State v. Shipman

Opinion

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA25-682

Filed 17 June 2026

Orange County, Nos. 23CR296604-670, 23CR314075-670, 23CR314542-670, 23CR317688-670, 23CR323429-670

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

FRANKIE EUGENE SHIPMAN, Defendant.

Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 30 January 2025 by Judge R.

Allen Baddour, Jr. in Orange County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals

26 February 2026.

Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Assistant Attorney General Maria B. Lattimore, for the State.

Law Office of Jason R. Page, PLLC, by Jason R. Page, for Defendant–Appellant.

MURRY, Judge.

Frankie E. Shipman (Defendant) appeals from judgments entered upon jury

verdicts finding him guilty of one count of felony stalking and twelve counts of

misdemeanor violation of a domestic violence protective order (DVPO). On appeal,

Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss all

charges for insufficient evidence. For the reasons below, we hold the trial court did STATE V. SHIPMAN

Opinion of the Court

not err by denying Defendant’s motion.

I. Background

Chazzidy Gomez gave birth to her and Defendant’s daughter in October 2016.

Defendant never lived with Ms. Gomez but would visit their daughter “once or twice

a week” for the first six years of the child’s life. In June 2022, after having gone

months without seeing their daughter, Defendant left gifts for her on Ms. Gomez’s

doorstep despite Ms. Gomez’s request that they meet up at a different time for him

to do so. Ms. Gomez observed afterwards that all four tires of her boyfriend’s car,

which was parked close to her apartment, had been slashed with “[b]ig stab wounds.”

Believing that Defendant had slashed the tires, Ms. Gomez applied for a temporary

ex parte DVPO, which the trial court granted on 6 June 2022. The trial court found

that Defendant had “attempted to cause . . . injury” to Ms. Gomez and had placed her

“in fear” of continued harassment. Consequently, the trial court ordered Defendant

to “stay at least 1,000 feet away from [Ms. Gomez]” and their child and “not to contact

[Ms. Gomez] directly or indirectly.”

Although the trial court initially set a domestic violence hearing for June 2022,

the trial court continued the hearing three times between June and September 2022

due to finding that Defendant had not been served with notice of the hearing. The

Wake County Sherrif’s Office finally served Defendant with the summons and a copy

of the ex parte DVPO on 30 August 2022. Following a 20 October 2022 hearing, the

trial court issued a one-year DVPO prohibiting Defendant from contacting Ms.

-2- STATE V. SHIPMAN

Gomez, but Defendant continued to contact her through social media, phone calls,

and text messages. Although Ms. Gomez initially allowed Defendant to contact their

daughter so they could “have a relationship,” she eventually ceased communication

because Defendant was “really unstable” and “unpredictable.”

In April 2023, Defendant messaged Ms. Gomez at 3:00 AM that he would be

coming by her house. In response, she “blocked [her] door with [her] sofa, scared that

he would come in,” and “didn’t sleep that night.” She also sent a screenshot of

Defendant’s message to Wake County Deputy Sheriff Cameron Miller. Defendant

continued to visit Ms. Gomez’s apartment unannounced during May of 2023, leaving

items at her doorstep. Upon finding items from Defendant outside her door and one

of her car tires slashed, Ms. Gomez reported these issues to the police, who

investigated the incident. On 23 May 2023, Defendant drove to Ms. Gomez’s

apartment complex and parked behind her car while she was in it, preventing her

from leaving. Fearful of Defendant’s approach, she called the police as he attempted

to speak with her. A few weeks later, Defendant threatened Ms. Gomez’s boyfriend

through social media. In June 2023, Ms. Gomez moved to renew the DVPO, which

the trial court granted for a two-year term on 13 July 2023, finding that “Defendant

continues to harass and destroy [Ms. Gomez’s] property” and she “still needs

protection.”

On 30 October 2023, a grand jury indicted Defendant for one count of felony

stalking and fifteen counts of violating a DVPO. The matter came on for trial on 27

-3- STATE V. SHIPMAN

January 2025. At trial, Ms. Gomez testified to Defendant’s numerous instances of

contact with her in violation of the DVPO and to being “in fear” of Defendant due to

his repeated threats and harassment, slashing the tires of her boyfriend’s car, and

“coming to [her] house unannounced.” She claimed that Defendant’s conduct “scared”

her because “he’[d] threatened [her] with guns” prior to her obtaining the DVPO.

