State v. Shea

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Shea, 2026-Ohio-2855.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT PICKAWAY COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, : : Case Nos. 25CA26 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 25CA27 : v. : DECISION AND JUDGMENT : ENTRY JAMES PATRICK SHEA, II, : : Defendant-Appellant. : RELEASED: 07/21/2026

APPEARANCES:

James Patrick Shea, II, Marion, Ohio, appellant pro se.

Jamie Hartley Fountain, Pickaway County Prosecuting Attorney, Circleville, Ohio, for appellee.

Wilkin, J.

{¶1} In this consolidated appeal, James Patrick Shea, II, appeals the trial

court’s decision denying his postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea,

Pickaway App. No. 25CA26, and his untimely petition for postconviction relief,

Pickaway App. No. 25CA27. Shea pleaded guilty to several drug related

offenses back in 2021, but did not file his petition for postconviction relief and

motion to withdraw his guilty plea until 2025. The trial court determined that

Shea failed to demonstrate he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the

facts in support of his petition and failed to demonstrate manifest injustice that

mandated his guilty plea to be vacated.

{¶2} Shea challenges the trial court’s decisions and requests that we

reverse. We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court; therefore, we affirm the Pickaway App. Nos. 25CA26 & 25CA27 2

trial court’s decision in denying Shea’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

Additionally, we find that Shea failed to meet the exceptions to warrant the filing

of his untimely petition for postconviction relief. Therefore, the trial court lacked

jurisdiction to review the merits of the petition. Accordingly, we modify the trial

court’s decision denying Shea’s petition to dismissing the petition for lack of

jurisdiction.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

{¶3} On June 9, 2021, Shea and the State reached a plea agreement, in

which the State dismissed five first-degree felony offenses and three second-

degree felony offenses, and amended four offenses to lesser-degree felonies. In

exchange, Shea pleaded guilty to one count of engaging in a pattern of corrupt

activity with a specification, a first-degree felony, one count of aggravated

trafficking in drugs with a specification, a first-degree felony, and four counts of

aggravated trafficking in drugs with specifications, all third-degree felonies.

{¶4} In August 2021, Shea was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of

15 years, with 5 years being mandatory. Shea did not directly appeal his

convictions and sentence, but in June 2025, he filed a motion to withdraw his

guilty plea and a delayed petition for postconviction relief. Shea acknowledged

that the motion and petition were untimely, but maintained that he was

unavoidably prevented from discovering evidence that the State’s witness, a

confidential informant, was coerced into assisting law enforcement and that one

of the officers was not being truthful. Shea asserted that he did not discover this Pickaway App. Nos. 25CA26 & 25CA27 3

evidence until he was able to obtain the trial transcript of a co-defendant, John

Lamar Kolle, in August 2024.1

{¶5} Shea argued that this evidence demonstrates violations of his due

process rights and invalidated his guilty plea because the State breached the

agreement by concealing exculpatory evidence. Additionally, Shea argued that

his counsel was ineffective for not conducting a thorough investigation of the

case. Shea emphasized that Kolle’s conviction for engaging in corrupt activity

was reversed on appeal, thus, his conviction should be reversed as well.

{¶6} The State disagreed with Shea’s assertion that this evidence was

new and exculpatory. The State maintained that the confidential informant’s

information was provided to Shea during discovery, and, moreover, there is

nothing about the testimony that exonerates Shea.

{¶7} The trial court denied Shea’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea and

petition for postconviction without conducting a hearing. In denying the motion to

withdraw his guilty plea, the trial court held that:

The charges of prosecutorial misconduct and newly discovered evidence tie together, as Defendant complains that the prosecutor did not supply transcripts from codefendant John Kolle’s trial. Kolle’s trial occurred on April 29, 2021; Shea pled on June 9, 2021. . . . This Court does not agree that this transcript would qualify as exculpatory evidence. The prosecution was under no obligation to provide the transcript and defense counsel’s decision not to seek the transcript falls squarely within the bounds of the attorney’s discretion as to trial strategy. ...

1 Shea and the State make references to the transcript from Kolle’s trial, but the transcript is not part of the record of the case. We note that any attachment to an appellate brief is not part of the record of the case, in which pursuant to App.R. 9(A)(1), the record of the case is limited to “[t]he original papers and exhibits” filed in the trial court. The complete transcript from Kolle’s trial was not submitted in the trial court proceedings here, and our “review is strictly limited to the record on appeal.” State v. Bumu, 2017-Ohio-6901, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.). Pickaway App. Nos. 25CA26 & 25CA27 4

Defendant argues that but for his counsel’s ineffectiveness he would have taken this case to jury trial instead of entering guilty pleas. He hangs his hat on his codefendant Kolle’s successful appeal on his RICO charge and purported inaccuracies and shortcomings of witnesses at Kolle’s trial. However, as the State of Ohio correctly points out, Mr. Shea’s case and Mr. Kolle’s case are entirely different. Mr. Shea had multiple direct criminal transactions with an undercover officer, Detective Lewis. Those transactions resulted in fourteen separate charges which were negotiated down to six counts by Mr. Shea’s attorney. . . . No exculpatory evidence was withheld. After a thorough review of Defendant’s file, this Court finds no manifest injustice to warrant the withdrawal of the Defendant’s guilty plea after the voluntary giving of such plea.

{¶8} The trial court in denying Shea’s petition for postconviction relief,

similarly found that

There is no need to reach the merits of this argument, as Defendant has made no case that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering this fact within the statutory period prescribed for a petition for post-conviction relief. Mr. Shea’s codefendant had a jury trial on April 29, 2021. Mr. Shea entered his guilty pleas on June 9, 2021. ... this Court does not find that counsel for Mr. Shea was deficient. This Court has reviewed the Kolle case and does not agree that any evidence produced at that trial would be exculpatory to Mr. Shea.

{¶9} It is from these judgment entries that Shea appeals.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR DELAYED POST-CONVICTION RELIEF.

II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

III. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT.

IV. UNENFORCEABLE PLEA AGREEMENT. V. CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF VIOLATIONS. Pickaway App. Nos. 25CA26 & 25CA27 5

{¶10} We will address Shea’s assignments of error together as they are

related and represent sub-arguments within his claim that the trial court erred in

denying his petition for postconviction relief and motion to withdraw guilty plea.

{¶11} Shea maintains that he met his burden demonstrating that the

transcript of his co-defendant Kolle was new evidence, was improperly withheld

from him by the State, and that his trial counsel was ineffective for not obtaining

the transcript. Shea argues that we should reverse the trial court’s decision

because of prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel, and

that his guilty plea should be vacated because it was entered without informed

consent and in violation of his due process rights. Shea asserts that these errors

cumulatively warrant reversal of his guilty plea.

{¶12} In support of his claims, Shea attached a confidential informant

identification record and questionnaire—forms that the informant was required to

review, complete and sign for law enforcement—as well as excerpts from Kolle’s

trial. The transcript excerpts include the confidential informant’s testimony that

other pending charges against her were dismissed in exchange for her

cooperation, and that she was paid approximately $2,000 for being an informant.

The transcript excerpts also included testimony from Detective Alan Lewis, which

Shea maintains included false statements. Specifically, Detective Lewis testified

that the confidential informant identified Shea as one of the drug dealers, but, on

the sheet submitted to law enforcement by the confidential informant, Shea’s

name was not listed. Pickaway App. Nos. 25CA26 & 25CA27 6

{¶13} The State disagrees and maintains that Shea’s motion and petition

were properly denied by the trial court because they are untimely. The State

contends that Shea cannot demonstrate the evidence is new and/or exculpatory,

because the confidential informant’s identity and the form she completed for law

enforcement were submitted in discovery during the pendency of Shea’s trial

proceedings, which was months prior to Shea’s guilty plea. Further, there is

nothing in Kolle’s trial transcript that is exculpatory or that would impeach any of

the State’s witnesses that would raise reasonable doubt as to Shea committing

the drug trafficking offenses.

{¶14} The State contends that the prosecution had no duty to provide

Shea with the transcript of the codefendant’s trial proceedings. Second, the

State asserts that Shea committed several of the offenses directly with an

undercover law enforcement officer. Additionally, the State notes that Shea

benefited from the plea agreement with the State in which four of his counts were

amended to lesser offenses and eight counts were dismissed. Therefore, the

State maintains that Shea cannot demonstrate his trial counsel was ineffective or

that the prosecution committed any misconduct to warrant the delayed filing of

his motion and petition.

I. Law

A. Standard of Review – Petition for postconviction relief

{¶15} “[A] postconviction proceeding is a collateral civil attack on the

judgment,” and “the ‘right to file a postconviction petition is a statutory right, not a

constitutional right.’ ” State v. Apanovitch, 2018-Ohio-4744, ¶ 35, quoting State Pickaway App. Nos. 25CA26 & 25CA27 7

v. Broom, 2016-Ohio-1028, ¶ 28. Accordingly, because the right is statutory, a

petitioner receives “only those rights specifically enumerated in [R.C. 2953.21’s]

provisions and no more.” Broom at ¶ 28. One limitation to the filing of the

petition, is the timeliness of it, in which R.C. 2953.21(A)(2)(a) provides:

Except as otherwise provided in section 2953.23 of the Revised Code, a petition under division (A)(1)(a)(i), (ii), or (iii) of this section shall be filed no later than three hundred sixty-five days after the date on which the trial transcript is filed in the court of appeals in the direct appeal of the judgment of conviction or adjudication or, if the direct appeal involves a sentence of death, the date on which the trial transcript is filed in the supreme court. If no appeal is taken, except as otherwise provided in section 2953.23 of the Revised Code, the petition shall be filed no later than three hundred sixty-five days after the expiration of the time for filing the appeal.

{¶16} “A trial court lacks jurisdiction to consider an untimely or a

successive petition if the petitioner fails to satisfy R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a) and (b).

State v. Parker, 2019-Ohio-3848, ¶ 19.” State v. Morrison, 2025-Ohio-4937, ¶ 24

(4th Dist.). And as an appellate court, we recognize that, “whether a court

possesses jurisdiction to entertain an untimely or a successive petition is a

question of law” that we “review independently and without deference to the trial

court.” Id., citing State v. Apanovitch, 2018-Ohio-4744. In order for a trial court

to consider an untimely petition, “[b]oth of the following” must apply:

(a) Either the petitioner shows that the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from discovery of the facts upon which the petitioner must rely to present the claim for relief, or, subsequent to the period prescribed in division (A)(2) of section 2953.21 of the Revised Code or to the filing of an earlier petition, the United States Supreme Court recognized a new federal or state right that applies retroactively to persons in the petitioner's situation, and the petition asserts a claim based on that right. (b) The petitioner shows by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error at trial, no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner guilty of the offense of which the petitioner was Pickaway App. Nos. 25CA26 & 25CA27 8

convicted or, if the claim challenges a sentence of death that, but for constitutional error at the sentencing hearing, no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner eligible for the death sentence.

R.C. 2953.23(A)(1).

{¶17} We previously outlined that

“A defendant is ‘unavoidably prevented’ from the discovery of facts if he had no knowledge of the existence of those facts and could not have, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, learned of their existence within the time specified for filing his petition for postconviction relief.” State v. Cunningham, 2016-Ohio-3106, ¶ 19 (3d Dist.), citing State v. Holnapy, 2013-Ohio-4307, ¶ 32 (11th Dist.), and State v. Ruark, 2015-Ohio-3206, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.); see also State v. Brown, supra, at ¶ 9 (4th Dist.). Moreover, “[t]he ‘facts’ contemplated by this provision are the historical facts of the case, which occurred up to and including the time of conviction.” State v. Williamitis, 2006-Ohio-2904, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.).

Morrison at ¶ 23.

B. Standard of Review – Postsentence motion to withdraw guilty plea

{¶18} Crim.R. 32.1 provides that “[a] motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or

no contest may be made only before sentence is imposed; but to correct

manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of

conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his or her plea.”

“A defendant who seeks to withdraw a plea of guilty after the imposition of sentence has the burden of establishing the existence of manifest injustice.” State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261, 361 N.E.2d 1324 (1977), paragraph one of the syllabus. A “manifest injustice” is a “clear or openly unjust act,” State ex rel. Schneider v. Kreiner, 83 Ohio St.3d 203, 208, 699 N.E.2d 83 (1998), and relates to a fundamental flaw in the plea proceedings resulting in a miscarriage of justice, State v. Tekulve, 188 Ohio App.3d 792, 2010-Ohio-3604, 936 N.E.2d 1030, ¶ 7 (1st Dist.), citing Kreiner at 208, 699 N.E.2d 83 and Smith at 264, 361 N.E.2d 1324. The term “has been variously defined, but it is clear that under such standard, a postsentence withdrawal motion is allowable only in extraordinary cases.” Smith at 264, 361 N.E.2d 1324. Pickaway App. Nos. 25CA26 & 25CA27 9

State v. Straley, 2019-Ohio-5206, ¶ 14.

{¶19} The decision on whether to grant or deny a motion to withdraw a

guilty plea pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1 is left to the sound discretion of the trial

court. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261, paragraph two of the syllabus. We thus, review

the trial court’s denial of Shea’s postsentence motion to vacate his guilty plea

under the abuse of discretion standard. “An abuse of discretion connotes more

than a mere error of judgment; it implies that the court’s attitude is arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unconscionable.” State v. Ables, 2012-Ohio-3377, ¶ 9 (4th

Dist.), citing State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157 (1980).

{¶20} The trial court denied Shea’s motion without conducting a hearing.

“An evidentiary hearing is not required for deciding postsentence motions to

withdraw a guilty plea where the record conclusively and irrefutably contradicts

the allegations in the motion.” State v. Cassell, 2017-Ohio-769, ¶ 27 (4th Dist.),

citing State v. Pasturza, 2009-Ohio-4222, ¶ 18 (4th Dist.).

C. Ineffective assistance of counsel law

{¶21} To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, Shea “must show

(1) deficient performance by counsel, i.e., performance falling below an objective

standard of reasonable representation, and (2) prejudice, i.e., a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the proceeding’s result would have been

different.” State v. Short, 2011-Ohio-3641, ¶ 113, citing Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688 (1984); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136

(1988), paragraph two of the syllabus. Failure to demonstrate either prong of this Pickaway App. Nos. 25CA26 & 25CA27 10

test “is fatal to the claim.” State v. Jones, 2008-Ohio-968, ¶ 14 (4th Dist.), citing

Strickland, 466 U.S. 668.

{¶22} Shea “has the burden of proof because in Ohio, a properly licensed

attorney is presumed competent.” State v. Gondor, 2006-Ohio-6679, ¶ 62, citing

State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279, 289 (1999), citing Vaughn v. Maxwell, 2

Ohio St.2d 299 (1965). “In order to overcome this presumption, the petitioner

must submit sufficient operative facts or evidentiary documents that demonstrate

that the petitioner was prejudiced by the ineffective assistance.” Id., citing State

v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 511, 513 (8th Dist. 1999). To demonstrate prejudice,

Shea “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.” Strickland at 694.

D. Prosecutorial misconduct law

{¶23} Shea’s prosecutorial misconduct claim is based on the United

States Supreme Court’s decision in Brady v. Maryland, in which the court held

that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused

upon request violates due process where the evidence is material to guilt or to

punishment, irrespective of the good faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. 83, 87

(1963). The Supreme Court of Ohio explained that “Brady imposes on the

government an obligation to turn over evidence that is both favorable to the

defendant and material to guilt or punishment. ‘Materiality pertains to the issue of

guilt or innocence, and not to the defendant's ability to prepare for trial.’ ” State v. Pickaway App. Nos. 25CA26 & 25CA27 11

Osie, 2014-Ohio-2966, ¶ 154, citing Maryland.

{¶24} The State’s duty pursuant to Brady as a matter of due process is

“inclusive of evidence that is exculpatory of guilt, as well as evidence that serves

to impeach the State’s witnesses.” State v. Green, 2024-Ohio-3260, ¶ 23 (1st

Dist.), citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280-281 (1999). And when

considering whether evidence is material under Brady the question is whether “ ‘

“there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the

defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” ’ ” State v.

Jury, 2022-Ohio-4419, ¶ 11 (6th Dist.), quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,

433 (1995), quoting U.S. v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). “[R]easonable

probability” is defined as a “probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.” Id., citing Bagley at 682 and State v. Johnston, 39 Ohio St.3d 48

(1989), paragraph five of the syllabus.

{¶25} Moreover,

A defendant claiming a Brady violation must demonstrate: “(1) the evidence is favorable to the defendant, because it is either exculpatory or impeaching, (2) the evidence was either willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the [S]tate, and (3) the defendant was prejudiced as a result.” Green at ¶ 25, citing State v. Brown, 2024- Ohio-749, ¶ 30. A Brady claim raises issues of due process that are mixed questions of law and fact, such that the standard of review is de novo. Id. at ¶ 22, citing State v. Smith, 2018-Ohio-4691, ¶ 24-25 (2d Dist.).

State v. Lemaster, 2025-Ohio-5621, ¶ 62 (4th Dist.).

E. Cumulative error law

{¶26} “Under the cumulative-error doctrine, ‘a conviction will be reversed Pickaway App. Nos. 25CA26 & 25CA27 12

when the cumulative effect of errors in a trial deprives a defendant of a fair trial

even though each of the numerous instances of trial-court error does not

individually constitute cause for reversal.’ ” State v. Knuff, 2024-Ohio-902, ¶ 288,

quoting State v. Powell, 2012-Ohio-2577, ¶ 223. Before a reviewing court can

find cumulative error, “it must find a reasonable probability that the outcome of

the trial would have been different but for the combination of the separately

harmless errors.” State v. Ward, 2007-Ohio-2531, ¶ 49 (4th Dist.), citing State v.

Thomas, 2001 WL 1103328 (2d Dist. Sept. 21, 2001).

II. Analysis

{¶27} We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Shea failed to

demonstrate manifest injustice to warrant vacating his guilty plea, and we also

agree that Shea fails to demonstrate the exceptions that permit the filing of his

untimely petition for postconviction relief. Shea fails to establish his trial counsel

was ineffective, the prosecution committed misconduct, and that his plea was not

knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered into.

{¶28} Shea does not dispute that prior to reaching the plea agreement

with the State, he knew the identity of the confidential informant, he was provided

the form identifying the confidential informant, and that he knew the identity of his

co-defendant Kolle. And the form identifying the confidential informant included

her response that she had information related to drug activity, but it did not

identify any individual by name. This, however, does not negate the fact that she

could have orally informed law enforcement of the name of the individuals

involved in drug activities. Additionally, the form advised the confidential Pickaway App. Nos. 25CA26 & 25CA27 13

informant that she must report any monetary compensation she received to the

Internal Revenue Service.

{¶29} Contrary to Shea’s assertions, a confidential informant may be

compensated monetarily by law enforcement for their assistance in setting up

and/or participating in controlled drug buys. The Sixth District Court of Appeals

in State v. Kamal, overruled an argument challenging several trafficking in drug

convictions as being against the manifest weight of the evidence because the

confidential informant “was not credible due to his financial incentive to cooperate

with police[.]” 2019-Ohio-3928, ¶ 7. The Sixth District held that “[t]o the extent

that the jury relied on the confidential informant’s testimony to convict Smith, our

review of the record has revealed nothing that would justify overturning the jury's

decision to do so.” Id. at ¶ 44. Similarly, in State v. Davis, the confidential

informant testified that she was paid for assisting law enforcement. 2016-Ohio-

1166, ¶ 50 (12th Dist.). The Twelfth District Court of Appeals overruled Davis’s

challenge to her complicity to trafficking in drugs conviction as being unsupported

by sufficient evidence and against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. at ¶

57. The Twelfth District held that the jury did not lose its way in finding the

confidential informant credible. Id. at ¶ 57.

{¶30} Furthermore, Shea does not dispute that his plea was entered prior

to the commencement of Kolle’s trial. Thus, Shea cannot demonstrate that his

counsel was ineffective for failing to anticipate future proceedings in his co-

defendant’s case. And there is no legal support for Shea’s assertion that the

prosecution was required to request a transcript at the conclusion of Kolle’s trial Pickaway App. Nos. 25CA26 & 25CA27 14

and provide Shea with a copy of that transcript. Kolle’s transcript was not in the

State’s possession. See State v. McQueen, 2008-Ohio-6160, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.)

(“The rationale underlying Brady does not require the state to supply a defendant

with all the evidence in the state’s possession that might conceivably assist with

the preparation of his defense, but to assure that the defendant will not be denied

access to exculpatory evidence known only to the state.”) (Internal citation

omitted.).

{¶31} Moreover, there is nothing exculpatory in the confidential informant’s

testimony or that of Detective Lewis. To the contrary, a review of the testimony

as outlined in the Kolle decision, demonstrates Shea committed multiple drug

trafficking offenses. Detective Lewis, while working undercover, made “four

videotaped controlled buys” directly from Shea. State v. Kolle, 2022-Ohio-4322,

¶ 3 (4th Dist.). Wherefore, even if Shea could impeach and undermine the

confidential informant’s credibility, his convictions would still be supported by the

direct evidence of his drug trafficking activity with Detective Lewis. What is more,

Kolle’s conviction of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity was reversed

because the State failed to “produce evidence of at least two corrupt activities.”

Id. at ¶ 49. That is not the case here, where the record reflects at least four

videotaped drug buys committed by Shea.

{¶32} Shea’s trial counsel requested discovery prior to Shea’s guilty plea,

thus there is nothing to demonstrate he was not prepared to proceed to trial.

Further, Shea’s counsel was able to negotiate a favorable plea agreement which

included dismissal of eight felony counts, including five first-degree felonies, and Pickaway App. Nos. 25CA26 & 25CA27 15

four second-degree felonies that were amended to third-degree felonies.

Therefore, there is nothing to support Shea’s claim that his trial counsel was

ineffective.

{¶33} Based on our finding that no prosecutorial misconduct was

committed and Shea fails to demonstrate his trial counsel was ineffective, we

summarily conclude that he fails to demonstrate cumulative error to warrant

granting his motion to withdraw guilty plea and/or his untimely petition for

postconviction relief.

{¶34} Accordingly, we overrule Shea’s assignments of error and affirm the

trial court’s decision. We note, however, “[t]his Court has recently reminded trial

courts that when an appellant has not established that any exception applies, a

court lacks jurisdiction to consider” a petition for postconviction relief. State v.

Morrison, 2025-Ohio-4937, ¶ 27, citing State v. McDaniel, 2023-Ohio-3051, ¶ 21

(4th Dist.). Wherefore, pursuant to App.R. 12(A)(1)(a), we modify the trial court’s

entry denying Shea’s petition for postconviction relief in Pickaway App. No.

25CA26 to a dismissal of the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION

{¶35} Having overruled Shea’s assignments of error, we affirm the trial

court’s decisions as modified.

JUDGMENT IN PICKAWAY APP. NO. 25CA26 IS AFFIRMED.

JUDGMENT IN PICKAWAY APP. NO. 25CA27 IS AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED. Pickaway App. Nos. 25CA26 & 25CA27 16

JUDGMENT ENTRY

It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IN PICKAWAY APP. NO. 25CA26 IS AFFIRMED AND JUDGMENT IN PICKAWAY APP. NO. 25CA27 IS AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED and that appellant shall pay the costs. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Pickaway County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Smith, P.J. and Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.

For the Court,

BY: ____________________________ Kristy S. Wilkin, Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

Pursuant to Local Rule No. 22, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.