[Cite as State v. Sherman, 2025-Ohio-976.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-240472 TRIAL NO. B-2301861 Plaintiff-Appellee, :
vs. :
IAN SHERMAN, : OPINION
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: March 21, 2025
Connie M. Pillich, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Candace Crear, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Derek W. Gustafson, for Defendant-Appellant. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
MOORE, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Ian Sherman appeals the trial court’s denial of his
motion for jail-time credit, arguing the court failed to apply 119 days of the 269 days
he was confined pending a 2022 conviction for having weapons while under a
disability (“WUD”) to the sentence he received for a 2023 WUD conviction.
{¶2} In revoking Sherman’s community control and imposing 18-month
sentences on both matters, the trial court correctly applied jail-time credit to both
sentences. Sherman’s 2023 WUD case was unrelated to the other WUD case. In fact,
the 2023 WUD case did not exist during the time Sherman was confined prior to the
2022 WUD conviction and it stemmed from a different disability. It is improper to
apply jail-time credit to a sentence in an unrelated case. For that reason, we affirm the
trial court’s judgment.
I. Factual and Procedural History
{¶3} In November 2021, Sherman was charged with WUD, a third-degree
felony, in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), in the case numbered B-2105742. Sherman
had been held for 269 days in jail before being found guilty in March 2022 and
sentenced to three years of community control.
{¶4} In June 2023, Sherman was convicted of a new WUD offense in the case
numbered B-2301861, a third-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2). He
was held for 150 days in jail prior to that conviction. As Sherman was still under
community control for the 2022 conviction, he was sentenced to a new period of
community control. The terms were to be served concurrently.
{¶5} In September 2023, Sherman was charged with violating community
control under both the B-2105742 and B-2301861 cases for “possession and hav[ing]
access to several firearms during a home contact.” The trial court revoked the
2 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
community control imposed in both cases and sentenced Sherman to concurrent 18-
month prison terms. Sherman received jail-time credit for the 150 days he served prior
to being convicted in the case numbered B-2301861.
{¶6} In the case numbered B-2105742, he received credit for the 269 days he
served prior to being convicted in that case in February 2022.
{¶7} Sherman filed a motion for jail-time credit, asserting he should have
received the same jail-time credit in both prison terms because his sentences were to
run concurrently. The trial court denied his motion, finding (1) State v. Fugate, 2008-
Ohio-856, and R.C. 2967.191 do not require “that a defendant be given additional days
of credit for the time he served in jail pretrial on another, unrelated offense, and unlike
in Fugate, Sherman was awarded credit in both sentences (2).”
{¶8} This appeal followed.
II. Analysis
A. Mootness
{¶9} Before we can address Sherman’s assignments of error, we must first
determine whether his appeal is moot as he was released from prison in November
2024. He remains under postrelease control.
{¶10} Generally, an offender who has completed his sentence must sustain his
burden of demonstrating a collateral disability or loss of civil rights stemming from
that conviction. State v. Wilson, 41 Ohio St.2d 236, 237 (1975). Demonstrating a
collateral disability would satisfy this burden.
{¶11} A collateral disability is an adverse legal consequence of a conviction or
judgment that survives despite the court’s sentence having been satisfied or served.
State v. O’Mara, 2024-Ohio-757, ¶ 23 (2d Dist.). Felony convictions result in
collateral disabilities as a matter of law. State v. Golston, 71 Ohio St.3d 224, 227-228
3 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
(1994).
{¶12} Ohio courts have held that an offender who has completed his or her
sentence but is under postrelease control satisfies this burden of demonstrating an
adverse consequence and defeats the mootness argument. See State v. Ambriez, 2005-
Ohio-5877, ¶ 10 (6th Dist.) (Appeal was moot where appellant only challenged his
sentence and not his convictions, and distinguishing Golston, was not subject to
postrelease control.); State v. Ysrael, 2015-Ohio-332, ¶ 13-15 (1st Dist.) (There was no
remedy available to Ysreal because he had challenged his conviction but not his
completed sentence and was not subject to postrelease control.); State v. Hatfield,
2019-Ohio-3291, ¶ 16-17 (2d Dist.) (No remedy to afford where appellant had been
released from prison and was not under postrelease control.).
{¶13} Accordingly, this matter is not moot as Sherman is under postrelease
control.
B. The trial court appropriately applied the jail-time credit
{¶14} Although this appeal is not moot, it fails on the merits.
