State v. Sheriff

• Court: Montana Supreme Court
• Decided: April 28, 1980
• Docket: 14824
• Status: Published

Opinion

No. 14824 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980

STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, VS.

DALE A SHERIFF, Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Honorable Charles Luedke, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Stacey and Nye, Billings, Montana Calvin J. Stacey argued, Billings, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana John Maynard argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Harold Hanser, County Attorney, Billings, Montana

Submitted: February 20, 1980 Decided: APR 2 ; 1280 fi .-'- Filed: -- .- ,I_/ Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court.

c his is an appeal arising out of defendant's conviction of the crimes of attempted deliberate homicide and aggra- vated burglary in the District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, in and for the County of Yellowstone, the Honorable Charles Luedke presiding. The facts as presented by the parties upon appeal are the following: On the night of June 26, 1978, Ms. Joyce Ann Lamb awoke in the bedroom of her Billings, Montana, resi- dence to find a man standing beside her in the dark. She immediately screamed at the sight of the man, and the man, in response also screamed. The man then proceeded to her bed and positioned himself so that he was straddled over her. In an effort to seek the help of her neighbors, Ms. Lamb began hitting her hand against the wall. The man then struck her and continued striking her for approximately one minute, at which time he raised up, backed against a closet, stood and looked at her, and finally turned and ran out of the room. The man apparently had difficulty in leaving the residence, because Ms. Lamb heard him hit something as he went through the back door. At this point, Ms. Lamb rea- lized that she was bleeding. She left her house, sought help from her neighbors, and was taken to the hospital, where it was determined that she suffered 11 stab wounds in total. Sometime later, an officer of the Billings Police Department stopped the defendant after a tip had been ob- tained from one of Ms. Lamb's neighbors that a man had just been seen peeking into her windows. The defendant was asked

for his identification, and, after some brief questioning, w a s released. A t t h e t i m e o f t h e s t o p , d e f e n d a n t had a

knife attached t o h i s belt. Defendant's residence w a s later

s e a r c h e d by t h e p o l i c e p u r s u a n t t o d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n s e n t .

Upon t h e b a s i s o f t h e s e a r c h , d e f e n d a n t w a s t a k e n i n t o

c u s t o d y and a d v i s e d of h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s . A t the

p o l i c e s t a t i o n , d e f e n d a n t gave a s t a t e m e n t t o t h e p o l i c e

which r e f l e c t e d t h a t h e had been a t M s . Lamb's r e s i d e n c e

t h a t n i g h t , b u t t h a t h e c o u l d n o t remember h i t t i n g h e r o r

s t a b b i n g h e r , o r , f o r t h a t m a t t e r , h a v i n g any involvement i n

t h e c r i m e . Defendant a l s o s t a t e d t h a t he d i d have a k n i f e ,

t h a t he always c a r r i e d i t w i t h him, and t h a t he washed i t

o f f and p l a c e d i t i n a drawer u n d e r n e a t h t h e t e l e v i s i o n

a f t e r r e t u r n i n g home t h a t n i g h t .

Defendant was c h a r g e d by i n f o r m a t i o n on J u l y 5 , 1978

w i t h t h e c r i m e s o f a t t e m p t ( d e l i b e r a t e homicide) and a g g r a -

vated burglary. Defendant e n t e r e d a p l e a of n o t g u i l t y t o

b o t h c h a r g e s , and t r i a l was h e l d on F e b r u a r y 26, 1979. The

j u r y r e t u r n e d a v e r d i c t of g u i l t y w i t h r e s p e c t t o b o t h

c h a r g e s , and d e f e n d a n t was s e n t e n c e d t o a 50 y e a r s e n t e n c e

f o r t h e crime of a t t e m p t and a 20 y e a r s e n t e n c e f o r t h e

c r i m e of a g g r a v a t e d b u r g l a r y , s a i d t e r m s t o be s e r v e d con-

currently. From t h e s e judgments, d e f e n d a n t a p p e a l s .

Defendant o r i g i n a l l y r a i s e d two i s s u e s f o r o u r con-

s i d e r a t i o n upon t h i s a p p e a l . However, d u r i n g o r a l argument,

c o u n s e l f o r d e f e n d a n t a d m i t t e d t h a t o n e of t h e s e i s s u e s had

been r e s o l v e d by t h i s C o u r t i n a p r i o r d e c i s i o n . Thus, we

f i n d it only necessary t o consider t h e remaining issue-- whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n g i v i n g t h e f o l l o w i n g i n -

s t r u c t i o n t o t h e jury:

" I f you f i n d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t , D a l e A. S h e r i f f , a t t e m p t e d t o commit a homicide and no circum- s t a n c e s of m i t i g a t i o n , e x c u s e o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n a p p e a r , t h e n you may i n f e r t h a t t h e a t t e m p t e d homicide was committed knowingly o r p u r p o s e l y . "

A t t h e o u t s e t , w e n o t e two o b s e r v a t i o n s w i t h r e s p e c t t o

t h e above i n s t r u c t i o n . The f i r s t i s t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n

g o e s o n l y t o t h e c r i m e o f a t t e m p t e d d e l i b e r a t e homicide and

n o t t o t h e crime of aggravated burglary. D e f e n d a n t ' s con-

v i c t i o n of t h e l a t t e r c h a r g e must, t h e r e f o r e , s t a n d . The

second i s t h a t w e have p r e v i o u s l y d e c i d e d i n a n o t h e r c a s e

t h a t an i n s t r u c t i o n i d e n t i c a l t o t h e one challenged h e r e w a s

n o t e r r o r i n t h e c o n t e x t of o t h e r i n s t r u c t i o n s g i v e n . See,

S t a t e v . Coleman (1979) Mont. - 1 - P.2d 36

St.Rep. 2237. Although Coleman may t h e r e f o r e have p e r s u a s i v e

a p p l i c a t i o n t o t h i s c a s e , t h e r e s t i l l r e m a i n s t h e need f o r

t h i s C o u r t t o i n d e p e n d e n t l y d e t e r m i n e t h e e f f e c t of t h e

c h a l l e n g e d i n s t r u c t i o n i n t h e c o n t e x t of t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s

given here.

D e f e n d a n t ' s s o l e c o n t e n t i o n upon t h i s a p p e a l i s t h a t

t h e i n s t r u c t i o n , on t h e b a s i s of Sandstrom v . Montana

(1979) 1 U.S. 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39, h a s

t h e e f f e c t o f r e l i e v i n g t h e S t a t e o f i t s burden t o p r o v e

e a c h and e v e r y e l e m e n t o f t h e o f f e n s e beyond a r e a s o n a b l e

d o u b t o r s h i f t i n g t h e burden o f proof t o t h e d e f e n d a n t .

The t h r e s h o l d i n q u i r y i n a s c e r t a i n i n g whether t h e S t a t e

h a s been r e l i e v e d o f i t s burden of p r o o f , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e

U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t i n Sandstrom, r e q u i r e s " c a r e f u l

a t t e n t i o n t o t h e words a c t u a l l y spoken t o t h e j u r y . . . for whether a d e f e n d a n t h a s been a c c o r d e d h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l

r i g h t s depends upon t h e way i n which a r e a s o n a b l e j u r y c o u l d

have i n t e r p r e t e d t h e i n s t r u c t i o n . " Sandstrom, 99 S 0 C t . a t

3453, 61 L.Ed.2d a t 45. I n Sandstrom, t h e j u r y was i n s t r u c t e d

t h a t " t h e l a w presumes t h a t a p e r s o n i n t e n d s t h e o r d i n a r y

consequences of h i s v o l u n t a r y a c t s . " This i n s t r u c t i o n related to a presumption of law and was mandatory by its very terms. There was no discretion allowed on the part of the jurors. In contrast, the jurors were told here that they "may infer" a material element of the crime, namely that the attempted homicide was committed knowingly or purposely. This instruction referred to an inference of fact and was, by its express terms, permissive. Ulster County Court v. Allen (1979), U.S. , 99 S.Ct. 2213, 60 L.Ed.2d 777. The jurors were given discretion with re- spect to the finding of intent and were free to follow or not to follow the instruction. The language of the in- struction, did not involve either a conclusive or burden- shifting presumption, as was involved in Mullaney v. Wilbur (1975)r 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508; Sandstrom, supra; or Morrissette v. United States (1952), 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288. Nor did the instruction have the effect of allocating to the defendant some part of the burden of proof that properly rested on the State throughout the trial. That the burden remained on the State in proving the elements of the offense is made clear by the other instruc- tions given by the trial court in this case. On appeal, we consider the instructions as a whole. State v. Farnes (1976)t 171 Mont. 368, 558 P.2d 472. "The whole of the law on a subject cannot be given in one instruction. In determining the effect of given instructions, all instruc- tions must be considered as a whole and if they fairly tender the case to the jury, the fact that one or more instructions, standing alone, is not as full or accurate as it might have been is not reversible error. [Cita- tions omitted.]" State v. Caryl (1975), 168 Mont. 414, 430, 543 P.2d 389, 398. Here, Instruction No. 21 stated that, in order to sustain the charge of attempted deliberate homicide, the State had to prove intent as one of the elements of the offense. Instruction No. 2 provided that the defendant was afforded a presumption of innocence and that the burden of proof was upon the prosecution to establish every material allegation of the information beyond a reasonable doubt. Instruction No. 5 reiterated the defendant's presumption of innocence. Instruction No. 10 stated that the defendant could not be convicted on conjecture, probability or sus- picion, but rather only on evidence which established his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Instruction No. 12 stated in pertinent part: "In order to prove the charge of COUNT I: ATTEMPT (FELONY) and COUNT 11: AGGRAVATED BURGLARY as alleged in the Information, the State must prove beyond g reasonable doubt -- element of that each the offense, all necessarily included offenses, - - - -

was committed or perpetrated knowingly by the defendant as a?oluntary act.

"Purpose or knowledge are manifested & - - the cir- cumstance~connectedwith the offense -- -- and need - - proved - - direct evidence but m x be not be by the inferred -- conduct, and circumstances from acts, appearing - evidence. in "There are two classes of evidence recognized and admitted in courts in the State of Montana. One is 'direct evidence,' the other is 'circumstantial evidence.' In 'direct evidence' the witnesses testify directly of their own knowledge of the main fact or facts to be proved, while 'circumstantial evidence' is the proof of certain facts and circumstances in a given case from which the jury may infer other connecting facts which usually and reasonably follow according - - common experiences of mankind. . ." to the - (Emphasis added.) Instruction No. 7 also provided: "Where the case of the State rests substantially or entirely on circumstantial evidence, you are not permitted to find the defendant guilty of any crime charged against him unless the proved circumstances a r e n o t only c o n s i s t e n t with t h e theory t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t i s g u i l t y of t h e c r i m e , b u t c a n n o t b e r e c o n c i l e d w i t h any o t h e r r a t i o n a l c o n c l u s i o n and e a c h f a c t which i s e s s e n t i a l t o a c o m p l e t e s e t of circumstances necessary t o e s t a b l i s h t h e defendant's g u i l t h a s been proved beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t .

"Also, i f t h e e v i d e n c e , a s t o any p a r t i c u l a r c o u n t , i s s u s c e p t i b l e of two r e a s o n a b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , one of which p o i n t s t o t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s g u i l t and t h e o t h e r t o h i s i n n o c e n c e , i t i s your d u t y t o a d o p t t h a t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which p o i n t s t o t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s i n n o c e n c e , and r e j e c t t h e o t h e r which p o i n t s t o h i s g u i l t . If, on t h e o t h e r hand, one i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e e v i d e n c e a p p e a r s t o you t o be r e a s o n a b l e and t h e o t h e r i n t e r - p r e t a t i o n u n r e a s o n a b l e , i t would be your d u t y t o a c c e p t t h e r e a s o n a b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and t o r e j e c t t h e unreasonable."

Defendant s u b m i t s , however, t h a t t h e s e i n s t r u c t i o n s

w e r e nevertheless inadequate. H e argues t h a t , while the

j u r y w a s i n s t r u c t e d t h a t t h e y c o u l d i n f e r i n t e n t from t h e

a c t s , conduct, o r circumstances appearing i n evidence, t h e

j u r y s h o u l d have a l s o been i n s t r u c t e d t h a t t h e y - -t need n o

make s u c h i n f e r e n c e . A p p a r e n t l y , d e f e n d a n t ' s argument i s

t h a t t h i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n s h o u l d have been i n c l u d e d a s a n

addendum t o t h e c h a l l e n g e d i n s t r u c t i o n o r s u b m i t t e d a s an

e n t i r e l y s e p a r a t e i n s t r u c t i o n . I n support defendant relies

on S t a t e v . B r y a n t (Tenn. 1 9 7 9 ) , 585 S.W.2d 586; and S t a t e

v . R o b e r t s (Wash. 1 9 7 7 ) , 562 P.2d 1259.

W e disagree.

I n Roberts an i n s t r u c t i o n w a s given t o t h e jury cre-

a t i n g a presumption of second-degree murder where no e x c u s e

o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n appeared. The c o u r t h e l d i n t h a t c a s e

t h a t , where a n i n s t r u c t i o n w a s s i l e n t a s t o how t h e presump-

t i o n m i g h t be overcome, t h e j u r y s h o u l d be f u r t h e r i n s t r u c t e d

r e g a r d i n g t h e c l e a r o p e r a t i o n of t h e presumption. Roberts,

562 P.2d a t 1261-62. I n B r y a n t a n i n s t r u c t i o n was g i v e n t o

t h e e f f e c t t h a t , i f a p e r s o n e n t e r e d t h e p r e m i s e s of a n o t h e r

d i s g u i s e d o r i n mask, t h e j u r y c o u l d c o n s i d e r t h a t a c t a s prima f a c i e e v i d e n c e of t h e p e r s o n ' s i n t e n t t o commit a

f e l o n y . The c o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e i n c l u s i o n o f t h a t i n s t r u c -

t i o n was e r r o r where no e x p r e s s i n s t r u c t i o n s were g i v e n a s

t o t h e e f f e c t of t h e i n f e r e n c e . B r y a n t , 585 S.W.2d a t 5 9 0 .

W e f i n d h e r e t h a t t h e r e was no d u t y on t h e p a r t of t h e

t r i a l c o u r t t o s u b m i t any q u a l i f i c a t i o n s o r a d d i t i o n s t o t h e

i n s t r u c t i o n s which were g i v e n , b e c a u s e t h e terms of t h e

i n s t r u c t i o n s made c l e a r t h e e f f e c t and o p e r a t i o n of t h e

inference. A s such, t h i s c a s e i s d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e . Bryant

and R o b e r t s d o n o t c o n t r o l . The j u r y was t o l d i n v e r y

e x p l i c i t t e r m s by I n s t r u c t i o n Nos. 7 and 1 2 what k i n d o f

e v i d e n c e c o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d i n making t h e i n f e r e n c e and

what k i n d of l o g i c a l s t e p s were p e r m i s s i b l e t o t a k e . Instruc-

t i o n No. 1 2 a l l o w e d t h e j u r y t o i n f e r p u r p o s e o r knowledge

from c i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e s u b m i t t e d by t h e S t a t e . In-

s t r u c t i o n No. 7 f u r t h e r d i r e c t e d t h e j u r o r s t h a t , where

c i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e i s s u s c e p t i b l e of two r e a s o n a b l e

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , and one of t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s p o i n t s t o

d e f e n d a n t ' s innocence, they should f i n d t h e defendant innocent.

These i n s t r u c t i o n s , t a k e n t o g e t h e r w i t h o t h e r i n s t r u c t i o n s

r e g a r d i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s presumption of i n n o c e n c e and t h e

S t a t e ' s burden o f p r o o f , made c l e a r t h e o p e r a t i o n and e f f e c t

of t h e i n f e r e n c e .

W e find, therefore, t h a t the t r i a l c o u r t properly

i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y and t h a t t h e r e w a s no e r r o r . The l a n -

guage of t h e c h a l l e n g e d i n s t r u c t i o n was p e r m i s s i v e . The

words "may i n f e r " connoted i n p l a i n t e r m s and i n p l a i n

u n d e r s t a n d i n g t o t h e j u r o r s t h a t t h e y had d i s c r e t i o n t o

follow o r not t o follow t h e instruction. Further, the

o p e r a t i o n and e f f e c t o f t h e i n f e r e n c e w a s c l e a r l y e x p l a i n e d

t o the jury. The i n s t r u c t i o n d i d n o t have t h e e f f e c t of allocating to the defendant some part of the burden of proof

that properly rested on the State throughout the trial.

Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

We concur:

W Chief ~ u s f i c e & A ~

-4. Justices u Mr. Justice Daniel J; Shea dissents and will file a written dissenr later.