State v. Shimits
This text of 461 N.E.2d 1278 (State v. Shimits) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
The position taken by the appellant in its second proposition of law, supported by the appellate minority, is that evidence of ownership of an automobile or other vehicle in a forfeiture proceeding under R.C. 2925.13(D) is limited by law to the “certificate of title,” and that ownership could not be established in any other manner to avoid forfeiture. However, such construction is unnecessarily restrictive and would contradict the principles set forth in State v. Emmons (1978), 57 Ohio App. 2d 173 [11 O.O.3d 173], and State v. Rhodes (1982), 2 Ohio St. 3d 74.
Initially, we must conclude that the provisions of R.C. 4505.04 were designed to protect title as between true and fraudulent title claimants and to create an instrument evidencing title to and ownership of motor vehicles. Hughes v. Al Green, Inc. (1981), 65 Ohio St. 2d 110, 115 [19 O.O.3d 307], We do not hold that the legislature intended for said section to be construed to effectively deprive equitable owners of their interest in a vehicle where that vehicle may be forfeited to the state.
The circumstances in this cause place it among narrowly drawn case-law exceptions, along with theft and fraud, involving “equitable ownership.” Though we reaffirm that concept today, and thereby reject appellant’s second proposition of law, we further find that the issue raised is not necessary to the resolution of this cause.
The person to whom a “certificate of title” to the automobile in question was issued, Louis Shimits, was the operator of the vehicle during its use in the commission of a felony drug abuse offense, in violation of R.C. 2925.13(A). The vehicle was, in fact, seized by the Parma Police Department and Shimits was convicted of violating R.C. 2925.13(A). R.C. 2925.13(D), in pertinent part, provides:
“Vehicles used in violation of division (A) of this section shall be seized and forfeited to the municipal corporation * * *. Forfeiture shall not apply to * * * innocent owners * * (Emphasis added.)
The statutory framework is clear. When a person knowingly permits a vehicle to be used for the commission of a felony drug abuse offense in violation of R.C. 2925.13(A), that vehicle “shall be” seized and forfeited upon proper motion. R.C. 2925.13(D). The seized vehicle shall not be forfeited where there is an “innocent owner” of the vehicle. Once the court determines that the vehicle is to be forfeited, R.C. 2933.41(D)4 details the various [86]*86dispositional alternatives for the court and R.C. 2933.41(E)5 explains exactly how any proceeds generated by the disposition of forfeited property are to be distributed.. After a determination has been made that the vehicle is to be forfeited, R.C. 2933.41(D) and 2933.41(E) are absolute and there are no statutory exceptions.
The problem in this case is that the trial court made contradictory findings. First, it determined that the third-party claimants were “innocent owners” by virtue of an equitable ownership interest, and then it ordered the vehicle “forfeited” and sold. The court further ordered, under the guise of “doing equity,” that the proceeds generated by the sale of the vehicle were to be split between the third-party claimants and the appellant. This was improper.
As R.C. 2925.13(D) currently stands, if an “innocent owner” exists, then forfeiture “shall not apply.” This can only mean that a seized vehicle must be returned to an innocent owner. If forfeiture is ordered, then the court has implicitly determined that no innocent owners exist and the relevant municipal corporation is entitled to all of the proceeds generated by the disposition of the forfeited property. R.C. 2933.41(E). We hold that the trial court has no authority, under either R.C. 2933.41 or 2925.13, to order an “equitable distribution” of the proceeds generated by the disposition of a vehicle seized [87]*87pursuant to R.C. 2925.13 once the court has declared the vehicle “forfeited.”6
Though the trial court found the third-party claimants to be “innocent owners,” it is clear that it did not believe their equitable interest was strong enough to prevent the forfeiture and sale of the seized vehicle. Accordingly, we must find that, upon ordering forfeiture, the trial court erred by not following the legislative directive of R.C. 2933.41(E) and by not ordering that all of the proceeds generated by the sale of the seized vehicle be distributed to the city of Parma.
To summarize, we hold that where a vehicle used in violation of R.C. 2925.13(A) is seized by law enforcement authorities, and a motion is made by the state to order the vehicle forfeited pursuant to either R.C. 2933.41 or 2925.13, and third parties enter the action claiming to be “innocent owners” of the vehicle, the trial court has two options: the court may find that the vehicle is “forfeited” and follow the dispositional alternatives provided in R.C. 2933.41, or the court may find the third parties to be “innocent owners” of the vehicles, in which case the forfeiture provisions “shall not apply” and the vehicle shall be returned to the innocent owners.
Further, in determining whether a third party is an innocent owner, evidence establishing an equitable ownership interest is admissible.
Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeals is reversed and this cause is remanded to the trial court so that it may order that the proceeds of the sale of the forfeited vehicle be placed in the general fund of the city of Parma.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
461 N.E.2d 1278, 10 Ohio St. 3d 83, 10 Ohio B. 413, 1984 Ohio LEXIS 1069, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-shimits-ohio-1984.