Deputy Miller testified to his compilation of Ms. Gomez’s domestic violence report

and to personally serving Defendant with copies of the ex parte DVPO and notice of

hearing. The assistant clerk of court testified that the clerk’s office mailed Defendant

a copy of the one-year permanent DVPO to the address on file for him in accordance

with standard procedure.

Defendant testified in his own defense that he never received a copy of the

DVPO and did not know of its existence. Despite this assertion, he admitted to

sending Facebook messages to a friend regarding “a letter [sent] to [his] mom’s house

from the police . . . talking about some domestic.” He also acknowledged that the trial

court’s address on file for him “was [his] mom’s old address” and affirmed that he had

lived with his mother in the past. Defendant moved to dismiss all charges against

him for insufficient evidence at the close of the State’s evidence and again at the close

of all evidence. The trial court denied both motions. The jury returned verdicts finding

Defendant guilty of one count of felony stalking and twelve counts of misdemeanor

DVPO violation. The trial court sentenced Defendant to 16–23 months but suspended

the sentence for 24 months of supervised probation. Defendant timely appealed.

-4- STATE V. SHIPMAN

II. Jurisdiction

This Court has jurisdiction over Defendant’s appeal from the trial court’s

denial of his motion to dismiss because it is a final judgment under N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-27,

15A-1444. See N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(b) (2025) (final judgment of a trial court); id.

§ 15A-1444(a) (pleaded not guilty but found guilty).

III. Analysis

Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss

because the State failed to provide substantial evidence at trial that Defendant had

notice of the DVPO and that a reasonable person in Ms. Gomez’s circumstances would

have feared for her safety or suffered emotional distress. This Court reviews a trial

court’s denial of a motion to dismiss de novo to determine “[w]hether the State

presented substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense” charged.

State v. Tucker, 380 N.C. 234, 236 (2022) (quotation omitted). In doing so, we consider

whether “more than a scintilla of evidence” supports “each essential element of the

offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein,” and the “defendant’s being

the perpetrator of such offense.” Id. at 236–37 (quotations omitted). We “view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of all

reasonable inferences. Contradictions and discrepancies do not warrant dismissal of

the case but are for the jury to resolve.” State v. Barnes, 334 N.C. 67, 75 (1993)

(citation omitted). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we

-5- STATE V. SHIPMAN

hold that the trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss for the

reasons discussed below.

A. Notice

First, Defendant argues that the State failed to provide substantial evidence

at trial that he had notice of the DVPO. To establish a DVPO violation, the State

must show that the defendant “knowingly” “violated” “a valid domestic violence

protective order.” State v. Williams, 226 N.C. App. 393, 406 (2013). Knowingly “means

that [the] defendant knew what he was about to do, and, with such knowledge,

proceeded to do the act charged.” Id. (quotation omitted). Our Rules of Civil Procedure

allow service of an order on a pro se party “[b]y mailing a copy to the party at the

party’s last known address or, if no address is known, by filing it with the clerk of

court.” N.C. R. Civ. P. 5(b). “Adequacy of notice is a question of law” reviewed de novo.

Barnett v. King, 134 N.C. App. 348, 350 (1999).

Although Defendant claims to lack knowledge of the DVPO due to improper

service, the evidence at trial demonstrates otherwise. Deputy Miller, who had

investigated Ms. Gomez’s domestic violence report, testified that the Wake County

Sheriff’s Office served Defendant personally with a copy of the initial ex parte DVPO

and a notice of the DVPO hearing on 30 August 2022. The trial court admitted both

documents into evidence. The assistant clerk of court testified to mailing the resulting

order in accordance with standard operating procedure. She further testified that the

clerk’s office mailed Defendant a copy of the one-year permanent DVPO “based on the

-6- STATE V. SHIPMAN

procedure.” Defendant admitted to sending Facebook messages to a friend regarding

“a letter [sent] to [his] mom’s house from the police . . . talking about some domestic.”

