilla argues the 365-day clock did not begin until December 15, 2023, when the juvenile bindover transcripts were filed. The State, conversely, maintains

that the clock was triggered on October 24, 2023, the date the clerk noted on the

docket that the trial transcripts from the criminal trial were filed. The State argues

that a “trial” is a proceeding to determine guilt or innocence, and therefore, a

juvenile probable cause hearing does not fall under the statutory definition of a trial.

Even assuming, without deciding, that Shirilla preserved her

timeliness theories for appellate review, Shirilla’s petition remains untimely under

R.C. 2953.21(A)(2)(a) and Shirilla does not satisfy the jurisdictional exceptions in

R.C. 2953.23(A). Under R.C. 2953.23(A)(1), the court may consider such a petition

only if the petitioner shows both that the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from

discovering the facts supporting the claim, or that a new, retroactively applicable

right was recognized after the filing deadline or a prior petition, and that, but for a

constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner guilty

or, in a capital case, eligible for the death penalty. Under R.C. 2953.23(A)(2), the

court may also consider an untimely or successive petition where postconviction

DNA testing, evaluated with all other admissible evidence, establishes by clear and

convincing evidence the petitioner’s actual innocence of the offense or, in a death-

penalty case, of the aggravating circumstance supporting the sentence.

Turning to the merits, the record reflects the trigger date was October

24, 2023, and the deadline for the postconviction relief petition was October 23,

2024. The Ohio Supreme Court reiterated that the deadline for filing a

postconviction petition is tied to the filing of the trial transcript in the direct appeal and that untimely petitions are barred unless the petitioner satisfies the exceptions

under R.C. 2953.23. Johnson, 2024-Ohio-134, at ¶ 9. Similarly, in Parker, the

Court emphasized that the 365-day period begins upon the filing of the trial

transcript in the direct appeal or, if no appeal is taken, upon the expiration of the

time for filing an appeal. Parker, 2019-Ohio-3848, at ¶ 18.

R.C. 2953.21(A)(2)(a) requires that a petition for postconviction relief

“be filed no later than three hundred sixty-five days after the date on which the trial

transcript is filed in the court of appeals in the direct appeal of the judgment of

conviction.” In computing that 365-day period, Ohio’s general computation-of-time

statute applies. Under R.C. 1.14, when a period of time is expressed in days, “the day

of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to run

shall not be included,” but “the last day of the period shall be included,” unless it

falls on a day the public office is closed, in which case the period extends to the next

day the office is open.

Accordingly, putting aside Shirilla’s contention that the calculation

was altered because 2024 was a leap year, the 365-day deadline is determined by

excluding the transcript-filed date and counting forward 365 days, including the

final day.

The statutory deadline is jurisdictional, meaning that a trial court

lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain an untimely petition unless specific

exceptions under R.C. 2953.23 apply. Johnson, 2024-Ohio-134, at ¶ 10; State v.

Pitts, 2023-Ohio-3545, ¶ 23-24 (6th Dist.). R.C. 2953.21(A)(2)(a) specifically refers to the “trial transcript,” not

the complete appellate record or supplemental transcripts. Under the customary

meaning of the words (or phrase) a “trial transcript” refers to the record of the

adjudicatory proceeding in which guilt was determined. State v. Everette, 2011-

Ohio-2856, ¶ 30. A juvenile probable cause hearing is a “preliminary, non-

adjudicatory proceeding” and does not constitute a “trial” for purposes of

R.C. 2953.21. State v. Courts, 2022-Ohio-690, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.). Ohio courts have

consistently held that the filing of transcripts from proceedings other than the trial,

such as suppression hearings, pretrial hearings, or sentencing hearings, does not

extend the 365-day deadline. E.g., State v. Durham, 2012-Ohio-4165, ¶ 5 (8th

Dist.). Shirilla points to State v. Barker, 2016-Ohio-8476 (1st Dist.), to suggest that

a “complete transcript” consisting of multiple parts may delay the start of the 365-

day clock until the final portion is filed. However, Barker is fundamentally

distinguishable from the present matter.

In Barker, the defendant was convicted following the entry of guilty

or no contest pleas, meaning there was no “trial” and, consequently, no “trial

transcript” to trigger the statute. Because the appeal in that case derived from a plea

rather than a trial, the First District found it necessary to look toward the filing of

transcripts that were “objectively necessary” to the record to determine the

triggering date.

Here, Shirilla was convicted following a trial. Unlike the scenario in

Barker, there exists a definitive “trial transcript” for this case, which was filed and noted on the docket by October 24, 2023. The First District distinguished its holding

in Barker from cases that “derived from convictions following a trial,”

acknowledging that other districts “insist on a strict reading of the phrase ‘trial

transcript’” in such instances. Because a trial occurred here, and Shirilla did not

seek leave to supplement the transcripts, the specific “trial transcript” controls the

jurisdictional clock, rendering the supplemental juvenile bindover transcripts

irrelevant for the purpose of the R.C. 2953.21 deadline.

