State v. Shelton

Opinion

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 127,961

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF KANSAS,

Appellee,

v.

VICKI LEE SHELTON,

Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Shawnee District Court; BRETT A. WATSON, judge. Submitted without oral argument. Opinion filed August 28, 2026. Affirmed.

Peter Maharry, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

Michael R. Serra, deputy district attorney, Michael F. Kagay, district attorney, and Kris W.

Kobach, attorney general, for appellee.

Before HILL, P.J., ISHERWOOD and BOLTON FLEMING, JJ.

PER CURIAM: A jury convicted Vicki Lee Shelton of reckless, second-degree murder related to the death of her significant other, Harvey Lee Baker. Some of the evidence supporting Shelton's conviction came from statements made by Shelton to people she encountered shortly after Harvey's death. Prior to her jury trial, Shelton filed a motion to suppress her statements made to law enforcement. She argued one category of statements should be suppressed because they occurred as the result of a custodial interrogation, and the officer failed to provide Shelton with an appropriate warning under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). In addition,

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Shelton argued that all of her statements to law enforcement should be suppressed because they were involuntarily given due to her intoxication and mental health issues. The district court denied Shelton's motion to suppress, finding that Shelton's first set of statements did not occur within a custodial interrogation, and that under a totality of the circumstances, each of her statements to law enforcement was voluntary. Shelton now makes the same arguments on appeal.

After a thorough review of the record, we first hold that the factual findings made by the district court in considering Shelton's motion to suppress were supported by substantial competent evidence. We conclude that the statements challenged by Shelton as a Miranda violation were correctly admitted into evidence because they did not occur as a result of a custodial interrogation, and no Miranda warning was required. We also find that under a totality of the circumstances, each of the statements made by Shelton to various law enforcement officers was voluntarily made. Finding no error in the district court's denial of the motion to suppress, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Vicki Lee Shelton was convicted by a jury of reckless, second-degree murder in violation of K.S.A. 21-5403(a)(2). Shelton's conviction was based on the killing of her significant other, Harvey.

At the time of his death, Harvey lived in a trailer with Shelton. One morning, Shelton called Jane (pseudonym), a family friend, to drive Shelton to run some errands. Jane drove to Shelton's home to pick her up, and while waiting in the doorway of Shelton's trailer, Jane asked whether Harvey would be joining them. Shelton replied, "'He won't be waking up. He'll be fine.'" Jane and Shelton left to run their errands, making several stops—including two trips to Walgreens and a stop at a liquor store where they purchased vodka.

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As the pair continued to run errands, Jane observed Shelton becoming agitated.

When Jane and Shelton went to Walgreens for a third time, Shelton became upset and insisted on calling Jane's mother and Shelton's son on Jane's phone. During one of these calls, Jane overheard Shelton say "she would do the right thing," though Jane did not understand the meaning of Shelton's statement at the time.

Jane offered to take Shelton home several times, but Shelton continued to ask Jane to take her to run additional errands. Jane was ready to return to her own apartment where her husband was waiting, and so she drove to a hotel parking lot near her apartment. While in the parking lot, Shelton stated to Jane, "'Look, I've got money. I can pay you. Just take me where I want to go. I already killed the motherfucker.'" Jane told Shelton she needed to go inside and change clothes, and that she and her husband would then take Shelton wherever she wanted. Jane left Shelton in the vehicle and went inside to call both her mother and law enforcement.

Officer Mumford Investigation

Officer Zachary Mumford was dispatched to the parking lot where Jane's vehicle was parked. When Officer Mumford arrived, Shelton was seated in the front passenger seat of the vehicle and appeared to be asleep. Shelton also had a liquor bottle in her lap.

Officer Mumford told Shelton that he had been dispatched to the scene because of reports that Shelton wanted to visit about a deceased person in a trailer. Officer Mumford told Shelton his purpose for being there was to determine "what was going on." Officer Mumford took the liquor bottle from Shelton, and asked Shelton if she had consumed too much alcohol, but Shelton did not respond.

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Officer Mumford reiterated multiple times that he was there to try to figure out "what was going on." He asked Shelton what she knew about people calling the police to report someone was dead inside Shelton's trailer. Shelton's response was, "Let's go see if he's there." After some discussion with Officer Mumford, Shelton identified her boyfriend as Harvey. Officer Mumford asked Shelton if Harvey was "okay," and Shelton replied, "Somebody's dead." Officer Mumford asked where the dead person was and Shelton responded, "In my house." Officer Mumford asked Shelton if the dead person was Harvey, and Shelton nodded in the affirmative. Officer Mumford asked Shelton if Harvey could have died of an overdose or of natural causes, but Shelton shook her head in the negative. When Officer Mumford asked Shelton if Harvey had been killed, Shelton nodded, and when Officer Mumford asked Shelton who killed Harvey, she pointed to herself.

Shelton travelled with Officer Mumford to Shelton's trailer where they were joined by two additional officers. Officer Mumford checked the bedroom and found blood on the bed pillow, bed, and floor. In the living room, Officer Mumford located a deceased individual lying on the floor, who was later identified as Harvey. Shelton was arrested and transported to the Topeka Law Enforcement Center for questioning.

First Police Station Interview

At the police station, Shelton was questioned by Detective Jared Strathman.

Shelton stated several times that she did not feel well but would not say why. Detective Strathman read Shelton her Miranda rights, and Shelton initially responded, "I understand." Shelton then stated she didn't understand but changed her mind and confirmed to Detective Strathman that she did understand. Detective Strathman continued to ask Shelton why she did not feel well, and Shelton did not identify any specific condition but responded, "I just don't feel good. I don't feel good at all."

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Detective Strathman began asking Shelton questions about Harvey's death. Shelton began to cry in her arms, while repeatedly stating "please tell me he's okay." Shelton was asked about her drinking habits, and she responded, "I don't drink every day." Shelton stated that she had talked with her son and another person and knew that someone wanted to kill her for her money. Detective Strathman asked Shelton if Harvey was threatening to kill her, and Shelton replied, "They, they tried to kill me." Shelton asked, "Is he okay?" Detective Strathman answered, "No, he's not. He passed away." Shelton then commented, "I don't know what I'm saying. I want to say what?"

Based on Shelton's behavior and statements, law enforcement decided to send Shelton by ambulance to a hospital for evaluation.

Shelton's Hospital Visit

When Shelton first arrived at the hospital, she was examined by Dr. Nicholas Krehbiel in the emergency room. Dr. Krehbiel conducted a physical examination and reviewed toxicology reports before concluding that there was no need for physical medical treatment.

Whitney Ellis, a hospital social worker, conducted a suicide assessment on Shelton due to suicidal comments Shelton made while at the hospital. The assessment was captured on the body camera of Officer Adam Kary, but Kary asked no questions of Shelton during the assessment. Shelton appeared distraught and told Ellis she had a history of suicide attempts. Shelton also told Ellis that "poor people" wanted to steal from her and kill her. Shelton also stated that "she just wanted to die."

Officer Kary remained with Shelton to make sure she did not flee and to observe her due to her suicidal comments. Eventually, Detective Jesse Sherer took over watching Shelton for a few minutes. During that time, Shelton attempted to remove her IV port, but

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Detective Sherer told her to stop. Shelton responded that she had already told law enforcement "she did it" and that she wanted to die. Detective Sherer told Shelton that he wanted her to be safe and could not let her harm herself. He also told her she had to stay with law enforcement while the situation was being dealt with. He told Shelton that she could participate as much or as little as she wanted with the investigation process. Detective Sherer told Shelton that law enforcement was "not gonna be trying to throw any curve balls at you or do anything stupid." Shelton responded, "I'm not worried about it. I know you're not. I say I done it. I'm never gonna lie to you." Detective Sherer told Shelton that law enforcement could not allow her to harm herself but would also not force Shelton to do anything. Detective Sherer told Shelton law enforcement would likely want to ask her more questions. Eventually, Shelton was discharged.

Second Police Station Interview

After her hospital discharge, Shelton was taken back to the police station.

Detective Strathman reintroduced himself and asked if he could speak with Shelton. Shelton responded that she "didn't have anything else to say" and that she "said all [she's] going to say." Detective Strathman then clarified, "You said all you want to say. Is that what you said?" Shelton responded, "Today, yeah." Shelton then stated, "I already told them I done it, so what else can I say? Nothing else I can, sorry. Okay, I did it. And, I'm sorry that I done it, you know, because I love him and I want to be where he, you know, I want to die too, you know." Detective Strathman then read Shelton her Miranda rights but Shelton indicated she did not wish to speak further. Detective Strathman retrieved a blanket for Shelton after she stated she was cold, and the interview concluded.

Motion to Suppress

Prior to trial, Shelton filed a motion to suppress each of the statements she made to law enforcement. Shelton argued that her statements to Officer Mumford were not

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admissible because they occurred within a custodial interrogation, and Officer Mumford failed to read Shelton her Miranda rights. Shelton also argued that the remainder of her statements to law enforcement were inadmissible because they were not voluntary due to her intoxication and mental health crisis.

The district court conducted a hearing and admitted a flash drive into evidence that was jointly submitted by the parties. The flash drive contained video recordings of Shelton's statements to law enforcement, and the district court reviewed those videos prior to issuing its ruling. The flash drive contained a total of five recordings, and included Shelton's statements to Officer Mumford, Detective Strathman, Whitney Ellis, and Detective Sherer.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court ruled on the admissibility of each category of Shelton's statements to law enforcement. As to Shelton's statements to Officer Mumford, the district court found that Shelton's interactions with Officer Mumford did not amount to a custodial interrogation, his questions were investigatory in nature, and no Miranda warning was required. The district court also found Shelton's statements to Mumford were voluntarily made.

The district court also considered Shelton's first interview with Detective Strathman and found that Detective Strathman read Shelton her Miranda rights prior to any interrogation and that Shelton repeated twice that she understood her rights. The district court found that the State had met its burden to prove Shelton had waived her Miranda rights. The district court also determined that, while it appeared Shelton was under the influence of alcohol or possibly exhibiting feelings of guilt during the interview, there was no evidence of overreaching conduct by Detective Strathman and Shelton's statements were voluntary.

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As to statements made by Shelton to social worker Whitney Ellis at the hospital, the district court determined that the purpose of the interview with Ellis "was to fulfill a medical need or necessity." Although the district court considered that this encounter may have been custodial because Shelton was not free to leave, law enforcement did not subject Shelton to a custodial interrogation. While Shelton made several incriminating statements to Ellis, there was no evidence that Ellis was acting as an agent of the State, and the officer who observed the statements, Officer Kary, did not question Shelton.

Next, the district court considered Shelton's interaction with Detective Sherer at the hospital. The district court found that this interaction was not a custodial interrogation because no questions were posed to Shelton regarding the crime. The district court noted that Detective Sherer's interaction with Shelton was not an attempt to obtain incriminating responses; rather, his actions and statements were meant to stop Shelton from harming herself. The district court found that during those interactions, Shelton made "spontaneous admissions to having committed the crime," and those statements were not in response to any question made by Detective Sherer.

The district court also considered the second interview with Detective Strathman.

During this interview, Shelton stated that she had already confessed. The district court determined Shelton's statement to be a spontaneous admission that was not in response to any question asked by Strathman. Once Shelton made the spontaneous statement, Detective Strathman read Shelton her Miranda rights. The district court noted that Shelton did not invoke her right to remain silent until after her Miranda warning was read. At that point, Shelton refused to answer questions or make any additional statements.

Finally, the district court conducted an analysis of the voluntariness of all of Shelton's statements to law enforcement, considering her intoxication and mental health status. The district court noted Shelton's intoxication and feelings of guilt but concluded

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neither of these conditions resulted in an involuntary statement. The district court also found that there was no evidence of any coercion, unfairness, or overreaching by law enforcement related to Shelton's statements. The district court ruled that under the totality of the circumstances, Shelton's statements to law enforcement were voluntary.

Jury Trial and Sentencing

After the district court denied Shelton's motion to suppress, the case proceeded to a jury trial. The evidence at trial included the statements made by Shelton on the day Harvey's body was found. Shelton also testified at trial and described that Harvey routinely used cocaine and methamphetamine and would at times become aggressive. She testified that on the day he died, Harvey became aggressive after running out of drugs. Shelton described that Harvey threatened her with a knife and tried to choke her. After struggling with Harvey on the bed, Shelton grabbed a liquor bottle and hit Harvey across the face.

At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury found Shelton guilty of reckless, second-degree murder, and at her sentencing hearing, Shelton was sentenced to 154 months in prison. Shelton timely appeals.

ANALYSIS

DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR BY DENYING SHELTON'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS?

On appeal, Shelton alleges the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress. She argues that her statements to Officer Mumford should have been excluded because they occurred in violation of her Miranda rights. She also argues that all of her statements to law enforcement should have been excluded because none of the statements were voluntary.

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Standard of Review

We review the district court's denial of Shelton's motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard of review. First, we review the district court's factual findings to determine whether they are supported by substantial competent evidence. State v. G.O., 318 Kan. 386, 407, 543 P.3d 1096 (2024). Substantial competent evidence is "'evidence . . . which possesses both relevance and substance and which furnishes a substantial basis of fact from which the issues can reasonably be resolved. [Citation omitted.]'" Ludlow v. State, 37 Kan. App. 2d 676, 687, 157 P.3d 631 (2007). We review the district court's ultimate legal conclusion de novo. State v. G.O., 318 Kan. at 407.

Finally, where a defendant has challenged the admissibility of a statement, the State bears the burden to prove that the challenged statement is admissible. K.S.A. 22- 3215(4).

Discussion

We note that Shelton's challenged statements occurred at different times and locations and involved various law enforcement officers. We will chronologically review each set of Shelton's challenged statements.

Statements to Officer Mumford

Shelton specifically challenged the admissibility of her statements to Officer Mumford based on the argument that he conducted a custodial interrogation of Shelton without giving her a Miranda warning. The district court ruled that no Miranda warning was required because no custodial interrogation occurred. The district court made the following factual findings as it pertains to the encounter between Shelton and Officer Mumford:

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"So in the material that the Court has reviewed, at, approximately, 3:00, Officer Mumford arrived at the Ramada parking lot because he had been advised that a person had died. At that point in time, there was no indication, precisely, who had died or who was responsible for the death.

"He approached the defendant, who was seated inside the vehicle. He testified, at the preliminary hearing, that when he approached the vehicle, the defendant appeared to be asleep. He also testified that she appeared to have a liquor bottle. And you can see, in the video, at one point in time, he removes the bottle from the vehicle, noting that it is illegal to have an open container inside the vehicle. He further testified, at the preliminary hearing, that his observations of the defendant indicated that she was intoxicated and would have been intoxicated to the point where she could not safely operate a motor vehicle.

"He had conversation with her, as she sat in the vehicle, trying to determine what was going on and the reason why he was summoned to that location. And during the course of that contact, the defendant had indicated that the victim had died and she pointed to herself, identifying herself as the person who had killed him.

"The Court must, first, determine whether or not the defendant was in custody for this statement or any of the statements which follow. And if in custody, the defendant is entitled to be advised of her Miranda rights before law enforcement can engage in custodial interrogation. If, in fact, the defendant was in custody, and she was not advised of her rights, per Miranda, and made a knowing and voluntary waiver of those rights, the statements are inadmissible at trial during the State's case in chief.

"In determining whether or not a person is in custody, the Court considers a number of factors. That is the time and place of the interrogation, the duration of the interrogation, the number of officers present, the conduct of the officers during the interrogation, the presence or absence of physical restraints or their functional equivalents, whether the person is being questioned as a suspect or as a witness, whether the person being questioned was escorted by the officers to the location of the interrogation, and the result of the interrogation.

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"Based upon consideration of those factors, the Court finds that the interview with Officer Mumford was noncustodial, therefore, Miranda rights were not necessary.

"There will be a separate question as to voluntariness that the Court will address at the end.

"But specifically, the Court's findings are the time and place of the interrogation was in the parking lot of the Ramada Inn at, approximately, three in the afternoon. This interrogation was for a relatively brief period of time. I believe, the entire recording is about 10 minutes. Only one officer was present.

"The officer's performance—or his behavior was simply asking questions to try to determine what was going on. He did not engage in any behavior that would cause a reasonable person to believe that they were in custody or not free to leave. The defendant was not in any physical restraint or functional equivalent, at that point in time. At that point in time, the defendant was not being questioned as a suspect.

"Rather, the officer was simply responding to the call of a death and trying to determine what was going on. The defendant was not escorted to the Ramada Inn for the purpose of the location. And I should also note, it was not an inherently coercive environment, but rather she was there and the officer was summoned to that location. The result of the questioning was, according to the testimony at the preliminary hearing, she accompanied the officer to the home where the body was discovered in an apparent attempt to corroborate what she had claimed in the parking lot and then later to the Law Enforcement Center and, ultimately, her arrest. That fact alone, however, does not convince the Court that while she was speaking with Officer Mumford, she was in custody."

We note the thoroughness of the district court's review of the evidence in the case, including multiple videos submitted by the parties. The evidence considered by the court was relevant because Shelton's statements were captured on the videos. The evidence formed a basis of fact that enabled the district court to draw its legal conclusions. Ludlow, 37 Kan. App. 2d at 687. "Appellate courts do not reweigh evidence, resolve evidentiary

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conflicts, or make witness credibility determinations." State v. Lloyd, 299 Kan. 620, 632, 325 P.3d 1122 (2014). We find that the district court's factual findings related to Shelton's encounter with Officer Mumford were supported by substantial competent evidence.

Shelton's encounter with Officer Mumford was not a custodial interrogation.

Shelton argues that her statements to Officer Mumford occurred in violation of her rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court examined a defendant's Fifth Amendment right to be free from self- incrimination within the context of police interrogations, holding "the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." The Court's holding created a procedure commonly known as a Miranda warning. "The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires any statements stemming from a custodial interrogation or interview to be excluded unless the State proves that procedural safeguards, i.e., Miranda warnings, were used to secure the waiver of defendant's constitutional rights." State v. McCullough, 321 Kan. 618, 625, 582 P.3d 1080 (2026) (citing State v. Guein, 309 Kan. 1245, 1253, 444 P.3d 340 [2019]).

Key to the requirement of a Miranda warning is the presence of a custodial interrogation. "Whether characterized as an interview or an interrogation, the critical inquiry for purposes of determining whether Miranda warnings were required is evaluating whether the encounter was custodial." McCullough, 321 Kan. at 625.

"A custodial interview '"is defined as questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his or her freedom in any significant way."'" McCullough, 321 Kan. at 625 (quoting Guein, 309

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Kan. at 1253; State v. Lewis, 299 Kan. 828, 834-35, 326 P.3d 387 [2014]). The McCullough court noted, "Custodial interviews are distinct from investigatory interviews, which happen '"as a routine part of the fact-finding process before the investigation reaches the accusatory stage."'" 321 Kan. at 625 (quoting Guein, 309 Kan. at 1253-54; Lewis, 299 Kan. at 834-35). "The overall consideration is whether, 'under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the interrogation and disengage from the encounter.'" McCullough, 321 Kan. at 625 (quoting Guein, 309 Kan. at 1254).

The Kansas Supreme Court has provided factors for courts to apply in determining whether an interaction with law enforcement resulted in a custodial interrogation. Under State v. Warrior, 294 Kan. 484, 496, 277 P.3d 1111 (2012), these factors include:

• The time and place of the interrogation; • The duration of the interrogation; • The number of law enforcement officers present during the interrogation; • The conduct of the officer and the person subject to the interrogation; • The presence or absence of actual physical restraint or its functional equivalent, such as a drawn firearm or a stationed guard;

• Whether the person is being questioned as a suspect or a witness; • Whether the person being questioned was escorted by officers to the interrogation location or arrived under their own power; and • Whether the interrogation resulted in the person being allowed to leave, being detained, or being arrested after the interrogation.

It is important to note that no one factor outweighs the rest and each case must be determined on its own particular circumstances. Warrior, 294 Kan. at 496; Lewis, 299 Kan. at 835. Ultimately, a court must consider whether "under the totality of those

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circumstances" a reasonable person would "have felt free to terminate the interrogation" and end the encounter. Warrior, 294 Kan. at 497.

Having established the applicable legal framework, we turn to the circumstances surrounding Shelton's statements to Officer Mumford. We consider the factors described in Warrior as applied to the facts contained in the record of this case.

We begin with the first Warrior factor—the time and place of the interrogation. A neutral location, as opposed to a police station, "weighs against a conclusion that an interview was custodial." Warrior, 294 Kan. at 497. Here, the record reflects that the encounter between Officer Mumford and Shelton occurred at a Ramada Inn parking lot near Jane's apartment during the day—a neutral location.

Second, as to the factor of duration, the record reflects that the entire interaction between Officer Mumford and Shelton occurred in less than one hour, and the statements Shelton made to Officer Mumford occurred in the first 15 minutes. Interviews that are short in duration weigh against a finding that a custodial interrogation has occurred. Warrior, 294 Kan. at 498.

The third Warrior factor tasks us with considering the number of law enforcement officers present during the interaction. Here, only Officer Mumford was at the scene, which weighs against a finding that the encounter was a custodial interrogation.

Fourth, we consider the conduct of Officer Mumford and Shelton. The video of the encounter reflects that Officer Mumford explained multiple times that he was there to determine "what was going on." He had received reports that Shelton wished to visit about a deceased body in her trailer. Substantial competent evidence supports the district court's conclusion that Officer Mumford's questions were aimed at trying to assess the situation. As to Shelton's actions, while she appeared to be sleeping when Officer

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Mumford approached the vehicle, she was able to interact with Officer Mumford once woken. We agree with the district court that the conduct of Officer Mumford and Shelton weighs against a custodial interrogation.

Shelton notes under this factor that Officer Mumford did not tell Shelton she was free to leave and argues that this failure resulted in a custodial interrogation, citing State v. Williams, 297 Kan. 370, 380, 300 P.3d 1072 (2013). But Shelton's reliance on Williams is misplaced because the Williams court did not focus on this single factor; rather, the court found that under a totality of the circumstances Williams would not have felt free to leave:

"As in Soto, we have no hesitation in concluding that a reasonable person in Williams' circumstances would have felt compelled to stop and unable to leave. Those circumstances include: (1) Williams was walking alone on a sidewalk at 2:30 a.m. on a deserted street; (2) two officers in a patrol vehicle pulled up next to Williams as he walked; (3) the officers activated their emergency lights; (4) the officers both got out of their car and positioned themselves on either side of Williams; and (5) the officers immediately began asking Williams questions without indicating he was free to leave." Williams, 297 Kan. at 380.

Williams does not stand for the principle that the failure to tell an interviewee they are free to leave renders the encounter a custodial interrogation. On the contrary, no one factor is determinative and courts are required to consider the totality of the circumstances. Warrior, 294 Kan. at 497. The circumstances here are quite different to those in Williams. Williams was walking alone in the middle of the night, on a deserted street, when a patrol car activated its emergency lights. The vehicle pulled alongside Williams and two officers took positions on either side of him. The officers then began questioning Williams without explaining he was free to leave. 297 Kan. at 380.

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In the present case, only a single officer, Officer Mumford, arrived at the Ramada Inn parking lot to interact with Shelton. This occurred during the day and there was no evidence Officer Mumford activated his emergency lights. Shelton remained in her seat in the vehicle. The only similarity between Williams and the present case is that Officer Mumford did not tell Shelton she was free to leave. That is one fact to be considered within a totality of the circumstances analysis, but it does not conclusively establish that Shelton was in custody.

Fifth, as for the presence or absence of physical restraint or its functional equivalent, Shelton was neither confined nor restrained during the interview. The video of the encounter reflects that Officer Mumford did not block Shelton from exiting the vehicle and did not restrict her movement. Moreover, there were no "drawn firearms or a stationed guard." See Warrior, 294 Kan. at 496.

Shelton argues under this factor that Officer Mumford's action in taking Shelton's alcohol away from her was a demonstration of authority that would have made her feel she was not free to leave. Shelton cites Guein in support of her argument. The Guein court found that a law enforcement officer standing guard over Guein while Guein was standing "in the submissive position of his hands on his head" weighed in favor of a custodial interrogation. Guein, 309 Kan. at 1258. The facts in this case are quite different. Here, there was no verbal instruction or physical positioning that prevented Shelton from leaving and no force or threat was used. And Officer Mumford explained to Shelton that he was taking the alcohol from her because it was illegal for her to possess the open container of alcohol in a vehicle. He also explained to Shelton that he was not going to cite her for that violation. We do not find that Officer Mumford removing Shelton's bottle of alcohol from the vehicle resulted in Shelton believing she was not free to leave.

Under the sixth Warrior factor, we consider whether Shelton was being questioned as a suspect or a witness. Officer Mumford arrived on scene as a result of several people

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calling law enforcement to report a person being deceased inside Shelton's trailer. As the district court noted, Officer Mumford repeatedly indicated he was on the scene as the result of those calls to try to assess the situation. Toward the end of the encounter, Officer Mumford did ask specific questions about who was deceased in the trailer, and how that person had been harmed, but substantial competent evidence supports the district court's conclusion that Officer Mumford's actions and statements were investigatory. The video reflects that Officer Mumford was trying to ascertain "what was going on" so he could decide what next steps needed to be taken.

Seventh, we consider whether Shelton was escorted by officers to the place where she was questioned or whether she arrived by her own power. Shelton was questioned at the Ramada Inn parking lot. She arrived there after running errands with Jane, and because Jane had grown suspicious of Shelton. Shelton was not escorted to an interrogation location by law enforcement.

Finally, we consider whether the interrogation resulted in Shelton being allowed to leave, being detained, or being arrested after the interrogation. The encounter ended without Shelton's arrest; rather, she travelled to the trailer with Officer Mumford to continue the investigation.

After applying the Warrior factors, we conclude under a totality of the circumstances that the interaction between Officer Mumford and Shelton was not a custodial interrogation and therefore, no Miranda warning was required. Here, every factor identified by the Warrior court weighs in favor of a noncustodial encounter. After a de novo review, we see no evidence in the record that would support a finding that Shelton did not feel free to terminate the encounter and leave. The district court did not err in denying Shelton's motion to suppress on this ground.

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Voluntariness

The remainder of Shelton's challenges on appeal pertain to whether her statements to law enforcement were voluntary. The voluntariness of a statement is determined based on the totality of the circumstances. State v. G.O., 318 Kan. at 400. "The State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was voluntary . . . ." State v. Dern, 303 Kan. 384, 392, 362 P.3d 566 (2015).

The Kansas Supreme Court has identified several nonexclusive factors for courts to consider when examining whether a statement by a defendant was voluntary:

• The accused's mental condition; • The manner and duration of the interview; • The accused's ability to communicate on request with the outside world; • The accused's age, intellect, and background; • The officer's fairness in conducting the interview; and • The accused's fluency with the English language.

State v. Walker, 304 Kan. 441, 449, 372 P.3d 1147 (2016); State v. Gibson, 299 Kan. 207, 214, 322 P.3d 389 (2014).

"These factors are not to be weighed against one another with those favorable to a free and voluntary confession offsetting those tending to the contrary. Instead, the situation surrounding the giving of a confession may dissipate the import of an individual factor that might otherwise have a coercive effect. Even after analyzing such dilution, if any, a single factor or a combination of factors considered together may inevitably lead to a conclusion that under the totality of circumstances a suspect's will was overborne and the confession was not therefore a free and voluntary act." State v. Randolph, 297 Kan. 320, Syl. ¶ 3, 301 P.3d 300 (2013).

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We acknowledge Shelton's specific argument that her intoxication rendered her statements involuntary. "The fact that an accused had been drinking or using drugs does not per se establish involuntariness of the accused's confession. All circumstances surrounding the giving of the statement must be examined to determine if the intoxication prevented the accused from voluntarily making a statement." State v. Gilliland, 294 Kan. 519, Syl. ¶ 5, 276 P.3d 165 (2012). Thus, Shelton's intoxication will be examined in the context of each of her statements.

Our Supreme Court has adopted a similar position on the issue of whether a mental health condition may render a statement involuntary:

"Bethel's position as stated in his brief is that he 'was insane at the time of the interview,' and, as a result, under Kansas law his statements should have been suppressed. Bethel's contention, however, is at odds with established law of this state. 'Mental disability alone is not determinative of voluntariness' of a confession. State v. Caenen, 270 Kan. 776, Syl. ¶ 3, 19 P.3d 142 (2001). In all cases, including cases of mental disorders or illness, where the voluntariness of a confession is at issue, the totality of the circumstances is examined. 270 Kan. at 783-84, 19 P.3d 142. The factors that have been identified as representing the totality of circumstances and which are to be taken into consideration are those that the trial court applied. See 270 Kan. at 784, 19 P.3d 142." State v. Bethel, 275 Kan. 456, 475, 66 P.3d 840 (2003).

Shelton's challenge is that her intoxication and mental health condition rendered each statement involuntary. Because the statements were made over the course of the day to multiple people at various locations, we continue our chronological review. But before moving to that review, we pause to note the findings of the district court as to the overall voluntariness of Shelton's statements on the day in question:

"The Court does, as a matter, note, first, the defendant does appear to be suffering some form of intoxication through all of these encounters. However, intoxication, alone, is not enough to determine or to hold that a statement is involuntary.

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There must be an indication that the intoxication is of such a level that would have affected the defendant's ability to understand what it is—what is going on. But furthermore, even where the defendant is intoxicated, and in this particular case, the Court finds the defendant's mental state was afflicted both by her state of intoxication as well as her feelings of guilt for having committed the homicide that she is charged with."

The district court went on to note that there was no evidence of police misconduct during the investigation:

"That is, they do not cause her to be intoxicated or feel—have feelings of guilt or this great emotional, overwhelming feeling that she had, nor is there evidence indicating that the police intended to exploit that condition for the purpose of tricking the defendant into making a statement. Rather, the evidence shows that the police responded to the defendant's need for medical treatment and also were sensitive to her condition."

Moreover, the district court found that Shelton's "mental condition, such as it was, was not so overwhelmed that she could not voluntarily make a choice to make statements to the law enforcement officers."

The district court also considered the duration of the investigation and noted that although it stretched for several hours, "the duration of the interrogations were all for a relatively brief period of time." The district court also noted that Shelton had the ability to communicate with others during the investigation and did so at the hospital. Shelton made no other request to communicate with others. As to the fairness of the encounter, the district court found "no overreaching or unfairness on the part of any of the law enforcement officers involved, in this case." The district court's factual findings are supported by substantial competent evidence. The district court reviewed the evidence before it in great detail, and its findings support the ultimate legal conclusions in the case.

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Shelton's statements to Officer Mumford were voluntary.

We have previously described the context in which Shelton made her statements to Officer Mumford. We now apply the factors explained by the Kansas Supreme Court in Walker to determine whether her statements were inadmissible because they were involuntary. While Officer Mumford testified that Shelton was intoxicated at a level that would have made it unsafe for her to drive, Shelton was still able to cooperate and respond to questions. Additionally, in the minutes leading up to her encounter with Officer Mumford, Shelton was able to instruct Jane to run particular errands and to let her call her son on Jane's phone. The encounter with Officer Mumford began when he was called to the parking lot after receiving a report of a possible death in Shelton's trailer. The duration of the interview was short—less than 11 minutes. Shelton made no request to communicate with the outside world during the encounter. There is no indication that Shelton's age, intellect, or background played any role in her ability to participate in the conversation. We agree with the district court's factual finding that there was no evidence of unfairness or coercion in Officer Mumford's tactics. Finally, Shelton fluently spoke English. Applying the factors described by the Kansas Supreme Court in Walker, and considering the totality of the circumstances, we find the State has met its burden of proof to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Shelton's statements to Officer Mumford were voluntary.

Shelton's statements during her first interview with Detective Strathman were voluntary.

Upon arriving at the jail, Shelton was questioned by Detective Strathman.

Importantly, shortly into the interview and prior to asking any questions, Detective Strathman gave Shelton a Miranda warning. Shelton responded that she understood, but then reversed course, stating she did not. Finally, Shelton confirmed that she understood her rights, and the interview continued. On appeal, Shelton argues that the waiver of her Miranda rights was not voluntary. Separately, she argues her statements were not

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voluntary because of her intoxication and mental health issues. We will address each argument in turn.

Shelton voluntarily waived her Miranda rights.

Our review of the voluntariness of Shelton's Miranda waiver begins with the district court's factual findings on that issue:

"Next, we move on to 5:51 p.m., at the Law Enforcement Center. Detective Strathman conducted an interview of the defendant. During this interview, the defendant began with her head in her hand. She made statements that she indicated that she did not feel good. Officer—or Detective Strathman asked if she was sick. He then introduced himself as Jared. The defendant responded that it was nice to meet him. I believe, her words were, 'Nice to meet you.' Detective Strathman said that he wanted to talk with her, first, but he needed to read her Miranda rights.

"Contrary to the assertion in the defendant's motion, at this point, Miranda rights were read. The defendant was advised of her right to remain silent, her right to have counsel present, and that anything she said could be used against you [sic] in court. When asked if she understood these rights, the defendant responded, on at least two different occasions, that she did understand her rights.

"However, it is clear, from this point in time, that the defendant's mood or demeanor is somehow deflated, possibly through the use of alcohol or possibly due to feelings of guilt. The Court would note that during the course of all of these interrogations, the defendant made statements indicating that she was responsible, that is, that she had killed the victim, in this case.

"And after considering all of this material, the Court finds that the defendant was, to some extent, under the influence of alcohol and the defendant was not feeling well, that her feelings of unwellness were due to her feelings of guilt for having committed the murder that she is now accused of. That accounts for the defendant's behavior in these early stages of the interview with Detective Strathman.

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"Detective Strathman attempted to ascertain what exactly was causing the defendant not to feel well, asking questions about whether or not she was in any physical pain. He asked, "Why don't you feel good? Do you have a headache? Do you feel like you're going to throw up? Do you need to go to the bathroom? The defendant responded 'No' to those questions.

"He then asked if she had been drinking, today. At about—approximately, 5:58 in the interview, he asked if she had been drinking and she gave a response which is inaudible. However, then at a point after that, she said, 'Just tell me that he's okay.' Detective Strathman further went on at, approximately, 6:00, to ask, 'Do I need to get you an ambulance?' She responded, 'Tell me he's okay.' He further asked if she could explain why she was not feeling good. He asked further questions regarding her drinking. He asked questions about whether or not she knew what day it was, what month. She shook her head, no. She—he went on to ask what she did that day at, approximately, 6:06. She began to cry and said, 'Told him I loved him.' And then at about 6:12, she made statements about the murder, indicating that he, the victim, had tried to murder her.

"So at this point—and as I said, I will deal with the issue of voluntariness at the very end.

"But at this point, the question is Miranda."

The district court went on to find that Shelton had voluntarily waived her Miranda rights, citing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S. Ct. 515, 93 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1986). The district court noted the Connelly court held that coercion by law enforcement must exist to find that a confession is involuntary. 479 U.S. at 163-64. The district court held that here, there was no evidence of coercion. Thus, the district court concluded that the State had met its burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Shelton's waiver of her Miranda rights was voluntary.

We first find that the district court's factual findings on this issue are supported by substantial competent evidence. The district court examined the evidence in detail and its

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findings are a fair recapitulation of the video contained on the flash drive that was jointly submitted by the parties.

Second, we agree with the district court that the evidence in the record does not demonstrate that any coercive tactics were used by Detective Strathman during his interview of Shelton. The evidence does reflect that Shelton stated she understood her Miranda rights and agreed to speak with Detective Strathman. While the district court noted Shelton's intoxication, Shelton was able to communicate with Detective Strathman. The interview was not lengthy and ended so that Shelton could be evaluated at the hospital because she was not feeling well. There was nothing in Shelton's background, her age, intellect, or ability to speak English that made it difficult for her to participate in the interview.

In addition, the district court correctly concluded that coercion by law enforcement must exist to find that a confession is involuntary:

"Thus the cases considered by this Court over the 50 years since Brown v.

Mississippi have focused upon the crucial element of police overreaching. While each confession case has turned on its own set of factors justifying the conclusion that police conduct was oppressive, all have contained a substantial element of coercive police conduct. Absent police conduct causally related to the confession, there is simply no basis for concluding that any state actor has deprived a criminal defendant of due process of law." Connelly, 479 U.S. at 163-64.

Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude the district court did not err by finding Shelton voluntarily waived her Miranda rights.

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Shelton's statements to Detective Strathman during her first interview were voluntary.

In addition, we consider whether Shelton's statements to Detective Strathman were voluntarily made. Our analysis requires the application of the same factors described herein—Shelton's mental condition; the manner and duration of the interview; Shelton's ability to communicate on request with the outside world; Shelton's age, intellect, and background; Detective Strathman's fairness in conducting the interview; and Shelton's fluency with the English language. Walker, 304 Kan. at 449. In addition, because Shelton has specifically raised the issues of intoxication and mental health, we factor those into our analysis.

We conclude under a totality of the circumstances that Shelton's statements to Detective Strathman were voluntary. Substantial competent evidence supports the district court's factual determination that while intoxication and mental health issues may have been affecting Shelton, those conditions did not exist to an extent that rendered her statements involuntary. And when considering the remaining factors from Walker, we agree with the district court that the duration of the interview was short and ended when Shelton indicated she was not feeling well. We also agree that there was no evidence of police coercion related to Shelton's statements. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 163-64. The district court did not err in finding Shelton's statements to Detective Strathman were voluntary.

Shelton's statements to Whitney Ellis were not the result of an encounter with law enforcement and were voluntary.

Shelton generally challenges statements made while she was at the hospital.

Shelton argues that these statements were involuntary due to her "mental and physical state." Shelton does not specifically challenge her statements to Ellis on appeal other than her general challenge to statements made at the hospital. Issues not adequately briefed are

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deemed waived or abandoned. State v. Gallegos, 313 Kan. 262, 277, 485 P.3d 622 (2021).

On the merits, the district court made factual findings related to the statements Shelton made to Whitney Ellis. The interview was captured on the body camera of Officer Kary, but Kary did not participate in the interview. The district court found that "the defendant was approached by a social worker and asked certain questions." The district court noted:

"During the course of this interview, the defendant made certain inculpatory admissions. It is apparent, from the Court's review of this recording, that the person in question, who is unnamed, the social worker asking questions is not being directed to ask questions by any law enforcement officer. There is—apparently, a law enforcement officer was present because the interaction was recorded on an axon body camera, but that officer is not directing that certain questions be asked or participating in the interview, in any way."

The district court concluded that

"the purpose of the interview, at that point in time, was to fulfill a medical need or necessity, that is, to inquire of the defendant as to her mental state, at that period of time, and, specifically, address questions that the defendant—or issues, excuse me, that the defendant may have raised regarding harming herself because of her then existing state of mind."

Relying on those facts, the district court ruled that Shelton's encounter with Ellis was not a law enforcement encounter because Ellis was not an agent of the State and the questions were directed at medical treatment—not the investigation of a crime.

We find that the district court's factual findings are supported by substantial competent evidence. The video of this encounter contained in the record supports the

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district court's findings. And we agree with the district court that Ellis was not an agent of the State, and her questions were not investigatory. We also note that Officer Kary, whose body camera recorded the encounter, did not participate in the discussion. A custodial interview requires questioning initiated by law enforcement officers. McCullough, 321 Kan. at 625-26.

We also conclude Shelton's statements we voluntary. We note that Ellis'

interaction with Shelton was only of a duration needed to complete the mental health interview. Shelton made no request to communicate with the outside world and Shelton communicated with Ellis. We also find no evidence of coercion. The district court did not err in its consideration of Shelton's statements to Ellis.

Shelton's statements to Detective Sherer at the hospital did not occur as part of a custodial interrogation and were voluntary.

While at the hospital, Shelton made statements to Detective Sherer. Detective Jesse Sherer had assumed watching Shelton for a few minutes after Officer Kary's departure. The district court characterized this encounter as Detective Sherer advising Shelton "against hurting herself. That is, he's trying to convince her not to commit suicide or not to harm herself." The district court noted that Detective Sherer told Shelton, "'We need to keep you with us while we try to figure this out.'" Detective Sherer continued, "'You can participate in that process as much or as little as you want.'" Detective Sherer explained, "'Once you are medically cleared, we will ask you some questions. If you don't want to answer them, that's fine.'" The district court observed that "at the conclusion of this interaction, it appears that she tries to remove her own IV and Detective Sherer stops her and tries to summon medical personnel to assist her with that procedure."

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During this episode, Shelton stated to Detective Sherer that she had already told law enforcement "she did it" and that she wanted to die. Detective Sherer told Shelton that she could participate as much or as little as she wanted with the investigation process. Shelton responded, "I'm not worried about it. I know you're not. I say I done it. I'm never gonna lie to you."

Based on these facts, the district court concluded that the interaction was not a custodial interrogation. "Rather, as I noted before, he is encouraging her not to harm herself and she, essentially, makes the spontaneous admissions to having committed the crime."

On appeal, Shelton makes no specific argument about her statements to Detective Sherer at the hospital; rather, she includes these statements as part of her general argument that her statements to law enforcement were involuntary due to her intoxication and mental health condition. A point raised incidentally in a brief and not argued therein is deemed waived or abandoned. State v. Meggerson, 312 Kan. 238, 246, 474 P.3d 761 (2020).

We also find that the district court's factual findings are supported by substantial competent evidence. We note that the district court denied Shelton relief on this issue based on a separate ground—that the encounter between Detective Sherer and Shelton did not occur as part of a custodial interrogation, which is true. But Shelton's challenge on appeal relates to the voluntariness of her statements. This leads us back to the factors suggested by the Kansas Supreme Court in Walker. We note that Detective Sherer's interaction with Shelton was brief. It occurred when she showed an intent to harm herself in the hospital. Shelton made no request to communicate with the outside world but had just visited with a social worker and remained in the hospital. Shelton's age, intellect, and background played no role in her ability to communicate. There was no evidence of coercion—the deputy communicated his role in keeping Shelton safe and explained that

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later she could participate in the investigation if she chose to. Based on the Walker factors, and considering the totality of the circumstances, we find Shelton's statements to be voluntary. We also note that the absence of evidence of police coercion operates to deny Shelton relief. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 163-64. The district court did not err in finding Shelton's statements were voluntary.

Statements to Detective Strathman (Second Interview)

After being released from the hospital, Shelton was returned to jail for a second interview with Detective Strathman. The district court found that Detective Strathman entered the interview room and the

"defendant made a statement that was hard for him to understand, at first, but he was, eventually, able to ascertain that the defendant stated, 'I already said what I want to say. I already told them that I done it. What more can I say?' The detective then read the defendant Miranda and asked if she was willing to speak, and she refused."

The district court found Shelton's statements were spontaneous and not the result of a custodial interrogation; thus, no Miranda warning was required. We find that the district court's factual determinations were based on substantial competent evidence—an accurate review of the video of the encounter.

On appeal, Shelton challenges the statements she made during her second jail interview on the basis that they were involuntary due to her mental and physical state. We again consider the Walker factors to consider the voluntary nature of her statements. Walker, 304 Kan. at 449. Notably, by this point in the investigation, Shelton had been cleared medically and discharged from the hospital. And while Shelton points out that during her second interview she was initially difficult to understand, the detective was able to ascertain Shelton's statement, as was the district court when it conducted its review. Substantial competent evidence supports the district court's finding that Shelton's

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statements were spontaneous and voluntary. We again note there was nothing in Shelton's background, her intellect, or ability to speak English that impacted her statement. And we find no evidence of any police misconduct. Shelton's statement was made very early into the interview and upon hearing it, Detective Strathman stopped to give Shelton a Miranda warning. The district court did not err in denying Shelton's motion to suppress.

Affirmed.