Defendant stated that he “believe[d]” the address on file for him “was [his] mom’s old

address” and affirmed that he had lived with his mother in the past. Viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we hold that the State properly

showed Defendant’s knowledge of the DVPO. See Barnes, 334 N.C. at 75. Thus, the

trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss on this ground.

B. Reasonable Fear

Second, Defendant argues that the State failed to provide substantial evidence

that a reasonable person in Ms. Gomez’s circumstances would have feared for her

safety or suffered emotional distress. Under North Carolina law, a defendant commits

“stalking” when he “willfully on more than one occasion harasses another person

without legal purpose” and “knows or should know that the harassment . . . would

cause a reasonable person to . . . [f]ear for [her] . . . safety” or “[s]uffer substantial

emotional distress by placing [her] . . . in fear of death, bodily injury, or continued

harassment.” N.C.G.S. § 14-277.3A(c). The statute defines harassment as “[k]nowing

conduct . . . directed at a specific person that torments, terrorizes, or terrifies that

person and that serves no legitimate purpose.” Id. § 14-277.3A(b)(2). We have

explained that incriminating communication “generally . . . involve[s] some type of

habitual stalking with numerous instances of contact over a period of time.” State v.

Wooten, 206 N.C. App. 494, 499–500 (2010) (quotation omitted); see Williams, 226

-7- STATE V. SHIPMAN

N.C. App. at 397 (requiring “continuing course of conduct” to prove stalking).

Here, Ms. Gomez testified that Defendant made social-media comments that

“felt like . . . a threat” and “scared” her because “he’[d] threatened [her] with guns”

prior to her obtaining the DVPO. She voiced her concerns that Defendant’s conduct

“was escalating and . . . seemed irrational” and claimed she was “in fear” of him due

to his slashing the tires of her boyfriend’s car and “coming to [her] house

unannounced.” She also testified to calling 911 from her car “immediately” after

Defendant approached her in front of her house because she “didn’t know how angry

he was at [her] and . . . it was scary.” When asked why she filed a motion to renew

the DVPO, Ms. Gomez answered that Defendant “was still doing the same thing[s]”

that put her “in fear” of him and that she was afraid of “[h]im hurting [her].” Her

motion to renew recounts how Defendant “continuously reached out to [her] through

texts, phone calls[,] and different social media platforms” and an incident where he

“blocked [her] car in . . . and started to try to talk to [her].”

In its order renewing the DVPO, the trial court found that “Defendant

continues to harass and destroy [Ms. Gomez’s] property” and that she “still needs

protection.” The trial court further found that Defendant had “sen[t Ms. Gomez] a

video of guns to intimidate” her, sent “multiple harassing phone calls and social

media messages,” and “threw an object at [Ms. Gomez] and the minor child as they

were walking away from Defendant” on one occasion. The evidence at trial shows

Defendant’s pattern of threats and harassment towards Ms. Gomez, with “numerous

-8- STATE V. SHIPMAN

instances” of unwanted contact that caused her emotional distress and which would

have caused a reasonable person in her position to fear for her safety. Wooten, 206

N.C. App. at 500.

Defendant mischaracterizes his conduct as serving a legal purpose because he

was “attempt[ing] to contact his daughter.” But his threatening social-media

comments and messages did not mention his daughter or relate to her in any way.

Ms. Gomez testified that Defendant asked her out on a date, which she refused, and

had gone “months” without seeing their daughter prior to her seeking the DVPO. She

also testified that, even though she wanted her daughter to maintain a father–

daughter relationship with Defendant, she eventually ceased communication with

him “because it seemed like every time [they] would try, it would escalate from being

just about [their daughter] to it being other things.” Defendant’s numerous instances

of harassment served no legitimate purpose, and the State presented substantial

evidence that a reasonable person in Ms. Gomez’s circumstances would have suffered

emotional distress and feared for her safety. Thus, we hold that the trial court did not

err by denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, this Court holds that the trial court did not

NO ERROR.

-9- STATE V. SHIPMAN

Judges HAMPSON and WOOD concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).

- 10 -