{¶15} In his sole assignment of error, Sherman argues the trial court erred in
declining to award him the same jail-time credit in the case numbered B-2301861 as
it did in the case numbered B-2105742. He contends the WUD charges arose from the
same disability and his prison sentences under both cases were ordered to run
concurrently. Sherman asserts having been confined “in excess of the sentence
imposed” is a violation of his equal-protection rights.
{¶16} R.C. 2967.191(A) provides relevant in part,
The department of rehabilitation and correction shall reduce the prison
term of a prisoner . . . by the total number of days that the prisoner was
confined for any reason arising out of the offense for which the prisoner
4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
was convicted and sentenced, including confinement in lieu of bail while
awaiting trial.
{¶17} The Ohio Supreme Court stated that the objective is to comply with “the
requirements of equal protection by reducing the total time that offenders spend in
prison after sentencing by an amount equal to the time that they were previously held.”
Fugate, 2008-Ohio-856, at ¶ 11. Sherman cites Fugate in support of his argument, but
he misconstrues the holding as applied to his case.
{¶18} In Fugate, the Ohio Supreme Court considered the calculation of jail-
time credit for concurrent sentences under R.C. 2967.191. In Fugate’s underlying
criminal case, he was held in custody prior to being sentenced on charges for burglary,
theft, and a community-control violation. Id. at ¶ 2. Fugate was sentenced to
concurrent prison terms upon his conviction of those charges. Id. However, Fugate
only received jail-time credit for the prison term for the community-control violation.
Id. Reviewing Fugate’s contention on appeal that he was entitled to additional jail-
time credit, the Court held that, “R.C. 2967.191 requires that jail-time credit be applied
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[Cite as State v. Sherman, 2025-Ohio-976.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-240472 TRIAL NO. B-2301861 Plaintiff-Appellee, :
vs. :
IAN SHERMAN, : OPINION
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: March 21, 2025
Connie M. Pillich, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Candace Crear, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Derek W. Gustafson, for Defendant-Appellant. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
MOORE, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Ian Sherman appeals the trial court’s denial of his
motion for jail-time credit, arguing the court failed to apply 119 days of the 269 days
he was confined pending a 2022 conviction for having weapons while under a
disability (“WUD”) to the sentence he received for a 2023 WUD conviction.
{¶2} In revoking Sherman’s community control and imposing 18-month
sentences on both matters, the trial court correctly applied jail-time credit to both
sentences. Sherman’s 2023 WUD case was unrelated to the other WUD case. In fact,
the 2023 WUD case did not exist during the time Sherman was confined prior to the
2022 WUD conviction and it stemmed from a different disability. It is improper to
apply jail-time credit to a sentence in an unrelated case. For that reason, we affirm the
trial court’s judgment.
I. Factual and Procedural History
{¶3} In November 2021, Sherman was charged with WUD, a third-degree
felony, in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), in the case numbered B-2105742. Sherman
had been held for 269 days in jail before being found guilty in March 2022 and
sentenced to three years of community control.
{¶4} In June 2023, Sherman was convicted of a new WUD offense in the case
numbered B-2301861, a third-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2). He
was held for 150 days in jail prior to that conviction. As Sherman was still under
community control for the 2022 conviction, he was sentenced to a new period of
community control. The terms were to be served concurrently.
{¶5} In September 2023, Sherman was charged with violating community
control under both the B-2105742 and B-2301861 cases for “possession and hav[ing]
access to several firearms during a home contact.” The trial court revoked the
2 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
community control imposed in both cases and sentenced Sherman to concurrent 18-
month prison terms. Sherman received jail-time credit for the 150 days he served prior
to being convicted in the case numbered B-2301861.
{¶6} In the case numbered B-2105742, he received credit for the 269 days he
served prior to being convicted in that case in February 2022.
{¶7} Sherman filed a motion for jail-time credit, asserting he should have
received the same jail-time credit in both prison terms because his sentences were to
run concurrently. The trial court denied his motion, finding (1) State v. Fugate, 2008-
Ohio-856, and R.C. 2967.191 do not require “that a defendant be given additional days
of credit for the time he served in jail pretrial on another, unrelated offense, and unlike
in Fugate, Sherman was awarded credit in both sentences (2).”
{¶8} This appeal followed.
II. Analysis
A. Mootness
{¶9} Before we can address Sherman’s assignments of error, we must first
determine whether his appeal is moot as he was released from prison in November
2024. He remains under postrelease control.
{¶10} Generally, an offender who has completed his sentence must sustain his
burden of demonstrating a collateral disability or loss of civil rights stemming from
that conviction. State v. Wilson, 41 Ohio St.2d 236, 237 (1975). Demonstrating a
collateral disability would satisfy this burden.
{¶11} A collateral disability is an adverse legal consequence of a conviction or
judgment that survives despite the court’s sentence having been satisfied or served.
State v. O’Mara, 2024-Ohio-757, ¶ 23 (2d Dist.). Felony convictions result in
collateral disabilities as a matter of law. State v. Golston, 71 Ohio St.3d 224, 227-228
3 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
(1994).
{¶12} Ohio courts have held that an offender who has completed his or her
sentence but is under postrelease control satisfies this burden of demonstrating an
adverse consequence and defeats the mootness argument. See State v. Ambriez, 2005-
Ohio-5877, ¶ 10 (6th Dist.) (Appeal was moot where appellant only challenged his
sentence and not his convictions, and distinguishing Golston, was not subject to
postrelease control.); State v. Ysrael, 2015-Ohio-332, ¶ 13-15 (1st Dist.) (There was no
remedy available to Ysreal because he had challenged his conviction but not his
completed sentence and was not subject to postrelease control.); State v. Hatfield,
2019-Ohio-3291, ¶ 16-17 (2d Dist.) (No remedy to afford where appellant had been
released from prison and was not under postrelease control.).
{¶13} Accordingly, this matter is not moot as Sherman is under postrelease
control.
B. The trial court appropriately applied the jail-time credit
{¶14} Although this appeal is not moot, it fails on the merits.
{¶15} In his sole assignment of error, Sherman argues the trial court erred in
declining to award him the same jail-time credit in the case numbered B-2301861 as
it did in the case numbered B-2105742. He contends the WUD charges arose from the
same disability and his prison sentences under both cases were ordered to run
concurrently. Sherman asserts having been confined “in excess of the sentence
imposed” is a violation of his equal-protection rights.
{¶16} R.C. 2967.191(A) provides relevant in part,
The department of rehabilitation and correction shall reduce the prison
term of a prisoner . . . by the total number of days that the prisoner was
confined for any reason arising out of the offense for which the prisoner
4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
was convicted and sentenced, including confinement in lieu of bail while
awaiting trial.
{¶17} The Ohio Supreme Court stated that the objective is to comply with “the
requirements of equal protection by reducing the total time that offenders spend in
prison after sentencing by an amount equal to the time that they were previously held.”
Fugate, 2008-Ohio-856, at ¶ 11. Sherman cites Fugate in support of his argument, but
he misconstrues the holding as applied to his case.
{¶18} In Fugate, the Ohio Supreme Court considered the calculation of jail-
time credit for concurrent sentences under R.C. 2967.191. In Fugate’s underlying
criminal case, he was held in custody prior to being sentenced on charges for burglary,
theft, and a community-control violation. Id. at ¶ 2. Fugate was sentenced to
concurrent prison terms upon his conviction of those charges. Id. However, Fugate
only received jail-time credit for the prison term for the community-control violation.
Id. Reviewing Fugate’s contention on appeal that he was entitled to additional jail-
time credit, the Court held that, “R.C. 2967.191 requires that jail-time credit be applied
to all prison terms imposed for charges on which the offender has been held,” and “[s]o
long as an offender is held on a charge while awaiting trial or sentencing, the offender
is entitled to jail-time credit for that sentence.” Id. ¶ 12.
{¶19} Sherman was not being held in the case numbered B-2301861 when he
served the 269 days in the case numbered B-2105742—in fact, the case numbered B-
2301861 did not even exist at that time. Instead, each WUD charge levied against
Sherman was based on different facts and involved different time periods and different
disabilities. Therefore, any jail-time days Sherman served in the case numbered B-
2105742 only applies to the sentence imposed for that WUD conviction—“the sentence
corresponding to the offense for which the prisoner was confined before receiving that
5 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
sentence.” State ex rel. Moody v. Dir., Ohio Bur. of Sentence Computation, 2024-
Ohio-5231, ¶ 9. That jail time does not apply to Sherman’s 18-month sentence imposed
for the WUD conviction in the case numbered B-2301861 because it is a different
criminal offense in a different case. Additionally, jail-time credit is not “additive” and
does not automatically apply to “to each concurrent sentence.” Id.
{¶20} The trial court did not err in denying Sherman’s motion for jail-time
credits so no equal-protection violation occurred, and therefore, we overrule
appellant’s sole assignment of error.
III. Conclusion
{¶21} The trial court followed Fugate and properly applied the appropriate
jail-time credit to each of Sherman’s 18-month prison sentences. Therefore, we affirm
the trial court’s judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
CROUSE, P.J., and NESTOR, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.