B. The Leap Year Calculation

Having established October 24, 2023, as the triggering date, we must

address the impact of the 2024 leap year. Shirilla argues that the “anniversary date”

of a triggering event should control the deadline, effectively providing 366 days for

filing during a leap year.

This argument is misplaced because of a fundamental difference in

statutory construction. The General Assembly frequently employs the term “one

year” in other contexts to imply a calendar-year period terminating on the same

anniversary date regardless of an intervening leap day. See Schon v. Natl. Tea Co.,

19 Ohio App.2d 222 (7th Dist. 1969). In those cases, the computation of time should

align with the anniversary date, not the number of days elapsed. Crump v. Batie,

2013-Ohio-2345, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.). A “year” terminates on the same anniversary date,

even in a leap year. The court emphasized that the computation of time should align

with the anniversary date, not the number of days elapsed. However, R.C. 2953.21(A)(2)(a) uses the specific term of “three

hundred sixty-five days.” “[O]hio law is clear that PCR petitions must be filed within

365 days after the trial transcript is filed in the court of appeals, not on the date’s

‘one year anniversary.’” State v. Long, 2021-Ohio-3651, ¶ 21 (12th Dist.). In a leap

year, the 365th day falls one calendar day prior to the anniversary of the triggering

event.

Because the statute prescribes a deadline in days, not years, the court

must apply the 365-day count as written. See R.C. 1.14; Pitts, 2023-Ohio-3545, at

¶ 20 (6th Dist.). Counting from October 24, 2023, the 365th day fell on October 23,

2024. Shirilla filed her petition on October 24, 2024, and the petition was therefore

untimely.

C. Jurisdictional Bar and Equitable Tolling

Because the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain

the untimely petition, we need not address whether Shirilla waived any of her

timeliness arguments.

In Shirilla’s second assignment of error, she argues that any error in

calculating the deadline for filing the petition to vacate or set aside the convictions

should be excused under principles of equitable tolling or in the interests of justice.

This argument is not well taken.

Shirilla seeks equitable tolling based on “excusable ignorance” and

the “confused state of the law” regarding leap years, citing federal habeas cases to

support this equitable authority. Shirilla’s reliance on federal habeas equitable tolling principles applicable in federal habeas proceedings do not apply to petitions

for postconviction relief governed by R.C. 2953.21 and 2953.23. See Johnson, 2024-

Ohio-134, at ¶ 9-10; State v. Apanovitch, 2018-Ohio-4744, ¶ 36. Ohio courts have

consistently held that a trial court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate an untimely

petition unless the petitioner satisfies one of the exceptions set forth in R.C. 2953.23.

These exceptions require the petitioner to demonstrate either that they were

unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts necessary to present their claim

or that a new federal or state right recognized by the United States Supreme Court

applies retroactively to their case.

Equitable arguments generally cannot overcome clear jurisdictional

requirements established by the General Assembly. State v. Hundley, 2023-Ohio-

2571, ¶ 14-16 (7th Dist.). There is no constitutional right to a petition for

postconviction relief; the only rights afforded to a defendant in a postconviction

proceeding are those specifically granted by the legislature. State v. Garrett, 2024-

Ohio-1367, ¶ 10-11 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Rackley, 2015-Ohio-4504, ¶ 10 (8th

Dist.). R.C. 2953.23(A) provides two exceptions to the strict statutory time limit.

State v. Borecky, 2020-Ohio-3697, ¶ 24 (11th Dist.).

The first requires a petitioner to show, in part, that his or her claim is

based on a newly recognized federal or state right that arose after the time limit.

R.C. 2953.23(A)(1). Id. The second exception allows a petitioner to file an untimely

postconviction appeal if there are new DNA results in the case. R.C. 2953.23(A)(2). Additionally, the petitioner must also show by clear and convincing

evidence that, but for constitutional error at trial, no reasonable factfinder would

have found her guilty. R.C. 2953.23. Absent satisfaction of these statutory

exceptions, the trial court must dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

R.C. 2953.23.

Here, Shirilla does not contend that she was unavoidably prevented

from discovering the facts upon which her claim relies, nor does she assert a newly

recognized retroactive constitutional right. Likewise, she does not satisfy the DNA-

based actual-innocence exception under R.C. 2953.23(A)(2). Because none of the

statutory exceptions apply, the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to

consider the untimely petition, regardless of any alleged mistake in calculating the

deadline or generalized appeals to fairness.

V. CONCLUSION

Because the filing of a postconviction petition is a jurisdictional act,

and the exceptions for delay set forth in R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a) and (b) are not

satisfied, the trial court lacks the authority to apply equitable tolling to excuse even

a one-day delay. Shirilla’s postconviction relief petition was filed on the 366th day

following the filing of her trial transcript. Accordingly, we find that the trial court

correctly determined it was without jurisdiction to consider the petition.

Finding no error in the trial court’s application of the jurisdictional

365-day mandate, both assignments of error are overruled.

Judgment affirmed. It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

____________________________ ANITA LASTER MAYS, JUDGE

MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, P.J., and EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR