IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED JANUARY SESSION, 1998 April 20, 1999
Cecil W. Crowson STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) Appellate Court Clerk C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9702-CR-00068 ) Appellee, ) ) ) DAVIDSON COUNTY VS. ) ) HON. THOMAS H. SHRIVER SHAWN D. LESLEY, ) JUDGE ) Appe llant. ) (Direct Appeal - Second Degree ) Murder)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
F. MICHIE GIBSON, JR. JOHN KNOX WALKUP 1416 Pa rkway Tow ers Attorney General and Reporter 404 James Robertson Parkway Nashville, TN 37219 LISA A. NAYLOR Assistant Attorney General 425 Fifth Avenu e North Nashville, TN 37243-0493
VICTOR S. JOHNSON District Attorney General
JOHN ZIMMERMANN Assistant District Attorney 222 2nd Avenue, No. Nashville, TN 37201
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED
JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE OPINION
On November 15, 1995, a Davidson County jury convicted Appellant
Shawn D. Lesley of second degree murder. On February 29, 1996, the trial
court sen tenced Appella nt as a R ange I sta ndard o ffender to a term o f twenty
years. Appellant filed a motion for a new trial on March 28, 1996, and an
amended motion for a new trial on September 6, 1996. The trial court denied
the m otion fo r a new trial on O ctobe r 4, 199 6. App ellant c hallen ges h is
conviction, raising the following issues:
1) whether the trial court erred when it allowed the State to introduce photographs of the victim’s hands into evidence; and 2) wheth er the trial co urt erred w hen it allow ed a witne ss for the S tate to testify about Appellant’s demeanor at the time that Appellant took the victim to the ho spital.
After a revie w of the re cord, we affirm the ju dgme nt of the trial co urt.
I. FACTS
Steven Cernawsky testified that he was working as a nurse in the
emergency room of Metro General Hospital on March 23, 1993, when
Appellant entered the hospital carrying fifteen-month-old Laura Waters. When
Appellant handed him the child, Cernawsky noticed that she was not breathing
and he immediately attempted to resuscitate her. Although Cernawsky began
performing C.P.R. when he determined that Laura had no pulse, Laura did not
regain co nscious ness.
-2- Cernawsky also testified that he observed that Laura had some bruising
on her forehead and had burns on her hands. Cernawsky then identified
some photog raphs o f Laura’s h ands a nd the p hotogra phs we re introdu ced into
eviden ce with out ob jection . The p rosec utor the n ask ed Ce rnaws ky if he c ould
describe Appella nt’s dem eanor w hen Ap pellant ha nded L aura to h im.
Appe llant’s coun sel then o bjected o n the gro und tha t Cerna wsky wa s not a
psych ologis t who w as qu alified to give an opinio n abo ut App ellant’s
demeanor. The trial court then stated that it would reserve ruling on the
objection until after it heard Cernawsky’s response.1 Cernawsky then testified
that “[Appellant] walked up to the desk. I was sitting there charting, and he
stood there with the child. I looked up and asked if I could help him. And he
just handed me . . . the child calmly. And . . . that’s when he said to me that
she had fallen and was h aving trouble brea thing.”
Doctor Olayinka Onadeko testified that he had treated Laura in the
emerge ncy room o n March 2 3, 1993. Althou gh Doctor O nadeko a nd others
performed C.P.R. for almost twenty-five minutes, the child did not resume
breathing. When Doctor Onadeko asked Appellant about the circumstances
of Laura’s death, Appellant stated that Laura had fallen down some steps and
had stopped breathing before they got to the hospital. Doctor Onadeko then
testified that Appellant’s explanation was inconsistent with Laura’s injuries and
her death from a head injury. Doctor Onadeko also testified that Laura had
unusual second or third degree burns on her hands and he then identified the
photog raphs th at show ed the b urns.
1 It appears that the trial court never formally ruled on the objection.
-3- Doctor Julia Goodin testified by video taped deposition that she had
perform ed an a utopsy o n Laura and ha d determ ined that th e caus e of dea th
was “multiple head trauma” that was consistent with multiple blows to the head
or violen t shak ing. Do ctor G oodin also ide ntified th e pho tograp hs of L aura’s
hand s and testified that the burn in juries w ere inc onsis tent with Appe llant’s
statement to the police that Laura had pulled herself up the stairs by grabbing
the handrail because it would have been too painful for Laura to hold on to the
handra il.
Detective Ron Carter of the Metro Police Department testified that
Appellant had given a statement in which he claimed that Laura had injured
herself when she fell down some stairs. Detective Carter subsequently video
taped a reenactment by Appellant of how Laura allegedly climbed up some
stairs by holding on to the handrail and then fell down the stairs.
Detective E.J. Bernard of the Metro Police Department testified that
Appellant gave a subsequent statement in which he admitted that Laura had
not fallen down the stairs. Detective Bernard also testified that Appellant had
admitted that he had been angry and he had taken his anger out on Laura by
shaking her very ha rd and th rowing L aura “for a flip” four times .
Appellant testified that Laura had been climbing up some stairs when
her hand slipped off the rail and she fell backwards. Appellant also testified
that after Laura fell, he picked her up and ran to the hospital. Appellant
testified that when he was subsequently taken to police headquarters,
Detective Carter pointed a gun at his head and told him that if he “mess[ed]
-4- up” he w as going to die. App ellant testified that at this po int, he dec ided to
make up a story about h ow he h ad bea ten Lau ra and to ssed h er in the air.
II. INTRODUCTION OF PHOTOGRAPHS
Appe llant conte nds tha t the trial court e rred whe n it allowed the State to
introduce the pho tograph s of Laur a’s burne d hand s into evide nce.
Specifically, Appellant claims that the photographs were not relevant to any
issue in the case and thus, their probative value was substantially outweighed
by danger of unfair prejudice.
Initially, we note that Appellant has waived this issue by failing to object
to the introd uction of th e photo graphs at trial. See State v. Duncan, 698
S.W .2d 63 , 67 (T enn. 1 985) (s tating th at the fa ilure of a defen dant to timely
object to the introduction of evidence is a waiver of appellate review of the
issue); Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a) (“Nothing in this rule shall be construed as
requiring relief be gra nted to a p arty respo nsible for a n error or w ho failed to
take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful
effect of an error.”).
Notwithstanding the waiver, we conclude that Appellant is not entitled
to relief on the merits. Rule 403 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence states
that
Althou gh rele vant, ev idenc e ma y be ex clude d if its pro bative v alue is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or m isleading the jury, or by co nsiderations of un due delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
-5- Ten n. R. E vid. 403 . The d eterm ination of whe ther to a dmit p hotog raphs falls
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED JANUARY SESSION, 1998 April 20, 1999
Cecil W. Crowson STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) Appellate Court Clerk C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9702-CR-00068 ) Appellee, ) ) ) DAVIDSON COUNTY VS. ) ) HON. THOMAS H. SHRIVER SHAWN D. LESLEY, ) JUDGE ) Appe llant. ) (Direct Appeal - Second Degree ) Murder)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
F. MICHIE GIBSON, JR. JOHN KNOX WALKUP 1416 Pa rkway Tow ers Attorney General and Reporter 404 James Robertson Parkway Nashville, TN 37219 LISA A. NAYLOR Assistant Attorney General 425 Fifth Avenu e North Nashville, TN 37243-0493
VICTOR S. JOHNSON District Attorney General
JOHN ZIMMERMANN Assistant District Attorney 222 2nd Avenue, No. Nashville, TN 37201
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED
JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE OPINION
On November 15, 1995, a Davidson County jury convicted Appellant
Shawn D. Lesley of second degree murder. On February 29, 1996, the trial
court sen tenced Appella nt as a R ange I sta ndard o ffender to a term o f twenty
years. Appellant filed a motion for a new trial on March 28, 1996, and an
amended motion for a new trial on September 6, 1996. The trial court denied
the m otion fo r a new trial on O ctobe r 4, 199 6. App ellant c hallen ges h is
conviction, raising the following issues:
1) whether the trial court erred when it allowed the State to introduce photographs of the victim’s hands into evidence; and 2) wheth er the trial co urt erred w hen it allow ed a witne ss for the S tate to testify about Appellant’s demeanor at the time that Appellant took the victim to the ho spital.
After a revie w of the re cord, we affirm the ju dgme nt of the trial co urt.
I. FACTS
Steven Cernawsky testified that he was working as a nurse in the
emergency room of Metro General Hospital on March 23, 1993, when
Appellant entered the hospital carrying fifteen-month-old Laura Waters. When
Appellant handed him the child, Cernawsky noticed that she was not breathing
and he immediately attempted to resuscitate her. Although Cernawsky began
performing C.P.R. when he determined that Laura had no pulse, Laura did not
regain co nscious ness.
-2- Cernawsky also testified that he observed that Laura had some bruising
on her forehead and had burns on her hands. Cernawsky then identified
some photog raphs o f Laura’s h ands a nd the p hotogra phs we re introdu ced into
eviden ce with out ob jection . The p rosec utor the n ask ed Ce rnaws ky if he c ould
describe Appella nt’s dem eanor w hen Ap pellant ha nded L aura to h im.
Appe llant’s coun sel then o bjected o n the gro und tha t Cerna wsky wa s not a
psych ologis t who w as qu alified to give an opinio n abo ut App ellant’s
demeanor. The trial court then stated that it would reserve ruling on the
objection until after it heard Cernawsky’s response.1 Cernawsky then testified
that “[Appellant] walked up to the desk. I was sitting there charting, and he
stood there with the child. I looked up and asked if I could help him. And he
just handed me . . . the child calmly. And . . . that’s when he said to me that
she had fallen and was h aving trouble brea thing.”
Doctor Olayinka Onadeko testified that he had treated Laura in the
emerge ncy room o n March 2 3, 1993. Althou gh Doctor O nadeko a nd others
performed C.P.R. for almost twenty-five minutes, the child did not resume
breathing. When Doctor Onadeko asked Appellant about the circumstances
of Laura’s death, Appellant stated that Laura had fallen down some steps and
had stopped breathing before they got to the hospital. Doctor Onadeko then
testified that Appellant’s explanation was inconsistent with Laura’s injuries and
her death from a head injury. Doctor Onadeko also testified that Laura had
unusual second or third degree burns on her hands and he then identified the
photog raphs th at show ed the b urns.
1 It appears that the trial court never formally ruled on the objection.
-3- Doctor Julia Goodin testified by video taped deposition that she had
perform ed an a utopsy o n Laura and ha d determ ined that th e caus e of dea th
was “multiple head trauma” that was consistent with multiple blows to the head
or violen t shak ing. Do ctor G oodin also ide ntified th e pho tograp hs of L aura’s
hand s and testified that the burn in juries w ere inc onsis tent with Appe llant’s
statement to the police that Laura had pulled herself up the stairs by grabbing
the handrail because it would have been too painful for Laura to hold on to the
handra il.
Detective Ron Carter of the Metro Police Department testified that
Appellant had given a statement in which he claimed that Laura had injured
herself when she fell down some stairs. Detective Carter subsequently video
taped a reenactment by Appellant of how Laura allegedly climbed up some
stairs by holding on to the handrail and then fell down the stairs.
Detective E.J. Bernard of the Metro Police Department testified that
Appellant gave a subsequent statement in which he admitted that Laura had
not fallen down the stairs. Detective Bernard also testified that Appellant had
admitted that he had been angry and he had taken his anger out on Laura by
shaking her very ha rd and th rowing L aura “for a flip” four times .
Appellant testified that Laura had been climbing up some stairs when
her hand slipped off the rail and she fell backwards. Appellant also testified
that after Laura fell, he picked her up and ran to the hospital. Appellant
testified that when he was subsequently taken to police headquarters,
Detective Carter pointed a gun at his head and told him that if he “mess[ed]
-4- up” he w as going to die. App ellant testified that at this po int, he dec ided to
make up a story about h ow he h ad bea ten Lau ra and to ssed h er in the air.
II. INTRODUCTION OF PHOTOGRAPHS
Appe llant conte nds tha t the trial court e rred whe n it allowed the State to
introduce the pho tograph s of Laur a’s burne d hand s into evide nce.
Specifically, Appellant claims that the photographs were not relevant to any
issue in the case and thus, their probative value was substantially outweighed
by danger of unfair prejudice.
Initially, we note that Appellant has waived this issue by failing to object
to the introd uction of th e photo graphs at trial. See State v. Duncan, 698
S.W .2d 63 , 67 (T enn. 1 985) (s tating th at the fa ilure of a defen dant to timely
object to the introduction of evidence is a waiver of appellate review of the
issue); Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a) (“Nothing in this rule shall be construed as
requiring relief be gra nted to a p arty respo nsible for a n error or w ho failed to
take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful
effect of an error.”).
Notwithstanding the waiver, we conclude that Appellant is not entitled
to relief on the merits. Rule 403 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence states
that
Althou gh rele vant, ev idenc e ma y be ex clude d if its pro bative v alue is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or m isleading the jury, or by co nsiderations of un due delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
-5- Ten n. R. E vid. 403 . The d eterm ination of whe ther to a dmit p hotog raphs falls
within th e sou nd dis cretion of the tria l court a nd the trial cou rt’s dec ision w ill
not be o verturned unless th ere has been a clear abu se of disc retion. State v.
Zirkle, 901 S.W .2d 874, 888 (Tenn. Crim . App. 1995 ).
In this case, the photographs of Laura’s burned hands have obvious
relevance to the issue of whether Laura was killed by Appellant or whether
she died as the result of an accident. In both his pre-trial statements to police
and his testimony at trial, Appellant claimed that Laura had been injured when
she fell down some stairs after she walked up the stairs while holding on to the
handra il. Doctor G oodin tes tified that Ap pellant’s cla im was inconsis tent with
the burn wounds on Laura’s hands. Specifically, Doctor Goodin testified that
Laura would have experienced a lot of pain when she touched something and
thus, she would n ot have h eld on to th e hand rail to pull hers elf up the s tairs.
The photo graph s were introdu ced in order to illustrate Docto r Goo din’s
testimon y. This wa s a prop er purpo se. See State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d
530, 542 (Tenn. 1994) (stating that trial court did not abuse its discretion when
it admitted a photograph of a corpse to illustrate the testimony of a police
detective). Finally, we have viewed the ph otographs a nd while they are
certainly unpleasant, they are not particularly gruesome. Thus, we conclude
that the probative value of the photographs was not substantially outweighed
by danger of unfair prejudice. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not
abus e its disc retion w hen it a dmitte d the p hotog raphs into evid ence . This
issue ha s no m erit.
-6- III. TESTIMONY ABOUT APPELLANT’S DEMEANOR
Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it allowed Cernawsky
to testify that when Ap pellant entered the emerge ncy room, A ppellant “calmly”
handed Laura to him. Specifically, Appellant claims that this was error
because Cernawsky was not an expert who was qualified to give his opinion
that Appellant was calm.
At the time that Appellant was tried in November of 1995, Rule 701 of
the Te nness ee Ru les of Evide nce pro vided, in pe rtinent part:
Gen erally. If th e witne ss is no t testifying as an exper t, the witn ess’s testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences where: (1) The opinions and inferences do not require a special knowledge, skill, experience, or training; (2) The witness cannot readily and with equal accuracy and adequacy communicate what the witness has perceived to the trier of fact witho ut testifying in te rms of o pinions o r inference s; and (3) The opinions or inferenc es will not m islead the trier of fact to the preju dice of the objecting party.
Tenn. R . Evid. 701(a). 2 We hold that C ernaws ky’s use o f the word “calmly” to
describe Appellant’s demeanor satisfies the requirements of this rule. First, no
“special knowledge, skill, experience, or training” is required to form an
opinion that someone acted “calmly” because such an opinion is within the
range of com mon exper ience . Seco nd, we conc lude th at Ce rnaws ky cou ld
2 In 1996, Rule 701(a) was amended to read as follows: Generally. If a witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’s testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (1) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (2) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s testimony or the determination of a fact in issu e. Tenn. R. Evid. 701(a). Our decision would be the same under either version of the Rule.
-7- not ha ve as “r eadily a nd with equa l accur acy an d ade quac y” expla ined h is
interactions with and observations o f Appellant if he had not used the te rm
“calmly.” T he Adv isory Com mission Com ments to Rule 7 01 state th at
In situations where a witness “cannot readily and with equal accuracy and ad equac y” testify withou t an opinio n, the witne ss ma y state opinions requiring n o expertis e. Cons equen tly, a lay witnes s may te stify that a per son wa s “drunk ” or that a ca r was trave ling “fast.”
Tenn. R. Evid. 701, Advisory Commission Comments. We can see no
difference between giving an opinion that someone was “drunk” or traveling
“fast” and giving an o pinion that som eone app eared to act “ca lmly.” Finally,
we do n ot believe th at Cern awsky’s use of the word “ca lmly” misle d the jury to
the preju dice of A ppellant. T his issue has no merit.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
____________________________________ JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
CONCUR:
___________________________________ JOHN H. PEAY, JUDGE
___________________________________ THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
-8-